I'm not sure that the correlation attacks for `bridge exits' are better than those for normal bridges. However, the `exit risk' would likely be more discouraging to such `bridge exits'. However, as a more general question, making the Tor network difficult to completely enumerate might be interesting. Clearly, there are valuable advantages to a hard-to-map network, but can it be done without gross disadvantages?
2009/11/24 Damian Johnson <atag...@gmail.com> > Interesting idea, but seems like it could be pretty dangerous. If an > attacker was able to figure out the subset of Tor users taking advantage of > these special exits and ran one themselves then correlation probably > wouldn't be too difficult. In addition, abuse issues makes finding exit > operators a lot harder than bridges so you probably wouldn't get the vast > number of volunteers needed for the current bridge distribution tactics. > -Damian > > > On Tue, Nov 24, 2009 at 5:05 PM, Ted Smith <ted...@gmail.com> wrote: > >> On Tue, 2009-11-24 at 19:49 -0500, Roger Dingledine wrote: >> > See especially point #1: "even if we didn't tell clients about the >> > list of >> > relays directly, somebody could still make a lot of connections >> > through >> > Tor to a test site and build a list of the addresses they see." >> > >> > I guess we could perhaps add support for configuring your own secret >> > exit node that your buddy runs for you. But at that point the >> > anonymity >> > that Tor can provide in that situation gets pretty fuzzy. >> >> It's like a bridge, but for exits. They would probably have to be a lot >> less friend-to-friend than bridges, but it might still be doable. I >> think this is what the original poster meant, anyways. >> > >