On Fri, 2010-01-08 at 11:56 -0800, Sam Peterson wrote: > Having read the heated discussion regarding some people's suggestion > on the list to provide an option to reduce the number of hops in a > circuit, I'm curious about something and was wondering if someone > smarter than I could enlighten me. > > Clearly smarter minds agree that 3 hops are necessary. However, I'm > confused as to why, other than probability arguments. Now I clearly > understand why 1 hop is bad. However, with 2 instead of 3, I'm not > sure I see how it makes things that much worse. I understand it makes > things a bit worse, but I don't understand how it makes things > overwhelmingly worse. > > I understand that with 3 hops, the entry node and middle node have no > idea whether or not they are the beginning or middle of a circuit, > which means they can never assume that who they're sending information > to will be the exit. > > I understand that when only 2 hops are used, an entry node actually > can assume that the traffic it relays will exit from the destination > it sends it to. However, the entry node still doesn't know the final > destination, and the exit node doesn't know the origin. > > Certainly a rouge entry node could be monitoring it's outgoing tor > traffic and correlating the destination information to, say, a website > owned by the operator to try and compromise people's anonymity. > Certainly this makes end-to-end monitoring a bit easier to accomplish > and correlate, but doesn't TOR already state that it makes no attempt > to protect from end-to-end monitoring attacks? > > Clearly the experts think it makes things considerably easier here, so > maybe there's something I'm missing. I appreciate all tutelage. >
May i know why people need to reduce the number of hosts? i prefer it be increased instead. *********************************************************************** To unsubscribe, send an e-mail to [email protected] with unsubscribe or-talk in the body. http://archives.seul.org/or/talk/
