I was reading these two docs. They seemed to hint that such a thing existed on the authoritative directories. As that seemed where the HS nodes were uploading their descriptors/intro points to. Thus maybe a disk or control port query would exist for such records. Or with some minor source change, could be logged upon receipt.
https://www.torproject.org/hidden-services.html.en Step two: the hidden service assembles a hidden service descriptor, containing its public key and a summary of each introduction point, and signs this descriptor with its private key. It uploads that descriptor to a set of directory servers. http://gitweb.torproject.org/tor/tor.git/blob/HEAD:/doc/spec/rend-spec.txt 1.2/1.6 > v2 hidden service descriptors are stored DHT-style on any relays > with the HSDir flag. Right now I count 581 of those relays in the > consensus. Hmm, ok, I think I need to read these specs some more. Well, certainly some of the 581 are untrusted regarding your A) above. Does each one hold a full list of the HS's out there? If DHT, no, it would probably be an even subset distribution. I'd have to read more. I can't imagine that logging each HS onion name received would present any risk to the net. But could provide a handy HS index. *********************************************************************** To unsubscribe, send an e-mail to [email protected] with unsubscribe or-talk in the body. http://archives.seul.org/or/talk/
