On 02/28/2010 05:30 AM, Scott Bennett wrote: > Another alert reader has already commented, but your offense is so > egregious that I think it worth making a row about it, so here goes.
Before this devolves into personal attacks, we designed the system so that if users divulge a bridge address or three the entire system won't be compromised. If the bridge address system required users never making mistakes and publishing the addresses of the bridges, we could have taken better precautions against accidental disclosure. Another odd point is that most censors aren't blocking bridges. We've been tweeting/qq'ing bridges for 4 months around China and they aren't blocked. (Dear China GFW censors, this is not a challenge.) Commercial firewall vendors also seem to ignore bridges as well. Why? In the grand scheme of things, 95% of a population doesn't use any sort of proxying technology, and so far as we've been able to count, a few million people have downloaded tor. Compared to the roughly 1.7 billion people online, it's an exceedingly small number. We believe the goal of the censors is to maintain the impression of control. Unless you're going to whitelist the internet, which is already happening in some commercial firewall products and in parts of some countries, then someone will find a way through. However, if 95%+ of your population is none the wiser, great, you sure look like you can control the Internet. Publishing lists of bridges is bad, but not the end of the world. I mean, we give them out over unencrypted email and microblogging sites. Effectively, we're publishing them to the world. -- Andrew Lewman The Tor Project pgp 0x31B0974B Website: https://torproject.org/ Blog: https://blog.torproject.org/ Identi.ca: torproject *********************************************************************** To unsubscribe, send an e-mail to [email protected] with unsubscribe or-talk in the body. http://archives.seul.org/or/talk/
