On Wed, May 26, 2010 at 4:06 PM, <[email protected]> wrote: > Rather than continue to hijack the old thread, here's a new one about > bridges and china. > > I'm fully aware the GFW seems to have successfully crawled > https://bridges.torproject.org and added all of those bridges into their > blocking regime. The email distribution method, [email protected], > may also have been crawled and added to the blocking regime. There are > still 3 other pools of bridge addresses, one of which is held in > reserve. It seems the other two methods are continuing to work, as a > paltry 5000 connections from China still can access Tor daily. This is > vastly smaller than the 100,000 or so we used to get.
Is it worth adding a captcha to bridges.torproject.org? Incidentally, what happens when "adversaries" just block access to that site? How about responding to bridge request emails with a captcha style email attachment with the IPs of bridges? That would kill any automated attempt to scrape the bridges? Al *********************************************************************** To unsubscribe, send an e-mail to [email protected] with unsubscribe or-talk in the body. http://archives.seul.org/or/talk/
