On Wed, Dec 08, 2010 at 03:15:24PM +0100, Mitar wrote: > Hi! > > On Wed, Dec 8, 2010 at 2:17 PM, Eugen Leitl <[email protected]> wrote: > > It should default to a much larger number of hops, > > Why? Is this really necessary?
Tor as is wasn't designed to resist TLA-level adversaries (which have no issues instrumenting each Tor node upstream with realtime network probes, and dedicate enough resouces for traffic analysis). Relaxing the realtime constraint, adding random delays, more hops and also chaff trafic in a Tor derivate would arguably make such attacks more difficult. Of course such a derivate would not play nice with the existing Tor network, and should be run as a separate entity. Due to limited carrying capacity such a network would be probably more vulnerable to denial of service attacks (flooding traffic from within). -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org";>leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE *********************************************************************** To unsubscribe, send an e-mail to [email protected] with unsubscribe or-talk in the body. http://archives.seul.org/or/talk/
