Never mind.
OWS was outstanding....
Hope they keep up these surprises !!!
I opened an iTAR. Within 5 minutes got an e-mail. Checked the updated TAR.
They had already put in a new patch for the problem I ran into.
Downloaded the new patch and applied it without any problem..
Now we are secured !!:) I can retire for the night !
- Kirti
-----Original Message-----
Sent: Thursday, February 20, 2003 9:39 PM
To: Multiple recipients of list ORACLE-L
Hello All,
If anyone successfully applied this patch (for Alert #51) to 8.1.7.4 32-bit on HP-UX
11.0, please let me know. It seems that the patch is not able to find a couple of
required lib files. Nothing found on the Metalink of any help... (I will log an iTAR
soon).
No problem on AIX, though.
Thanks.
- Kirti
-----Original Message-----
Sent: Thursday, February 20, 2003 4:01 PM
To: Multiple recipients of list ORACLE-L
)
"This electronic message contains information which may be confidential,
privileged or otherwise protected from disclosure. The information is
intended to be used solely by the named recipient(s). If you are not a
named recipient, any review, disclosure, copying, distribution or use
of this transmission or its contents is prohibited. If you have received
this transmission in error, please notify me immediately."
----- Forwarded by Jared Still/Radisys_Corporation/US on 02/20/2003 01:58
PM -----
"NGSSoftware Insight Security Research" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
02/17/2003 02:09 PM
To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
cc:
Subject: Oracle unauthenticated remote system compromise
(#NISR16022003a)
NGSSoftware Insight Security Research Advisory
Name: Oracle unauthenticated remote system compromise
Systems Affected: All platforms; Oracle9i Database Release 2, 9i Release
1,
8i, 8.1.7, 8.0.6
Severity: Critical Risk
Category: Remote System Buffer Overrun
Vendor URL: http://www.oracle.com
Author: Mark Litchfield ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
Date: 16th February 2003
Advisory number: #NISR16022003a
Description
***********
Oracle is the leader in the database market with a 54% market share lead
under ERP (Enterprise Resource Planning). The database server is
vulnerable
to a remotely exploitable buffer overflow vulnerability. What exacerbates
this problem is that no valid User ID or password is required by an
attacker.
Details
*******
There is a remotely exploitable buffer overflow vulnerability in the
authentication process with the Oracle Database Server. By supplying an
overly long username when attempting to log onto the database server an
attacker can overflow a stack based buffer overwriting the saved return
address. Any arbitrary code supplied by an attacker would execute with
the
same privileges as the user running the service; this account is typically
"Oracle" on linux/unix based platforms and Local System on Windows based
operating systems such as NT/2000/XP. As such this allows for a complete
compromise of the data stored in the database and possibly a complete
compromise of the operating system. As most client applications for
Oracle
will tuncate the length of the username that can be supplied to the
database
an attacker would need to write their own Oracle "Authenticator" to
exploit
this issue. That said, NGSSoftware has found one client application that
will allow longer usernames so to test if you are vulnerable to this
issue,
use the LOADPSP utility usually found in "bin" directory found under the
OracleHomeInstallDirectory. On Windows, for example, run:
C:\ora9ias\BIN>loadpsp -name -user LONGUSERNAME/tiger@iasdb myfile
Fix Information
***************
NGSSoftware alerted Oracle to this vulnerability on 30th September 2002.
Oracle has reviewed the code and created a patch which is available from:
http://otn.oracle.com/deploy/security/pdf/2003alert51.pdf
NGSSoftware advise Oracle database customers to review and install the
patch
as a matter of urgency.
A check for these issues has been added to NGSSQuirreL for Oracle, a
comprehensive automated vulnerability assessment tool for Oracle Database
Servers of which more information is available from the NGSSite
http://www.ngssoftware.com/software/squirrelfororacle.html
It is further recommend that Oracle DBAs have their network/firewall
administrators ensure that the database server is protected from Internet
sourced traffic.
Further Information
*******************
For further information about the scope and effects of buffer overflows,
please see
http://www.ngssoftware.com/papers/non-stack-bo-windows.pdf
http://www.ngssoftware.com/papers/ntbufferoverflow.html
http://www.ngssoftware.com/papers/bufferoverflowpaper.rtf
http://www.ngssoftware.com/papers/unicodebo.pdf
About NGSSoftware
*****************
NGSSoftware design, research and develop intelligent, advanced application
security assessment scanners. Based in the United Kingdom, NGSSoftware
have
offices in the South of London and the East Coast of Scotland.
NGSSoftware's
sister company NGSConsulting, offers best of breed security consulting
services, specialising in application, host and network security
assessments.
http://www.ngssoftware.com/
http://www.ngsconsulting.com/
Telephone +44 208 401 0070
Fax +44 208 401 0076
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
----- Forwarded by Jared Still/Radisys_Corporation/US on 02/20/2003 01:58
PM -----
"NGSSoftware Insight Security Research" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
02/17/2003 02:12 PM
To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
cc:
Subject: Oracle TO_TIMESTAMP_TZ Remote System Buffer Overrun
(#NISR16022003b)
NGSSoftware Insight Security Research Advisory
Name: Oracle TO_TIMESTAMP_TZ Remote System Buffer Overrun
Systems Affected: All platforms; Oracle9i Database Release 2, 9i Release
1,
8i, 8.1.7, 8.0.6
Severity: High Risk
Category: Remote System Buffer Overrun
Vendor URL: http://www.oracle.com
Author: Mark Litchfield ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
Date: 16th February 2003
Advisory number: #NISR16022003b
Description
***********
Oracle's database server contains fuctions for use within queries. The
TO_TIMESTAMP_TZ function exists to convert a string into a timestamp with
a
time zone datatype. This function contains an exploitable buffer overflow
vulnerability.
Details
*******
There is a remotely exploitable buffer overflow vulnerability in the
TO_TIMESTAMP_TZ function. A normal statement would look like the
following,
converting a character string string to a value of timestamp with time
zone:
SELECT TO_TIMESTAMP_TZ('2003-02-016 12:00:00 -8:00','YYYY-MM-DD HH:MI:SS
TZH:TZM') FROM DUAL;
By supplying a long character string for the second parameter an attacker
can overwirte a saved return address on the stack of Oracle process.
Before
this issue can be exploited an attacker must be able to log on to the
database server with a valid user ID and password, but as the
TO_TIMESTAMP_TZ() function can be executed by PUBLIC by default any user
of
the system can gain control. Any arbitrary code supplied by an attacker
would execute with the same privileges as the user running the service;
this
account is typically "Oracle" on linux/unix based platforms and Local
System
on Windows based operating systems such as NT/2000/XP. As such this allows
for a complete compromise of the data stored in the database and possibly
a
complete compromise of the operating system.
Fix Information
***************
NGSSoftware alerted Oracle to this vulnerability on 30th September 2002
and
Oracle has produced a patch which is available from
http://otn.oracle.com/deploy/security/pdf/2003alert50.pdf
A check for these issues has been added to NGSSQuirreL for Oracle, a
comprehensive automated vulnerability assessment tool for Oracle Database
Servers of which more information is available from the NGSSite
http://www.ngssoftware.com/software/squirrelfororacle.html
Further Information
*******************
For further information about the scope and effects of buffer overflows,
please see
http://www.ngssoftware.com/papers/non-stack-bo-windows.pdf
http://www.ngssoftware.com/papers/ntbufferoverflow.html
http://www.ngssoftware.com/papers/bufferoverflowpaper.rtf
http://www.ngssoftware.com/papers/unicodebo.pdf
About NGSSoftware
*****************
NGSSoftware design, research and develop intelligent, advanced application
security assessment scanners. Based in the United Kingdom, NGSSoftware
have
offices in the South of London and the East Coast of Scotland.
NGSSoftware's
sister company NGSConsulting, offers best of breed security consulting
services, specialising in application, host and network security
assessments.
http://www.ngssoftware.com/
http://www.ngsconsulting.com/
Telephone +44 208 401 0070
Fax +44 208 401 0076
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
----- Forwarded by Jared Still/Radisys_Corporation/US on 02/20/2003 01:58
PM -----
"NGSSoftware Insight Security Research" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
02/17/2003 02:17 PM
To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
cc:
Subject: Oracle9i Application Server Format String Vulnerability
(#NISR16022003d)
NGSSoftware Insight Security Research Advisory
Name: Oracle9i Application Server Format String Vulnerability
Systems Affected: All platforms; Oracle9i Application Server Release
9.0.2
Severity: Critical Risk
Category: Format String Vulnerability
Vendor URL: http://www.oracle.com
Author: David Litchfield (david@ngssoftware) and Mark Litchfield
([EMAIL PROTECTED])
Date: 16th February 2003
Advisory number: #NISR16022003d
Description
***********
Oracle's 9i Application Server offers a highly functional web server
designed to seamlessly integrate with an Oracle backend database server.
Based on Apache the server offers many environments for web based
applications such as Java/JSP, PL/SQL, Perl and FastCGI. With their latest
release of the Application Server, 9.0.2, Oracle has added support for
WebDAV, Web Distributed Authoring and Versioning, that turns the Web into
a
file sharing system.
Details
*******
DAV is turned on by default. Whilst this is bad in and of itself, as
attackers can anonymously upload files to the server, an attacker can
exploit a format string bug in the one of the logging functions. If an
attacker uses the COPY method and supplies a destination URI that uses a
different scheme or port then a 502 Bad Gateway response is returned. This
is logged and in doing so the format string can be exploited. Although the
Apache mod dav module is not vulnerable itself the vulnerable code is
there - it is just not ever executed. Oracle has modified the moddav
module
and changed it so bad gateway responses are logged - and thus they are
vulnerable. Looking at the moddav source
>From mod_dav.c revision 1.157
..
..
lookup = dav_lookup_uri(dest, r);
if (lookup.rnew == NULL)
{
if (lookup.err.status == HTTP_BAD_REQUEST)
{
ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR | APLOG_NOERRNO,
r,lookup.err.desc);
return HTTP_BAD_REQUEST;
}
return dav_error_response(r, lookup.err.status, lookup.err.desc);
}
..
..
This code calls the dav_lookup_uri() function in dav_util.c. From
dav_util.c
revision 1.84
..
dav_lookup_result dav_lookup_uri(const char *uri, request_rec * r)
{
..
..
if (strcasecmp(comp.scheme, scheme) != 0 || comp.port != port)
{
result.err.status = HTTP_BAD_GATEWAY;
result.err.desc = ap_psprintf(r->pool,
"Destination URI refers to different "
"scheme or port (%s://hostname:%d)\n"
"(want: %s://hostname:%d)",
comp.scheme ? comp.scheme : scheme,
comp.port ? comp.port : port,
scheme, port);
return result;
..
..
}
When dav_lookup_uri() returns to mod_dav.c the format strings occurs
..
lookup = dav_lookup_uri(dest, r);
if (lookup.rnew == NULL)
{
if (lookup.err.status == HTTP_BAD_REQUEST)
{
// THIS IS THE FIRST FORMAT STRING VULNERABILITY
ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR | APLOG_NOERRNO,
r,lookup.err.desc);
..
..
}
Of course the code should have read
ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR | APLOG_NOERRNO,
r,"%s",lookup.err.desc);
to not be vulnerable.
By crafting a specially formed format string and sending to the server an
attacker can overwrite arbitrary address with arbitrary values which can
allow an attacker to gain control of the web server. To do this they could
overwrite a saved return address on the stack, an exception handler or
pointer to a function with an address that points to a buffer that
contains
the arbitrary code to execute.
Fix Information
***************
NGSSoftware alerted Oracle to this vulnerability on 24th September 2002.
Oracle has developed a patch which is available from
http://otn.oracle.com/deploy/security/pdf/2003alert52.pdf
A check for these issues has been added to OraScan, a comprehensive
automated vulnerability assessment tool for Oracle Application Servers of
which more information is available from the NGSSite
http://www.nextgenss.com/software/orascan.html
About NGSSoftware
*****************
NGSSoftware design, research and develop intelligent, advanced application
security assessment scanners. Based in the United Kingdom, NGSSoftware
have
offices in the South of London and the East Coast of Scotland.
NGSSoftware's
sister company NGSConsulting, offers best of breed security consulting
services, specialising in application, host and network security
assessments.
http://www.ngssoftware.com/
http://www.ngsconsulting.com/
Telephone +44 208 401 0070
Fax +44 208 401 0076
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
----- Forwarded by Jared Still/Radisys_Corporation/US on 02/20/2003 01:58
PM -----
"NGSSoftware Insight Security Research" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
02/17/2003 02:15 PM
To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
cc:
Subject: Oracle TZ_OFFSET Remote System Buffer Overrun (#NISR16022003c)
NGSSoftware Insight Security Research Advisory
Name: Oracle TZ_OFFSET Remote System Buffer Overrun
Systems Affected: All platforms; Oracle9i Database Release 2, 9i Release
1,
8i, 8.1.7, 8.0.6
Severity: High Risk
Category: Remote System Buffer Overrun
Vendor URL: http://www.oracle.com
Author: Mark Litchfield ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
Date: 16th February 2003
Advisory number: #NISR16022003c
Description
***********
Oracle's database server contains fuctions for use within queries. The
TZ_OFFSET function returns the time zone offset corresponding to the value
entered based on the date the statement was executed. For example:
SELECT TZ_OFFSET('US/Eastern') FROM DUAL;
would return the time zone offset value of -04:00. The TZ_OFFSET()
function
contains a remotely exploitable buffer overflow vulnerability.
Details
*******
There exists a remotely exploitable buffer overflow vulnerability in the
TZ_OFFSET function. By supplying a long character string for the time zone
name an attacker can overwrite a saved return address on the stack of
Oracle
process. Before this issue can be exploited an attacker must be able to
log
on to the database server with a valid user ID and password, but as the
TO_TIMESTAMP_TZ() function can be executed by PUBLIC by default any user
of
the system can gain control. Any arbitrary code supplied by an attacker
would execute with the same privileges as the user running the service;
this
account is typically "Oracle" on linux/unix based platforms and Local
System
on Windows based operating systems such as NT/2000/XP. As such this allows
for a complete compromise of the data stored in the database and possibly
a
complete compromise of the operating system.
Fix Information
***************
NGSSoftware alerted Oracle to this vulnerability on 30th September 2002.
Oracle has developed a patch which is available from
http://otn.oracle.com/deploy/security/pdf/2003alert50.pdf
A check for these issues has been added to NGSSQuirreL for Oracle, a
comprehensive automated vulnerability assessment tool for Oracle Database
Servers of which more information is available from the NGSSite
http://www.ngssoftware.com/software/squirrelfororacle.html
Further Information
*******************
For further information about the scope and effects of buffer overflows,
please see
http://www.ngssoftware.com/papers/non-stack-bo-windows.pdf
http://www.ngssoftware.com/papers/ntbufferoverflow.html
http://www.ngssoftware.com/papers/bufferoverflowpaper.rtf
http://www.ngssoftware.com/papers/unicodebo.pdf
About NGSSoftware
*****************
NGSSoftware design, research and develop intelligent, advanced application
security assessment scanners. Based in the United Kingdom, NGSSoftware
have
offices in the South of London and the East Coast of Scotland.
NGSSoftware's
sister company NGSConsulting, offers best of breed security consulting
services, specialising in application, host and network security
assessments.
http://www.ngssoftware.com/
http://www.ngsconsulting.com/
Telephone +44 208 401 0070
Fax +44 208 401 0076
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
----- Forwarded by Jared Still/Radisys_Corporation/US on 02/20/2003 01:58
PM -----
"NGSSoftware Insight Security Research" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
02/17/2003 05:09 PM
To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
cc:
Subject: Oracle bfilename function buffer overflow vulnerability
(#NISR16022003e)
NGSSoftware Insight Security Research Advisory
Name: ORACLE bfilename function buffer overflow vulnerability
Systems Affected: All platforms; Oracle9i Database Release 2, 9i Release
1,
8i, 8.1.7, 8.0.6
Severity: High Risk
Category: Remote System Buffer Overrun
Vendor URL: http://www.oracle.com
Author: David Litchfield ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
Date: 16th February 2003
Advisory number: #NISR16022003e
Description
***********
Oracle's database server contains fuctions for use within queries. The
bfilename() function returns a BFILE locator to a binary large object
stored
in the database.
Details
*******
The bfilename() function suffers from a remotely exploitable buffer
overrun
when an overly long DIRECTORY parameter is supplied. Before this issue can
be exploited an attacker must be able to log on to the database server
with
a valid user ID and password, but as the bfilename() function can be
executed by PUBLIC by default any user of the system can gain control. Any
arbitrary code supplied by an attacker would execute with the same
privileges as the user running the service; this account is typically
"Oracle" on linux/unix based platforms and Local System on Windows based
operating systems such as NT/2000/XP. As such this allows for a complete
compromise of the data stored in the database and possibly a complete
compromise of the operating system.
Fix Information
***************
NGSSoftware alerted Oracle to this vulnerability on 30th September 2002.
Oracle has developed a patch which is available from
http://otn.oracle.com/deploy/security/pdf/2003alert50.pdf
A check for these issues has been added to NGSSQuirreL for Oracle, a
comprehensive automated vulnerability assessment tool for Oracle Database
Servers of which more information is available from the NGSSite
http://www.ngssoftware.com/software/squirrelfororacle.html
Further Information
*******************
For further information about the scope and effects of buffer overflows,
please see
http://www.ngssoftware.com/papers/non-stack-bo-windows.pdf
http://www.ngssoftware.com/papers/ntbufferoverflow.html
http://www.ngssoftware.com/papers/bufferoverflowpaper.rtf
http://www.ngssoftware.com/papers/unicodebo.pdf
About NGSSoftware
*****************
NGSSoftware design, research and develop intelligent, advanced application
security assessment scanners. Based in the United Kingdom, NGSSoftware
have
offices in the South of London and the East Coast of Scotland.
NGSSoftware's
sister company NGSConsulting, offers best of breed security consulting
services, specialising in application, host and network security
assessments.
http://www.ngssoftware.com/
http://www.ngsconsulting.com/
Telephone +44 208 401 0070
Fax +44 208 401 0076
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
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Author: Deshpande, Kirti
INET: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
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