Left Wing Extremist Consolidation Undermines Electoral Processes
Guest Writer: Sanjay K. Jha
Associate Fellow, Institute for Defence Studies & Analyses, New Delhi
The election process in the States of Bihar and Jharkhand, scheduled
for February 2005, has been brought under serious threat by an abrupt
escalation in Left Wing extremist (also referred to as Naxalite)
violence in these States. The newly integrated Communist Party of
India - Maoist (CPI-Maoist) has given a call for the boycott of the
elections, and has been mobilizing people against participation in
the polls, both through mass contact and distribution of pamphlets,
as well as through direct intimidation. The Maoists have also made it
clear that police and paramilitary forces deployed for elections will
be specifically targeted for violence.
A physical declaration of intent is already in evidence. On January
5, 2005, suspected Naxalites of the Communist Party of India (Maoist)
killed the Superintendent of Police (SP) of the Munger District in
Bihar, P.C. Surendrababu, and six other policemen in a landmine
blast. The Naxalites also looted the firearms of the slain police
officials. Babu was returning after conducting joint raids in the
adjoining Jamui district when the explosion blew up his vehicle. He
was the second Indian Police Service (IPS) official to have fallen to
the Naxalites, after Ajay Kumar, the then SP of Lohardaga, now in
Jharkhand.
In another potentially serious incident, the Police foiled an attempt
by the Naxalites to blow up a road bridge when they recovered three
powerful landmines, switches, detonator wire and other equipment on
the national highway under the Risiup police station, Aurangabad
district, on January 8, 2005.
Again, on January 11, 2005, police reportedly recovered an
unspecified number of landmines, five detonators, 10 bags containing
gelatine and landmine equipment in the Chitrakauli forest in the
Nawada district. Police suspected that the Naxalites might have
stored the explosives to create disturbances during the forthcoming
assembly elections. Earlier, on January 4, 2005, the Naxalites had
attacked the Government Railway Police (GRP) post at Kajra Railway
Station in the Lakhisarai District and looted four rifles and a
carbine.
A similar escalation in violence has also been reported from
Jharkhand. On January 5, 2005, three persons, including two security
force personnel, were injured in a landmine blast in Latehar
district. On January 3, 2005, police in Jharkhand averted a major
strike by the Naxalites when they recovered 16 powerful landmines
buried in the sand on a river bank at Godra village under the
Vashishth Nagar police station, Chatra District. According to
Jharkhand Police sources, the Maoists have planted hundreds of
landmines in different parts of the State and a number of senior
police officials are on their hit-list. The State police have sought
the help of the National Security Guard (NSG) and the Border Security
Force (BSF) to help de-mine Maoist affected areas in Jharkhand.
Bihar, where Maoists are active in 31 out of 38 districts, was the
worst affected State in 2004, with 155 Naxalite-related killings
between January and November 30, 2004, up from 128 in 2003.
Jharkhand, where Maoists are active in 16 out of 22 districts, ranked
second, with 150 deaths as against 117 in 2003. In total, Naxalite
violence in India claimed 518 lives till November 30, 2004 [according
to a statement in Parliament by the Union Minister of State for Home
on December 14, 2004] as against 513 killings in 2003 [Union Ministry
of Home Affairs Annual Report 2003-04]. The intensity and scale of
violence has been intense, particularly after the merger of the
Maoist Communist Centre of India (MCCI) and the Communist Party of
India, Marxist-Leninist (People's War) in the united formation, the
CPI-Maoist, in September 2004. The pattern of violence, particularly
the Munger killings, demonstrates that the left wing extremism has
been spreading, to new areas in the recent past. Munger had, thus
far, not been known for Naxalite violence.
A number of incidents of Naxalite violence were reported from various
parts of the State. In retaliation to the Bihar Government's ban on
the December 5, 2004, CPI-Maoist rally to celebrate the merger and
demonstrate strength, the Naxalites blew up a portion of a railway
track and a bridge near Karbandiya in the Rohtas district, affecting
rail traffic on the Howrah-Delhi section, on December 20, 2004. On
December 23, 2004, Naxalites blew up the railway line in a stretch of
one-and-a-half metre near Gurupa station of Gaya-Koderma section of
the East Central Railway in Bihar. On December 29, 2004, Naxalites
killed four persons including a woman and blasted two houses at Mauri
village under the Paliganj police station in Patna district.
Administrations in both the States recognize that the recent upsurge
in violence is linked to Naxalite efforts to disrupt the elections.
Media reports on January 9, 2005, moreover, quoted a senior leader of
the Central Committee of the CPI-Maoist as saying, "Offensive against
the Government forces will increase in the coming days". To thwart
these plans, the Police in both the States have launched a crackdown
against the Naxalites. In Jharkhand, for example, a 'comprehensive
plan' has been chalked out, including aerial surveillance, to deal
with the Maoists. In response, the latter, in order to evade the
pre-poll crackdown, are believed to have shifted some of their camps
into the neighbouring States of Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal and
Chhattisgarh, where there is a strong Maoist presence in border
districts. The inter-State movement of Maoists is not a new thing and
in the last few years, the poor coordination between security forces
of various affected States has facilitated the easy movement of
Maoist cadres from one State to another.
The behaviour of Naxalite groups during previous elections suggests
that their stated objectives have little role to play as far as
grassroots mobilization of electoral support is concerned. In a state
like Bihar, caste remains one of the most important factors in
political mobilisation and its impact has been visible in the
organizational structure, mobilization strategy and activities of
Naxalite groups. In Bihar, for instance, though the CPI-Maoist has
officially declared that the continuance in power of the ruling
Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD) is against the interest of the party, it
has, at the same time, admitted that the Naxalites and the RJD 'share
the same social base'. Some prominent leaders of the RJD have also
expressed the same view. The RJD State vice-president, Samsher Alam,
said on December 12, 2004, "Both extremists and RJD are struggling
for social justice. While, extremists use violence as a weapon to
fight social injustice, RJD believes in non-violent method for the
purpose. In this situation, we do not see any possibility of
extremist attack on our programme." The CPI-Maoist has reportedly
alleged that Laloo Prasad Yadav has been trying to bribe its cadre
and activists through Government contracts and projects. In
combination, these factors have ensured that, unlike Andhra Pradesh,
where the PWG had issued a call to defeat Chandrababu Naidu in the
run-up to the April 2004 elections, the Maoists in Bihar are not
expected to issue any statement asking people to defeat the RJD.
Muscle power plays a critical role in elections in these States and
the enormous clout wielded by Naxalite groups at the grassroots level
has been one of the crucial instruments of influence in the electoral
process. In Jharkhand, according to one estimate, the Naxalites are
capable of influencing the election process in some 54 of the 81
Assembly constituencies. Unsurprisingly, Naxalite groups often use
their influence to support candidates or political formations which
provide them a favourable context for operation in the post election
phase. The resulting ambivalence has meant that the impact of their
boycott call is not significant on voter turnout. Thus, for instance,
during the April 2004 Parliamentary Election in Jharkhand, where the
pre-poll campaign was marred by a series of attacks on security force
personnel, the voter turnout was recorded at 55.71 per cent. Even in
some of the worst-affected districts, including Palamu, Hazaribagh,
Singhbhum and Lohardaga, the voter turnout ranged between 49 and 60
per cent. Similarly, many Naxalite dominated areas in Bihar
registered an impressive voter turn out.
There are reports, moreover, that these groups have themselves
contested the elections through proxies. For example, during the
Panchayat (Village Council) elections in 2001, activists of both the
PWG and MCCI contested in Jehanabad district. In the Parliamentary
Elections of April 2004, a former 'sub-zonal commander' of the MCCI,
Ramlal Oraon alias Veer Bhagat, contested as an independent candidate
from one of the worst Naxalite-affected constituencies, Chatra in
Jharkhand, and the voter turnout in some of the worst-affected
Assembly segments recorded their highest turnout in the last 20
years.
Clearly, despite the announcement of the election boycott, the
factors that have historically influenced the behaviour of Naxalite
groups still remain operative, and will continue to have considerable
influence during the election process. Some of these factors include
the general breakdown of the rule of law, the criminalization of
politics, sharp polarization on the basis of caste, and a nexus
between elements of mainstream political parties, various State
institutions and extremist formations.
The problem is enormously compounded by the absence of proper
administrative and enforcement responses. After every major incident
of Naxalite violence, the Central and State Governments announce a
succession of ad hoc and emergency measures, but these have only had
a negative impact in the long run. No attention has been paid to
basic issues, such as the proper functioning of civil administration
in rural and tribal areas and the development of an effective police
force. Bihar, for instance, has no police training college after its
separation from Jharkhand. The State Police lacks the most basic
counter-terrorism capabilities, such as bullet-proof vehicles,
high-frequency wireless sets, night vision devices and anti-landmine
vehicles, even in the Districts worst afflicted by Left Wing
extremism. It is evident that the crisis created by the complex
dynamics of the Left Wing insurgency requires skill, capacities and
efficiency far beyond the current capabilities of the state and its
various agencies.
SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Volume 3, No. 27, January 17, 2005
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