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"The Iranians have a fundamental strategic decision to make." 
The Three-Power Game 

By George Friedman 
Now the question becomes Iran. But the Iran question is not the
simplistic "next target" issue that has been framed by the media -- or
the Bush administration for that matter. The Iran question is far more
complex, subtle and defining. It divides into two questions. First,
once Iraq holds elections, what will Iran's policy be toward Iraq's
new Shiite government? Second, since the Shiite-Sunni split is
fundamental to the Islamic world, how will the United States manage
and manipulate that divide? 

To approach these questions, we need to look at the world through
Iran's eyes. Iran has a single, overwhelming national security
interest: protecting itself from encroachments by foreign powers.
After World War II, the primary threat came from the Soviet Union.
Another threat, both ancient and continual, came from Iraq. Under both
the shah and the ayatollahs, Iraq constituted what became Iran's major
national security threat. 

The Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s had a devastating effect on Iran. There
is hardly an Iranian family that did not suffer a loss in that war.
Iraq came out ahead in the war militarily, but had it simply defeated
Iran, the result would have been catastrophic. Since the fall of the
Soviet Union, Iraq has been Iran's nightmare. 

This is why the Iranians did not seriously object to the U.S. invasion
of Iraq. To the contrary, the Iranians did everything they could to
encourage and entangle the Americans in the war -- including providing
intelligence that triggered American responses. There was nothing more
important for Iran than seeing Saddam Hussein's regime collapse. 
For Iran, the best outcome of the war would be a pro-Iranian regime in
Baghdad. The second best outcome would be chaos in Iraq. Both provide
Iran with what it needs: a relatively secure frontier and an
opportunity to shape events to the west. The third -- and least
acceptable -- outcome would be a neutral Iraq. Neutrality is highly
changeable. 

It had been Iran's hope that the U.S. invasion would create a
pro-Iranian regime in Baghdad. The United States certainly dangled
this possibility in front of the Iranians. Ahmed Chalabi, the original
fair-haired boy of the Pentagon, had a dual role to play. He was the
conduit the Iranians used to pump intelligence into Washington that
justified and required the invasion.
 
He was also the channel used by the United States to convince the
Iranians to keep the lid on the Iraqi Shia. Chalabi told Iran that the
United States would give them what they wanted if the Shia remained
quiet. Chalabi, like a figure in a Cold War espionage novel, was used
and used up by both sides. 
The Iranians will get a Shiite government in Baghdad after the
election. It is not clear at all that it will be a puppet state. The
Iraqi and Iranian Shia have diverging interests and somewhat different
views of the kind of regime they want. Nevertheless, whatever the
tensions, any Shiite regime is better than a Sunni regime as far as
the Iranians are concerned. Even for this there will be a price. The
new government will continue to control Shiite regions and probably
have the cooperation of the Kurds. 
It will not control Sunni regions, where the insurgency is in place.
There will not be a real Iraqi state unless the Sunni insurgency is
defeated. The Shia -- with the Americans -- can potentially defeat the
Sunnis, but Iranian cooperation is necessary. At the very least, the
Iranians will have to avoid destabilizing the Shiite government by
manipulating the Iraqi Shia to get more pro-Iranian officials in
place. They will also have to share tactical intelligence on the Sunni
insurgency with the Americans. 

Alternatively, they can go with their second-best choice: chaos in
Iraq. Under that scenario, the Shia in Iraq are pressured not to fight
the Sunnis and the Iraqi regime becomes the government of Shiite Iraq
and nothing more. At that point, Iraq, in effect, becomes divided into
three states -- Shia, Sunni, Kurd. 

This is a tempting proposition. The problem the Iranians have is that
every action has an equal and opposite reaction. If Iraq collapses and
the Iranians dominate southern Iraq, then the road is open militarily
to Kuwait and Saudi oil fields. The Iranians might not want to take
advantage of this, but the Arabs cannot hope for the best as a foreign
policy. 

The Saudis cannot afford chaos in Iraq or for the road from Iran to be
wide open. They will increase their dependence on the United States
and will be forced to do whatever they can to reduce the rebellion in
the Sunni region. A united Iraq under a Shiite-dominated coalition
government will secure Iran's western frontiers, but will deny it the
opportunity to dominate the region. A divided Iraq will give Iran
secure borders, an opportunity for domination and serious responses
from Arab states. It will drive the Arabs into the Americans' arms.
Things could get dicey fast for the Iranians. The United States is
letting them know -- via the convenient conduit of Seymour Hersh and
The New Yorker magazine -- that it is ready to push back hard on Iran.
U.S. President George W. Bush directly warned the Iranians on Jan. 26
to stay out of the Iraqi elections. The Iranians are signaling back
that they are a nuclear power -- which is not true yet.
 
The Iranians have a fundamental strategic decision to make. They can
work with the United States and secure their interests. They can
undermine the United States and go for the big prize: domination of
the Persian Gulf. The first is low risk, the second incredibly high risk. 

Behind this all there is a complex three-power game. There is the
United States, in a war with factions of the Sunni. There are the
Sunnis themselves, divided and unsure of their direction. There are
the Shia, maneuvering to shift the political balance with the Sunni
without becoming American puppets. Within each of these communities --
including the American -- there are deep divides, complex
contradictions and political tensions. Each side is trying to use
these to its advantage. 

How this relationship plays out is the real issue. The question of the
Sunni insurrection in four provinces of Iraq is not unimportant, but
it is not defining. It is simply the arena in which the basic
strategic complexity is being played out. But the real game is: Three
players, each trying to create an alliance that locks out the third
without limiting its own freedom of action, with none of the players
really in control of the situation. It reminds us a bit of the
U.S.-Soviet-Chinese game in 1968-1970. But even there, although
internal factionalism was rife in all three countries, the
decision-making process was not that chaotic. 

That's why, in the end, it does not boil down to the Shia as much as
to Iran. Iran can opt to align with the United States and define the
terms under which it will accept a united Iraq under a Shiite-led
coalition government, or it can go for it all, undermine the Shiite
leadership in Iraq and open the door to the division of Iraq into
three parts, with southern Iraq in the Iranian sphere of influence and
the road to the western littoral of the Persian Gulf wide open --
except for the United States. 

Iran has a low-risk, low-reward choice and a high-risk, high-reward
choice. How lucky is Iran feeling? 













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