http://atimes01.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/GA08Ak02.html
Jan 8, 2005 COMMENTARY Vanished fear of an al-Qaeda attack By Ehsan Ahrari Americans, I am sure, are happy that they are no longer bombarded with the fear-mongering public warnings of "imminent" and impending al-Qaeda attacks, and the announcements of heightened "threat levels" that were abound during the presidential election campaign. Now reality is at the other extreme. It appears as if al-Qaeda has virtually disappeared from America's domestic radar screen, even though it is very much present in carrying out most of the attacks on US forces in Iraq. How should one explain this reality? Has the threat of a potential al-Qaeda attack on the US really dissipated, or was it not that worrisome a factor to begin with? A good way of finding an answer is to understand the cumbersome strategy of al-Qaeda in Iraq and its linkage with that entity's global strategy, especially in relation to attacking the United States at home. The long-term presence of the US in Iraq offers al-Qaeda a tremendous opportunity to engage it as brutally and as frequently as possible. The terrorist entity is convinced that it can defeat the lone superpower there for two reasons. First, America's "Vietnam syndrome" is legendary. Simply put, that syndrome states that if a high number of American troops were to die in Iraq over a prolonged period of time, it would seriously consider pulling out. Richard Nixon devised the strategy of "Vietnamization" of the Vietnam War, not only to lower the casualty rates of American soldiers, but also to let the South Vietnamese take over the brunt of fighting and dying for their country. That strategy was to deliver Nixon a way out, an "honorable" withdrawal from Vietnam. That very same strategy is being implemented in Iraq through the massive training of the indigenous forces. The US tried in vain to get substantial force commitments from such European countries as France and Germany; Asian states such as India; and even from Muslim countries, who knew better than to become a part of the US occupation of a Muslim state. The Bush administration even attempted to extract a commitment of North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces without much success. Thus Washington's last best hope became the massive training of the Iraqi security forces, with the hope that, like the South Vietnamese soldiers, Iraqi boys would fight and die for their country, thereby paving the way for an eventual US withdrawal. Second, al-Qaeda seems to be convinced that the frequent and massive killing of Iraqi forces will result in the defeat of America's strategy of "Iraqization" of the Iraq war. In this regard, that organization and other insurgent groups appear to have been quite effective. Let's also not forget the relationship between the large-scale killing of Iraqi security forces and the upcoming elections in that country. Here again, al-Qaeda's purpose is to make January 30 elections as questionable as possible. It knows that, given the rising enthusiasm of the Shi'ites and the Kurds to participate in the elections, it is facing an uphill battle. Even if, as the worst-case scenario from the US vantage point, most Sunnis were not to participate, still about 80% of popular participation - or something close to it - would make the Iraqi elections quite meaningful. (Even the US is notorious for having a low voter turnout - percentages around the low to mid-50s - during its presidential elections. For congressional elections, that turnout rate goes down even further.) However, the absence of Sunni participation, or even a very low turnout, would constantly raise doubts, both domestically and in the global arena, about the legitimacy of the elected Iraqi government. The overall outcome of the preceding, as al-Qaeda envisages, would result in a long stay of US forces in Iraq. The longer the US stays in Iraq, the better the chances for it to be bled into withdrawal - ie, its defeat. Indeed, that very same reality resulted in the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989. One can argue ad nauseam whether al-Qaeda's calculation is valid. The validity of it will only be proved or disproved over time. But the underlying logic or rationality of it may not be questioned. So how does the preceding relate to the question raised earlier of whether the al-Qaeda-related threat has dissipated? The struggle between the US and al-Qaeda is not about Iraq alone. It is, first and foremost, about reclaiming the Arab Middle East from US dominance. The rest of the Islamic world is the secondary part of its global campaign. For that purpose, engaging the United States in Iraq and bleeding it is a crucial aspect of al-Qaeda's war, but it isn't an end in itself. Al-Qaeda knows that striking the US at home is the most important aspect of its success: taking terrorism to America. Osama bin Laden was quite unequivocal when he said, around the time of the US military campaign against the Taliban regime, "We want you to feel the same terror that we have been experiencing for a long time." In this sense, it is sheer folly to think that al-Qaeda will not strike the US again. Unfortunately, that old adage - it is not a matter of "if" but "when" - is most apt. The encounters between President George W Bush and challenger John Kerry involving al-Qaeda were about winning the election. Bush won that contest. But the most troubling question of the day is whether the US is deceiving itself in thinking that the threat of al-Qaeda has dissipated. Ehsan Ahrari, PhD, is an Alexandria, Virginia, US-based independent strategic analyst. [Non-text portions of this message have been removed] ------------------------ Yahoo! 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