http://www.ict.org.il/

November 27, 1998

Syrian Support to Hizballah: The Turkish Lesson
Dr. Ely Karmon 
ICT
On October 22, 1998 an agreement was signed between the governments of
Turkey and Syria in the framework of which Syria agreed to:
 
�       recognize the PKK as a terrorist organization and pledges to cease
every aid to the organization, whether in weapons, logistics,
financing, or propaganda;

�       shut down all PKK training camps on its territory and arrest the
organization's activists;

�       deport PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan from Syria and keep members of the
organization from entering Syria;

�       work together with Lebanon and Turkey in combating the
organization's terrorist activity.
One of the agreement's clauses - Ocalan's expulsion - was carried out
even before the treaty was signed. 

The agreement constitutes in fact a Syrian surrender to Turkey's
demands. It was reached at the end of a severe crisis, following
military and political moves on the part of the Turkish government
from the beginning of September 1998, along with an ultimatum from
Turkish President Demirel that if Syria did not cease its support for
PKK, Turkey would have no recourse but the military option. 
For years Turkey has tried, to no avail, to influence or to coerce
Syria to cease its support for the PKK, which has put in jeopardy the
territorial integrity and the internal stability of Turkey since 1984,
when it first became active. The aid to the PKK was instrumental for
Syria in its dispute with Turkey over territory and rights to water
sources originating in Turkey. Every one of the understandings and
agreements signed in the past was consistently and openly violated by
the Syrian regime--notwithstanding political or economic pressures. 

What then liesbehind Turkey's recent power play and its success? A
combination of factors worked toward moving the Turkish authorities to
take resolute and effective action at this time: 

�       The successes of the Turkish army and security forces in countering
PKK's activity, both in Turkey and in northern Iraq, which
significantly weakened the operational capabilities of the organization.
�       On the other hand, the feeling that the organization is on the verge
of a political breakthrough - including recognition by European
governments and the European Union.

�       The determination shown during the last year by the secular Turkish
regime, with the backing of the military, to fight Islamic
fundamentalism. This resolve led to the removal of the Islamic Welfare
Party from power and the reduction of Iranian involvement in Turkey's
internal affairs.

�       The American example of total war on terrorism, primarily the
American missile strikes on Osama bin Ladin's bases in Afghanistan and
the chemical plant in Sudan, but also the understanding of the
American need for Turkish support in the Iraqi crisis.

�       The strategic agreement with Israel, which reinforced the Turkish
leadership's feeling of Syria's strategic isolation.

 
Is it possible for Israel to accomplish a similar feat? Could Syria be
forced to cease its support for Hizballah's terrorist and guerrilla
activities against Israel, or to give up its sponsorship of
Palestinian opposition groups? Some of these groups, such as the
Palestinian Islamic Jihad are capable of significant damage to the
peace process. 

This question is of even greater import now, when the issue of
Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon is raised on the background of heavy
losses in Southern Lebanon, and the United States is trying to renew
the peace process with Syria. 

Historically, Israeli policy, and that of other Western states,
including the United States has been exceedingly cautious in the face
of Syrian support for terrorist organizations--an approach that has
had no real impact on Syrian policy. Syria did not pay a significant
price for its backing of the terror activities of Hizballah against
the American, French and Israeli forces in Lebanon--activities that in
the end forced the Americans and the French out of Lebanon. Israel for
its part was forced to retreat to the security zone, where it
continues to incur casualties. 

Only recently, Mustapha Tlass, the Syrian Army Commander boasted that
in 1983 he gave the green light to the Islamic organizations to act
against the American and French forces in Lebanon. However, he said,
facetiously, he did not permit operations against the Italians because
he was enamored of the Italian film star, Gina Lolobrigida! Has any
Western government reacted at all to this little scoop? 
The United States bombed Libya in 1986 for its support of
anti-American terrorist acts, but was careful not to adopt the same
policy when it became clear that Syria was behind an attempt to blow
up an El Al plane in the air enroute from London. 

All of Israel's leaders have declared that without the approval of
Syria, Hizballah could not act in Lebanon; that Iranian aid to
Hizballah arrives through the good offices of Syria; that all the
Palestinian terrorist organizations operate headquarters and training
camps either in Syria or in the Syrian controlled Baka'a Valley. Yet,
Israel has never taken any significant action against Syria, even when
it was clear that it was using Hizballah as a bargaining chip in the
negotiations with Israel at Wye Plantation in 1996. 

In light of the Turkish success in bringing about a real change in
Syria's attitude toward the PKK, it seems that there is a need to
reevaluate and revise Israel's strategy regarding the Syrian support
for Hizballah and Palestinian terrorism. Actually, most of the
political and strategic factors that worked for the benefit of Turkey
in the last crisis, exist also in the case of Israel: 

�       The American policy favoring decisive action against states that
sponsor terrorism. It is necessary to explain to the American
government, public opinion and media that this policy can not be
applied successfully if states such as Syria continue to benefit from
leniency with regard to their support of terrorism

�       The strategic agreement between Israel and Turkey works both ways,
and Syria's apprehensions about the alliance should be exploited in
the framework of the struggle against terrorism.

�       Iran, the main sponsor of Hizballah, and Syria's sole remaining
strategic partner, has been weakened recently due to internal strife
in the regime, even if this is not yet evident as regards Iran's
policy toward Israel.

�       Israel must not repeat the mistake of engaging in negotiations under
American auspices, while giving Syria a free hand to use terrorism
from Lebanon to reinforce its tactical positions.

�       Israel cannot continue to accuse the Palestinian Authority of not
acting consistently against terrorism and its infrastructure, while at
the same time ignoring the use to which Syria puts the same terrorism.
This dual policy will become all the more acute as the negotiations
for a permanent settlement draw near, and the Palestinian Authority
will be tempted to use terrorism or violence to further its strategic
goals.

�       And last but not least, while the "The Lion of Damascus" may well
have nerves of steel, it was shown that he knows how to retreat when
he senses his adversary's determination to put an end to the policy of
blackmail.

Over the past few years the public discussion of the problem of
terrorism from Lebanon has centered only on two options: a Israeli
unilateral withdrawal without prior security arrangements; or a
withdrawal in the framework of a general settlement, which would
enable Syria to reap the fruits of its occupation of Lebanon and
ensure the recovery of the Golan Heights at minimal cost. The time has
come to look at the new strategic map and examine other options.










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