Al Qaeda's Nuremberg? 
The arrest of Osama bin Laden's reputed No. 3 commander again raises a
vexing issue: what will America do with captured Al Qaeda leaders?

WEB EXCLUSIVE

By Michael Isikoff <http://msnbc.msn.com/id/4863599/site/newsweek/>  and
Mark <http://msnbc.msn.com/id/4901246/site/newsweek/>  Hosenball

Newsweek

Updated: 7:25 p.m. ET May 4, 2005

 

May 4 - The arrest of a top deputy to Osama bin Laden this week raises anew
an issue that has bedeviled Bush administration officials for some time:
what will America ultimately do with captured Al Qaeda leaders after they
have been milked for all the intelligence they have to offer? 

The apprehension in Pakistan of Abu Faraj al-Libbi, reputed to be Al Qaeda's
No. 3 commander, is only the latest in a series of "big catches" announced
by U.S. counterterrorism officials since the American invasion of
Afghanistan in the fall of 2001. Spirited away to secret locations overseas
and reportedly subjected to extreme interrogation techniques under the
murkiest of rules, the captured Al Qaeda leaders include most of those
believed to be directly responsible for the September 11 terror attacks with
the notable exception of bin Laden and his top deputy Ayman Al-Zawahiri.

But even as President George W. Bush today hailed al-Libbi's arrest as a
"critical victory in the war on terror," a number of top counterterrorism
officials are increasingly frustrated over the lack of any plans to put top
Al Qaeda leaders on trialeither in special military tribunals that were
authorized by Bush in November 2001 or in civilian courts.

Sources tell NEWSWEEK that administration lawyers have made virtually no
headway in resolving the dilemma. In part, this is because of continued
arguments by the U.S. intelligence community that "high value" prisoners
such as 9/11 master planner Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, who was captured in
March 2003, may still yield useful information about Al Qaeda plans and
operatives that can help thwart future attacks.

But that line of argument becomes harder to sustain as time goes on and the
information known to captured detainees such as Mohammed, Ramzi bin al-Shibh
(another key 9/11 planner) and Mustafa Ahmed al-Hawsawi (the alleged 9/11
paymaster) becomes inevitably outdated. "At a certain point, whatever
residual intelligence value they have is far outweighed by their value as
defendants," said Brad Berenson, a former White House lawyer who worked on
President Bush's order authorizing the creation of military tribunals in the
fall of 2001. Berenson now advocates a mass Nuremberg-style trial of Al
Qaeda leaders.

Another reason for pressing the issue relatively soon, some officials say,
is the recent guilty plea of accused 9/11 co-conspirator Zacarias Moussaoui.
His case now enters a new phase in which prosecutors will argue that
Moussaoui, who played a peripheral role in the 9/11 conspiracy at best,
should be executed while the actual architects of 9/11 remain alive
indefinitely with no apparent plans to even put them on trial.

Aside from the fundamental inconsistency in the U.S. government's position,
the lack of trial plans for top Al Qaeda leaders could gravely undermine the
position of prosecutors in court: under federal death penalty law, if
defense lawyers can establish that Moussaoui's superiors such as Khalid
Shaikh Mohammed and Ramzi bin al-Shibh are in U.S. custody and are not
facing death, it would count as a "mitigating factor" that could help
Moussaoui avoid execution.

The internal tensions over what to do with top Al Qaeda leaders became
briefly visible last year when FBI Director Robert Mueller told reporters
that the bureau was gathering evidence for use in a possible military
tribunal case against Mohammed and other high-value detainees. "I would
expect that there would be tribunals at some point," said Mueller in
response to a reporter's questions about whether Mohammed and others would
face trial. 

But within hours of those remarks, Mueller aides and administration
officials quickly moved to tamp down any speculation that trials of the real
perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks were anywhere close to happening. In fact,
administration officials told reporters, no decisions had been made or were
even being contemplated. 

If anything, the difficulties in bringing top Al Qaeda leaders to trial have
only grown since then. The constitutionality of the military tribunals
authorized by Bush is being challenged in the federal courts by lawyers for
accused detainees. Even more significantly, in the wake of the Abu Ghraib
scandal, there have been a series of disclosures that White House and
Justice Department lawyers approved the CIA 's use of a number of extreme
interrogation techniques against top Al Qaeda detainees. These include
"water boarding" in which a prisoner is strapped down, forcibly pushed under
water and made to believe he might drown. Some lawyers say any trial of
Khalid Shaikh Mohammed and others even in military tribunals would open the
door for their defense lawyers to potentially embarrass the U.S. government
by introducing evidence to suggest that their clients had been tortured by
CIA interrogators in violation of international law. 

In part, the Bush administration may dodge the bullet in the case of Abu
Faraj al-Libbi, or "the Libyan," as he is known, by simply deciding not to
press for custody of him. The Al Qaeda commander was captured by Pakistani
security forces after a firefight on Monday involving a group of terrorist
operatives in Pakistan's North West Frontier Province.

In the past, the Bush administration successfully pressed Pakistani
authorities to turn over to American representatives-usually the
CIA-high-level Al Qaeda operatives such as Mohammed and  al-Shibh. But in
this case, a U.S. official said, the Pakistanis have good reason to want to
hold al-Libbi themselves and possibly put him on trial in Pakistan.
Pakistani officials have accused him of orchestrating two December 2003
assassination attempts against Pakistan's president, Gen. Pervez Musharraf.
Reports from Pakistan also describe al-Libbi as a major suspect in other
terrorist attacks in Pakistan, including the attempted assassination of the
country's prime minister last year and several bombings.

Officials in Washington say the administration appears to be content to
allow the Pakistanis to hold al-Libbi so long as U.S. interrogators get
access to him. Closely allied with Musharraf, the American government is
confident it will get such access.

Al-Libbi is important because some U.S. intelligence officials describe him
as just below bin Laden and Al-Zawahiri in importance. Considered an Al
Qaeda fixer who also had an "operational planning role," al-Libbi is said by
some U.S. authorities to have moved into the bin Laden network's top
leadership to replace Mohammed, Al Qaeda's top field commander.

U.S. officials say they have reason to believe that al-Libbi directly
participated in the planning for post-9/11 attacks inside the United States,
possibly during last year's presidential-election campaign and between
Election Day and Bush's second inauguration. No such attacks occurred.

Some officials said intelligence may tie al-Libbi to an Al Qaeda computer
expert who was arrested in Pakistan about a year ago. That expert was
allegedly in contact with a suspected terrorist cell in London whose leaders
included an associate of Mohammed who allegedly visited the U.S. prior to
9/11 to conduct surveillance of financial targets in New York, New Jersey
and Washington. Officials declined to give any further details on the
purported plots or threats that al-Libbi allegedly was orchestrating against
the U.S. mainland.

URL: http://msnbc.msn.com/id/7739321/site/newsweek/



[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]



------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Sponsor --------------------~--> 
Give underprivileged students the materials they need to learn. 
Bring education to life by funding a specific classroom project.
http://us.click.yahoo.com/FHLuJD/_WnJAA/cUmLAA/TySplB/TM
--------------------------------------------------------------------~-> 

--------------------------
Want to discuss this topic?  Head on over to our discussion list, [EMAIL 
PROTECTED]
--------------------------
Brooks Isoldi, editor
[EMAIL PROTECTED]

http://www.intellnet.org

  Post message: [email protected]
  Subscribe:    [EMAIL PROTECTED]
  Unsubscribe:  [EMAIL PROTECTED]


*** FAIR USE NOTICE. This message contains copyrighted material whose use has 
not been specifically authorized by the copyright owner. OSINT, as a part of 
The Intelligence Network, is making it available without profit to OSINT 
YahooGroups members who have expressed a prior interest in receiving the 
included information in their efforts to advance the understanding of 
intelligence and law enforcement organizations, their activities, methods, 
techniques, human rights, civil liberties, social justice and other 
intelligence related issues, for non-profit research and educational purposes 
only. We believe that this constitutes a 'fair use' of the copyrighted material 
as provided for in section 107 of the U.S. Copyright Law. If you wish to use 
this copyrighted material for purposes of your own that go beyond 'fair use,' 
you must obtain permission from the copyright owner.
For more information go to:
http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/107.shtml 
Yahoo! Groups Links

<*> To visit your group on the web, go to:
    http://groups.yahoo.com/group/osint/

<*> To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to:
    [EMAIL PROTECTED]

<*> Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to:
    http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/
 


Reply via email to