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Saddam's WMD: Under the layers of deception, the facts were nowhere to be found "There was evidence of a discussion of possible WMD collaboration initiated by a Syrian security officer, and ISG received information about movement of material out of Iraq, including the possibility that WMD was involved." Charles Duelfer � Affiliation: special adviser to the CIA on Iraqi WMD � Whereabouts: Washington, D.C. Layers of Iraqi deception: In Saddam's world, no rewards for truthfulness Charles Duelfer has completed his report on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, and the report marks an indictment of U.S. intelligence. Duelfer ran the Iraq Survey Group that for 18 months sought and failed to find Iraqi WMD systems. The ISG was not lacking in manpower. It had 1,200 Australian, British and American experts. But what it lacked was expertise, follow-up organization and drive. The result was a final report by the ISG that included a great deal of testimony on Iraqi missile and WMD programs with almost no material evidence. Duelfer said the ISG was hampered by frequent staff turnover, a Sunni insurgency war that severely limited inspections and experts who understood little of Iraq and the people they were debriefing. The result: ISG found two chemical weapons. The first was a sarin mortar shell used as an improvised explosive device. The second was a handful of 122-mm rocket warheads filled with inert mustard gas. But what the ISG found contradicted the long-held assumptions of the U.S. intelligence community. Iraq and Syria were enemies for decades, but once Saddam Hussein was threatened by the United States he quickly made peace with his western neighbor. Soon afterwards the two countries became the closest of allies - so close, that Iraq discussed the transfer of WMD and scientists to Damascus in case of a U.S. invasion. "Whether Syria received military items from Iraq for safekeeping or other reasons has yet to be determined," the ISG addendum released last week said. "There was evidence of a discussion of possible WMD collaboration initiated by a Syrian security officer, and ISG received information about movement of material out of Iraq, including the possibility that WMD was involved. In the judgment of the working group, these reports were sufficiently credible to merit further investigation." Duelfer said the ISG did not obtain information on a WMD transfer to Syria from debriefing Iraqis. Indeed, they uniformly denied any knowledge of residual WMD that could have been secreted to Syria. "Based on the evidence available at present, ISG judged that it was unlikely that an official transfer of WMD material from Iraq to Syria took place," the report said. "However, ISG was unable to rule out unofficial movement of limited WMD-related materials." Charles Duelfer, shown testifying before Congress, Nov. 17, 2004, led the Iraq Survey Group that scoured Iraq for weapons of mass destruction. And there lies the Iraq's biggest secret. Most of the regime's activities were unofficial, with even Saddam Hussein kept in the dark. Secret programs were financed, failures were concealed and lies were told at the highest levels. Everybody was scared of Saddam's wrath, which could result in imprisonment at best and torture and execution at worst. But ISG debriefers could rarely get beyond these axioms. As Duelfer himself reported, high-level Saddam aides couldn't have poured their secrets out even if they wanted to. ISG personnel came and went so quickly that no relationships could be formed with detainees. Sometimes, an ISG expert would only stay for one month. "Not knowing the details of previous debriefs, new debriefers and SMEs [subject matter experts] often asked detainees to retrace ground already covered," the report said. "This had two unfortunate results. First, the detainees became quite familiar with the type of information we wanted and as a result, developed a 'party line' - blaming everything on Husayn Kamil or Qusay Hussein. Second, they failed to develop, or lost, respect for the debriefers," the report stated. "For example, if the detainee's discussion wandered into topics of strategic or political nature, many debriefers would cut the digression short and redirect the detainee back to the more specific tactical focus of the written SDR, potentially losing significant information about the nature and operations of the regime," the report added. What is clear is that Syria was always considered an option for the safekeeping of Iraqi WMD. The report said Saddam's son, Qusay, was dealing with the option of transferring Iraqi WMD assets about a year before the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq. The first job was to protect Iraqi scientists, particularly those dealing with biological weapons research. "In early 2002, Qusay asked [Iraqi military procurement chief Abdul Al Tawab Al Mullah] Huwaysh to compile a list of Iraqi BW experts that Qusay intended to pass to Syria," the report said. During his interrogation, Huwaysh and another senior official, Amir Al Saadi, assessed that Iraqi WMD scientists were not sent to Syria. Al Saadi ventured that Syria, fearing discovery by Israeli intelligence, would never agree to such cooperation. But ISG experts failed to move beyond the initial testimony to understand the relations between officials and how the Saddam regime worked. Duelfer, a longtime government official involved in the Middle East, understood. But he did not have the required help. "Saddam did not lead by espousing detailed goals and objectives," the report said. "He tended to allow ideas to float up and he would consider them �often never pronouncing on them one way or the other. This meant that much guidance to the government was implicit rather than explicit. For investigators, a consequence is that forensic evidence of presidential direction may not exist, but it does not mean that such guidance was not there, but simply that we cannot see it in the usual ways." Duelfer's conclusions mark the challenge that regimes such as Saddam's as well as those in Iran, Libya, North Korea and Syria pose to the United States. There is no paper trail in these government bureaucracies and no clear orders of policies. Leaders spend most of their time concealing their agenda, rather than explaining it. At one point, an Iraqi minister asked a U.S. official why the U.S. Air Force was always attacking Iraqi buildings. Saddam would simply order the removal of equipment from these structures and they would disappear into homes or underground installations. U.S. intelligence still saw the sign on the government building, but it no longer had any value to the regime. "This method of management makes interpreting their descriptions of the inner workings of regime figures very difficult," the report said. "They often did not know the truth. Hence, when they would describe something that is wrong, it is difficult or impossible to know if they are purposely dissembling. ISG investigators suffered some of the same problems as Saddam; not knowing if senior advisors are telling the truth, or leaving out important facts." ------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Sponsor --------------------~--> Give underprivileged students the materials they need to learn. Bring education to life by funding a specific classroom project. http://us.click.yahoo.com/FHLuJD/_WnJAA/cUmLAA/TySplB/TM --------------------------------------------------------------------~-> -------------------------- Want to discuss this topic? 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