Assessing London and Sharm al-Sheikh

Analysing the Role of Internet Intelligence and the Threat of Web-based 
Terrorist Recruitment

The Role of Internet Intelligence and Urban Warfare Training

► http://www.jamestown.org <http://www.jamestown.org/> 

► Jamestown Foundation / Terrorism Focus / by Michael Scheuer [He served in the 
CIA for 22 years before 

      resigning in 2004. He served as the Chief of the bin Laden Unit at the 
Counterterrorist Center from 1996 to 1999. He is the once 

      anonymous author of Imperial Hubris: Why the West is Losing the War on 
Terror and Through Our Enemies' Eyes: Osama bin 

      Laden, Radical Islam, and the Future of America]

Aug 6 2005 ► Aug 5. Western experts are continuing to debate whether the 7 and 
21 July 2005 attacks in London and the 23 July 2005 attack in Sharm al-Sheikh, 
Egypt, were directed and controlled by al-Qaeda's leaders, undertaken by 
so-called al-Qaeda "franchise" groups, or staged by al-Qaeda-inspired 
free-lancers.  While this debate proceeds, it seems useful to step back and 
consider the possibility that, whoever exercised command-and-control over the 
attacks, al-Qaeda's assiduous effort to cultivate and train professional 
insurgents and urban warfare specialists via the Internet is bearing fruit.

Bin Laden has always considered al-Qaeda's main role in the war against America 
and its allies to be incitement and paramilitary training.  Toward> those ends, 
he established religious and insurgent training camps in places like 
Afghanistan, Sudan, and Yemen.  Always aware of and eager to exploit the latest 
in modern communications technology, however, bin Laden did not put all his 
marbles in training camps.  By the late 1990's, al-Qaeda's use of the Internet 
was well underway in regard to theological and paramilitary training.  This 
trend accelerated rapidly after 9/11 when U.S. airpower made the use of 
physical training camps problematic.

Al-Qaeda's Internet programs cover a wide array of topics and this article will 
focus only on the training that has been made available for urban insurgents 
over the past few years; training, that is, which is pertinent to the recent 
operations in the cities of London and Sharm al-Sheikh.  In particular, the 
writings of al-Qaeda military chief Sayf al-Adl and Abd-al-Aziz al-Muqrin, 
al-Qaeda's commander in Saudi Arabia until his summer 2004 death in a firefight 
with Saudi police, are pertinent to all three attacks.

Al-Adl is a former Egyptian military officer -- probably of its Special Forces 
-- and became al-Qaeda's military commander after Mohammad Atef's death in 
November 2001.  Al-Adl played a prominent role in commanding and then 
dispersing al-Qaeda's fighters after the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan.  He 
has since written extensively on the lessons al-Qaeda learned from fighting 
U.S. ground forces, and has been a prolific producer of paramilitary and 
intelligence instructional essays for the group's Internet journals.  Less is 
known about al-Muqrin.  He commanded al-Qaeda's forces in Saudi Arabia, and was 
killed in the operation in which the American engineer Nicholas Johnson was 
beheaded.  While in command, he produced a stream of Internet articles on the 
need for jihad to defend the Muslim world, as well as instructional essays on 
urban warfare.

The most important fact of the three July 2005 attacks is that each was an 
absolute defeat for the security services involved.  Both London attacks 
completely surprised London's Metropolitan Police and the British Security 
Service -- both among the best in the Western world -- and the Sharm al-Sheikh 
operation stunned the pervasive and interwoven security services of the 
Egyptian police state.   In all three cases the attackers selected and 
surveilled the target, planned and prepared the attack, and struck at the time 
and place of their choosing without detection.  The botched 21 July London 
attack should not obscure the fact that British authorities were blindsided for 
the second time in two weeks.

The training that made these attacks possible was available electronically.  In 
a series of articles in al-Qaeda's Internet journal Mu'asker al-Battar, Sayf 
al-Adl and Abu-Hajar Abd-al-Aziz Muqrin offered instruction on how to plan and 
conduct an urban attack.   "Planning," al-Adl wrote in September 2004, "is the 
scientific pre-examination of targets to identify the right target and the best 
means to achieve success.  This is done by means of organizing a group of 
coherent, comprehensive, and well-aimed measures intended for misleading and 
taking the enemy by surprise and minimizing losses as much as possible if the 
act is discovered." To be effective, al-Adl explained, an attack plan must be 
"creative, flexible, and confidential" and have the following additional 
features:

1. A plan should be reasonable. In other words, alternatives should be 
well-examined and weighed carefully to choose the best of them.

2. There should be a major -- specific -- target and other secondary targets 
for the operation.

3. The plan should be realistic.

4. It should be coherent, tight and accurate. There should be no gaps in it. 
Rather, each part of the plan should complement the other part.  It should 
appear to the enemy as a connected sequence of events.

5. It should be simple. In other words every member [of the attack team] can 
easily understand it [the plan] to implement it without difficulty.[1]

In the articles, al-Adl also stressed the need for rigor in the planning 
process by "presuming that the target is in the farthest place possible - the 
most difficult place," proceeding as if "the enemy is very smart and free to 
move," and preparing the operation "from the end to the beginning and not vice 
versa." [2] Al-Adl also emphasized the need for "vigilance" and security within 
the attack team. All members, he wrote, must be alert, steadily calm -- "no 
excessive zeal", and schooled to work on a strict need-to-know basis, 
especially regarding the actual attackers and the timing of the operation. [3] 
Team members should also carefully vary their activities -- "do not be a 
hostage of habit" -- and ensure that the vehicles and motorcycles used in 
pre-attack surveillance activities are locally owned and insured, "have proper 
licensing," and that drivers and passengers "adhere strictly to traffic laws to 
avoid being stopped [by police]." [4]

Abu-Hajar Abd-al-Aziz al-Muqrin supported al-Adl on the need for urban 
operations, adding that "[t]he dangers surrounding a mujahid in the city far 
exceed the dangers surrounding him in mountains or jungles." [5] Urban attacks 
are vital, al-Muqruin argued, "because most targets, regime officials, the 
economy, and wealth are concentrated there.  In most cases cities reflect the 
state's prestige."  As a practical matter, al-Muqrin explained, "City action 
needs small and separate groups, with no more than four individuals in each 
group."  These men must be urbanites because "city residents are familiar with 
the nature and roads in the city ...[and will] be able to move around easily 
and smoothly to escape the eyes of the spies who are present in the cities."   
Al-Muqrin instructed his readers that the operational team for an urban attack 
should be divided into four units: the command group; the information-gathering 
group; the preparation group; and the execution group.  The participants in 
these groups must be the best available, "[o]nly the best educated, cultured, 
and trained personnel in the organization must work in the cities.  This will 
help personnel move and operate better." [6]

While the experts have yet to assign final responsibility for the attacks in 
London and Egypt, the foregoing suggests that the attackers and their 
supporters may well have profited form the urban-warfare training al-Qaeda has 
made readily available on the Internet.  The complete surprise and success of 
the operations shows the attackers were well-trained in urban operational 
techniques approximating those taught by al-Adl and al-Muqrin. The London 
attackers picked out and surveilled 'reasonable' targets; chose targets that 
were within their capabilities to strike; maintained compartmentation and 
security in the planning and preparation phases; and executed the attacks, as 
al-Adl instructed, so that they would "appear to the enemy as a connected 
sequence of events." Ironically, the rapid post-attack round-up of some members 
of the London teams by British and Italian authorities suggests that the 
al-Qaeda leaders' instructions for post-attack behavior were not followed.  
Al-Adl, in particular, stressed the importance of urban team members avoiding 
excessive movement and electronic communications after an attack, [7] and the 
British and Italian media report that the spate of arrests was triggered by the 
members' frequent movement and cell phone use. [8]

The foregoing barely scratches the surface of the in-depth instruction for 
urban operations, as well as for the organizational, intelligence-collection, 
logistical, and financial activities needed to support them that al-Qaeda has 
placed on the Internet. The instruction seems likely to produce a highly 
professional cadre, and one that is infused with al-Qaeda's offensive spirit. 
"A plan should be aggressive and free of hesitation. It should not be 
defensive," Sayf al-Adl told his readers. "Almost 75 percent of the plan 
involves well-examined possibilities. Apparently, it will be cowardly to try to 
increase this percentage since we will be seeking a higher safety percentage.  
Almost 25 percent of the plan is left to fate." [9]


Notes


1. Sayf al-Adl, "Planning Special Operations," Mu'asker al-Battar (Online 
Journal), 13 September 2004.

2. Ibid.

3. Sayf al-Adl, "Principles of Security," Mu'asker al-Battar, 2 February 2004.

4. Sayf al-Adl, "Transportation Security," Mu'asker al-Battar, 1 March 2004.

5. Abu-Hajar Abd-al-Aziz al-Muqrin, "Skills to move inside cities," Mu'asker 
al-Battar, 12 June 2004.

6. Abu-Hajar Abd-al-Aziz al-Muqrin, "The Secret Action Group," Mu'asker 
al-Battar, 12 June 2004, and "Skills to move inside cities," 17 March 2004.

7. Say al-Adl, op. cit., 2 February 2004, and Sayf al-Adl, "Defensive 
Security," Mu'asker al-Battar, 14 February 2004.

8. Financial Times, 29 July 2005.

9. Sayf al-Adl, "Planning Special Operations," Mu'asker al-Battar, 13 September 
2004.



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