Italy and Islamic Militancy: From Logistics Base to Potential Target By Guido Olimpio [From: Terrorism Monitor (The Jamestown Foundation, USA) Volume 3, Issue 18, 21 September 2005]
Islamic radicals have been present in Italy in large numbers since 1992, shortly after the defeat of the Red Army in Afghanistan. Like in other European countries, the influx of former mujahideen volunteers from the Arab world had a great impact. Geographically and politically, the center of gravity for the Islamists was North Italy, where thousands of Muslim immigrants live and work. In Milan, the most active are from Egypt and Algeria, whereas Turin, Varese and Cremona are the territory of the Moroccans and the Tunisians. Further south, apart from a few small groupings in Rome, the most significant presence is in Naples, where the Algerians have established their bridgehead. The Palestinians are of less importance, being fewer and generally more wary of extremist doctrines. In the mid-nineties, during the wars in the former Yugoslavia, Milan became the "hotbed" of Islamic extremism for five main reasons: 1) the activism of the Egyptian Imam Anwar Shaban, linked to al-Gamaa al-Islamiya and close to the positions of the blind Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman; 2) the importance of its Viale Jenner mosque, a proselytizing and recruitment center with international connections; 3) its geographical position, allowing easy access to Northern Europe, the Balkans, the U.S. and the Middle East; 4) the presence of numerous Afghan war veterans and North African extremists linked to terrorist movements; and 5) the ease of collecting funds, documents and arms in North Italy for the jihad fronts, especially in Morocco and Chechnya. Shaban, with his many contacts in the Persian Gulf, was instrumental in keeping the rank and file of the Islamic networks in Italy together. While clearly inspired by the principles of international jihad, his main objective was to bring down the Egyptian regime. His sermons drew in new recruits, many of whom were sent to Bosnia to fight the Serbs, with a smaller number going to Chechnya [1]. Viale Jenner formed part of a network that linked up Islamist groups in Austria, Germany, Turkey and the U.S. Milan was often visited by a then little-known character who was to gain notoriety in 2003: Mullah Krekar, head of Ansar al-Islam [2]. In the course of investigations into the first attack on the Twin Towers (February 1993), telephone contacts between Milanese Islamic militants and the cell involved in the attack were uncovered. There were also close links with other prominent international exponents of jihad, including Ayman al-Zawahiri, who faxed over his orders and advice. Shaban gradually increased his involvement in Bosnia and became the emir of the Mujahideen Battalion. When the war ended, many of the volunteers went back to their countries (including Italy) and started forming the first al-Qaeda groups in Europe. The Imam's career ended dramatically in 1996 when he was killed at a Croatian road block. But his death didn't signal the end of radicalism in Italy as many of his followers went on to develop networks of their own. Investigations by the Italian authorities (the Milan counter-terror unit in particular) since 1995 show the growth of this phenomenon. Operation Sfinge (targeted against the followers of Shaban) brought 35 suspected Islamic militants to trial; operation Ritorno led to the investigation and sentencing of 11 Islamists; operation Fattar led to the sentencing of 10 individuals and 3 acquittals and the Essid operation led to the successful sentencing of 13 individuals. Various radical groups have a presence in either northern or southern Italy. The Armed Islamic Group, the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (the draft of a document about the formation of the group was found in Cremona in 1998), the Algerian Islamic Salvation Front, the Egyptian Gamaa, the Egyptian Jihad and the pan-Islamic (albeit non-violent) Hizb ut-Tahrir all have some form of presence in Italy. The extent of the phenomenon is demonstrated by the fact that, despite the police raids, the cells continue to reformstronger than beforethanks to the activities of "veterans" such as Abdelkader Es-Sayed [3] and Nasr Mustafa, alias Abu Omar [4]. Investigations have proved that Es-Sayed knew about the September 11 attacks before they happened [5]. >From 1995 to the present, northern Italywith its mosques in Viale Jenner and Via Quaranta in Milanhas been an important base for Islamic militants, which have used it for: recruiting mujahideen for Afghanistan, Iraq and Chechnya; recruiting suicide bombers for the Zarqawi network in Iraq; supplying forged documents for international operations; illicit financial activities; illegal immigrant trafficking; and providing a base of support for fugitives. Since the anti-terrorism offensives prompted by 9/11, the extremists have changed their modus operandi. They visit mosques less frequently because of increased surveillance and they also establish small communities in provincial towns that do not have a strong police presence. Moreover, they have developed special and largely secure channels of encrypted communication with their reference contacts and task masters in Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Iran. The networks are no longer led by charismatic figures like Shaban, but by local leaders who, although considered minor and unimportant, are capable of planning and ordering attacks [6]. These local leaders have the military expertise and connections with mid- to high-level operatives in al-Qaeda to successfully plan and execute attacks. For example, in an area north of Milan there is a small but very active group of Pakistani militants with links to London and Lahore. Some of them are veterans of the Afghan war. According to informed sources, the Italian military intelligence service (SISMI) is keeping a very close eye on this network, with suspicion that they are controlled by a rogue agent in Pakistan's notorious Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISIDbetter known as the "ISI"). As with the rest of Europe, the Italian intelligence services are concerned about the militants connected to the Islamic Moroccan Combatant Group, which has roots not only in rural areas but also in larger cities such as Milan and Turin. The arrest of Mohammed Rabei in Milan, alias Mohammed the Egyptian, one of the masterminds behind the Madrid bombings, has probably prevented an attack in Italy or in other European countries. After the attacks in Spain, Rabei traveled to Italy to find a safe place and recruit potential terrorists. Furthermore, recent developments have confirmed links between extremists in Italy and the Zarqawi network in Iraq. Also noteworthy are changes in the funding methods and communication channels. Before 9/11 the money came from zakat (alms) and donations from the Persian Gulf States, which were usually routed through Middle Eastern banks. Since 9/11 the funds have been coming in cash, usually brought over by couriers with suitcases full of dollars or from crime: forged documents, drug trafficking and forged residence permits have all been used to generate funds. Moreover, Pakistanis and Somalis run call centers, which give excellent cover for fundraising and "clean" phones. According to investigative sources one militant, involved in clandestine activities, would use 30-40 SIM cards for a single mobile phone. His method was very simple: he would make a first call and pronounce a few words, before changing the SIM card and ringing the number again to communicate a few words in code. The Islamic extremists in Italy have proved themselves to be particularly adept at producing forged documents. Some of the forged passports ended up in the possession of the network involved in the killing of Afghan Northern Alliance leader Ahmad Shah Massoud in September 2001. Others found their way to an organization active in Morocco. And yet others were found to have been sent to al-Qaeda leaders arrested in Malaysia in 2002. The militants have developed the expertise to produce not just Italian passports but also documents of North African countries (Morocco in particular). The lives of cell members in Italy have always been governed by Spartan principles, putting security before all else. In some districts where they have safe houses, they have created "fortress" zones with a trusted network of look-outs. One of these was in the Porta Venezia district of Milan; a member of the cell spending hours in a little Arabic restaurant posing as a customer, the Tunisian barber keeping an eye on a junction, the Algerian seller watching over a possible escape route; they were like sentries with eyes and ears everywhere. They noted the faces of all "suspect" persons: Italian law enforcement agents, but above all spies from Arabic intelligence agencies. The militants display regimented behavior and have regulated and standardized conduct through the production of manuals, one of which was found by the Carabinieri (paramilitary police) in Milan in July 2002, in an apartment used by Islamic militants. Given this impressive presence in Italy, if the order comes for an attack, there are various teams that are ready to act; all of which have people capable of preparing explosive devices, the hideouts, the documents needed for escape and the would-be martyrs. Moreover, it is very easy to procure explosives in Italy, the traditional sources of supply being either local (Calabrian mafia) or East European (particularly Albanian) organized crime networks. The going price for a kilo of plastic explosives is about USD 1500, whereas civil-use explosives costs USD 1000 per kilo and a machine gun can be bought for just a few hundred dollars [7]. A Tunisian detainee who agreed to cooperate with the authorities spoke of a cell, active from 2001 to 2002, that had looked into ways of fabricating bombs from substances freely available on the market: the ingredients and the formula were the same as those used in the London bombs [8]. In the attacks, they were to be packed in trucks specially reinforced to carry large quantities of explosives, rucksacks left in station luggage deposits and a police car that was to be stolen, filled with explosives and launched against the Cathedral in Milan. The possible targets considered were the U.S. Embassy in Rome, American Consulates, an international school in Milan and the Police Headquarters [9]. There are essentially two reasons why there have been no attacks in Italy thus far; several plots have been thwarted by police and intelligence action and in certain cases the Islamic extremists have elected to protect their logistics networks. But, as in London, this can change in the space of a few hours. Notes 1. Islamic source in Milan 2. From investigation papers, Operation Sfinge 3. Possibly died in 2001 in Afghanistan 4. Seized by the CIA in 2003 in Milan 5. Police report 6. Intelligence source 7. Corriere della Sera, 12/07/2005 8. Police report, 2003 9. Intelligence source http://jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2369789 .................................................................... Is Italy Next In Line After London? By Lorenzo Vidino [From: Terrorism Monitor (The Jamestown Foundation, USA) Volume 3, Issue 18, 21 September 2005] Italy has been on heightened alert since the London attacks in July, as information available to the intelligence community points to the country as one of the most probable targets for al-Qaeda's next attack. On July 14, Niccolo Pollari, director of the Italian intelligence agency SISMI (Servizi per le Informazioni e la Sicurezza Militare Military Security and Information Service) offered his agency's gloomy assessment of the security situation in the country, telling Parliament that "in Italy there are cells ready to strike" (Corriere della Sera, July 15, 2005). Two days earlier, Italian police had carried out a massive preemptive operation, raiding more than 200 sites and arresting 174 individuals connected to Islamic extremism throughout the country, from Sicily to the large cities of the north, where most Islamist terrorist cells are known to operate (La Repubblica, July 13, 2005). Rome's fears are more than justified, as Italy finds itself in a situation that is eerily similar to that of Great Britain before the London attacks. The Italian government has been one of the staunchest supporters of the US-led war on Terrorand more importantly, of its campaign in Iraqcontributing more than three thousand troops to Operation Iraqi Freedom. The bombings in Madrid and London have proven beyond doubt that the terrorists' goal is to attack European countries that have or had a presence in Iraq, both to punish them and to force them to withdraw their troops. Italian officials and Islamists alike are well aware that an attack in Italy would have particularly devastating effects on the already fragile Berlusconi government, whose support of the Iraqi war was strongly opposed by the great majority of Italians. In a recent interview with Corriere della Sera, Saudi dissident and designated terrorism supporter Saad Al Faqih warned that Italy will be hit soon, as it is the logical next step in al-Qaeda's strategy of driving a wedge between the U.S. and its European allies (Corriere della Sera, July 12, 2005). It is chilling that the Italian Minister of Justice, Roberto Castelli, went even further and declared that authorities know that the attack will take place next February, when Italy will be hosting the Winter Olympics in Turin and just two months before the national elections (Corriere della Sera, July 13, 2005). Like Great Britain, Italy has been one of the most active scenes for Islamic militants operating in Europe over the last 15 years. London's infamous Finsbury Park mosque has seen no greater radical activity than Milan's Islamic Cultural Institute and intelligence agencies in both countries put the number of hardcore militants operating on their territories in the hundreds. Exactly as occurred in the UK, Italian authorities have thwarted terrorist plots in the past, arresting individuals planning to attack mass transportation systems and U.S. diplomatic and military facilities in the country. Just five days after the London attacks, a court in the northern Italian city of Brescia convicted two North African militants who belonged to a cell that in 2002 had allegedly planned to bomb the cathedral of Cremona and the Milan metro system, the busiest in the country (Corriere della Sera, July 13, 2005). Moreover, suicide bombers recruited in Italy have carried out deadly attacks out of the country, and authorities fear that they might soon strike at home. As British militants blew themselves up in Israel and Iraq in 2003, at least five young Muslims recruited in northern Italy are believed to have carried out brazen suicide operations in Iraq over the last two years. One of them is Lotfi Rihani, a Tunisian who had close ties to a Milan-based al-Qaeda cell that had planned chemical attacks in France in 2001. According to military intelligence, Rihani died in September of 2003 when he, along with two other Tunisian passengers, struck U.S. forces with a car laden with explosives [1]. Algerian national Fahdal Nassim, died in the August 2003 bombing of the United Nations headquarters in Baghdad that killed 22 people, including UN special envoy to Iraq Sergio Vieira de Mello (Corriere della Sera, December 10, 2004). Kamal Morchidi, a 24-year-old Moroccan who had served on the board of a Milanese company used as a front to launder money by al-Qaeda operatives, died in October 2003 during an attack against Baghdad's Rashid Hotel. The likely target of the attack was U.S. Undersecretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, who was staying at the hotel on the night the terrorists struck. The fear that suicide bombers could now target Italy is becoming more and more legitimate. As was the case in Great Britain in the months prior to the London bombings, Italy has long been unable to find the political unity to pass effective anti-terrorism legislation or to effectively enforce the existing immigration and terrorism laws. While membership in a terrorist organization was introduced as a new crime in the wake of the attacks of 9/11 (article 270 bis of the Penal Code), the Italian Parliament repeatedly failed to pass measures that would have granted more stringent surveillance powers to anti-terrorism investigators. Only after the London attacks, proposals for new measures (e.g., prolonging detention without charge of a suspected terrorist from 12 to 24 hours, faster deportations for illegal aliens deemed "security risks" and easier procedures to allow investigators to tap phones) have been passed following violent infighting among political parties. In some cases where authorities did have the legal tools they needed, their case fell apart because of the judges' interpretation of the law and of events in Iraq. Most recently, this situation was demonstrated in January 2005, when Italy was shocked by the sentence returned in the trial of a group of Ansar al-Islam affiliates accused of recruiting fighters for the Iraqi-based group. Although the Milan judge, Clementina Forleo, decided that the men were indeed part of a network that was recruiting fighters for the Iraqi conflict, she interpreted the operations taking place in Iraq as "guerrilla warfare" and not terrorism, and thereby acquitted them of all terrorism-related charges [2]. Moreover, even though the Italian government has repeatedly connected illegal immigration to terrorism, authorities have failed to deport thousands of illegal aliens. This trend has partially changed in the two months following the London attacks, as more than a dozen known radicals have been deported, but immigration flows are still uncontrolled. While few doubt that an attack in Italy over the coming months is likely, it is more difficult to predict which group among al-Qaeda's network of affiliates and offshoots will attempt to carry out the attack. Italian authorities are taking into consideration different hypotheses, including the idea that the plot might be hatched by different groups working together. The group that most worries Italian authorities is the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM), the loosely-connected but extremely dangerous network that is believed to have been behind the attacks in Casablanca and Madrid. After the Casablanca bombings, Moroccan authorities passed information to their Italian counterparts about a number of members of the group living in Italy and since then DIGOS (Italian special police) has been monitoring suspected cells in various northern Italian cities such as Turin, Varese, Vercelli, Udine and Vicenza (Corriere della Sera, July 15, 2005). A nationwide investigation revealed that money had been sent from Italy to individuals involved in the Casablanca bombings. The confirmation that the group was active in Italy came in June 2004, when Rabei Osman El Sayed Ahmed, an Egyptian believed to be one of the masterminds of the Madrid bombings, was arrested in Milan [3]. Another organization that worries authorities is the Algerian Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), which, over the last few years, has established an extensive network in Italy. GSPC's main bases of operations are in Naples, where its operatives work closely with local criminal gangs to obtain false documents and weapons, and in Milan, where they have established a sophisticated recruiting network out of the city's infamous Islamic Cultural Institute. These Algerians have worked very closely with the Tunisians, who also have several cells active in the Milan area, despite repeated anti-terrorism operations carried out against them by Italian authorities between 2000 and 2001 [4]. Milan, the real hub for Islamists in Italy, was also the headquarters of the network that recruited fighters for Ansar al-Islam. A two-pronged investigation led to the arrest of most of the key players in the Ansar cell, but authorities believe that parts of the network are still active. More troubling is the fact that some of the militants who have acquired battlefield experience in Iraq are now making their way back to Western Europe, exactly as their brethren did after the conflicts in Bosnia, Chechnya and Afghanistan (Il Giornale, July 12, 2005). Proof that the attackers might come from Iraq comes from U.S. Special Forces' July 10th capture of a key lieutenant of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in Ramadi. Detailed satellite pictures of several symbolic locations in Rome were on his laptop, and the man, identified as Abu Shiba, told interrogators he attended a meeting where attacks in Italy had been discussed (Corriere della Sera, July 24, 2005). Authorities are also watching the movements of more independent cells, such as those composed by members of Takfir wal-Hijra (Anathematization and Exile) or the so-called "non-aligned mujahideen." Cells of East Africans are also monitored, as Italian authorities believe that Somalis and Eritreans have established an extensive network throughout the country. In fact, it is not a coincidence that one of the perpetrators of the failed July 21 London bombings, Ethiopian Osman Hussein, sought refuge in Italy, where he contacted associates in Rome, Brescia and Udine (Corriere della Sera, July 31, 2005). The Italian Ministry of Interior has a list of what it considers "likely targets" for terrorist attacks and has put all of them under some form of police surveillance. The list contains more than 13,000 sites that range from foreign diplomatic facilities to the thousands of tourist sites scattered throughout the peninsula. Police are also currently monitoring more than 700 individuals believed to be linked to Islamic militancy (La Repubblica, July 8, 2005). Despite these precautionary moves, there is a sort of resignation among Italian authorities, who are well aware than an attack on Italy has long been inevitable. Notes 1. Tribunal of Milan, Indictment of Muhamad Majid and others, November 25, 2003. 2. Tribunal of Milan, Sentence against Maher Bouyahia and others, January 24, 2005. 3. Tribunal of Milan, Indictment of Rabei Osman Ahmed El Sayed and others, June 5, 2004. 4. DIGOS, Report "Muhajiroun 3," November 21, 2001. http://jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2369788 ...................................................................... Italian Security and Potential Terrorist Targets By Federico Bordonaro [From: Terrorism Monitor (The Jamestown Foundation, USA) Volume 3, Issue 18, 21 September 2005] The terror alert level in Italy rose this summer, as a result of the terrorist attacks in London in July. Although Rome has been repeatedly threatened by al-Qaeda for years, and has been consistently spotlighted as a legitimate target, the London bombings have certainly had a powerful psychological and political impact in Italy [1]. The Italian government has reacted by implementing new measures against the activities of potential terror cells on its soil. Interior Minister Giuseppe Pisanu proposed in July a set of laws (DL 144, approved by the Italian Senate on July 29) designed to enhance the government's capability to counter terrorist activities. The laws are intended, among other things, to deploy the army to patrol public buildings, to allow the military to search and arrest suspected individuals, and to strictly monitor internet café users. The core of Rome's strategy is based upon the enhancement and the effectiveness of its human intelligence resources. Explicit threats against Italy were published on the Internet on July 18 by the Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigades, the same group that claimed responsibility for the London bombings [3]. The group announced its determination to carry out devastating attacks in Rome and other Italian cities if Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi's government did not withdraw its troops from Iraq. The same group issued a second warning on July 25, in which it stated that Rome would be transformed into a graveyard if Italian troops were not withdrawn by August 15. In a videotape transmitted by the Qatar-based television network al-Jazeera on September 1, al-Qaeda official Ayman al-Zawahiri also warned all European governments that took part in military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq to withdraw their military forces if they wanted to avoid terrorist attacks. Potential Targets and Counter-Strategies The London bombings and the repeated threats against Italy immediately raised the question of which potential targets are the most likely to be attacked by Islamic terrorists. Apparently over 13,000 potential targets are being monitored daily after the reinforcement of anti-terrorist strategies. Due to Italy's historyas the heart of European Christianity and the place where one-third of the world's artistic masterpieces are locatedanalysts believe that terrorists could strike unconventional targets, such as churches and historical monuments. In Bologna, the church of San Petronio is considered by analysts to be a likely target because one of its most famous frescos is said to show Prophet Mohammed in Hell. In 2002, five people (one Italian and four North Africans) were arrested as they were allegedly conducting "hostile surveillance" around the church. In general, museums, churches and historical monuments are increasingly monitored by the police. Analysts believe car bombs and/or suicide bombers to be the most likely method of assault against buildings. In this respect, an immediate physical counter-strategy implemented by Pisanu and military intelligence has been to erect protective barriers around the potential target, so that it would be impossible to park a car bomb near it, and to enhance the use of metal-detector devices at the entrance of museums and churches to prevent armed people from entering them. Notwithstanding the possibility of attacks on historic buildings, the public transportation systemboth its infrastructure and vehiclesis on top of the target list. Airports, train stations, underground trains and major ports like Civitavecchia near Rome represent the first set of potential targets. The most important airports are obviously international hubs such as Milan's Malpensa and Linate, Rome's Fiumicino and airports in big cities such as Naples, Turin and Florence. Here, terrorists could carry out classical attacks with explosives, or could try to hijack a plane. However, both the intensity of patrolling and the massive use by the police of high-tech devices to monitor these facilities (including cameras, metal-detectors and other electronic equipment) make such targets harder to strike than before. Underground trains in Rome and Milan recently moved to the top of the intelligence short-list, especially after the London bombings. Five million euros have been raised in order to install new television cameras in the underground, which is now constantly patrolled by private security firms and guards. Analysts believe thatlike in Londonthe underground could be attacked by suicide bombers or by bombs placed in the trains, or in a station. Moreover, the structure of underground lines may lead terrorists to use chemical or bacteriological agents (such as sarin gas or anthrax), which is why anti-WMD specialists are on high alert. In the summer of 2005, Italian authorities ordered Milan and Rome, but also other big cities, to prepare themselves for possible attacks by engaging in public exercises and evacuation plans. Il Corriere della Sera reported on August 26 that thousands of security operators are scheduled to hold a counter-terror exercise in Milan's main train stations (Centrale, Garibaldi), airports (Linate) and possibly a supermarket, in late September. Details unveiled by the authorities show that special units against chemical and biological attacks will also take part in the exercises. In Rome, the city's authorities ordered the Coliseum to be cordoned off with barriers which will keep people and vehicles 100 meters away from the monument, apart from the entrances. Although, according to the authorities, there is not a specific threat against the ancient Roman building, the measures will help to better coordinate the security effort, such as during special events like the Elton John concert of September 3. Apart from traditional and culturally sensitive targets and transportation hubs, Italy also offers terrorists other possiblealthough less likelytargets. For instance, U.S. military bases and facilities are prevalent throughout the country, and they present obvious high-value targets. Some of the most important U.S. bases in the country are those of Aviano, Vicenza (both in the northeast), Camp Darby (Pisa), Sigonella (Sicily), and the naval facilities of Gaeta (Naples) and La Maddalena (Sardinia). In 2003, on the eve of the invasion of Iraq, sources quoted by the journal Analisi Difesa said that the alert level was raised in Sigonella [2]. Not only do the U.S. bases symbolize unrivalled high-value targets to Islamic militants, but by attacking such facilities terrorists would be sending a message to all enemies of the U.S. military presence in the world. In the recent past, al-Qaeda has explicitly warned all Muslims to keep away from American civil and military installations [3]. It would nevertheless be extremely difficult to effectively strike a U.S. military base. Air traffic around these areas is constantly monitored, whereas attempting a guerrilla-type operation with rocket launchers or similar weapons would probably not succeed, and the terror cell would likely be rapidly overwhelmed and liquidated. Perhaps the most viable option would be to attack U.S. warships as they navigate near the base. That could be done by suicide bombers driving motorboats loaded with explosives. This is why monitoring naval traffic and the theft of boats and explosives has become a decisive element in preventing possible attacks. Aqueducts have also been mentioned by analysts as possible targets, particularly in relation to the use of chemical or biological agents. On February 19, 2002, four Moroccan citizens were arrested in Rome as police found them in possession of a cyanide compound, allegedly destined to be released in the aqueducts running in the U.S. Embassy's areaof which the four individuals had a detailed map. Geopolitical and Cultural Issues Due to its key geographic position among Western Europe, the Balkans and the Eastern Mediterranean Sea, and North Africa, Italy is the landing place for millions of immigrants. Over 700,000 Muslims (of which more than 140,000 are Moroccan) live in Italy. While this figure is still lower than in France and the U.K., the Muslim cultural identity is particularly sensitive and controversial in Italian society. Italian intelligence agencies increasingly worry about extremist activities in mosques. In fact, a recent study by the Executive Committee for Security and Information Services (C.E.S.I.S.) [4] explains how anti-integrationist and fundamentalist ideologies are spreading in the Muslim community due to radical preaching in Italian mosques (Analisidifesa.it). According to these sources, radical imams are selected by terror networks and periodically sent to fundamentalist madrassas in the Indian sub-continent to be indoctrinated. By doing this, radical Islamists are allegedly trying to ensure that jihadist activities and propaganda will continue even after the stabilization of Iraq. This has prompted the Italian authorities to expel from the country some imams who were suspected of encouraging or justifying extremist actions. In particular, in November 2003 the imam of Carmagnola (in Lombardy) was deported, and the imam of Turin was deported in September 2005. In addition, sources show that Islamist networks are active in the Balkan regions of Bosnia, Kosovo and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. A SISMI-led operation uncovered weapons and C4 explosives smuggled in Bosnia (Gornja Maoca) and Croatia (Zagreb) with the final destination being Italy [5]. Allegedly, an Islamist commando was preparing to attack Pope Karol Wojtiła's funeral in Rome last April with rocket launchers and C4 explosives (Il Corriere della Sera, August 26). Conclusion In confronting the terrorist threat, the Italian intelligence community is wagering on Human Intelligence more than anything else. It is the belief of both political decision-makers and intelligence officials that terrorist networks can be more effectively fought by intercepting their communications, smuggling activities, traveling plans, propaganda and logistic tactics much more than countering them with highly sophisticated high-tech devices. Analytical work, communication monitoring and timing will be decisive, together with Rome's intense collaboration with other countries' intelligence agencies. Notes 1. In August 2004, the Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigades threatened to carry out terrorist attacks against Italy it if the government did not pull out its troops from Iraq. 2. http://www.analisidifesa.it/articolo.shtm/id/2674/ver/IT 3. See La Repubblica, online edition, April 27, 2004. 4. This special committee collects sensitive information from Italian intelligence agencies and compiles reports for the Prime Minister. 5. S.I.S.Mi.: Military security and information service, the Italian military intelligence agency. See also http://cca.analisidifesa.it/it/magazine_8034243544/numero4/article_462748525 367458880732502148243_4507362016_0.jsp http://jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2369791 ..................................................................... The 2006 Olympics: Assessing the Threat of Unconventional Attacks By Kathryn Haahr-escolano [From: Terrorism Monitor (The Jamestown Foundation, USA) Volume 3, Issue 18, 21 September 2005] Al-Qaeda's repeated threats to punish Italy for its continued involvement in Iraq, coupled with the organization's public pronouncements justifying chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) attacks against its adversaries, may culminate in an attack on Turin, site of the 2006 Winter Olympics. Al-Qaeda and its affiliates could view attacking Turin, either conventionally or unconventionally, as an opportunity to influence Italy's lengthy electoral campaign, which immediately follows the Olympics. Italy as a Target for al-Qaeda Unconventional Attacks Al-Qaeda has, in the last several years, threatened Venice (which it dismisses as the "Jewish Ghetto"), the Milan subway, the U.S. Embassy in Rome, and the Vatican with chemical attacks, involving poisons and toxins such as Ricin. While none of the chemical attacks actually occurred, the arrest of radical Islamists in various European countries (London, Paris, and Rota, Spain) and the discovery of toxins and poisons in their possession illustrate a clear intent to use them. Of the four parts of the CBRN equation, a chemical attack is probably the most attractive to terrorists, since the materials are easier to obtain and disperse. Commonly available industrial toxic chemicals, such as cyanide, and poisons are widely available on the commercial market, and are listed on the Internet. The most difficult step, however, is the dissemination of the toxic substance, whether in a confined or open space. Al-Qaeda will have little ability or opportunity to execute a large-scale chemical attack. The Turin Olympics will be primarily conducted in very large spaces; however there are enclosed spaces (locker and hotel rooms in particular) that could be targeted and still have a maximum public shock factor. An Italian periodical recently described how a jihadist group could spray the nerve agent Sarin [1]. A chemical attack would seriously disrupt the Olympics and could lead to their cancellation. Depending on the substance/s used and the degree of affected civilians, the Italian government would have to decide whether or not to continue with the Games. Regarding biological and radiological threats, the most likely scenarios are releases of radiological material through so-called "dirty bombs" and low-technology biological attacks, such as the contamination of the food supply with a bacteria or toxin. Terrorists could attempt a radiological dispersal device attack by combining radioactive material with a simple explosive. Although the actual radiation levels would be low and not cause any deaths, the explosion itself would result in death and injury. The Italian government would have to deal with contaminated areas, but not on a large scale. However, the propaganda victory of a "dirty bomb" attack would eclipse any attempts by the Italian government to dispel fear and distrust in the government. This pernicious form of attack likely would close down the Olympics. Al-Qaeda's Justification for Unconventional Attacks Al-Qaeda's most recent exhortation to the Muslim community for global jihad comes from Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's September 6 audiotape posted to the Internet. Increasingly, al-Qaeda's videotapes and Internet postings threatening those countries allied with the U.S. in Iraq are targeted to indigenously-based Muslimsespecially in Europe with references to the recovery of al-Andalus in Spain. Although the Italian security services have routinely monitored the most egregious Imams, there are certainly less observable individuals who may be motivating their followers to justify an al-Qaeda unconventional attack in Italy. Recent justifications for and interest in CBRN attacks include: According to a media report, the Italian intelligence services describe in a classified report how Italyin conjunction with several alliesestablished "an operating profile" for dealing with an al-Qaeda nuclear attack on Italian territory. In addition, the Italian report discussed preparations for a scenario in which an al-Qaeda nuclear device explodes in an Italian city [2]. "We call for the Muslim brothers to imitate Pakistan as to the possession of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons," read a letter alleged to have been written by bin Laden and seized in London three years ago. Mustafa Setmariam Nasar (a.k.a Abu Musab al-Suri) the notorious Syrian al-Qaeda leader and the purported founder of the first al-Qaeda cell in Spain, justifies the use of nuclear, "dirty bombs," chemical and biological weapons by "martyrs" in his "holy war" strategy. Al-Suri's statements go "beyond classical Islam's criteria for a just jihad and recognize no limits but their own, employing any weapons or means" [3]. In his vision, he calls for a new holy war that employs nuclear, chemical and bacteriological weapons, and dirty bombs [4]. The former Imam of Carmagnola and follower of bin Ladin, Abdel Qader Fadlallah Mamour, threatened that, "within six months Italy will undergo a chemical attack." Mamour specifically stated that if the attack had to be organized by a concurrent al-Qaeda group in Italy, "it [the attack] could take place in little weeks" [5]. Imam Amar Sahounane in Naples stated: "Just as the Jews and Christians in the past had divine authorization for their warfare, now Muslims have divine approval for the actions they believe opportune " [6] Tunisian citizen Essid Sami Ben Khemaiswho attended the Milan Mosque and probably was the leader of the Milan celldescribed a terrorist attack to an al-Qaeda operative, Lased ben Heni (a Tunisian) in a bugged 2001 conversation: " an extremely efficient liquid that suffocates people" [7]. While there is no apparent reporting that Khemais or other members of the Milan cell explicitly discussed using Sarin or other chemical agents in Italy, Khemais' relationship with the Hamburg al-Qaeda cell is unsettling. It is public knowledge that the Hamburg ring was preparing poison gas attacks in France, possibly with Sarin nerve gas. Given the logistics involved in preparing for a chemical/biological/radiological attack, individuals would have to obtain the substances and then prepare an appropriate dissemination method, possibly involving suicide bombers. Although the Italian security services disrupted an al-Qaeda "mujahideen recruiting" cell in Milan, it is possible that a CBRN nucleus exists somewhere in the country. Similarly, there presumably was a "poisons/toxins" cell in France, the UK, and Spain set up to conduct the planned chemical attacks against the Paris Metro system, Ricin attacks in London and Spain's Rota Naval Base. Counterterrorism Measures for the Turin Olympics There are various measures that the Italian intelligence services, acting in close coordination with European and U.S. government counter-terrorism services, can take now to secure the Turin Games: Continue with the selective expulsion of radical Islamist Imams and other individuals under Italy's new counter-terrorism law, which makes it easier to expel foreigners who are deemed a risk to national security or found supporting terrorist groups. Begin immediate preparation for scheduled events hosted in Italy tied to the 2006 Games, which include a symposium on 21 September in Turin. Physically secure key sites months ahead of the Games and begin monitoring for CBRN substances. Increase border security by checking containers and individuals, especially any individual who has recently travelled to Pakistan, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Continue monitoring all forms of communication between known and suspected radical Islamists in-country as well as their conversations with individuals outside of Italy. Increase attempts to recruit clerics and Imamsas well as other Muslimsto report on any suspicious activity relating to the Turin Games. Monitor the purchase/selling/theft of industrial chemicals and radioactive materials and ensure effective communication through the G-5's new "CBRN alert mechanism network" established in Granada, Spain in March [8]. Conclusion An al-Qaeda unconventional attack on the Turin Olympics could result in electoral defeat for the incumbent government. Italy is in a unique situation: it is hosting a hugely symbolic international event shortly before national elections. While it is impossible to predict how the electorate would vote in the event of an unconventional attack, voter repudiation of Prodi and his Iraq policy as the reason for the attack is not implausible. In addition to risk mitigation activities, the government would face the crucial task of reassuring a scared and possibly angry public which will likely clamor for the immediate withdrawal of forces from Iraq. An unconventional attack against the Turin Olympics would represent a major coup for al-Qaeda and will constitute yet another victory against a vulnerable European power. If Italian Muslims were discovered to be involved in any attack, that would seriously advance al-Qaeda's "polarization" project, which seeks to create as much distance as possible between Muslims and non-Muslims (especially in Western countries). Most significantly, a CBRN attack would legitimize and standardize unconventional attacks as an "appropriate" act of terrorism by al-Qaeda affiliated groups around the world. Notes 1. www.lastampa.it, 12 Sept 05 2. La Stampa, 12 Sept 05. 3. "Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam," John Esposito. 4. "Espana Sigue Amenazada," www.elpais.es, 6 Jun 05. 5. www.rerepublic.com, 14 July 05 6. Magdi Allam, "The Sermons of Hatred in Certain Mosques," November 2003, printed in Corriere della Serra, www.chiesa.com and www.amislam.com 7. www.mackenzieinstitute.com/2002 . Khemasi was recently extradited to Italy due to his involvement with a member of the now disrupted Milan cell. 8. www.elmundoes., 15 March 05 http://jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2369790 ------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Sponsor --------------------~--> Fair play? Video games influencing politics. Click and talk back! http://us.click.yahoo.com/VpgUKB/pzNLAA/cUmLAA/TySplB/TM --------------------------------------------------------------------~-> -------------------------- Want to discuss this topic? 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