VoIP Security Threats Defined
Reprinted
From:
<http://enterprisesecurity.symantec.com/popup/offsitejump.cfm?offsiteurl=htt
p://securityfocus.com> SecurityFocus
OCT 26, 2005 ARTICLE ID: 6128
by Kelly Martin
On the same day that new Skype threats were announced, the VoIP Security
Alliance (VoIPSA) delivered its first document with a laundry list of
security threats (PDF available
<http://www.voipsa.org/Activities/taxonomy.php> here).
The document, which defines security threats facing VoIP deployments, raises
awareness of a technology that is becoming more and more mainstream. While
threats such as caller ID spoofing, denial-of-service attacks and
eavesdropping attacks have been known for some time, the VoIPSA public
report identifies many additional areas where VoIP technology remains
vulnerable.
The report comes amid a changing landscape, as traditional phone companies
in Europe and the Middle East consider blocking VoIP calls on their
networks, and in August the U.S. Federal Communications Commission announced
that ISPs and VoIP providers in the U.S. must soon prepare to accommodate
wiretap requests for law enforcement officials.
Information on the new Skype vulnerabilities is available
<http://www.skype.com/security/skype-sb-2005-02.html> here and
<http://www.skype.com/security/skype-sb-2005-03.html> here.
Content is copyrighted material and may not be duplicated, distributed,
transferred, transmitted, copied, altered, sold, used to create derivative
works, or otherwise misused. Copyright C 1999-2005 SecurityFocus
SKYPE-SB/2005-002: Buffer overflow in Skype-specific URI and VCARD import
handling
Bulletin title: Buffer overflow in Skype-specific URI and
VCARD import handling
Bulletin ID: SKYPE-SB/2005-002
Bulletin status: FINAL
Date of announcement: 2005-10-25 13:00:00 +0000
Date of last revision: 2005-10-27 15:05:15 +0000
Products affected: Skype for Windows
Vulnerability type: Buffer overflow
CVE references: CVE-2005-3265
Risk assessment: HIGH
CVSS base score: 10.0 (AV:R/AC:L/Au:NR/C:C/I:C/A:C/B:N)
Cross-references: http://qc.borland.com/wc/qcmain.aspx?d=4744
SKYPE-SB/2004-001 <http://www.skype.com/security/skype-sb-2004-01.html>
(formerly SSA-2004-01)
Table of contents:
1. Problem
<http://www.skype.com/security/skype-sb-2005-02.html#section1> description
and brief discussion
2. Impact
<http://www.skype.com/security/skype-sb-2005-02.html#section2> and affected
software
3. Solution
<http://www.skype.com/security/skype-sb-2005-02.html#section3> or
work-around
4. Special
<http://www.skype.com/security/skype-sb-2005-02.html#section4> instructions
and notes
5. Software
<http://www.skype.com/security/skype-sb-2005-02.html#section5> download
location
6. Authenticity
<http://www.skype.com/security/skype-sb-2005-02.html#section6> verification
7. Common
<http://www.skype.com/security/skype-sb-2005-02.html#section7> Vulnerability
Scoring System (CVSS) assessment
8. Credits
<http://www.skype.com/security/skype-sb-2005-02.html#section8> and
additional information
9. Bulletin
<http://www.skype.com/security/skype-sb-2005-02.html#section9> release
history
10. Notices
<http://www.skype.com/security/skype-sb-2005-02.html#section10>
1. Problem description and brief discussion
Description
A security bug in the Skype for Windows user client has been
identified and fixed.
Skype can be made to execute arbitrary code through a buffer
overflow when Skype is called upon to handle malformed URLs that
are in Skype-specific URI types callto:// and skype://.
In addition, Skype can be made to execute arbitrary code during
importation of a VCARD that is in a specific non-standard format.
Discussion
This bug is a subsidiary effect of documented Borland Delphi
bug 4744 (http://qc.borland.com/wc/qcmain.aspx?d=4744).
Skype has replaced instances of the offending routine with one
that performs proper bounds-checking.
Note that this bug is similar to the issue previously reported in
SKYPE-SB/2004-001 <http://www.skype.com/security/skype-sb-2004-01.html>
(formerly numbered as SSA-2004-01), but was not
caused by a reintroduction of the previously fixed source code.
This is tracked by Mitre CVE ID CVE-2005-3265.
2. Impact and affected software
Impact
A user could cause arbitrary code to be executed if a specially-
crafted Skype-specific URL is clicked or if a specially-crafted
VCARD is imported.
Affected software
The following Skype clients are vulnerable to this attack:
Skype for Windows:
Releases 1.1.*.0 through 1.4.*.83
3. Solution or work-around
An official fix to the issue covered by this Security Bulletin has
been released. To implement this fix, update to one of the
following releases of Skype. (Downloading instructions are shown
in Section 4 of this Bulletin.)
Skype for Windows:
Release 1.4.*.84 or later
As a work-around prior to updating the Skype software, this bug may
be avoided by not selecting Skype-specific URIs and not importing
VCARD records.
4. Special instructions and notes
None.
5. Software download location
The preferred method for installing security updates is to download
the software directly from Skype's website, from the website of
Skype's authorized partners, or from a reliable mirror site. Skype
may also be safely downloaded from other locations, but in this
case it is particularly important that you verify the authenticity
of the download.
We recommend that once you download any Skype software that you
verify its integrity by the methods listed in Section 6 of this
Bulletin.
You may install Skype by running the Skype installer using the
installation commands displayed under the appropriate operating
system listed at http://www.skype.com/download/.
x86 platform, Microsoft Windows 2000 or Microsoft Windows XP:
http://www.skype.com/products/skype/windows/
x86 platform, Linux:
http://www.skype.com/products/skype/linux/
PPC platform, Mac OS X v10.3 (Panther) or later:
http://www.skype.com/products/skype/macosx/
Pocket PC platform, Microsoft Windows Mobile 2003:
http://www.skype.com/products/skype/pocketpc/
6. Authenticity verification
- Bulletin authenticity verification:
Skype security bulletins are published on Skype's web site and
via mailing lists. The authenticity and integrity of a Skype
security bulletins may be determined by inspecting the crypto-
graphic signature that is attached to each bulletin. All Skype
security bulletins are published with a valid digital signature
produced by PGP.
- Software authenticity verification:
Both the Skype installer program and the Skype program that is
installed by the installer are digitally signed.
For Skype software built for Microsoft Windows operating
environments, the digital certificate used by Skype to sign
software packages is signed by "VeriSign Class 3 Code Signing 2004
CA".
For Skype software built for Linux platforms, all packages are
signed by PGP key ID 0xD66B746E, the public component of which may
be downloaded from http://www.skype.com/products/skype/linux/.
- For general information about Skype security, please visit the
Skype Security Resource Center at http://www.skype.com/security/.
7. Common Vulnerability Assessment System (CVSS) assessment
Skype has rated the issue covered by this Security Bulletin under
the CVSS scheme as follows:
Base metrics:
Access Vector (AV) ........... Remote
Access Complexity (AC) ....... Low
Authentication (Au) .....,.... Not Required
Confidentiality Impact (C) ... Complete
Integrity Impact (I) ......... Complete
Availability Impact (A) ...... Complete
Impact Bias (B) .............. Normal
Computed CVSS base score: 10.0
Temporal metrics as of 2005-10-25
Exploitability (E) ........... Functional
Remediation Level (RL) ....... Official Fix
Report Confidence (RC) ....... Confirmed
Computed CVSS temporal score: 8.3
Skype participates in the CVSS by rating each identifiable security
vulnerability against the CVSS base metrics. In addition, Skype
may rate each vulnerability against temporal metrics from time to
time. As suggested by the name, temporal metrics for a particular
vulnerability may change from time to time.
More information about the CVSS may be obtained from the CVSS host
website at http://www.first.org/cvss/.
8. Credits and additional information
This bug was referred to SKY-CERT by an external referrer, Mark Litchfield
of Next Generation Security Software (NGSS), who did the research concerning
VCARD importation. Based on this, Mark Rowe of Pentest Limited identified
the same bug as it related to long URL handling. We would like to thank and
credit these individuals for having referred this issue to Skype.
9. Bulletin release history
2005-10-25 Initial bulletin release
2005-10-27 Updated to correct credit information
10. Notices
Copyright 2005 Skype Technologies, S.A. All rights reserved.
This Skype Security Bulletin may be reproduced and distributed,
provided that the Bulletin is not modified in any way and is
attributed to Skype Technologies, S.A. and provided that repro-
duction and distribution is performed for non-commercial purposes.
This Skype Security Bulletin is provided to you on an "AS IS" basis
and may contain information provided by third parties. Skype makes
no guarantees or warranties as to the information contained herein.
ANY AND ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING WITHOUT
LIMITATION WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
PURPOSE, OR NON-INFRINGEMENT, ARE HEREBY DISCLAIMED.
SKYPE-SB/2005-003: Heap overflow in networking routine
Bulletin title: Heap overflow in networking routine
Bulletin ID: SKYPE-SB/2005-003
Bulletin status: FINAL
Date of announcement: 2005-10-25 08:00:00 +0000
Date of last revision: 2005-10-27 15:06:11 +0000
Products affected: Skype client (all platforms)
Vulnerability type: Heap overflow
CVE references: CVE-2005-3267
Risk assessment: HIGH
CVSS base score: 8.0 (AV:R/AC:H/Au:NR/C:C/I:C/A:C/B:A)
Cross-references: None
Table of contents:
1. Problem
<http://www.skype.com/security/skype-sb-2005-03.html#section1> description
and brief discussion
2. Impact
<http://www.skype.com/security/skype-sb-2005-03.html#section2> and affected
software
3. Solution
<http://www.skype.com/security/skype-sb-2005-03.html#section3> or
work-around
4. Special
<http://www.skype.com/security/skype-sb-2005-03.html#section4> instructions
and notes
5. Software
<http://www.skype.com/security/skype-sb-2005-03.html#section5> download
location
6. Authenticity
<http://www.skype.com/security/skype-sb-2005-03.html#section6> verification
7. Common
<http://www.skype.com/security/skype-sb-2005-03.html#section7> Vulnerability
Scoring System (CVSS) assessment
8. Credits
<http://www.skype.com/security/skype-sb-2005-03.html#section8> and
additional information
9. Bulletin
<http://www.skype.com/security/skype-sb-2005-03.html#section9> release
history
10. Notices
<http://www.skype.com/security/skype-sb-2005-03.html#section10>
1. Problem description and brief discussion
Description
A security bug in the Skype user client, for all platforms, has
been identified and fixed.
Skype can be remotely forced to crash due to an error in bounds
checking in a specific networking routine.
Discussion
An attacker who sends a stream of specifically-crafted network
traffic to a Skype client network can cause the client to overwrite
part of the heap, including the heap integrity control data. Since
the attacker cannot control the address where the data is written,
the most likely effect will be that the Skype will abort execution
due to an internal error, although other unpredictable behavior is
possible.
Such a crash will lead to a loss of availability of the Skype
application until it is restarted by the user. Skype has been able
to induce Skype clients to crash, but has not been able to cause the
client to execute specific instructions.
This is tracked by Mitre CVE ID CVE-2005-3267.
2. Impact and affected software
Impact
An attacked Skype client may crash.
Affected software
The following Skype clients are vulnerable to this attack:
Skype for Windows:
All releases prior to and including 1.4.*.83
Skype for Mac OS X:
All releases prior to and including 1.3.*.16
Skype for Linux:
All releases prior to and including 1.2.*.17
Skype for Pocket PC:
All releases prior to and including 1.1.*.6
3. Solution or work-around
An official fix to the issue covered by this Security Bulletin has
been released. To implement this fix, update to one of the
following releases of Skype. (Downloading instructions are shown
in Section 4 of this Bulletin.)
Skype for Windows:
Release 1.4.*.84 or later
Skype for Mac OS X:
Release 1.3.*.17 or later
Skype for Linux:
Release 1.1.*.20 or later
Skype for Pocket PC:
No patch is yet available. This bulletin will be updated when it
has been made available.
4. Special instructions and notes
None.
5. Software download location
The preferred method for installing security updates is to download
the software directly from Skype's website, from the website of
Skype's authorized partners, or from a reliable mirror site. Skype
may also be safely downloaded from other locations, but in this
case it is particularly important that you verify the authenticity
of the download.
We recommend that once you download any Skype software that you
verify its integrity by the methods listed in Section 6 of this
Bulletin.
You may install Skype by running the Skype installer using the
installation commands displayed under the appropriate operating
system listed at http://www.skype.com/download/.
x86 platform, Microsoft Windows 2000 or Microsoft Windows XP:
http://www.skype.com/products/skype/windows/
x86 platform, Linux:
http://www.skype.com/products/skype/linux/
PPC platform, Mac OS X v10.3 (Panther) or later:
http://www.skype.com/products/skype/macosx/
Pocket PC platform, Microsoft Windows Mobile 2003:
http://www.skype.com/products/skype/pocketpc/
6. Authenticity verification
- Bulletin authenticity verification:
Skype security bulletins are published on Skype's web site and
via mailing lists. The authenticity and integrity of a Skype
security bulletins may be determined by inspecting the crypto-
graphic signature that is attached to each bulletin. All Skype
security bulletins are published with a valid digital signature
produced by PGP.
- Software authenticity verification:
Both the Skype installer program and the Skype program that is
installed by the installer are digitally signed.
For Skype software built for Microsoft Windows operating
environments, the digital certificate used by Skype to sign
software packages is signed by "VeriSign Class 3 Code Signing 2004
CA".
For Skype software built for Linux platforms, all packages are
signed by PGP key ID 0xD66B746E, the public component of which may
be downloaded from http://www.skype.com/products/skype/linux/.
- For general information about Skype security, please visit the
Skype Security Resource Center at http://www.skype.com/security/.
7. Common Vulnerability Assessment System (CVSS) assessment
Skype has rated the issue covered by this Security Bulletin under
the CVSS scheme as follows:
Base metrics:
Access Vector (AV) ........... Remote
Access Complexity (AC) ....... High
Authentication (Au) .....,.... Not Required
Confidentiality Impact (C) ... Complete
Integrity Impact (I) ......... Complete
Availability Impact (A) ...... Complete
Impact Bias (B) .............. Availability
Computed CVSS base score: 8.0
Temporal metrics as of 2005-10-25
Exploitability (E) ........... Proof of Concept
Remediation Level (RL) ....... Official Fix
Report Confidence (RC) ....... Confirmed
Computed CVSS temporal score: 6.3
Skype participates in the CVSS by rating each identifiable security
vulnerability against the CVSS base metrics. In addition, Skype
may rate each vulnerability against temporal metrics from time to
time. As suggested by the name, temporal metrics for a particular
vulnerability may change from time to time.
More information about the CVSS may be obtained from the CVSS host
website at http://www.first.org/cvss/.
8. Credits and additional information
This bug was simultaneously referred to SKY-CERT by two independent sources,
one internal to Skype and one external. We would like to thank and
acknowledge the external referrer, the EADS Corporate Research Center
security lab, for having referred this issue to Skype.
9. Bulletin release history
2005-10-25 Initial bulletin release
2005-10-25 Corrected credit information at the request of Imad Lahoud of the
EADS Corporate Research Center
2005-10-27 Updated to reflect release of updated software for Skype for
PocketPC
10. Notices
Copyright 2005 Skype Technologies, S.A. All rights reserved.
This Skype Security Bulletin may be reproduced and distributed,
provided that the Bulletin is not modified in any way and is
attributed to Skype Technologies, S.A. and provided that repro-
duction and distribution is performed for non-commercial purposes.
This Skype Security Bulletin is provided to you on an "AS IS" basis
and may contain information provided by third parties. Skype makes
no guarantees or warranties as to the information contained herein.
ANY AND ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING WITHOUT
LIMITATION WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
PURPOSE, OR NON-INFRINGEMENT, ARE HEREBY DISCLAIMED.
[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Sponsor --------------------~-->
Get fast access to your favorite Yahoo! Groups. Make Yahoo! your home page
http://us.click.yahoo.com/dpRU5A/wUILAA/yQLSAA/TySplB/TM
--------------------------------------------------------------------~->
--------------------------
Want to discuss this topic? Head on over to our discussion list, [EMAIL
PROTECTED]
--------------------------
Brooks Isoldi, editor
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
http://www.intellnet.org
Post message: [email protected]
Subscribe: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Unsubscribe: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
*** FAIR USE NOTICE. This message contains copyrighted material whose use has
not been specifically authorized by the copyright owner. OSINT, as a part of
The Intelligence Network, is making it available without profit to OSINT
YahooGroups members who have expressed a prior interest in receiving the
included information in their efforts to advance the understanding of
intelligence and law enforcement organizations, their activities, methods,
techniques, human rights, civil liberties, social justice and other
intelligence related issues, for non-profit research and educational purposes
only. We believe that this constitutes a 'fair use' of the copyrighted material
as provided for in section 107 of the U.S. Copyright Law. If you wish to use
this copyrighted material for purposes of your own that go beyond 'fair use,'
you must obtain permission from the copyright owner.
For more information go to:
http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/107.shtml
Yahoo! Groups Links
<*> To visit your group on the web, go to:
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/osint/
<*> To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to:
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
<*> Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to:
http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/