Nov 3, 2005
British Arabism and the bombings in Iran By Mahan Abedin and Kaveh Farrokh
[From: Asia Times Online]

Following the recent bomb attack in Ahwaz and the riots and bombings in late
spring, the Iranian government, as well as other sections of Iranian society
both inside and outside the country, has pointed an accusing finger at the
United Kingdom.

On the surface the accusations seem implausible, not least because they
invoke irrational Iranian fears of British guile and omnipotence.
However, there is a mass of evidence that connects the British secret state
to Arab separatism in Iran.

Whether these connections make the United Kingdom complicit in the recent
troubles in Khuzestan is currently unclear. But, at the very least, the
British connection fatally undermines claims that the recent troubles in
Iran's strategic southwestern province are either wholly rooted in local
conditions or the work of elements in the Islamic republic who seek to
"militarize" the country.

British Arabism

An in-depth understanding of the British sponsorship of Arab separatism in
Iran requires an understanding of British Arabism in its entirety. Francis
Fukuyama, in his description of the American Arabists, opines that they are
"... a sociological phenomenon ...
Arabists not only take on the cause of the Arabs, but also the Arabs'
tendency for self-delusion".

That tendency for self-delusion is vividly expressed by the main tenets of
Arab nationalism, which views all non-Arab Muslim peoples as subsidiary to
the Arab language and culture. Moreover, Robert Kaplan observes that
psychologically the English-speaking Arabist is "obsessed with the Arabs ...
a defining Arabist trait". This psychological process is subsumed under
British commercial and political interests. This is vividly exemplified in
the case of T E Lawrence, as defined by Kaplan (1993): "Lawrence ... among
Arabs in the desert ... became pro-Arab; in Whitehall he was pro-Empire."

British Arabism can trace its origins to geopolitical imperialism, namely
the need to project political, economic, and if necessary, military power
into Persia. The first official Arabists are Sir Charles Lyall (1845-1920)
and William Muit, both civil servants of the British East India Company.

Lyall published works on Arabic literature, including pre-Islamic odes,
while Muit wrote extensively about the Arab caliphate. It is difficult to
ascertain why they were so keenly interested specifically in Arabic, as
Arabic, along with Persian and Sanskrit, had been banned from India's
educational system since the 1830s. Another early Arabist was a Cambridge
professor, E H Palmer, whose knowledge of Arabic was useful in his role as a
secret agent in Egypt, where he died in action in August 1882.

It was in the Arab Bureau of Cairo, however, where British Arabism was
formally implemented as a tool for the advancement of British geopolitical
and economic interests. The Arab Bureau was set up on February 4, 1916. It
was from here that the British coordinated their activities with the local
Arab sheikhs of the Persian Gulf.

Their main mission by World War I was to foster an Arab rebellion by way of
the invention of Arab nationalism, a domain viewed as a "product" by the
British Foreign Office and the Arab Bureau. The primary objective was to
accomplish the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. Arab nationalism, since
the conclusion of World War I, has been encouraged to focus itself against
Iran, an ideological proclivity that was taken to its logical extremes by
the Ba'athist regime of Saddam Hussein.

Today, the Arab Bureau survives in the form of various innocuous-sounding
organizations, namely the Arab-British Center, the CAABU (Council for the
Advancement of Arab-British Understanding), the Arab-British Charitable
Trust, the Labor Middle East Council, the Anglo-Arab Association and (until
1979) MECAS (Middle East Center for Arab Studies).

While British Arabism has penetrated many sectors of British national life,
it is particularly influential in the intelligence, academic and media
fields. It is interesting to note that British academic Arabists do not
focus on the entire Arab world, which includes Egypt and Libya.
Instead, the British academic Arabists have been almost exclusively
preoccupied with the eastern Arab world, which is contiguous to Iran
(historical Persia) and the Persian Gulf, areas rich in fossil fuels and
hence of prime importance to British economic and commercial interests.

To summarize, British Arabism, although a genuine academic discipline and
psychological condition, is ultimately a device for furthering British
interests in the Middle East. Moreover, the apparent advocacy of Arab issues
among British Arabists is selective in three ways:

# They have remained largely silent (or neutral) with respect to the
Arab-Palestinian disputes with the Israelis.
# They have opposed the formation of a single unified Arab superstate along
the lines proposed by T E Lawrence.
# They actively support anti-Persian views with respect to the role of
Persia in the geography, linguistics, anthropology, archaeology, history and
culture of Islam, the Arabic world, and the Persian Gulf.

British intelligence and Iranian Arab separatists

The severing of Iran's Khuzestan province and its "Arabization" has been a
long-held British goal. In fact, this policy was made clear in the November
2, 1944 editorial of the Times of London, which proposed Iran's
dismemberment by having Khuzestan appropriated by the British.

To achieve this long-term objective, British Arabists have supported Arab
nationalist activities (academic and military) against Iran and in Khuzestan
in particular. Needless to say, this plan neatly converged with the ideology
and geopolitical aspirations of Arab nationalists, particularly of the
Ba'athist variety.

When Iraq invaded Iran on September 22, 1980, with the stated intent of
annexing Khuzestan, the BBC news network and English print media, as well as
other major Western media outlets, provided full overage of the Iraqi
invasion in the first week.

There were two main premises to the reporting: (a) Iranian resistance would
collapse quickly; (b) the Arabs of Khuzestan would fully support the
invasion. These premises proved to be utterly unfounded, with Iranian
resistance actually stiffening, leading to the permanent expulsion of
Saddam's armies from Khuzestan in 1982. The vast majority of Iranian Arabs
not only did not support Saddam, but were in fact at the forefront of
resistance to the Iraqi invaders.

The failed Iraqi invasion of Khuzestan (which was partly based on British
invasion plans dating back to 1937) has been, to date, the most concerted
and determined effort to sever the province from Iran.
The fact that it failed was a massive blow to small groups of separatists in
the area, and they would have likely faded away had it not been for the
patronage of the Iraqi and British intelligence services.

Although Iranian Arab separatists have had a presence in the UK since the
1970s, their activities became noteworthy after the 1979 Islamic revolution.
Working in concert with Iraqi intelligence services, Khuzestani separatists
engaged in low-level sabotage operations against Iranian interests in the UK
and mainland European countries.

These sabotage activities reached a dramatic climax on April 30, 1980 when
Iraqi-backed Khuzestani separatists seized the Iranian Embassy in London.
The subsequent siege lasted for five days, during which time Iraqi agents
killed two of the embassy's staff. But the terrorists offered virtually no
resistance when Britain's elite Special Air Services stormed the embassy
building, killing five out of the six Iraqi agents.

The dramatic events at the embassy were very much the exception to the rule,
as far as British pressure on UK-based Khuzestani separatists was concerned.
Indeed, from the early 1980s, the UK has been home to almost all expatriate
Khuzestani separatists (with a small number also based in Baghdad), where
their activities are tolerated as long as they do not engage in brazen acts
of violence on British soil.

Behind the scenes, however, British toleration in the 1980s translated into
active cooperation with the separatists. In some cases, the British even
shared separatist agents with the Iraqi intelligence services. In two
specific cases dating back to 1985, the British used Khuzestani separatists
to infiltrate the Iranian consulate in Manchester and the Iranian Air Force
logistics office in the National Iranian Oil Company office in Westminster.

It is interesting to note that both the Iranian consulate in Manchester and
the logistics office were closed down by the British government in 1987. It
is unclear whether information supplied by the separatist agents was a
decisive factor in the closure of these establishments.

But the spirit of public toleration and private cooperation collapsed,
almost overnight, after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990.
Saddam's brazen challenge to the West and Iraq's desire to change the
geopolitical balance of the region forced Western intelligence services to
cease their cooperation with their Iraqi counterparts. Khuzestani Arab
separatists were one of the many victims of this sudden collapse in
relations between Iraq and the West.

The Gulf War of early 1991 and the catastrophic defeat of Iraq further added
to the separatists' woes. Today, Khuzestani separatist spokesmen in the UK
claim that their cooperation with Iraqi intelligence services ended after
the Iran-Iraq War in 1988.

While it is clearly convenient for the separatists to make such claims, this
stance raises far more questions than answers. Firstly, intelligence links
(particularly those that are deep-rooted and underpinned by ideological
affinity, as in the case of the Khuzestani separatists and the Iraqi
Ba'athists) are too complex to be severed so immediately and abruptly.

Secondly, given that Khuzestani separatism (because of its unpopularity with
almost all Iranian Arabs) is only viable when allied to the foreign policy
of a powerful state, severing links with the Iraqis would have been followed
by patronage by another state.

But this was not the case. The only other state with the historical
motivation, connections and unique resources to consistently support the
separatists is the United Kingdom, but evidence strongly suggests that the
British authorities dramatically decreased their cooperation after the
events of 1990 and early 1991. Indeed, in some cases the British even put up
serious obstacles, for instance making it difficult for separatists to
travel to countries such as Greece, Cyprus, Turkey and Lebanon to meet with
their Iraqi handlers.

British government opposition notwithstanding, Khuzestani separatists
continued to operate in the UK in the 1990s. In many cases they were
absorbed by the Anglo-Arab organizations mentioned earlier. While in many
cases these organizations are engaged in genuine academic, media and
advocacy work, there is little doubt that they are ultimately controlled by
the British secret state.

The US-led invasion and occupation of Iraq in 2003 and the consequent
pressures this has exerted on Iran has made Khuzestani separatism (and other
separatist movements in Iran) relevant insofar as it can be used by the West
as a pressure point on Tehran. The recent events in Khuzestan are a good
example of this.

Trouble in Khuzestan

The riots and bomb attacks that occurred in Khuzestan in late spring,
coupled with the latest bombing, have been attributed to widely different
causes. The Iranian government claims that both the riots and the bombings
were essentially the work of foreign elements.

The Khuzestani separatists in the UK, anxious to deflect attention from
separatist violence, pin the blame on elements in the Islamic republic which
seek to militarize the country. Both positions suffer from serious flaws.

Firstly, while the Iranian government is correct to attribute the bombings
to foreign elements, it is not being wholly truthful when it dismisses the
riots as foreign-inspired. Iranian Arabs in Khuzestan have a number of
economic grievances, with roots that may go back decades. These economic
woes were sharply exacerbated by the failed Iraqi invasion of Khuzestan,
which destroyed the livelihoods of many Iranian Arabs. It would be safe to
assume that economic grievances were, at the very least, a factor in the
riots of late spring.

Secondly, the Khuzestani separatist position that the bombings were the work
of the Iranian government smacks of clumsily constructed conspiracy theory
that does not stand up to even perfunctory scrutiny.
The statement by the Khuzestani separatist spokesman that the bombings were
either the work of the "Pasdaran or the Basij" immediately discredits their
argument, as the Basij and the Pasdaran (Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps)
are effectively the same entity.

The contention that terrorist organizations do not target their own people
is clearly false, as virtually every terrorist organization in the world has
victims (in varying degrees) among the people they purports to represent.
Furthermore, claims that the Khuzestani separatists are "non-violent" fly in
the face of their actual record (the seizure of the Iranian Embassy in
London and the killing of two of its employees was clearly not an example of
peaceful activism) and is in fact oxymoronic: how can dismembering a nation
and producing false historical narratives be achieved by "non-violence"?

Sources in Tehran are in little doubt that the recent bombings are the work
of separatists in Khuzestan who are ultimately controlled by the remnants of
the former Iraqi intelligence services. These intelligence services
controlled impressive intelligence and sabotage networks in Khuzestan, and
it is safe to assume that some of these networks have remained intact since
the collapse of the Ba'athist regime in April 2003.

The motivation behind the bombings is not altogether clear. While sources in
Tehran claim that former officers of Iraq's Istikhbarat and Mukhabarat
agencies are keen to export the Iraqi insurgency into Iran, it is unclear
how this can be done with infrequent and isolated bombings in Khuzestan.

A more likely explanation is that the remnants of Istikhbarat and Mukhabarat
are exacting revenge on Iran for the targeted assassinations of their
members since the collapse of the Ba'athist regime. A generally
under-reported feature of the troubles in Iraq is the very careful and
systematic targeting of influential elements in the former regime by either
Shi'ite organizations (in particular the Badr Organization - formerly the
Badr Corps - of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq) or
by covert Iranian operatives in Iraq. The Badr organization has been
particularly prolific in this regard, and has recently been accused of even
targeting Arab Sunni pilots in the Iraqi air force.

Iranian allegations that the British government is complicit in this
terrorist campaign have as yet not been substantiated by any evidence on the
ground. But warming relations between the British government and the very
small number of Khuzestani Arab separatists in the UK does raise concerns
about the British government's position on this complex situation.

But it is important to place these concerns in perspective, not least
because, contrary to their claims, the Khuzestani separatists have no proper
organization in the UK. Their presence is reducible to a few key
personalities who run several websites that try to create the impression
that there are large socio-political networks behind them. [1]

What all these websites have in common is the desire to produce a spurious
ethnic counter-narrative. To do this the Khuzestani separatists (and their
British patrons) amalgamate a series of suppositions, half-truths and myths.
All of this is underpinned by the assertion that the Arabs in Khuzestan
constitute a majority, yet no valid ethnic statistics have been produced to
verify such claims.

Little mention is made of the fact that Khuzestan is inhabited not only by
Arabs but by an array of ethnic groups, including Bakhtiaris, Behbahanis,
Lurs in the north, Afshari and Qashqai tribes, and Persians in the major
cities.

Moreover, the separatists' counter-narrative is guided by a very biased
selection of information and the retroactive Arabization of Iranian history
and civilization. Furthermore, claims that Arabs in Iran constitute a
persecuted minority are as false as they are amusing. In fact, since the
Islamic revolution of 1979, the Iranian government has gone out of its way
to promote the Arabic language (at the expense of Persian) in its drive to
"Islamize" Iranian society.

It is also important to note that Iran's current defense minister, Ali
Shamkhani, is an ethnic Arab from Khuzestan. Claims by Khuzestani
separatists that the Iranian regime is engaged in the persecution of
minorities is particularly strange when one considers the fact that the
Islamic republic has shown extreme sympathy for Arab causes both inside and
outside of Iran.

Conclusion

The terrorist campaign in Iran's Khuzestan province is essentially a
by-product of the invasion and occupation of Iraq. There can be little doubt
that the terrorists are ultimately controlled by insurgent networks in Iraq.
There is simply no other rational or convincing explanation for these
unusual events.

Moreover, the deteriorating security situation in Iraq makes it likely that
Khuzestan will continue to experience terrorist bombings for the foreseeable
future.

While the Iranian government is keen to implicate the British in the
terrorist campaign for obvious propaganda and counter-propaganda reasons,
the British have much to answer for their historical connections to
Khuzestani separatists. Furthermore, it is clear that the British see the
situation in Khuzestan, and the presence of separatists in the UK, as a
useful pressure point on the Islamic republic, as the stand-off over Iran's
nuclear infrastructure steadily deteriorates into a crisis.

In the final analysis, Khuzestani Arab separatism does not pose any serious
threat to Iran's territorial integrity. The only entity with the overriding
ideological and geopolitical motivation to provide significant support to
Khuzestani separatists was a strong Iraqi state, and this was blasted away -
probably forever - by the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003.

Note
[1] The main so-called "Ahwazi" websites are the following:
# al-Ahwaz This site has a fancy introduction along with a "national
anthem". Their symbols are almost a carbon copy of Ba'athist Party insignia
(note the Ba'athist eagle). There is a Persian version of the al-Ahwaz site.
# The Ahwaz Studies Center purports to be an academic establishment, when in
fact it is an anti-Persian site complaining of "ethnic cleansing". This is a
dangerous and misleading term - falsely implying violence. For instance, the
article on Minoo Island conveniently fails to mention that in any industrial
project people are relocated.
# The London-based British-Ahwazi Friendship Association is a relatively new
site and claims as its chairman Daniel Brett, an Englishman. The site is
linked directly to the aforementioned Ahwaz Studies Center, the Democratic
Solidarity Party of Ahwaz, Ahwaz Human Rights Organization, and al-Ahwaz
Television. Interestingly, the site is also selectively linked to other
separatist organizations such as "The Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan"
as well as to the "Iraqi Turkmen Human Rights" organization. Of interest is
the "treasurer" of the British-Ahwazi Friendship Association: Mansour
Silawi-Ahwazi, who also hosts a separate and particularly amusing site. On
this he posted An Arab National Re-Birth Searching for its Identity in an
attempt to convey the impression of a separate Arab state since 4000 BC; ie
about 4,500 years before the efflorescence of Arab civilization on the
Arabian peninsula.

Mahan Abedin is the editor of Terrorism Monitor, which is published by the
Jamestown Foundation, a non-profit organization specializing in research and
analysis on conflict and instability in Eurasia. The views expressed here
are his own.

Dr Kaveh Farrokh has a PhD from the University of British Columbia,
specializing in the cognitive and linguistic processes of Persian. He has
researched and written extensively on the role of British imperialism in
Persia, as well as the pan-Turanian movement. His book, Sassanian Elite
Cavalry AD 224-642 was published by Osprey Publishing.
He lectures on the history of pre-Islamic Persia at the University of
British Columbia in Vancouver. A new book encompassing Persia's military and
cultural relations with the Greco-Roman world between
553BC-637 AD is due to be released in the fall of 2006. 

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/GK03Ak02.html

......................................................................

British Offices In Iran Struck By Bombers In Second Mysterious Attack Nov
02, 2005 JUS News Desk

In what is sure to be used as cannon fodder for the war addicted neocons,
bombers struck the offices of British Airways Plc and BP Plc in Tehran for
the second time in three months today. While no one was hurt in the small
blast it surely leaves room for speculation as to who may be behind this
uprising. With Tehran obstructing UK imports and accusing London of inciting
Arab separatist bomb attacks in the southwestern oil province of Khuzestan,
there may be little guesswork.

A small device exploded on the 10th floor of the Sayeh Tower, without
causing injuries. The bomb exploded in the fire escape of the tower on Vali
Asr Avenue in northern Tehran. The last attack on the same floor of the
15-story building was on August 2, 2005.

The blast comes amid mounting tensions between Iran and Britain over the
Islamic republic's nuclear program, alleged Iranian meddling in Iraq and
after a recent call by President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad for Israel to be 'wiped
off the map' that triggered a fuss in Washington. This further attack in the
Middle East's second-largest oil producer, Iran is said to need management
and technical expertise for its oil industry as it struggles to meet its
OPEC quota amid surging prices.

While Britain is downplaying a British connection to the blast, noting that
the complex targeted also houses a number of other international companies,
not just British ones, the target was clearly Britain. There has been no
claim of responsibility for the bombing that is sure to leave some
considering how far the warmongers will go to invoke support the invasion of
this sovereign nation. (JUS)

http://www.jihadunspun.net/intheatre_internal.php?article=5111&list==/home.
php&





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