Great powers in the Middle East
Russia is not a piece of furniture Apr 20th 2006 | MOSCOW >From The Economist print edition Kremlin watchers wonder what Vladimir Putin is up to with Hamas and Iran http://www.economist.com/world/europe/displaystory.cfm?story_id=6829280 A LONG wait for a meeting at a Russian naval base was enlivened recently by a curious overheard conversation. A retired Russian officer said he was trying to claim a financial allowance due for combat service rendered in Soviet times. Where was it? In the 1980s, he said, off the coast of Lebanon. At that time, the Middle East was one of the main arenas for proxy cold-war confrontation. And it increasingly seems to be the region selected by Russia for a renewed tussle for influence with its old rival. This week, Russia re-stated the positions that, to America's discomfort, it has staked out on two combustible regional issues: how to deal with Hamas-victors in January's Palestinian election-and how to handle Iran. At a diplomatic powwow in Moscow, the Russians reiterated their opposition to the use of either force or sanctions to deter Iran's nuclear ambitions. Meanwhile, Russia agreed to provide the Hamas-led Palestinian Authority (PA) with financial aid-America and the European Union having suspended theirs-this week's suicide bombing in Tel Aviv notwithstanding. On the face of it, Russia's dalliance with Hamas, and patience with Iran, look odd, given Russia's own experience of Islamist terrorism, Iran's proximity to Russia's volatile north Caucasus, and the valuable role Russia enjoys as the region's sole official nuclear power. Dmitri Peskov, a Kremlin spokesman, insists that Russia's sensitivity on Iran is equal to America's. But look closely, and their interests arguably differ. To the Kremlin, Iran has been a well-behaved neighbour, which has kept out of Chechnya, and the Russians want to keep it that way. Russia is less anxious than America about Israel's security. Dimitri Simes, of the Nixon Center in Washington, says a nuclear Pakistan, which America regards as an ally, is a bigger worry in Moscow than is Iran. Cash is also at stake: Russia is helping to build a nuclear plant for the Iranians. Last year it promised them a batch of ground-to-air missiles-though they have yet to be delivered, and won't be, if the Americans get their way. More important than these concerns, however, may be another, uniquely Russian kind of interest. Dmitri Trenin, of the Moscow Carnegie Centre, says the Kremlin's aim in the Middle East is to show that "Russia is not a piece of furniture." Or, as one American administration official puts it, the message is, "We're back." Oil at $70 a barrel, he says, has inculcated "a self-confidence [in Moscow] that we haven't seen since the break-up of the Soviet Union". To prove it is not a piece of furniture, Russia needs to do something visibly different from America. And as Georgy Mirsky, a Moscow-based analyst, argues, for one reason or another the Middle East is the best place for Russia to do it. This new imperative seems the best explanation for the invitation issued by Vladimir Putin, Russia's president, for the leaders of Hamas to visit Moscow, which they did last month. The public rationale is that Hamas won a democratic election; that dialogue is better than isolation; and, moreover, that Russia has not officially designated Hamas a terrorist group, as other governments have: perhaps it can be converted to peaceful politics, as was the Irish Republican Army. Yevgeny Primakov, an ex-prime and foreign minister still thought to wield influence, says its historically good relations with the Palestinians, Syrians and others give Russia "special opportunities" in the Middle East. Mr Primakov says he is sure the Hamas initiative was quietly agreed with America and other parties, even though they squawked in public. Actually, says that American official, "we were very, very unhappy." The decision to fund the Hamas-led PA has taken Russia even further from the previously agreed line. The Hamas poll win-a "great blow" to American policy, crowed Mr Putin-seems to have created a perfect, if temporary, match. As Avinoam Idan, formerly an Israeli diplomat in Moscow, puts it, Hamas was looking for recognition; the Kremlin was looking for a chance to demonstrate its independence. And rather than the considered wiliness for which Mr Primakov was once renowned, the Hamas invitation announced by Mr Putin looks like evidence of a different trend: the Kremlin's tightening grip on policymaking. Americans say that Russia's foreign ministry was as surprised by the move as they were. Divining who in the Kremlin has the president's ear is tricky; but among them, says Mr Mirsky, are some who are schooled to befriend "any thug in the world who declared himself anti-American". There are some, says Mr Simes, who feel Mr Putin and his predecessor, Boris Yeltsin, were too obliging to America over Kosovo, Iraq and America's incursions in Central Asia. Many top officials regard America's promotion of pro-western forces in the former Soviet states as a provocation, and the stalling of Russian efforts to join the World Trade Organisation as deliberate American sabotage. Russians become doubly suspicious when they see signs of a link, however tenuous, between America's cultivation of new friends in the ex-Soviet world, and its broader Middle East policy-take, for example, the fact that Georgia recently raised its contribution to the American-led coalition in Iraq. "We want to be contributors as well as consumers of security, and the Russians scold us for this," says Nino Burjanadze, Georgia's parliamentary speaker. For the Russians, there is a risk that their new foreign policy may prove as counter-productive as Kremlin-run economic policy has sometimes appeared to be. Still, so far, the strategy of irking and embarrassing America in the Middle East, without risking a serious rupture, is holding up. Despite some pressure in Washington for George Bush to "punish" Mr Putin for his policies, domestic and foreign, there is little will in his administration to give Russia any more than an occasional rebuke. Iran may change that. The gap between the American and Russian positions has narrowed: the two countries, says that American official, are at least now reading from the same book, if not the same page. But as Iran has ascended the list of American preoccupations, the importance of the gap has grown. In the end, the Kremlin may have to weigh the risk of serious American displeasure, and of a nuclear Iran, against the value of its newly prized autonomy. Tactical incentives from Washington, perhaps over the World Trade Organisation, may help. In some Russian behaviour, national and personal interests (including the financial kind) are hard to disentangle. That may be the key to a strange tale that emerged recently of the intelligence alleged (by the Pentagon) to have been leaked by Russians to the Iraqis before and during the war of 2003 (the Kremlin denies it). Just as mysterious was the apparent pre-war trip to Baghdad of two hard-line, retired Russian generals, and the convoy of people, documents and who knows what else, from Baghdad to Syria, said to have been led by Russia's ambassador. The Americans seem less perturbed about all that than might have been expected. Perhaps they concluded that the implicated officials were acting alone, or consoled themselves that, whatever the Russians got up to, it made little difference in the end. Or perhaps they decided their dance with the Kremlin in the Middle East was delicate enough, without restarting old arguments. [Non-text portions of this message have been removed] -------------------------- Want to discuss this topic? Head on over to our discussion list, [EMAIL PROTECTED] -------------------------- Brooks Isoldi, editor [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.intellnet.org Post message: [email protected] Subscribe: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Unsubscribe: [EMAIL PROTECTED] *** FAIR USE NOTICE. This message contains copyrighted material whose use has not been specifically authorized by the copyright owner. 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