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Volume 4, Issue 7 (April 6, 2006) |
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Maritime Terrorism in Southeast Asia: Potential Scenarios
By Catherine <http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/analysts.php?authorid=331>
Zara Raymond
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The MV Limburg was attacked by terrorists in the Gulf of Aden in 2002, an
example of the threat posed by maritime terrorism.
In Southeast Asia, home to one of the world's most strategic sea lanes-the
Straits of Malacca, and the world's second largest port, Singapore-the
vulnerability of the maritime sector is of great concern. As a result, over
the last few years various scenarios of how terrorists might carry out an
attack in the maritime domain have been put forward by the media and
academics alike. Many of these potential scenarios are extremely unlikely
due to their complicated nature and their sheer impracticability.
Nevertheless, a great number of these scenarios have remained unchallenged
due to a lack of knowledge of the geography of the region, local shipping
patterns and the nature of the commercial shipping industry in general. This
has led to a misunderstanding of the threat posed by maritime terrorism.
This article seeks to address this problem by examining the credibility of a
number of these scenarios. In addition, several other scenarios will be
discussed which have received little or no attention in the literature on
maritime security but which if carried out by terrorist groups could
potentially have a serious impact on both Singapore and the efficient flow
of global trade through the region's strategic sea lanes.
Scenario: Ship Sunk to Block the Straits of Malacca
In an article in Singapore's major broadsheet newspaper, the Straits Times
on March 27, 2004, an "expert" on maritime security is quoted as saying that
"If terrorists want to mount a maritime strike here [Southeast Asia],
sinking a ship in the Malacca Straits is the likely attack of choice." He
goes on to say that "It would enable them to wreak economic havoc worldwide
by blocking the sea lane, and is also the easiest way to attack."
This scenario is clearly impossible for one key reason: the narrowest point
of the marked channel in the Malacca Straits is at One Fathom Bank, where
the width is 0.6 nautical miles. Even if a ship was sunk at this point,
which itself is not necessarily an easy task to accomplish, it would not
block the Straits. Ships could continue to use the waterway by simply
navigating around the sunken vessel.
Scenario: Tanker as Floating Bomb to Strike Ports
The second possible scenario was summed up by Singapore's Foreign Minister
George Yeo in a speech given to the ASEAN Regional Forum on July 29, 2005:
"Terrorists could hijack an LNG [Liquefied Natural Gas] tanker and blow it
up in Singapore harbor. Singapore, of course, would be devastated. But the
impact on global trade would also be severe and incalculable" (Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, Singapore). As this statement implies, the potential threat
of terrorists hijacking one of the many vessels passing through the region,
particularly those carrying high-risk cargos, such as LNG, crude oil or
other such inflammable chemical products, is of great concern to the
Singapore government.
In addition, the high number of pirate attacks in the region, a number of
which have involved the hijacking of these more high-risk vessels, has led
to worry that terrorists could use copycat methods to takeover a vessel for
more sinister reasons. In a visit to Malaysia in 2005, Vice Admiral Terry
Cross of the U.S. Coast Guard told the media that the ease with which pirate
attacks were taking place in the Malacca Straits could "alert terrorists to
the opportunities for seizing oil tankers" and that "these could be used as
floating bombs" (The Straits Times, April 18, 2005). In a similar vein, when
the 1,289-ton MT Tri Samudra was boarded by pirates in the Malacca Straits,
the regional manager of the International Maritime Bureau was quoted as
saying: "This is exactly the type of tanker that terrorists would likely use
to attack a shore-based port or other facility" (The Business Times
Singapore, March 15, 2005). The Tri Samudra is a chemical tanker that was
carrying a full cargo of inflammable petrochemical products when it was
hijacked.
There are a number of issues related to this scenario that need to be
considered when assessing how likely it would be and what particular form it
would take. The first issue is the differing capacity of each vessel and its
cargo to cause damage and the means by which this could be made possible by
determined terrorists. The second issue is the actual impact on the port or
facility itself.
LNG tankers and their potential role in a scenario of this kind have
probably received the most attention. In its liquid state, natural gas is
not explosive, and it is in this form that it is shipped in large quantities
via refrigerated tankers. Once in the open air, LNG quickly evaporates and
forms a highly combustible visible cloud. It has been reported that if
ignited the resulting fire could be hot enough to melt steel at a distance
of 1,200 feet, and could result in second-degree burns on exposed skin a
mile away (Council of Foreign Relations, February 11). A fire of this
magnitude would be impossible to extinguish. It would burn until all its
fuel was spent. The impact of such a fire on a port like Singapore would be
devastating. There would be loss of life and severe structural damage in the
immediate area. This would mean that the port would have to operate at a
reduced capacity, causing delays in trade and a loss of business.
The most likely way that terrorists would carry out an attack using an LNG
tanker would be to create an explosion onboard the vessel as it is rammed
into the target. If powerful enough this could rupture the hull and cause
the gas to escape. The force required to breach the hull and tank, however,
would almost certainly cause a fire at the tank location which would ignite
the gas as it escaped rather than causing a cloud of fire or plume. Thus,
the potential damage would be limited somewhat to the tanker's location.
If the vessel chosen was an oil tanker carrying crude oil or petroleum
products, its explosive capability would depend on the nature of the cargo
and whether or not the vessel had a full load. Crude oil itself is difficult
to ignite; its vapor, however, which may remain in the tanks after the
vessel has unloaded its cargo, is more easily ignited. The most likely risk
to the target port or facility is that of a localized fire, explosion
(particularly in the case of volatile petroleum products), and the
consequences of a potential oil spill.
The risk from a vessel carrying chemical products is also worrisome.
Chemical products may pose a toxicity risk in addition to being highly
volatile. Like LNG tankers, chemical tankers are designed with the maximum
provisions for safety. The vessels are designed in such a way as to maintain
space between tank walls to prevent incompatible cargos from coming into
contact with each other. The safeguards in place, however, may not always be
sufficient and may not be designed to guard against deliberate sabotage. In
addition, general cargo vessels and container ships (which may not have such
safeguards in place) are also sometimes used.
Scenario: Malacca Straits Blocked by Mines
One scenario that has not received much attention is the potential for the
Malacca Straits to be blocked by mines. There are two variations of this
scenario, both equally alarming. The first is that terrorists mine the
Straits and the authorities are alerted to this fact either by a declaration
from the perpetrators or because a ship hits a mine. The second is that
terrorists merely claim to have mined the Straits and simulate a mine attack
on a ship to add credibility to their claims. In each scenario, assuming
that there is little or no information on the exact area of the Straits that
has been mined, the impact would be the same-the Malacca Straits would be
closed to shipping traffic, forcing the vessels, particularly those on
international voyages, to reroute around the Lombok and Sunda Straits. This
would cause severe delays to shipping as these alternate routes are longer.
Additionally, shipping costs would increase and world trade would be
affected. The impact on the region's economies could be severe if the
closure lasted more than a few days.
Scenario: Missile Launched at Aircraft from Vessel
The final scenario, and again one which has not been widely discussed, is
terrorists using a portable surface-to-air missile (SAM), launched from a
ship, to bring down a commercial airliner. This would be of concern to
Singapore where planes coming into land must make their descent over the
busy shipping lane-the Singapore Straits. While arrangements may be in place
to reduce the possibility of a SAM being fired from the shore in Singapore,
the same cannot be said about ships passing off-shore.
SAMs can be purchased on the black market for a starting price of $10,000
and have a range which puts aircraft that are landing or in a holding
pattern waiting to land well within their targeting capability. The missile
could be launched from one of the many hundreds of small vessels transiting
the Singapore Straits. The impact on Singapore would be massive; not only
due to the loss of life, closure of the airport and the immediate effect on
the Singaporean economy, but because there would be no way of guaranteeing
that a similar attack would not be carried out in the future. Short of
inspecting the contents of every ship that passes though the Singapore
Straits, the law enforcement agencies can do very little to reduce this
particular threat.
Conclusion
The key to gauging the extent of the threat posed by maritime terrorism lies
not only in an assessment of the capabilities and motivations of the
terrorist groups themselves, but also in an understanding of the maritime
environment, shipping practices, the vulnerabilities of the commercial
shipping industry and the response capabilities of those agencies tasked
with safeguarding the region's shipping lanes. Uninformed claims regarding
potential maritime terrorist scenarios, which are based on a
misunderstanding or a complete lack of knowledge of these key factors, has
led to a misinterpretation of the threat from maritime terrorism. This must
be rectified if there is to be any hope of reducing the threat.
Find this article at:
http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2369950
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