http://blogs.theatlantic.com/aspen/index.php?/archives/26-The-Quiet-Subversi on-of-Sir-Richard-Dearlove.html#extended
<http://blogs.theatlantic.com/aspen/index.php?/archives/14-Saving-This-One-f or-Tomorrow.html> Saving This One for Tomorrow Since nearly all members of your blogging team were present at a (very interesting) session just ended on "Terrorism and Technology," I suspect that you'll get an overview of the presenters and their points from one of them. I'm writing to put down a marker for one tantalizing theme that didn't end up getting explored in the Q&A. As it happens, I'll have a chance to ask more about it tomorrow, when I'm scheduled to moderate a discussion that includes the person who made the point. The speaker in question was Sir Richard Dearlove. He is famous as a former director of MI6, Britain's secret intelligence service, and he was favored on this panel by being addressed as "Sir Richard" when the other people were "Jim" or "Danny." Without ramming home the point, at four or five instances he suggested that just about everything in the American approach to the war on Islamic terrorism had been ill-conceived. The minor instances came when the other participants, all American, talked about this or that reorganization of the intelligence agencies or the Department of Homeland Security, and Sir Richard (I can't really call him "Dearlove," can I? Maybe "C," his James Bondish organizational name?) confined himself to a one-liner about such organizational details usually being the least important aspects of creating an effective intelligence system. The Americans talked about the expansion of executive power after 9/11, and worried about the larger tension between civil liberties and military security. "C" wrapped up that discussion in two sentences, saying (a) that whenever civil liberties were being infringed, it was crucial that the change be made through legislation rather than sheer executive action, since it built in at least the chance of political debate; and (b) that what had been done via executive action in the United States "would be illegal in Great Britain, as a matter of common law." But the main tension involved the larger U.S. emphasis on a "Global War on Terror." "Terrorism is an extreme form of political communication," he said. "You want to be sure that, in your response, you don't end up amplifying the messages that terrorists are trying to convey." This understanding, he said, explained why his country approach counter-terrorism in so different a way from America's. That's what I wanted to hear more about - in what ways, exactly, he thinks the United States might have "amplified" the Al Qaeda message, and what a different approach would look like. Similarly, he threw out the assertion that the only way to live with a terrorist threat was through "risk management," as opposed to the "risk minimization" that he said the United States had erred in adopting. Where would all this lead, as a matter of concept and of policy? That's one of the things I'll hope to find out tomorrow. As <http://blogs.theatlantic.com/aspen/index.php?/archives/14-Saving-This-One-f or-Tomorrow.html> mentioned earlier, I had some left over questions to ask Sir Richard Dearlove - aka "C," the former head of Britain's MI6. At a forum two days ago, he had given off numerous small signals about his disapproval of the general U.S. strategy in the "Long War" or "Global War on Terror." I wanted to hear more about those - and about his role in the famous Downing Street Memo, in which he reported to the Blair government in the summer of 2002 that in the United States intelligence was "being fixed around the policy" and that an invasion of Iraq was "seen as inevitable." About the memo - and the Iraq war in general - he said mainly that there was little he could say. "I am less than two years out of government, and I have my pension," he said, making a joke of it - but then added that even after two years he would probably not feel free to speak further on this point. "Check out the archives in Pembroke College, Cambridge in a hundred years!" he said. He recently became master of that college. He did offer this one explanation, which he said he had tried without success to get noted in the U.S. press: "The version of the memo that is most often quoted was not the final version," he said. "I made some important changes" - although he would not say what these pentimenti might have been. All this occurred as I was moderating a conversation between Dearlove and Shashi Tharoor, an Indian novelist, man of letters, and U.N. official who is in the running to be the next UN Secretary-General. The topic was the general state of terrorism in the world, and each was offering large-scale historical perspectives on the evolution of Islam, the nature of grievances against the West, and so on. Resolutely, Sir Richard continued his campaign of quiet subversion against current U.S. anti terrorism policy. To wit: . The idea of a "war" against world terrorism made sense for a while after 9/11, but as time passes the overall strategy needs to change as well. . What American policies did he have in mind when saying earlier that parts of the U.S. response would have been "illegal in Great Britain as a matter of common law"? He was thinking, especially, of "renditions" - sending prisoners to other countries in the full knowledge that they would be tortured - and the entire Guantanamo operation. (The U.S. Supreme Court is notably indifferent to what foreign laws might be, but of course it has come to a similar conclusion about Guantanamo.) . And - the point he stressed time and again, even in a bonus comment after the official program session had ended - the Western world, notably the United States, was doomed unless it reclaimed "the moral high ground." By the end of the Cold War, he said, there was no dispute world wide about which side held the moral high ground. As a professional spy master, he said that reality made it so much easier for him to recruit operatives - they would volunteer to come to him, because they believed in the cause. Therefore, as a matter of pure strategic necessity, the United States needed to behave according to its best traditions, not the exigencies of an open-ended wartime emergency. (I'm paraphrasing a little, but not taking too many liberties.) When American Democrats say things like this - as some of them occasionally screw up the courage to do - they are dismissed as pathetic one-worlders. The words are somehow more plausible coming from a man who would have been James Bond's boss. As <http://blogs.theatlantic.com/aspen/index.php?/archives/14-Saving-This-One-f or-Tomorrow.html> mentioned earlier, I had some left over questions to ask Sir Richard Dearlove - aka "C," the former head of Britain's MI6. At a forum two days ago, he had given off numerous small signals about his disapproval of the general U.S. strategy in the "Long War" or "Global War on Terror." I wanted to hear more about those - and about his role in the famous Downing Street Memo, in which he reported to the Blair government in the summer of 2002 that in the United States intelligence was "being fixed around the policy" and that an invasion of Iraq was "seen as inevitable." About the memo - and the Iraq war in general - he said mainly that there was little he could say. "I am less than two years out of government, and I have my pension," he said, making a joke of it - but then added that even after two years he would probably not feel free to speak further on this point. "Check out the archives in Pembroke College, Cambridge in a hundred years!" he said. He recently became master of that college. He did offer this one explanation, which he said he had tried without success to get noted in the U.S. press: "The version of the memo that is most often quoted was not the final version," he said. "I made some important changes" - although he would not say what these pentimenti might have been. All this occurred as I was moderating a conversation between Dearlove and Shashi Tharoor, an Indian novelist, man of letters, and U.N. official who is in the running to be the next UN Secretary-General. The topic was the general state of terrorism in the world, and each was offering large-scale historical perspectives on the evolution of Islam, the nature of grievances against the West, and so on. Resolutely, Sir Richard continued his campaign of quiet subversion against current U.S. anti terrorism policy. To wit: . The idea of a "war" against world terrorism made sense for a while after 9/11, but as time passes the overall strategy needs to change as well. . What American policies did he have in mind when saying earlier that parts of the U.S. response would have been "illegal in Great Britain as a matter of common law"? He was thinking, especially, of "renditions" - sending prisoners to other countries in the full knowledge that they would be tortured - and the entire Guantanamo operation. (The U.S. Supreme Court is notably indifferent to what foreign laws might be, but of course it has come to a similar conclusion about Guantanamo.) . And - the point he stressed time and again, even in a bonus comment after the official program session had ended - the Western world, notably the United States, was doomed unless it reclaimed "the moral high ground." By the end of the Cold War, he said, there was no dispute world wide about which side held the moral high ground. As a professional spy master, he said that reality made it so much easier for him to recruit operatives - they would volunteer to come to him, because they believed in the cause. Therefore, as a matter of pure strategic necessity, the United States needed to behave according to its best traditions, not the exigencies of an open-ended wartime emergency. (I'm paraphrasing a little, but not taking too many liberties.) When American Democrats say things like this - as some of them occasionally screw up the courage to do - they are dismissed as pathetic one-worlders. The words are somehow more plausible coming from a man who would have been James Bond's boss. [Non-text portions of this message have been removed] ------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Sponsor --------------------~--> Something is new at Yahoo! Groups. Check out the enhanced email design. http://us.click.yahoo.com/SISQkA/gOaOAA/yQLSAA/TySplB/TM --------------------------------------------------------------------~-> -------------------------- Want to discuss this topic? 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