"The power of radical ideologies, the widespread suspicion of the West, and
the general hatred of America and Israel in the Middle East today is the
Soviet Union's posthumous revenge." 
 
http://www.israpundit.com/2006/?p=1755

The World Was Going Our Way
Reviewed by Barry Rubin


The KGB and the Battle for the Third World by Christopher Andrew and Vasili
Mitrokhin.  New York: Basic Books, 2005. 677 pp. $29.95.






Hammer, Sickle, and Crescent

One of the worst mistakes ever made by the KGB, the Soviet security agency,
was to punish one of its agents, Vasili Mitrokhin,  for a critical remark
about the regime in 1972 by demoting him to archivist.  In that position,
Mitrokhin copied large numbers of documents  and hid them at his country
house.  As the Soviet Union was crumbling, he offered the cache to the
British  in exchange for his family's rescue from the country and removal to
safe haven,  which he got.

In cooperation with Christopher Andrew,  Britain's preeminent historian of
intelligence, Mitrokhin authored The Sword and the Shield, a history of
Soviet espionage against the West.  It was perhaps  the best single book
ever on the subject. Now comes the promised sequel, dealing with the KGB and
the Third World, and it does not disappoint.  The book has dramatic new
details - sometimes the kind of data that changes our view of history  - on
every part of the world,  showing how pervasive Soviet influence and
espionage was  during the Cold War.

Especially interesting  are the 120 pages dealing with the Middle East and
34 pages on Afghanistan and Islam in the USSR. The USSR viewed the Middle
East as its "backyard" and devoted a lot of effort  in an ultimately failed
effort to gain influence there. It is easy to forget that,  not so long ago,
Egypt, Iraq, Syria, and South Yemen were brimming with Soviet advisors,
money,  and weapons.

The great Soviet hope in the Middle East  was its relations with Egyptian
president Gamal Abdel Nasser. In addition to reading Egyptian codes  - the
Soviets broke most Arab codes through cryptography or burglaries against
their Moscow embassies - the Soviets recruited key agents, including Sami
Sharaf, Nasser's chief intelligence advisor. On Nasser's 1958 visit to
Moscow (where the KGB, not the Soviet foreign ministry, guided him) he was
very effectively flattered. During a performance of Swan Lake he attended,
for example, Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev told Nasser that the black
swan represented U.S. secretary of state John Foster Dulles.

Moscow supported Nasser's regime  by every means.  Soviet agent Kim Philby,
then a journalist, explained to his British readers  that Nasser had turned
Egypt into a "cooperative socialist democracy." The Soviets wrongly saw the
Egyptian army as strong,  so Israel's massive victory in 1967  took them by
surprise, leaving a grudging admiration for Israel,  anger at the Arabs  for
making Soviet weapons look useless, and a total overhaul  in Soviet
intelligence for the region.

Just after that war,  a weakened Nasser  granted more concessions  to the
Soviets, but his successor Anwar Sadat  soon turned toward the United
States.  Although the Soviets spied effectively on his secret communications
with the Americans, they chose not to support actively pro-Moscow Egyptians
plotting a coup against Sadat,  and so, were powerless to stop him. The KGB
restricted itself to forging documents to persuade Sadat  that the Americans
were tricking him  and portraying Egypt's leader in non-Egyptian Arab media
as the dupe of Jewish bankers, a CIA agent, a sexual deviant, a drug addict,
and mentally ill.  Sadat so infuriated KGB officials, some advocated his
assassination. Moscow was never directly involved in such an effort but knew
its contacts in Syrian intelligence and the Palestine Liberation
Organization were, though Islamists beat them to it in 1981.

In Iran, the Soviets, with little influence after the 1953 pro-shah coup,
focused on undermining U.S.-Iran relations. Their forgeries, pretending to
be U.S. documents ridiculing or planning to overthrow the shah, sometimes
even fooled Iran's monarch. Elaborate plans were made for sabotage inside
Iran, but the defection of a key KGB officer involved in these schemes
ensured their cancellation. The Soviets hoped the Iranian revolution would
turn in a leftist direction  but wrongly estimated  the shah was too strong
to be toppled and,  like others,  discounted any chance of an Islamist
revolution

Although the Soviets had few intelligence assets in Islamist Iran, they
continued disinformation efforts there, feeding forged documents-at times
through Yasir Arafat-about U.S. and Israeli plots to overthrow or
assassinate Khomeini. On one occasion, a tough anti-Soviet Iranian foreign
minister was fired and, along with seventy others, shot largely due to phony
coup plans cooked up by the KGB.  But when a Soviet intelligence officer in
Tehran  defected to the West, the CIA passed information to Tehran, allowing
it to expel Soviet spies and arrest 200 secret communists on charges of
spying for Moscow.

Especially fascinating  is the discussion of Soviet relations  with Saddam
Hussein, whose Stalin-worship was well known in Moscow. The KGB organized
special, secret trips for Saddam  to the late Soviet dictator's hangouts.
But Saddam shared with Stalin an abiding suspicion of everyone, including
the Soviets; he also mistrusted the Iraqi communists,  many of whom  he
executed. By 1982, however, the Iran-Iraq war pushed Saddam and the Soviets
together in trying to ensure that Iran did not win. The Soviets supplied
Scud missiles, which Iraq fired at Iranian cities. While Moscow opposed
Saddam's 1990 invasion of Kuwait, Soviet military experts showed him
satellite pictures indicating accurately how the United States was going to
attack him on the ground. Saddam viewed the material as a phony attempt to
intimidate him and ignored the warning.

The KGB's favorite Arab dictatorship was Syria where both cooperation and
infiltration of agents to key posts flourished. Even closer ideologically,
though further culturally, was South Yemen. "We wanted to prove," said the
Soviet ambassador to that country, "that a small underdeveloped Arab country
[could rapidly advance] toward the bright future provided it was armed with
the slogans of scientific socialism." It didn't work.

The Soviets were also deeply involved in backing the Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO) and terrorism, though fear of discovery made them
delegate many of these activities to European satellite states or through
Arab regimes. One of the book's most important revelations is that Wadi
Haddad, deputy leader of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
(PFLP) until his natural death in 1978, was a Soviet agent. Haddad's
philosophy was summed up in his statement, "To kill a Jew far from the
battlefield has more effect than killing hundreds of Jews in battle." The
Soviets also gave the PFLP weapons-all manufactured in other countries to
conceal their supplier. A number of PFLP operations, including kidnappings
and assassinations of American citizens as well as attacks on Israel, were
specifically approved in advance by Soviet leaders. The KGB had advance
notice of all the main PFLP terrorist attacks.

Another revelation of major importance was the identity of the KGB's most
important agent in the PLO, Hani al-Hasan, a confidante of Yasir Arafat for
four decades and, at the time of Arafat's death in 2004, his national
security advisor. His code name was GIDAR. Moscow was suspicious of Arafat
for several reasons, including his ideology, propensity to lie, and close
ties with Romanian intelligence (which the KGB distrusted). Arafat met with
the KGB and was boosted diplomatically by the Soviets but the low quality of
the trainees presented by the PLO-internal documents accused half of them of
alcoholism, passing counterfeit money, and sexual perversion-made
intelligence cooperation more difficult. So disillusioned were the Soviets
of dealing with Arafat that Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev asked in 1988,
according to an aide, "What's the point in my meeting with him?"

The World Was Going Our Way  provides a detailed account of the KGB's
strenuous efforts  to place agents in Israel  among Soviet-bloc Jewish
emigrants, starting in the late 1940s.  After some initial successes,  it
appears the Soviet regime was so riddled with anti-Semitism (which
repeatedly shows up in internal reports) and ideology that it simply could
never understand  what Israel was about.

By 1953, all Jews had been purged from the KGB  and forty years later  that
ban still held. Soviet contempt for Israel  was critical in such
intelligence failures as the prediction that Israel would never be able to
defeat Arab armies. Especially ironic is the fact that many emigrating Jews
promised to be Soviet agents  - perhaps in order to get out - and then in
the words of a KGB official "forgot their pledges as soon as they crossed
the Soviet border."

A major feature of KGB policy was its obsession with "Zionist subversion"
which was so extreme, the authors write that it


"came close to, and at times arguably crossed, the threshold of paranoid
delusion."


A 1982 KGB conference concluded that all the Soviet bloc's problems were
traceable to Zionists. One can only conclude that the overall Soviet
campaign against Israel, Jews, and Zionism bears a striking resemblance to
the thinking and behavior of the Czarist secret police or even, at times, to
the kinds of analyses prevalent in places like Saudi Arabia and Iran.

In the end, of course, Soviet efforts ended in failure. It backed the losing
side, could not get regional dictators  to do its bidding, and faced an
environment unfriendly to its ideology. Yet the KGB's efforts succeeded in a
way not generally appreciated today.

Many of its fabricated claims and arguments about the United States and
Israel did become widely accepted, not only in the Arab world but even in
many Western media and intellectual circles. The power of radical
ideologies, the widespread suspicion of the West, and the general hatred of
America and Israel in the Middle East today is the Soviet Union's posthumous
revenge.



Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs
(GLORIA) Center of the Interdisciplinary University in Israel and editor of
the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest
book is The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the
Middle East (Wiley).



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