"
 
Fund Transfers - African Terrorists Blend Old and New: Hawala and
Satellite Telecommunications
[by] Major Robert Feldman*
Intelligence Analyst, Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort
Leavenworth KS, USA.
[From: Small Wars and Insurgencies
Vol. 17, Issue 3, September 2006]

Attempts to disrupt the flow of funds through Africa used to finance
terrorism have been hindered by terrorists utilizing satellite
telecommunications in conjunction with hawala, an ancient system of
fund transfers based on trust. This arrangement leaves few records for
tracing transactions, a task made even more difficult by the general
paucity of investigators trained in the languages commonly used for
hawala. Acquiring personnel with the appropriate linguistic skills is
one of the steps agencies can take to reduce the terrorist financing
that occurs through this unique blend of an ancient system with modern
technology.

Introduction

International terrorist organizations are blending hawala, an ancient
means to transfer funds based on trust, with modern day satellite
telecommunication systems to thwart efforts by intelligence agencies
and law enforcement to detect and disrupt funding of terrorists. This
financial detection and disruption is a key objective of the war on
terror.

Millions of dollars have been funneled to al Qaeda using hawala.1 The
terrorist organization then uses hawala to disperse the moneys across
its network of operatives around the globe. It is efficient, rapid,
and relatively hard to detect. The properties of this hybrid of
ancient hawala and modern communications provide a cover difficult to
penetrate by outsiders.

Do Not Get it in Writing: Hawala

Hawala, also referred to as Hundi, is Arabic for `to change'.2 It
essentially involves the transfer of money without physically moving
funds across borders. While non-Muslims also utilize hawala, it has
come to be identified with `Islamic Banking'.

Hawala's origins are obscure. Some believe it developed in South Asia
during medieval times as a way to finance long distance trade. Texts
of Islamic jurisprudence from as early as the 8th Century AD refer to
hawala. Despite its ancient roots and appearance in religious texts,
it is used to transfer funds for modern-day illicit activities,
including the trafficking of drugs, gold, and diamonds.3,4 A
significantly more benign use of hawala, though still frustrating to
governments who wish to control it for purposes such as taxation, is
remittance of funds by migrant workers to their native lands.

There are many variations of hawala. In its most basic form a network
of brokers transfer funds. As an example, a Somali man in New York
wishes to transfer money to his father in Mogadishu. The son in New
York would give money to a hawala broker, known as a hawaladar. That
broker, in turn, would contact a hawaladar in Mogadishu. The New York
broker will provide instructions for the disposition of money to the
father, as well as agreeing to settle the debt, at a later date, the
Mogadishu broker incurs. Both brokers will take a commission.

There is a strong amount of trust built into this system. The son must
trust the hawala broker in New York to actually arrange for the
transfer of funds. The broker in Mogadishu, who paid the father with
his own money, trusts that the New York broker will at some point
reimburse him.

It might be difficult for someone from the west, where financial
transactions are based on legal instruments, to imagine an economic
system based on trust. However, the work of Fukuyama on issues related
to trust helps clarify this situation.5 Briefly, trust develops when
members of a community possess commonly shared norms such as their
beliefs in a deity. Social capital, the ability of people to work
together in groups for a common purpose, is born from that trust.
Social capital, like other forms of capital, can even be transmitted,
and is done so through cultural mechanisms such as tradition or religion.

Hawala, which is sometimes used as the word `trust', is an example of
the utilization of social capital. It depends on a group of people
working toward a common goal, which is the movement of funds. Its
roots are in both tradition, as money has long been moved that way in
certain regions of the world, and religion, Islam. Thus, as a young
man grows up in a nation such as Somalia, he readily incorporates
hawala, which is part of the culture that surrounds him, into his own
way of life. When it is time to make a financial transfer, he and
others involved in the transaction will rely on what Fukuyama calls
`prior moral consensus', which in relation to hawala means everyone
has already agreed to trust each other.

It is because of this trust that paperwork seems to be minimal to
none, though disagreement exists over how much is actually kept. Some
claim that paperwork is indeed maintained, but that it is often
obscure and difficult to follow. Other sources claim no promissory
notes are exchanged, and not even records of individual transactions
are kept in written form. Instead, the brokers only keep a running
tally of how much one owes the other. The actual amount of paperwork
created, and the degree it can be used to follow the money, probably
varies among different hawaladars.

The settlement of debts between the brokers can take several forms;
cash transactions, merchandise, and special favors being some of them.
Import/export businesses lend themselves to completing this cycle by
altering their prices on their merchandise to incorporate any debt
payments. Some of these companies even act as their own hawaladars.
Building on the previous example of the son in New York sending money
to his father in Somalia, the debt could be paid in the following
manner. The hawaladar in New York may own a rug store, while the
hawaladar in Somalia manufactures rugs. When the New York hawaladar
purchases rugs from the Somali hawaladar for resale in the United
States, he may pay over six hundred dollars for five hundred dollars
worth of rugs. The difference is the debt owed to the Somali
hawaladar. The money in this instance could be transferred using
traditional bank accounts, appearing as a legitimate business
transaction, and not including the names of the son who transferred
the money via hawala or the father who was the recipient.

Numerous examples exist in the files of Interpol of hawala being used
for illegal activities.6 In one instance convictions were obtained for
customs violations and tax fraud when a Pakistani in the Washington,
DC metropolitan area did hawala transfers for other expatriates. The
scheme involved importing surgical items manufactured in Pakistan into
the US at inflated prices, facilitating the transfer of money from the
US to Pakistan. This was in apparent violation of Pakistani law. In
another example from Interpol the results were actually lethal. Here
terrorists transferred the proceeds from the sale of narcotics to arms
dealers via hawala. They then used the military hardware in the
assassination of an Indian politician.

Interpol provides six reasons why hawala thrives despite the inherent
risks in using a system based on trust in strangers.7 Briefly, these are:

1. Cost effectiveness. This comes from low overhead (some
hawaladars have little more than a cell phone), exchange rate
speculation, and integrating hawala with existing business activities.
2. Efficiency. Most remittances take place in a day or two. It is
not dependent upon the actual moving of funds via surface mail.
3. Reliability. Unlike large banks which use several steps to
process a transaction, with each step being a potential problem,
hawala is simple, making it reliable.
4. Lack of bureaucracy. No social security number, no passport, no
bank account still means no problem.
5. Lack of a paper trail. This is especially beneficial if the
money is being laundered.
6. Tax evasion. Relating to some of the previous reasons, the
anonymity involved with hawala often lets it escape taxation.

Thus, even in countries with no formal judiciary or banking systems,
such as Somalia, hawala can still be used. However, with countries
that do have working banking systems in place, hawala is still widely
used, serving as a sort of parallel finance system outside the formal
legal one, benefiting from the lack of scrutiny as well as an absence
of taxes.

Though the exact size of the hawala system is unknown, estimates of
its magnitude in various countries abound. For example, experts
suspect approximately five billion dollars moves through hawala
networks a year in Pakistan, whereas in India it is estimated to be 40
per cent of the gross domestic product.8 Clearly the worldwide
movement of funds through hawala is immense.

Attempts to Control Hawala

With a renewed interest in terrorism and money laundering following
the attacks on 9/11, there has been a strong push to keep a closer
watch on hawala and to attempt to curtail its use by illicit groups.9
Though some countries have outlawed it, actually stopping such a
culturally ingrained practice has at times proven elusive. For almost
thirty years hawala transactions have been illegal under India's
Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, but the flow of funds continues.10

It is often uncertain whether the countries that ban hawala do so
because it can be used for illicit activities such as financing
terrorists, or because of the negative economic impact it sometimes
has on government coffers, often related to an inability to tax
transactions or benefit from skewed exchange rates. As an example,
many South Asian nations prohibit currency speculation as well as
foreign exchange transactions at anything besides the official rate of
exchange.11 Regulations also exist governing inbound and outbound
remittances. Hawala clearly flaunts these rules, often providing
better exchange rates with near total anonymity while bypassing the
tax collector.12

Specifically banning hawala by name, and only hawala, would probably
prove ineffective as there are numerous other alternative remittance
systems similar in concept. Besides, as former Treasury Secretary
O'Neill discovered during a trip to Dubai in 2002 to see the hawala
system firsthand, and aptly summarized by a BBC reporter,
`Unsurprisingly, not a single trader would admit to involvement in the
business, nor to knowledge of how it works'.13

Many countries are grappling with the complexity of still allowing
hawala while implementing at least a modicum of regulation. Part of
the problem lies with the secretive nature of hawala; countries do not
even know how much money is being transferred, nor the various forms
of hawala used to transfer it. It is difficult to legislate against
the unknown.

Another problem with attempting to regulate hawala, as Mohammed
El-Qorchi, a senior economist in the IMF's Monetary and Exchange
Affairs Department, pointed out, is that there is agreement `that
overregulation and coercive measures will not be effective because
they might push IFT [informal funds transfer] businesses, including
legal ones, underground. The purpose of any approach is not to
eliminate these systems but to avoid their misuse'.14

Some countries have implemented regulations to curtail or control
hawala. Pakistan and the United Arab Emirates require brokers to
register.15 Restricting the amount that may be transferred, or
requiring documentation of the transactions are some of the other
methods being used, though sometimes with only limited success, by
various nations.

Thus, while some countries have tried to curb hawala, especially when
used for illicit purposes, it is generally a difficult practice to
curtail. It is used by a vast number of people, often for legitimate
reasons. Indeed, a large portion of the money moved by hawala is
simply expatriates sending remittances home. There it is used to
purchase food, clothing, medicine, and other basic necessities. As
Anoor Hassan, a Somali in Dubai who trades in foodstuffs, told the
BBC, `I usually send money to my mother every month. If I don't send
the bills, they don't get the food that they eat'.16

An additional difficulty that countries such as the US have
encountered in trying to curtail hawala is that advertisements in
papers are often in foreign languages and do not expressly mention
hawala. Instead, phrases such as `sweet rupee deal' or `great rupee
deal' are ambiguously expressed, leaving enforcement agencies without
a clear-cut understanding of what is occurring.17

A lack of investigators skilled in uncovering hawala, sometimes
carefully camouflaged in such organizations as supposedly legitimate
charities, has also hindered progress in controlling it. As Professor
Barry Rider, head of London University's Institute of Advanced Legal
Studies said six months after the attack on 9/11, `That there is a
shortage of human experience in the field is undoubted. There's been a
surge of media interest, but when you go to the conferences (about
disrupting money laundering and terrorist finance) you find a
relatively small number of rather bemused people'.18

Satellite Telecommunications, a Modern Technology Perfect for Ancient Ways

Satellite telecommunications utilize ground-based devices that can
send signals to, as well as receive them from, satellites. Thus, the
satellite serves as a distant relay, receiving messages from one
ground-based device, perhaps in Kenya, and forwarding it to another
ground-based device, perhaps in Somalia. The various forms of
satellite telecommunications are named according to the ground-based
devices used to send and receive signals. Two of special note because
they are relatively small and inexpensive, making them particularly
well suited for use by terrorists, are VSATs and handheld satellite
phones.

VSATs is the acronym for very small aperture terminals, devices with
an antenna generally less than two meters in diameter.19 Introduced in
the 1980s, they are a mature technology, and now comprise hundreds of
thousands of units installed around the world.20

There are several reasons VSATs have gained in such popularity. They
are relatively inexpensive, with some units available for as low as
$3,500. Additionally, they are easy to set up and maintain, and can
readily be expanded or upgraded to offer additional capabilities.

VSATs' properties have made them a common choice to serve as the
devices behind the cybercafes proliferating throughout Africa. These
cafes do not employ security procedures, nor do they collect
information on their customers, making them almost ideal for use by
anyone desirous of keeping their activities hidden.

Al Qaeda is known to use cybercafes. Following American airstrikes in
Afghanistan, the terrorist organization utilized cybercafes in
Pakistan to send e-mails in an attempt to regroup.21,22 The
terrorists' anonymity enables them to blend in with the crowds all
vying for terminal usage.

Smaller, more portable and easier to conceal than VSATs are handheld
satellite phones. These devices, which can weigh less than a pound,
are similar to the VSATs in that they utilize satellites as relay
stations. Their power sources include batteries, auto cigarette
lighter adapters, and flexible solar panels that can be rolled up.
They can be purchased or rented from various telecom providers. The
fact that they can easily be taken from one country to another and
still be able to send and receive information, as they are not
dependent on local telecom operators, makes them a valuable tool for
businessmen, diplomats, journalists, and terrorists to use. Osama Bin
Laden has one.23 It is highly probable that the `satellite contraption
with a solar charger' discovered with the Al Isla terrorist group
suspects, arrested in Kenya on 22 February 2005 for the slaying of BBC
journalist Katie Hilma in Somalia earlier that week, is a handheld
satellite phone.24

Hawala and Satellite Telecommunications: A Powerful Mix

By combining the ancient money transfer system of hawala with modern
day satellite telecommunications, terrorists have made the task of
uncovering their fund transfers difficult. It is truly an example
where the sum is greater than the whole of its parts, for either taken
alone is difficult to trace, but taken together that task becomes
significantly harder.

The popularity of hawala and satellite communications in Africa as
well as other locations has added to the difficulty in tracking
terrorists. Internet cafes, also known as cybercafes, sometimes double
as hawala companies.25 This is the case in Somalia, where an estimated
23 per cent of the nation's income is sent from the nearly 25 per cent
of the population living abroad. The internet cafes can provide both a
location for fund transfers as well as an opportunity to communicate
with expatriate relatives. In other African countries disguised
terrorists could easily hide in the crowds of businessmen, tourists,
and locals who frequent such cafes. Their e-mails, whether coded or
not, become part of the immense internet traffic generated by these
sites, making it difficult to pick their surreptitious messages
regarding fund transfers for weapons purchases from the legitimate
ones asking for additional funds to purchase food or clothing.
Compounding the problem is the use of hawala and satellite
telecommunications by groups other than terrorists, but still involved
in criminal activity, though there is certainly a significant overlap
between them, with some terrorist organizations funding their
activities via illegal activity. Thus, non-terrorist narcotraffickers,
smugglers and other such types may be sending e-mails that sound
similar to the ones some terrorists use, further complicating the
efforts of intelligence agencies to tease out messages primarily
related to terrorism. With too few linguists on their staffs versed in
the languages of Africa, the task not only of separating criminal
messages from those with legitimate aims, but also of separating
terrorist communications from other criminal activities, becomes
incredibly daunting.

By providing reliable connections between even remotely located
people, the use of satellite communications makes the problem of using
hawala to transfer funds for illicit purposes an even greater threat
when compared to how it operated in the past. Because of the expense
involved in installing fixed-line telephones, as well as the
associated bureaucracy and corruption, there were relatively few
phones throughout most of Africa. However, the low start-up costs of
satellite communications has revolutionized the ability of people in
many remote locations throughout Africa to be connected with the
outside world. Thus, what used to take days in the past, for the first
hawala broker to contact a second broker in an African city (for the
vast majority of phones were in cities), who then had to reach the
intended recipient in a rural area, perhaps by sending someone to
travel by foot through dangerous terrain, can now happen at the speed
of light. Using satellite telecommunications that create a direct
connection between two brokers, the first hawaladar can contact a
second hawaladar in a remote area and quickly deliver funds to the
intended recipient. This rapidity can keep intelligence agencies off
balance as events unfold too quickly for them to react in time.

Summary and Suggested Courses of Action

Terrorists in Africa and elsewhere are exploiting the technologies
developed by countries they have avowed to destroy, essentially
turning the western world's own high tech inventions against itself.
Nowhere is this more evident than in the use of satellite
telecommunications.

However, the terrorists are also exploiting the difficulties in
penetrating some of their ancient traditions, such as the money
transfer system known as hawala. In the west, with its tradition of
precisely recording every transaction, and thus leaving a paper trail
that can often be easily followed, the use of an honor system to
manage fund transfers appears alien and difficult to penetrate.

Thus, terrorists are using both the old and the new in their war
against the west, just as the west must do against them. It is
important in the area of satellite telecommunications that more
sophisticated eavesdropping devices be developed, as well as automated
facilities to sort through the myriad of messages in order to find
ones involving terrorist activities. Tracking can be done, as
evidenced in the case of Daniel Pearl, the Wall Street Journal
reporter who was kidnapped and murdered by terrorists in Pakistan. The
group's e-mails from a cybercafe were able to be traced, leading to
their arrest.26

In the area of hawala more human intelligence, especially with
linguists trained in the languages commonly used for the money
transfers, could prove invaluable in helping to keep track of the
enormous sums of money flowing to terrorists. Developing human assets
with the requisite skills that can penetrate a system that relies on
trust and stealth will take time.

There should also be increased pressure on countries that permit, or
inadequately regulate hawala, to further control it. The United Arab
Emirates, in particular, warrants this additional attention. It is
probably not a coincidence that Dubai is not only a center for hawala,
but also for telecommunications. Both its banks and its informal money
transfer systems, despite the implementation of tighter government
regulations, remain a focus in the investigation of terror funding.
This is no surprise given that approximately half of the $250,000
spent on the 9/11 attack was wired from Dubai banks to the al-Qaeda
terrorists in the US.27

Governments and private organizations must learn to recognize illicit
transfers via hawala and other alternative remittance systems.
Information related to how to recognize these transfers, as well as
observed criminal activity, needs to be shared, for such systems are
truly transnational. Interpol's Anti-Money Laundering Unit, which the
organization describes as being `dedicated to increasing the flow of
money laundering information among financial investigators', is
helping tremendously in this effort.28

So intertwined are hawala and satellite telecommunications that
sometimes the funding for VSATs and handheld satellite phones is
through hawala, which in turn allow even greater fund transfers to
occur. It is a symbiotic relationship, with each actor benefiting the
other, thus allowing both to grow. This bond can be used to the
advantage of intelligence agencies. By targeting one, the other can
be, at least in part, disrupted. Thus, interrupting the flow of hawala
funds might impede the purchase of telecom equipment by terrorists,
and jamming terrorists' telecommunications might impede their flow of
funds.

There have been some successes, to be sure. Western countries have
frozen accounts, blacklisted organizations, and applied pressure to
other nations to take appropriate steps to curb hawala, sometimes as
part of a broader effort in the attack on money laundering. The
Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the international secretariat in
Paris charged by its 30-odd members with developing strategies to
combat both terrorist financing and money laundering, has developed
nine recommendations to help spot transactions linked to the former
and 40 recommended countermeasures against the latter.29 The
recommendations against money laundering, including items such as
prohibiting the establishment of shell banks and having financial
institutions bar anonymous accounts, would make illegal transactions
less easy to hide.30 Numerous international bodies have endorsed or
adopted the list, reflecting an attempt by at least a portion of the
global community to combat illegal financial transactions.

Some of the impetus for the new-found cooperation in the war against
money laundering can be attributed to the events of 9/11. This is
especially true for the US and EU which, in response to the threat to
both of them by what has been described as `Islamic extremist
terrorism', have found their security objectives increasingly
converging since that date.31 Not much more than a month after the
attacks, the European Commission formally adopted a directive on money
laundering, signaling once again the importance it places on
disrupting the funding of terrorism.

These efforts have all been steps in the right direction, but much
more needs to be done. However, it is unrealistic to expect the
complete cessation of hawala and other alternative money transfer
systems. It is a system that has adapted and survived for more than a
thousand years, and is deeply enshrined in the cultures of many
nations, especially those with large Muslim populations. The west has
a tendency to view a nation's economy as a separate entity, when `in
reality it is inextricably tied to the social and political life' of a
society.32 Thus, ill-conceived or clumsy attempts to curb hawala,
which in some countries is an integral part of a people's way of life,
could drive it deeper underground, putting it further from the reach
of law enforcement. Nor is it necessarily desirable to eliminate
hawala. Many transactions are for relatively small amounts, often sent
home by expatriate workers to support their families, and with the
deliberate avoidance of the unfamiliar, bureaucratic, modern banking
system.

An approach that targets the use of hawala for terrorist financing and
other illegal activities will probably be more fruitful than one that
attempts to eliminate it completely. Limiting the attack on hawala to
only terrorist and criminal transactions would also be more likely to
appeal to those Islamic nations that do not wish to eliminate an
economic tradition, but only to regulate it. With the need for such
countries to `buy in' to a global approach to combat terrorist
financing, an acceptance by the west that hawala is not inherently
evil, but rather is a system that can be used for constructive or
destructive purposes, is imperative.

Thus, elimination of hawala may not be possible or even desirable.
However, with appropriate resources dedicated to the task, significant
dents could probably be made in its use for illicit purposes.

Satellites and hawala, the new and the old, are posing a danger to the
civilized world. To combat them we must take a step forward and
develop advanced technologies to trace satellite communications, and
take a step back to better understand how money transfer occurred
before the evolution of impersonal modern day banking practices.
Disclaimer

The views expressed in FMSO publications and reports are those of the
authors and do not necessarily represent the official policy or
position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the
US Government.

Notes

1Anderson, Kevin, `Hawala System Under Scrutiny', 8 Nov 2001, BBC
News, 27 Feb. 2005. <http://www.news.
<http://www.news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/1643995.stm>
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/1643995.stm>.

2Vaknin, Sam, `Hawala, or the Bank that Never Was', 1 Jan. 2002 (est).
Samvak.tripod.com, 27 Feb. 2005.
<http://www.samvak. <http://www.samvak.tripod.com/nm104.html>
tripod.com/nm104.html>.

3Anderson, Kevin.

4`US Expands Dirty Money Investigation', 26 July 2002, BBC News, 20
March 2005, <http://www.news.
<http://www.news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/2153788.stm>
bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/2153788.stm>.

5Fukuyama F., Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity
(New York: Free Press Paperbacks, 1995).

6Jost, Patrick M. and Sandhu, Harjit S. `The Hawala Remittance System
and its Role in Money Laundering', Jan. 2000, Interpol, 26 Feb. 2008.
<http://www.interpol
<http://www.interpol.int/public/financialcrime/moneylaundering/hawala/defaul
t.asp#12> .int/public/financialcrime/moneylaundering/hawala/default.asp#12>.

7Jost, Patrick M and Sandhu, Harjit S.

8Looney, Robert E. `Following the Terrorist Informal Money Trail: The
Hawala Financial Mechanism', 1 Nov. 2002, Center for Contemporary
Conflict, 2 Feb. 2006.
<http://www.ccc.
<http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/rsepresources/si/nov02/southasia.asp>
nps.navy.mil/rsepresources/si/nov02/southasia.asp>.

9El-Qorchi, Mohammed, `Hawala', Dec. 2002, Finance and Development, a
Quarterly Magazine of the IMF, 20 March 2005.
<http://www.imf.
<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2002/12/elqorchi.htm>
org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2002/12/elqorchi.htm>.

10Cottle, Michelle, `Hawala v the War on Terrorism', 15 Oct. 2001, The
New Republic, 20 March 2005.
<http://www.tnr. <http://www.tnr.com/101501/cottle101501.html>
com/101501/cottle101501.html>.

11Reszat, Beate, `Hawala', 4 Dec. 2002, Hamburg Institute of
International Economics, 20 March 2005.
<http://www.hwwa.
<http://www.hwwa.de/projekte/iud_schwerpunkte/idsps/asia_gateway/hawala.htm>
de/projekte/iud_schwerpunkte/idsps/asia_gateway/hawala.htm>.

12Jost, Patrick and Sandhu, Harjit.

13Scott-Joynt, Jeremy, `The Battle Against Blood Money', 14 March
2002, BBC News, 20 March 2005.
<http://www.news. <http://www.news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/1867314.stm>
bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/1867314.stm>.

14El-Qorchi, Mohammed.

15`Fear Over US Hawala Crackdown', 6 Feb. 2004, BBC News, 14 Feb.
2005. <http://www.news.
<http://www.news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3463683.stm>
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3463683.stm>.

16`Fear Over US Hawala Crackdown', 6 Feb. 2004, BBC News, 14 Feb.
2005. < http://www.news.
<http://www.news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3463683.stm>
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3463683.stm>.

17Jost Patrick and Sandhu, Harjit.

18Scott-Joynt, Jeremy.

19`VSAT Satellite', 22 Nov. 1998, Nova Stars, 14 Feb. 2005.
<http://www.the- <http://www.the-saudi.net/communication/vsat/>
saudi.net/communication/vsat/>.

20`Why Use Satellite?' 22 Nov. 1998, Nova Stars, 14 Feb. 2005.
<http://www.the-
<http://www.the-saudi.net/communication/vsat/why_use_satellite.htm>
saudi.net/communication/vsat/why_use_satellite.htm>.

21Eng, Paul, `Filtering Out Terrorists' 15 April 2002, ABC News as
reported by InfosecNews, 25 Feb. 2005.
<http://www.security <http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/12/267700>
focus.com/archive/12/267700>.

22Kassen, Ron, `Terrorists Using Cybercafes', 17 April 2002, Geek.com.
25 Feb. 2005.
<http://www.geek.
<http://www.geek.com/news/geeknews/2002apr/gee20020417011226.htm>
com/news/geeknews/2002apr/gee20020417011226.htm>.

23Testimony of J.T. Caruso, Acting Assistant Director, Counter
Terrorism Division, FBI Before the Subcommittee on International
Operations and Terrorism, Committee on Foreign Relations, United
States Senate, 18 Dec. 2001. `Al-Qaeda International' 25 Feb. 2005.
<http://www.fbi. <http://www.fbi.gov/congress/congress01/caruso121801.htm>
gov/congress/congress01/caruso121801.htm>.

24Wabala, Dominic. `Four Terror Suspects Arrested', 22 Feb. 2005, The
Nation, 25 Feb. 2005.
<http://www.allafric <http://www.allafrica.com/stories/200502220117.html>
a.com/stories/200502220117.html>.

25Winter, Joseph, `Somalia's Diaspora Offers a Financial Lifeline', 24
Nov. 2004, BBC News, 25 Feb. 2005.
<http://www.news. <http://www.news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4038799.stm>
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4038799.stm>.

26`Tracing the Kidnappers' E-mails', 6 Feb. 2002, BBC News, 27 Feb.
2005. <http://www.news.
<http://www.news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/sci/tech/1805173.stm>
bbc.co.uk/1/hi/sci/tech/1805173.stm>.

27`Dubai: A Financial Hub for Terror Funds', 18 Jan. 2004, The Times
of India, 20 March 2005.
<http://www.freerepu
<http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1060292/posts>
blic.com/focus/f-news/1060292/posts>.

28Interpol Anti-Money laundering Unit, 6 Sept. 2005, Interpol, 2 Feb.
2006.
<http://www.interpol
<http://www.interpol.com/public/financialcrime/moneylaundering/unit.asp>
.com/public/financialcrime/moneylaundering/unit.asp>.

29Scott-Joynt, Jeremy.

30`FATF Documents on the Forty Recommendations', 2003, FATF-GATI 1
Feb. 2006.
<http://www.fatf-
<http://www.fatf-gafi.org/document/28/0,2340,en_32250379_32236930_33658140_1
_1_1_1,00.html#r4>
gafi.org/document/28/0,2340,en_32250379_32236930_33658140_1_1_1_1,00.html#r4
>.

31Nourbakhsh, Amir Ali, `Iran: Majlis Reformists Take on the Money
Launderers', May 2004, Iran Focus, 1 Feb. 2006.
<http://www.payvand. <http://www.payvand.com/news/04/may/1179.html>
com/news/04/may/1179.html>

32Fukuyama, Francis. 


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