http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_id=10
<http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_id=10&categ_id=5&article_id
=74916> &categ_id=5&article_id=74916
 
Where was Asia in the Lebanese-Israeli conflict?

By N. Janardhan 
Commentary by 
Tuesday, August 22, 2006
 
  
Asia was conspicuously absent in efforts to recently end the conflict
between Hizbullah and Israel in Lebanon. The lack of an Asian response
assumed significance because of two main factors. First, nearly one-third of
Asia's population is Muslim, translating into about 70 percent of the
world's Muslims. That a continent, a genuine powerhouse of Islam, adopted a
passive approach only invited more trouble domestically. It would have been
better for Asian states to help formulate solutions, even failed ones, to
the conflict internationally. 
Second, the silence and ineffectiveness of Asia showed that Asia has been
unable to convert its economic and military gains into diplomatic capital.
Asia is home to three declared and three undeclared or suspected nuclear
powers, and is riding on the wave of unprecedented booming economies in
China, Japan, India and South Korea, among others. It was revealing that
China - the only Asian country to send an envoy to five Middle Eastern
countries to drum up support for peace during the crisis - considered United
Nations Security Council Resolution 1701 "unbalanced," but voted for it
anyway, because it "noticed that Arab countries, including Lebanon, did not
oppose the resolution." 
In the most significant response, some Asian countries were only able to
voice their frustration at an emergency summit of the Organization of the
Islamic Conference convened in the fourth week of the conflict. While
demanding that the UN implement a cease-fire and investigate Israel's
"flagrant human rights violations," leaders from Indonesia, Pakistan, and
Malaysia voiced support for the Lebanese people "in their legitimate and
courageous resistance against the Israeli aggression." 
Indonesia, the largest Muslim country in the world, could only highlight
that the "war must stop, or it will radicalize the Muslim world, even those
of us who are moderate today ... from where, it will be just one step away
to that ultimate nightmare: a clash of civilizations." Less consequentially,
several hard-line Islamic groups said they were signing up fighters and
suicide bombers to travel to the Middle East to wage jihad against Israel,
with at least two claiming they had dispatched dozens of men. The Malaysian
foreign minister even said that Muslim countries should consider the call to
supply arms to Hizbullah. More constructively, Turkey, Malaysia, and
Indonesia said they were ready to send soldiers to Lebanon to join an
international peacekeeping force. 
India's fence-sitting and inconsistent diplomacy, perhaps conditioned by its
roots in the Non-Aligned Movement, was also evident during the crisis. Its
first official response was critical of Israel's "excessive and
disproportionate military retaliation" and New Delhi condemned the
"abduction of two Israeli soldiers by Lebanese militants," calling for their
release. Later, Parliament passed a unanimous resolution expressing concern
over the violence and condemning Israel. 
Among the domestic factors conditioning India's contradictory response was
the fact that India is home to one of the largest Muslim populations in the
world. Furthermore, the government survives thanks to the support of leftist
parties, which have sought international sanctions against Israel. Yet,
externally, New Delhi has given teeth to a new alliance with Tel Aviv and
Washington during the last decade. As a result, India has had a
three-dimensional relationship with the main parties in the Middle East,
creating a gray patch in its foreign policy: Israel is India's second
biggest arms supplier; India is keen to see through a deal with the US
involving the transfer of civilian nuclear technology, which the Indians
consider crucial for their economic growth; and India has been a longtime
political and economic partner of countries in the Middle East, including
Iran. 
It is also very likely that India, the largest contributor to UN
peacekeeping operations, will continue to be a part of the new international
force in Lebanon, UNIFIL, where it is already present. 
The reason for such passive Asian involvement to the Lebanon conflict was
that while most Asian countries share warm or close ties with Middle Eastern
countries, many of them are also either locked in with the United States or
Israel, and, in some cases both, for varying reasons. This has enraged their
populations and often forced governments to compromise and restricted their
diplomatic maneuverability. 
China is dependent on several Middle Eastern countries for its oil. But even
before formal diplomatic relations were established in 1992 and despite
consistent criticism of Israeli policies toward Palestinians, China
benefited immensely from Israel in its process of military modernization,
and continues to do so. China also supplies Iran with arms. And it is only
in the standoff over Iran's nuclear program with the international community
that China has been playing a proactive role in the region. 
While Pakistan has great potential to play a hands-on role in the Middle
East, there are obstacles. It is fighting to crush the Taliban and Al-Qaeda
in its own territory and along the Afghan border in cooperation with the US,
but it is also considering improving relations with Israel. Both steps are
domestically unpopular. Indonesia and the Philippines are also cooperating
with the US in fighting terrorism at home. 
Looking ahead, Asia has to wake up from its slumber. It will not become a
significant player in the Middle East based solely on its economic strength.
It must learn to diplomatically leverage this power, and perhaps show signs
of engaging its growing military might in the region. Asia should also
ensure that the Middle East peace process resurfaces as an important part of
its countries' domestic agendas - not only to contribute to peace in the
region, but also to guarantee greater stability at home. 
N. Janardhan is the program manager of Gulf-Asia relations and the editor of
Gulf in the Media at the Gulf Research Center in Dubai. THE DAILY STAR
publishes this commentary in collaboration with the center.


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