Who Won II: the Islamist dimension [by Marc Lynch From: Abu Aardvark weblog 22 Aughust 2006} http://abuaardvark. <http://abuaardvark.typepad.com/abuaardvark/2006/08/who_won_ii_the_.html> typepad.com/abuaardvark/2006/08/who_won_ii_the_.html
All along I've been writing that the Sunni-Shia dimension of the conflict http://www.prospect <http://www.prospect.org/web/page.ww?section=root&name=ViewWeb&articleId=117 46> .org/web/page.ww?section=root&name=ViewWeb&articleId=11746 was a bit of a red herring, promoted by the conservative Arab regimes in an attempt to divide the public and blunt support for Hezbollah. It didn't work; Hezbollah and Hassan Nasrallah have received tremendous popular support throughout the Arab world despite the Sunni-Shia issue. Their open hostility to Hezbollah in the early going only heightened their own unpopularity and fueled the underlying rage against the Arab order which lies at the heart of the "al-Jazeera narrative." But if I think I got that one right, there is still more going on with the Sunni-Shia dimension, and with wider Islamist politics, worth thinking through. First, there's no question that mainstream Sunni Islamists have clearly opted for populism over sectarianism. The Muslim Brotherhood and a range of mainstream Islamist figures have aggressively supported Hezbollah. Yusuf al-Qaradawi, the influential Sunni Islamist featured on al-Jazeera, http://www.qaradawi <http://www.qaradawi.net/site/topics/article.aspx?cu_no=2&item_no=4362&versi on=1&template_id=117&parent_id=188> .net/site/topics/article.aspx?cu_no=2&item_no=4362&version=1&template_id=117 &parent_id=188 has repeatedly called for support of Hezbollah and denounced anti-Shia attitudes (he has also condemned attacks on the Shia in Iraq, it should be recalled, so it isn't purely opportunistic). Awadh al-Qurni, a Saudi Islamist often featured on al-Arabiya, responded to concerns about a Shia Cresent by saying that even if that happened it would be in opposition to an American-Israeli project and thus a lesser danger. For now, everyone loves Hezbollah, at least for public consumption. The fate of a controversial Saudi fatwa declaring that it violated sharia to support Hezbollah because of its Shi'ism is worth attention. That alleged fatwa sparked a real intra-Islamist political feeding frenzy, with almost every Islamist of note rushing to denounce it. Then a very interesting roundup on al-Arabiya http://www.alarabiy <http://www.alarabiya.net/Articles/2006/08/08/26443.htm> a.net/Articles/2006/08/08/26443.htm last week claimed that there had in fact not been such a fatwa against supporting Hezbollah because of its Shi'ism at all. According to that story, Shaykh Abdullah bin Jabrin claimed that the controversy had been ignited by an "old fatwa that had nothing to do with Hezbollah", and others scrambled to cover their butts, um, I mean scrambled to deny that any fatwa declaring "takfir" on the Shia had ever been issued by anyone, while also declaring their total support for the resistance of the Palestinian and Lebanese people. I interpret all of this as backtracking from a failed rhetorical gambit, just like Bashar's Foreign Minister now claiming to have never said the "half-men" thing which everyone heard him say. The same al-Arabiya report did note with concern the allegedly growing use of the term "Ruwafidhin" to describe the Shia, a historically and doctrinally loaded term preferred by Sunni Islamists. The one place where the Sunni-Shia issue seems to be more potent than I had suggested is within the jihadist communities themselves. If their on-line forums are anything to go by, Hezbollah's Shi'ism is an extremely active concern among the jihadis. I don't want to provide links here, since I've grown leery of that, but I can say that there has been an astonishing amount of heated debate about the Shia issue on the jihadi boards I follow. A post by Mohammed al-Mas'ari on his al-Tajdeed forum defending Hezbollah as a Muslim movement and decrying sectarian attacks or declarations of takfir against the Shia, has as of today sixty responses (many quite critical) and over 7,000 page views (a lot for this kind of forum). I have seen dozens and dozens of postings denouncing Hezbollah and the "Rafidhin", warning about the "Shia-ization" of the jihad. Those are matched by enthusiastic endorsements of resistance, and there's a lot of sharp exchanges back and forth. But overall I think it's safe to generalize that I've seen more naked anti-Shi'ism here than anyplace else (even the op-ed pages of the Saudi al-Sharq al-Awsat). This rift between a mainstream Arab public (which dismisses Sunni-Shia differences in favor of populist mobilization against Israel, America, and their own regimes) and a much more doctrinaire jihadist community fits well within the "Al-Qaeda Media Strategies" argument http://www.national <http://www.nationalinterest.org/ME2/dirmod.asp?sid=&nm=&type=Publishing&mod =Publications::Article&mid=1ABA92EFCD8348688A4EBEB3D69D33EF&tier=4&id=E76896 67566548ECB882400570ECFD2D> interest.org/ME2/dirmod.asp?sid=&nm=&type=Publishing&mod=Publications::Artic le&mid=1ABA92EFCD8348688A4EBEB3D69D33EF&tier=4&id=E7689667566548ECB882400570 ECFD2D I put out there a few months ago. At that time I argued that al-Qaeda Central (OBL and Zawahiri) preferred to use mass media to reach out to the "median Arab" while Zarqawi and the new hard-core jihadis preferred online media aimed at an already mobilized base. Some of that same dynamic is playing out with regard to Lebanon and Hezbollah. Zawahiri has tried to appropriate the Lebanese struggle, because that's where the median Arab-Muslim is, while many within the on-line communities are sticking to their doctrinal guns and denouncing Hezbollah no matter how unpopular that position may be with wider publics. Hey, should we start calling the jihadis the "Islamist Netroots"? Whether this hurts al-Qaeda or helps it remains an open question, I would say. A lot of writers whose views I respect http://www.ft. <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/b5e204be-2e17-11db-93ad-0000779e2340.html> com/cms/s/b5e204be-2e17-11db-93ad-0000779e2340.html are arguing that Hezbollah's ascent harms bin Laden. I think that's short sighted, though. Looking ahead only a bit down the road, Lebanon qua Lebanon will likely fade to the sidelines in most Arab and Muslim public argument (just as many Lebanese fear), and Hezbollah will likely revert back to its natural weight. It is fundamentally a Lebanese movement, and a Shia one, and those who celebrate it for fighting Israel aren't going to look to it as any kind of wider political model (the same is true of al-Qaeda, for the most part, it should be noted). I've seen remarkably few signs of Hezbollah actually trying to interject itself into politics elsewhere in the region, especially given the panicked hyperbole about its growing power. As the storyline moves on, as it will, Hezbollah will likely still be wildly popular and praised for its part in the war, but in more of a passive than an active way - a myth, a memory, rather than a current political player. And when that happens, what will be left is a more radicalized Arab and Muslim public, angrier with America and Israel, more open to the possibility of violent resistance, and more open to Islamist politics. In other words, in the medium term al-Qaeda benefits from the war http://www.ft. <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/b5e204be-2e17-11db-93ad-0000779e2340.html> com/cms/s/b5e204be-2e17-11db-93ad-0000779e2340.html because it furthers its "clash of civilizations" agenda. .............................................................. http://abuaardvark. <http://abuaardvark.typepad.com/abuaardvark/2006/08/who_won.html> typepad.com/abuaardvark/2006/08/who_won.html Who won? Who won the Israel-Lebanon war? The general sense of the Arab public discussion of Lebanon won't surprise most people: most agree that Hezbollah won, that Israel suffered a serious setback, that the Lebanese people are the greatest losers, that the gap between Arab regimes and their peoples has grown even wider, and that America fared very poorly. So not really that different from American debates, really - although Arab writers http://asharqalawsa <http://asharqalawsat.com/leader.asp?section=3&article=377692&issue=10120> t.com/leader.asp?section=3&article=377692&issue=10120 are far more likely to emphasize American losses http://asharqalawsa <http://asharqalawsat.com/leader.asp?section=3&article=377515&issue=10118> t.com/leader.asp?section=3&article=377515&issue=10118 from the conflict. There are a few things going on beneath those headlines worth highlighting, though. First, for all the shouting in the streets, a lot of the press commentary and talk show discussions has been far more cautious, and worried that military victory might be squandered through diplomacy. In today's al-Hayat, Arfan Nizam al-Din offers a preliminary reading http://www.daralhay <http://www.daralhayat.com/opinion/08-2006/Item-20060820-2ca63398-c0a8-10ed- 019d-d97b5da858c5/story.html> at.com/opinion/08-2006/Item-20060820-2ca63398-c0a8-10ed-019d-d97b5da858c5/st ory.html of the war's winners and losers, which begins not with a rousing declaration of victory but a long list of conditionals which will ultimately decide the outcome: how quickly and forcefully Resolution 1701 is enforced, the sincerity of the various parties to the agreement, whether Israel refrains from ceasefire violations, whether the Lebanese army can really do anything, whether there are moves to dealing with the real roots of the regional conflict. Only then does he move to an accounting: the Lebanese people and state the greatest losers, the Lebanese government a major loser for being unable to protect its people or its borders - though it could redeem itself by seizing the chance to build on a moment of national unity, Hezbollah a big winner despite its losses, the Palestinian people losers because their issue has become relatively marginalized, Israel and especially Olmert losers for failing to achieve their objectives. Similarly, Ragheda Dergham http://www.daralhay <http://www.daralhayat.com/opinion/08-2006/Item-20060817-1d5387ad-c0a8-10ed- 019d-d97bee69df99/story.html> at.com/opinion/08-2006/Item-20060817-1d5387ad-c0a8-10ed-019d-d97bee69df99/st ory.html argues that the war clearly hasn't ended yet and all premature declarations of victory should be discounted (she is also one of the few to declare Hezbollah as much a loser as Israel, since - in her view - it weakened its claims to independence from Syria and Iran, while showing Lebanese that it would sacrifice their lives and land to its political goals). The deep contempt for Arab regimes in much of the Arab public discourse colors their views of the future. As the war comes to an end and violence gives way to diplomacy, a lot of Arab writers http://asharqalawsa <http://asharqalawsat.com/leader.asp?section=3&issue=10116&article=377197> t.com/leader.asp?section=3&issue=10116&article=377197 and pundits are worrying that the feckless and corrupt Arab regimes will negotiate away everything Hezbollah won on the ground - giving Israel a political victory it could not achieve by force of arms. Wa'il Abd al-Fattah, in Lebanon's al-Akhbar, for instance, denounces the culture of fear and impotence http://www.al- <http://www.al-akhbar.com/ar/node/1744> akhbar.com/ar/node/1744 which continues to govern Arab politics despite all the talk of "the spirit of Beirut." Saad Eddin Ibrahim argues, in a piece describing the new Middle East as angry, democratic, and Islamist, http://elaph. <http://elaph.com/ElaphWeb/NewsPapers/2006/8/171119.htm> com/ElaphWeb/NewsPapers/2006/8/171119.htm that more than ever before Arabs and Muslim popular anger focused on the triumverate of Israel, America, and the Arab regimes seen as accomplices to the violence (he attributes this to the fact that for the first time, hundreds of millions of Arabs and Muslims directly witnessed Israel's assault on an Arab-Muslim state on satellite television, night in and night out - obviously an argument I'm happy to see, but which puzzles me since the same was true from 2000-2002, from the Palestinian al-Aqsa Intifada through the Israeli re-occupation of the West Bank). The pervasive disgust with the Arab order and with Arab regimes, by the way, is one reason why Bashar al-Asad's speech denouncing the Cedar Revolution and the pro-American Arab regimes http://www.alquds. <http://www.alquds.co.uk/index.asp?fname=2006%5C08%5C08-18%5Cz29.htm&storyti tle=ff%CD%D1%C8%20%DF%E1%C7%E3%ED%C9%20%E3%D5%D1%ED%C9%20%DC%20%D3%DA%E6%CF% ED%C9%20%DC%20%C7%D1%CF%E4%ED%C9%20%D1%CF%C7%F0%20%DA%E1%ED%20%C8%D4%C7%D1:% 20%E1%E3%20%ED%CA%CE%D0%20%E4%D5%DD%20%DE%D1%C7%D1%20%E6%E1%E3%20%ED%CD%D1%D F%20%E4%D5%DD%20%CC%E4%CF%ED%20%D3%E6%D1%EDfff> co.uk/index.asp?fname=2006%5C08%5C08-18%5Cz29.htm&storytitle=ff%CD%D1%C8%20% DF%E1%C7%E3%ED%C9%20%E3%D5%D1%ED%C9%20%DC%20%D3%DA%E6%CF%ED%C9%20%DC%20%C7%D 1%CF%E4%ED%C9%20%D1%CF%C7%F0%20%DA%E1%ED%20%C8%D4%C7%D1:%20%E1%E3%20%ED%CA%C E%D0%20%E4%D5%DD%20%DE%D1%C7%D1%20%E6%E1%E3%20%ED%CD%D1%DF%20%E4%D5%DD%20%CC %E4%CF%ED%20%D3%E6%D1%EDfff went over so poorly. http://www.aljazeer <http://www.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/1AD34311-B1D8-4E39-9373-2B7301D36E31.htm > a.net/NR/exeres/1AD34311-B1D8-4E39-9373-2B7301D36E31.htm Few of the enthusiasts for Hezbollah saw Syria helping, http://english. <http://english.daralhayat.com/opinion/OPED/08-2006/Article-20060821-30cdb63 3-c0a8-10ed-019d-d97b0bc33bec/story.html> daralhayat.com/opinion/OPED/08-2006/Article-20060821-30cdb633-c0a8-10ed-019d -d97b0bc33bec/story.html and whatever the nature of Syrian-Hezbollah relations the former gets no credit in the court of Arab public opinion for the successes of the latter. (Although one wonders if the furious response by defenders of various Arab regimes suggests that the part about Arab leaders being "half men" actually went over pretty well, striking a nerve perhaps?) Many writers for the Saudi al-Sharq al-Awsat have been scathingly critical of Hezbollah all along, and now their analysis tends to fall along the lines of "let's see what they do with their victory" (Yusuf al-Dini, for example, expects Hezbollah's "adventurism" to give way to "pomposity" in victory which will alienate their new supporters). http://asharqalawsa <http://asharqalawsat.com/leader.asp?section=3&article=378600&issue=10125> t.com/leader.asp?section=3&article=378600&issue=10125 Liberals and regime supporters alike are frantically trying to minimize the significance of Hezbollah's victory by emphasizing its local roots and distinctively Lebanese dynamics. Jamil al-Nimri (in Jordan's al-Ghad), http://www.alghad. <http://www.alghad.jo/?article=4509> jo/?article=4509 for instance, stresses that Hezbollah's experience can not be replicated elsewhere or its lessons more widely applied. The divide between Lebanese and non-Lebanese Arab commentators is especially notable. From the start, a lot of Lebanese complained that the Arab media was just appropriating their suffering for the larger Arab cause - as in al-Jazeera's immensely influential "Sixth War" frame. - and would just move on once the Lebanese resistance to Israel was no longer useful to that storyline. That divide has only sharpened since war's end: non-Lebanese commentators primarily writing about the war's impact on the Islamic movement, on Israel's power, or on the fortunes of various Arab governments; and Lebanese commentators writing about those things, but also about what is to become of Lebanon's politics. Arab and Muslim pundits applaud Hezbollah as a new champion against Israel, but Lebanese worry about its influence at home. Hazem Saghiye, for instance, writes about how the weakness of the Lebanese state http://www.daralhay <http://www.daralhayat.com/opinion/08-2006/Item-20060820-2ca55c53-c0a8-10ed- 019d-d97b8315abc6/story.html> at.com/opinion/08-2006/Item-20060820-2ca55c53-c0a8-10ed-019d-d97b8315abc6/st ory.html is ultimately the source of its problems, and that Israel's brutal war had made it much more difficult for Lebanon to regain the "stateness" it had only so recently rescued from Syria. Walid Shaqir (also in al-Hayat) http://www.daralhay <http://www.daralhayat.com/opinion/08-2006/Item-20060817-1d566f83-c0a8-10ed- 019d-d97b24390198/story.html> at.com/opinion/08-2006/Item-20060817-1d566f83-c0a8-10ed-019d-d97b24390198/st ory.html worries that a struggle between PM Seniora and Syria's Bashar al-Asad is coming, in which the latter will attempt to use the aftermath of the war to overturn the Cedar Revolution and restore Syrian domination of Lebanon (a fear which Asad's speech denouncing the Cedar Revolutionaries as Israeli agents will not likely assuage). In short, this anxious public debate about the future suggests that the Arab public is less consumed by triumphalism than unsure what to do with such an unusual turn of events. The doubts about the ability or interest of Arab regimes to capitalize on Hezbollah's victory, and the potential divide between Lebanese and Arab priorities, are crucial undercurrents in current Arab discourse. There are others, of course, and I'll try to explore some of them over the course of the week. [Non-text portions of this message have been removed] -------------------------- Want to discuss this topic? Head on over to our discussion list, [EMAIL PROTECTED] -------------------------- Brooks Isoldi, editor [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.intellnet.org Post message: [email protected] Subscribe: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Unsubscribe: [EMAIL PROTECTED] *** FAIR USE NOTICE. This message contains copyrighted material whose use has not been specifically authorized by the copyright owner. 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