http://www.axisglobe.com/article.asp?article=1044
Lebanon War to Continue in Central Asia Michel Elbaz The outcome of military actions between Israel and Hezbollah, lasted from July 12 till August 14, has been apprehended by the vast majority of the Islamic world as a regular of the Shia fundamentalist movement over the <Zionist formation>. Two of the previous achievements of Hezbollah are marked especially: an expulsion of the Israeli army from South Lebanon in May, 2000 and release by Israel of more than 400 Arab prisoners in January, 2004. In the Islamic world, many political commentators and spiritual figures emphasize that secular Arabian regimes, even with joint efforts, have never had such a success in confrontation with the Jewish state. Any war with Israel with the participation of regular Arab armies did not last so long - more than a month. Never before the Israeli cities were exposed to missile bombardments during so long time. Coalitions of the Arab armies were unable to expel the Israeli armies from any territory and always suffered defeat. And the Arab regimes that had concluded peace treaties with the Jewish state, failed to achieve release of almost five hundred prisoners from the Israeli prisons. In this connection the representatives of the Sunni fundamentalist movement traditionally accuse secular regimes of the Middle East of passivity, arrangement with the West and even treachery of interests of Moslems. However similar <powerlessness> in the struggle against Israel is characteristic for the Sunni fundamentalism itself. Weakness of Sunni Jihad Tens of the Sunni Islamite organizations, considering <Zionist formation> as an avant guarde of the <western imperialism>, are setting as their purpose <liberation of the Islamic lands seized by Jews>. But never before their actions against Israelis did not come closer on the scales and productivity to the actions of Hezbollah. Yet the attempts of HAMAS that have not brought particular success (the Palestinian branch of the Association of Muslim brotherhood) to copy the tactics of Hezbollah, serve only as an acknowledgement of the general powerlessness of the Sunni fundamentalist movement. As consequence, Hassan Nasrallah has turned into <a national hero> not only in the opinion of Lebanese Shia, but also of broad masses of the Sunni population in the Middle East and even behind its borders. Popularity of the Hezbollah leader puts in shade all political leaders of the Sunni Islamists with no exception. The similar situation puts under doubt efficiency of all Jihadist movements in the Sunni fundamentalism. Expulsion of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan in 1989 and the American contingent from Somalia in 1993 till now were considered its main military achievements. However since then the actions of the supporters of Jihad have not brought appreciable results in the struggle against secular regimes of the Muslim countries, in confrontation with the <incredulous>. On the contrary, their activity have had negative consequences for the believing Moslems and the very Islamic movement. The beginning of Jihad in 1992, launched by the <Afghan Arabs> against Algerian authorities, had provoked mass reprisals against supporters of Islamists among the population, and in the further it had led to the splitting in the Islamic movement. Actions of foreign Mojahedin in Bosnia in 1992-1995 have caused <ethnic cleanings> of local Moslems by the Serbs. Invasion of the Arab Mojahedin and their Caucasian adherents into Dagestan in 1999 was used by the new Russian leadership with a view of destruction of independence of the Chechen Republic and had led to many thousands of victims among the Chechen population. Actions of the Uzbek Islamists in 1999-2000 that leaned support of the international Jihadist movement, caused persecutions against their supporters in Uzbekistan by the regime of Karimov. Actions of Al-Qaeda on September 11, 2001 in the United States provoked an intervention of allies against Afghanistan and overthrow of the Taliban government. At the same time, in 1991-2006 all the essential internal political achievements of Islamists in Algeria, Jordan, Tajikistan, Turkey, Morocco, Egypt and Palestine was a result not of an armed struggle but of their participation in legal political processes. Against this background even the victories of the Jihadist movements in Afghanistan and Somalia appear in a slightly different light. Taking into consideration the rather low efficiency of the Sunni Islamists from the strategic point of view, it is necessary to admit that the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan took place owing to internal processes in the USSR, an active intervention of the West and Pakistan, and also liberation struggle of the Afghans, including Shia and Sunni who did not approve the ideas of Islamic fundamentalism. The <main role> of the foreign Mojahedin in this war is more likely creating of a myth by the <Afghan Arabs>, as actually their contribution had a minor character. In Somalia, defeat of Americans truly became a result of activity of mainly Arab representatives of the Jihadist movement. However it had occurred not thanks to their participation in the long military campaign but owing to a guerrilla type individual action that was successfully carried out on October 3-4, 1993. In all other cases, in conditions of long military confrontation, supporters of the Sunni Jihadist movements have failed to render essential influence on an outcome of operations. Moreover, their efforts frequently had negative consequences for Moslems. Geopolitics of Jihad Minimal effectiveness of the Sunni Jihadist movements in comparison with the successes of the Shia fundamentalists, have been aggravated by the geopolitic alignment of forces in the Middle East. The ruling regimes of Egypt and Jordan, even during the Lebanon's war, had refused to break off their relations with Israel. Both these states, in the level with the Sunni monarchies of the Persian Gulf, despite of the American-British intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan, are keeping close relations with the West. Simultaneously, persecution of radical Islamic groupings do not stop in these countries. In turn, the regime rate Turkish Islamists, having come to power in 2003, not only have not refused contacts with Israel, but also in every way have been aspiring to become a part of the European community. All this qualitatively distinguishes the leadership of Iran from the ruling elites of the neighboring Sunni states. Despite of the threats of Washington and pressure of the West European capitals, Tehran it is not going to turn off its nuclear program. During the Lebanon crisis, insurgents of Hezbollah assaulted Israeli cities and troops, using Iranian weapons. In parallel, the leaders of the Islamic republic are keeping to openly declare their aspiration to destroy the Jewish state. Against the background of feebleness of the Sunni official leaders and the leaders of the Juhadist movement, Iran and Hezbollah, in the opinion of a significant part of Moslems, appear as the main defenders of the Islamic civilization in the struggle against the <aggression of the American-British imperialism and Zionism>. It promotes the growth of authority of Tehran in the Islamic world and the Iranian influence on radical Sunni groupings. The similar situation should disturb the conservative circles in the Persian Gulf monarchies and in Saudi Arabia. Being the treasurer of the main relics of Islam, its ruling dynasty traditionally competes with Iran, Turkey and Egypt for the leadership in the Islamic world. Exactly with this very aim since the 1960s Riyadh began to support the Egyptian Association of Muslim brotherhood, and from 1970, also the broken away from it or arisen under its influence, more radical groupings worldwide. However last five years Saudi Arabia has appeared in a rather inconvenient position. On the one hand, it did not wish to refuse influence on the Sunni fundamentalist movement, but on he other, as a result of the American pressure after September 11 and antigovernmental actions of the Islamic opposition, it was compelled to reduce essentially its contacts with the foreign Jihadist organizations. Now the strengthening of the Iranian influence is threatening not only to the geopoliticak ambitions of Saudi Arabia, but also to its safety (this caused the criticism of Riyadh addressed to Hezbollah at the initial stage of the Lebanon's war). First, the ruling elites of the kingdom had always cautiously viewed the escalating of military potential of the Islamic republic, in particular of its nuclear program. Secondly, the Iranian influence on the Sunni radical groupings can be extended to the religious opposition in Saudi Arabia. And, thirdly, by various estimations, Shia make up between 4 and 15 per cent of the kingdom's population. Their basic part is concentrated in the Eastern province of the El-Hasa, and in one of its largest cities, Al Qatif, their number reaches about 95 per cent of the general population. The region has a special strategic value for the kingdom. It occupies the Saudi coast of the Persian Gulf and is the country's main source of oil. Under the influence of Islamic revolution in the neighboring Iran, in November, 1979 and February, 1980 mass antigovernmental disturbances of Shia flared up El-Hasa. About 20,000 militaries were necessary to suppress them. After an explosion at the American base in eastern city of El-Hobar in June, 1996, security services arranged reprisals against the Shia population. Their main object became the supporters of the local Shia organization, Hezbollah, accused in contacts with the Iranian secret services and a Lebanese movement of the same name. Now Riyadh is afraid that the growth of influence of Iran and popularity of the Lebanese Hezbollah might cause an activization radical Shia elements in the Eastern province. Avant guarde of Worldwide Jihad In the present situation the ruling elites of Saudi Arabia and five other Persian Gulf monarchies are interested in <balancing> growth of influence of Iran and Hezbollah in the Islamic world. However, against the background of popularity of Hassan Nasrallah and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the open actions of Riyadh in this direction can cause only a counter-action. Therefore achievement of the given purpose was assigned on the Sunni fundamentalists, led by <foremother> of the movement, Association of the Muslim brotherhood. First, it traditionally has close contacts with the Conservative circles of Saudi Arabia, and secondly, their interests in the Shia issue do coincide. Since the beginning of August, in the light of the Lebanon's crithe the chief of the World leadership of Muslim brotherhood, Mohammed Mahdi Akef had made a set of statements, speaking volumes for the plans of activization of the Sunni fundamentalists and Jihadist movement in particular. The most important messages in this connection contained his appearance on August, 1 at a conference in a Cairo staff of the teachers trade union, and also in <the weekly address>, published on August 19. In the first case Akef emphasized that the Muslim brotherhood <was and will remain fighters of Jihad until the reencounter with the Allah or will not reach their victory>. In his address dated August, 19 Akef emphasized that the <Islamic nation> was under the threat not only in the zone of the Arab-Israeli conflict, but also in other regions of the world, in particular in Iraq and Afghanistan. He also especially noted that the Muslim brotherhood support not only HAMAS and the Islamic Jihad <http://www.axisglobe.com/article.asp?article=266> but also all other groupings of Mojahedin in the Muslim world, aspiring to creation Islamic Caliphate, to an establishment of Sharia and education of the young generation in traditions of Jihad. These statements made by Akef contain two moments especially important: - From the beginning of the 1970s the official leadership of the Muslim brotherhood had refused the idea of an immediate Jihad. This essentially distinguished the movement from more radical Jihadist groupings that had broken away from it. In turn, the central leadership of the Muslim brotherhood supported integration into the legal political life of Egypt and other Muslim countries. The paramount attention was paid to the propaganda called to prepare Moslems to the stage-by-stage Islamization of the state system. At the same time, theoretically it was admitted that <the Islamic nation> should be ready to conducting Jihad, especially in the case of foreign aggression. In this connection, the struggle of HAMAS against Israel or that of Iraqis against the western coalition in 2003 was considered absolutely legitimate. However, the central leadership of the movement has never expressed its support to the global Jihad aimed at creation of the Islamic Caliphate. - In his appeal on August 19 Akef had clearly expressed his support of Jihad not only on primordially Muslim lands exposed to <American-Zionist aggression> (Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan), but actually worldwide where there are the groupings of Mojahedin aspiring to the creation of Islamic Caliphate. As is known, they are actively acting in the Balkans, in Russia, republics of Central Asia and in Northwest China <http://www.axisglobe.com/article.asp?article=556> (Xinjiang province), in India, South Thailand and the Philippines, and also in the countries of East Africa. Akef' s remarks are speaking for the new <activist line> in the activity of the Muslim brotherhood. His statements also are a declaration of intentions of the movement to raise its role in the fronts of the world Jihad. As the Muslim brotherhood remains the largest Islamic organization operating in a greater part of the globe, activization of their assistance to the Jihadist movement would inevitably be reflected in the situation at least in several regions of the world. Fronts of Jihad In a view of the last success of Hezbollah, it is necessary for the Sunni Fundamentalists to show as soon as possible their not less active participation in the struggle against <the enemies of the Islamic nation>. In this connection one should expect an increase of actions of the Jihadist groupings against the western and Israeli objects worldwide, and an increase of their activity on the most perspective geographical directions of the world Jihad. In a number of regions of traditional opposition of Moslems and the representatives of other faiths it is useless today to apply any special efforts. So, for example, the authorities in China and India have been suppressing any Jihadist displays in the most rigid way. Activity of local Jihadist groups is proceeding in North Caucasus, however it is almost impossible to achieve specific success there, too, as too many various power structures are concentrated in this region. Besides, the supporters of Jihad have actually lost the recent jumping-off place in the Chechen Republic and almost all most prominent leaders <http://www.axisglobe.com/article.asp?article=978> of the local Islamic movement, both from among the indigenous population and foreign Mojahedin. Against the background of continuation of negotiations about the status of Kosovo <http://www.axisglobe.com/article.asp?article=906> the Balkan region stays in the condition of expectation. Contradictions between Moslems and adherents of other religions in Kosovo, South Serbia (Presevo valley <http://www.axisglobe.com/article.asp?article=689> ), Bosnia-Herzegovina <http://www.axisglobe.com/article.asp?article=991> , especially in Sandzak <http://www.axisglobe.com/article.asp?article=888> of Montenegro and Macedonia <http://www.axisglobe.com/article.asp?article=938> , are still far from the stage of an open conflict. Though from the previous war in the region, first of all in Bosnia, many foreign Mojaheds <http://www.axisglobe.com/article.asp?article=522> stayed there, and also Arab funds and charity organizations (including those connected with the Saudi secret services) are continuing to operate there, there are no objective conditions the for renewal of Jihad in the Balkans. In Palestine, HAMAS with readiness accepts any financial and technical assistance (that in particular was showed during the development of the project on creation of Kassam rockets in 2001), but consistently objects to participation of foreign Mojahedin in the struggle against Israel, relying exclusively on the Palestinian forces. Events in the outlaying eastern areas of Africa and Asia do not cause special interest neither for Islamic, nor the western society. Especially because military operations have been lasting there already for a long time and it is practically impossible to reach overweight in favour of Moslems. In 1993 the operations of the Arab Mojahedin in Somalia had caused so wide resonance only because of the presence of American militaries. There still remain Iraq, Afghanistan and republics of Central Asia. On these directions, in the near future, one should expect even greater livening up of international Jihadist movements. Iraq and Afghanistan represent perfect conditions for making efforts by the supporters of Jihad. These are countries inhabited mainly by Moslems in whose territory there are troops of the western countries, under aegis of America. On both fronts the foreign Mojahedin have for a long time adapted to local conditions and have found their supporters in the environment of indigenous population. Military operations here constantly draw attention of the world mass media. Besides, the withdrawal of troops of the coalition from these countries, first of all, from Iraq, is inevitable and will allow to declare another <historical victory> of the Jihadist movement. Central-Asian Jihad In Central Asia, from the point of view of the supporters of Jihad, the situation is much more complex, though not unpromising. The majority of the population of the five states in the region consists of Sunni Moslems, a subject to various degree of Islamization. According the social attribute, countrymen are more religious than the urban population, as regards ethnicity, Islam traditionally has special influence among the Uzbek population of the region. Geographically, the Islamization is mostly perceptible in North Uzbekistan, West Kyrgyzstan, Northwest Tajikistan and Southeast Kazakhstan. Distribution of Islamic fundamentalism is promoted by numerous inveterate problems of social and economic character that are especially characteristic for Ferghana valley, located on the joint of the borders of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. It historically is a stronghold of Islam in all Central Asia. This region, and first of all Uzbekistan, has a special value for the supporters of creation of the Islamic Caliphate. Almost 50 million Moslems (more than a half are Uzbeks) live here. Besides, Central Asia historically played a role of a link between the centers of Islamic civilization of the Middle East and the Muslim population of South Russia, Western China and Northwest India. At the same time, such historical centers of the Sunni Islam and its orthodox Sufi sects as Samarkand and Bukhara are situated in the region. Penetration into Central Asia of modern Jihadist ideologies begun in the 1970s, and an illegal distribution of works of the theoreticians of the Association of Muslim brotherhood had a special value in this connection. Fahmi Hawadi, an Egyptian representative of the movement and a journalist, who visited Ferghana valley in 1980, makes out that already then in Namangan (the Uzbek part of the valley) the works of Hasan al-Banna and especially of the Qutb brothers, were extended distributed and studied. A centre of Jihadist doctrines was situated in Andijan <http://www.axisglobe.com/article.asp?article=75> where underground religious schools functioned under direction of young Islamists Rahmatulla and Abdulwali. On the joint of the 1980s and 1990s numerous Middle East funds, in particular from the Persian Gulf monarchies, and emissaries of the Islamic organizations, including those of Jihadist line, began to operate actively in Central Asia. However from the beginning of the 1990s, promulgation of fundamentalism was developing differently in the republics of the region. Uzbekistan In Uzbekistan in 1991-1993, authorities had resolutely opposed Ferghana valley Islamists. As a result many of them left the republic, having located in the beginning in Tajikistan, and then having dissipated throughout Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, Western European countries and the Arab East. They made a foreign infrastructure of the Islamic movement of Uzbekistan formed in 1996 and later renamed into Islamic movement of Turkestan. In Uzbekistan, the Islamists turned to illegal position, continuing to distribute their influence on the population, first of all, in the east of the country. Since 1999-2000 the standoff between the regime of Karimov and the Islamic opposition turned into a stage of armed confrontation. It was manifested in a series of acts of terror in Tashkent and also attempts of Islamists to intrude in the northeast and southeast areas of Uzbekistan, from Kyrgyzstan and Afghanistan, with an aim of provoking popular uprising in the country. Uzbek authorities replied with large-scale reprisals against the supporters of Islamic movement. In 2001-2002, under influence of operation of allies in Afghanistan, the Uzbek Islamists in exile divided into a number of local groupings operating both in Central Asia and behind its borders. A part from them went over under protection of the international Jihadist movement. >From the point of view of foreign Islamists, now it is inexpedient to activate an armed struggle inside Uzbekistan. Any such attempts will be stopped by the authorities in the most rigid way as the events of May, 2005 in Andijan had showed. Activization of Jihad in present conditions can only undermine the Islamists' forces. Accordingly it is necessary to continue intensive underground propaganda among the population, paying special attention to servicemen and employees of the law enforcement agencies. Representatives of the organization Hizb ut-Tahrir <http://www.axisglobe.com/search.asp?sort=ByDate> are engaged in realization of the task. Arab Islamists believe that the underground in Uzbekistan has to protect its forces for that moment when a change of power, expected in the nearest years, will take place in the country. Only in this transition period it has sense to initiate an activization of Jihad, with a view of seizure of power, at least, in the northeast areas. Turkmenistan Even before the Russian colonization, Turkmen nomads differed with smaller religiousness from the settled Uzbeks. Between the 1920s and 1930s a powerful blow had striked positions of Islam in this part of Central Asia. After establishment of the Soviet authority many spiritual figures ran abroad, those who remained were subjected to repressions. The low level of Islamization of the Turkmen was conditioned also by the fact that the Sunni orthodoxy have never had strong influence on them. Particular position here traditionally had belonged to Sufi cults absorbing pre-Islamic beliefs and the elements of Shia esoteric doctrines, got here from Persia. In opinion of the supporters of Islamic fundamentalism, all this where is much closer to paganism, rather than to a proper Islam. Attempts of Iran, after Islamic revolution 1979 to change the situation by broadcasting propaganda programs in Turkmen language from Gorgan, did not bring any appreciable result. As a result of the general liberalization in the USSR, in second half of the 1980s, revival of Islam begun in Turkmenistan. The religious literature began to be distributed freely, new mosques were erected. In the first years of independence, the process proceeded with the support of the authorities. If in the middle of the 1980s in Turkmenistan there were only four mosques in total, in 1996 their number exceeded 400. This promoted the formation of new clergy and its young representatives were trained in Turkey and Arab countries. However, in the middle of the 1990s, being afraid of emergence of Islamic opposition, authorities started to establish rigid control over religion. Almost all Islamic educational institutions and many mosques were closed, distribution of religious literature was prohibited. A number of spiritual figures, who had criticized the regime from Islamic positions, were subjected to repressions. At the moment, in Central Asia, Moslems of Turkmenistan are least subjected to processes of Islamization. The local beliefs are still far from the Sunni orthodoxy and have mainly household character. At the same time, as a result of revival of Islam between the middle of the 1980s and the middle of the 1990s, a small layer of religious youth and clergy, having absorbed influences of the Middle East Islamic centres and gravitating to the ideas of fundamentalism, appeared in Turkmenistan. It was this layer that is serving as an active potential of the Jihadist movement in the country. >From the point of view of the Arab Islamists, in present conditions, an activization of activity in Turkmenistan is unpromising. It is dictated both by the extremely low level of Islamization of the population, and the total control exercised by the authorities. It is expected that in the foreseeable future, because of deterioration of the state of health of President Niyazov, he will be compelled to leave politics, and it in turn, would cause a fierce struggle for power between various groupings of the ruling elite. Only in such a situation one can expect activization of foreign Islamists in Turkmenistan, with the support of local radical elements. Kazakhstan Historically Kazakh nomads also have been much less subjected to Islamization than the settled Uzbeks. Under influence of the last, from the south to the north, distribution of Islam among Kazakhs was taking place. Here, too, prevailed Sufi cults that had incorporated pre-Islamic beliefs. Traditional distinctions in the Islamization of the southern and northern Kazakhstan have been remaining till now. They are promoted by the ethnic factor: in the south the basic part of local Uzbek diaspora is concentrated, in many areas in the north the Slavic population prevails. Level with Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan for a long time showed the most loyal attitude to Islamic preachers, funds and the organizations from the Middle East. It had allowed foreign Islamists to create a circle of supporters among local, mainly, the Uzbek population in the south of the country. From the beginning of the 2000s, owing to an activization of the Islamic propaganda, demands of Uzbekistan and Russia, and also events of September 11, the Kazakh authorities started to pursue the adherents of the radical Islam. In reply the foreign representatives of the Jihadist movement initiated preparation of some demonstrative acts of terror, with a purpose of intimidation. With an assistance of the secret services of other Central Asian republics, Azerbaijan, Russia and Turkey, in 2004-2006 several large groups of Jihadists, involved in terrorist activity against both, Uzbek and Kazakh authorities, were neutralized in Kazakhstan. At the same time, from the point of view of the Arab Islamists, an activization of Jihad in Kazakhstan has no sense in the nearest perspective. Such actions may only cause negative reaction of broad masses of the Muslim population. First, the population in overwhelming majority remains rather far from the <proper Islam>. Secondly, rather high economic level of development of Kazakhstan does not promote active growth of Islamic moods. Thirdly, even persecutions of Islamists are of rather gentle character, in comparison with other republics of the region. This does not allow to interpret the religious situation in the country as persecution by the authorities aimed against Islam. In these conditions the paramount purpose of Islamists consists in activization of the propaganda activity, especially outside the Uzbek community, first of all, among Kazakhs, not only in southern, but also other areas. The same as in other republics of Central Asia, the members of the local cells of the Hizb ut-Tahrir most intensively engaged in its execution. Simultaneously, foreign representatives of the Jihadist movement are going, as formerly, to use still territory of Kazakhstan in their activity against Uzbekistan. Tajikistan In Tajikistan, as well as in other regions of the Central Asia, before the Russian colonization Islam was presented first of all by the Sufi brotherhoods; their doctrines had absorbed numerous pre-Islamic elements. The same as with other Central Asian nations, Sufi figures were taking the lead of Tajiks resistance against the Russian expansion, and then against the Soviet authority. With the victory of Bolsheviks, mass reprisals against the Sufis were organized all over Central Asia, including Tajikistan. However unlike other republics, the local Sufi brotherhoods in the greatest degree managed to adapt to new realities, and in many respects to keep the unique position in the Tajik society. Subsequently it was the <survivability> of the Tajik Sufizm that had played one of key roles in the polarization of Islam in Tajikistan. The process begun between the 1960s and 1980s under influence of two factors: activization of Sufi instructors in the national environment and occurrence of the groups gravitated to ideology of classical Islamic fundamentalism. Penetration of these ideas into Tajikistan occurred under influence of underground Islamic figures of the Uzbeks of Ferghana valley. In 1978 the first illegal association of the Tajik Islamists, the Youth Organization, adhering religious-political concepts of the Association of Muslim brothers, was formed. In 1983 in Tajikistan the first edition of cleanly Islamic orientation periodical, Hidojat, was published in underground. In parallel, at the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s the process of consolidation of various Islamic elements, both traditional-Sufi, and modern-Fundamentalist orientated, had begun. In the second half of the 1980s, representatives of intellectuals who were not related neither to Sufi brotherhoods, nor radical Islamists, but adhered pro-Islamic sights joined them. Simultaneously, against the background of the general liberalization in the USSR, an activization of Islamic figures in the republic was taking place. As consequence in 1990 the Islamic Revival Party of Tajikistan (IRP) was formed. Representatives of all local Islamic currents entered it, but the leading position was filled with the natives of the Sufi brotherhoods. This in many respects defined the more moderate and national-traditionalist character of the IRP that essentially distinguishes it from the Islamic organizations that had appeared in Central Asia lately. Subsequently this has allowed IRP to become the unique legal political force of Islamic orientation in the region. During the 1992-1997 civil war, the IRP was the main component of the antigovernmental opposition but after the conclusion of peace agreements, the party had filled one of the first places in the political life of the country. By the end of the 1990s, under influence of active contacts of Tajikistan with the countries of the Middle East and activity of supporters of the Islamic opposition of Uzbekistan, radical Islamic organizations started to appear in the republic. Hizb ut-Tahrir has the leading position among them. In the initial period, the radical Islamists acted only in the north of the country, mainly in Sogd area, among local Uzbeks. In 2003-2006 the situation has changed, they have distributed their activity to the central and southern areas, covering also the Tajik population. Adherents of classical Islamic fundamentalism are equally hostilely treating both, the secular authorities and official clergy, and the IRP. The similar attitude to this party is based on its participation in the legal political life, and also adherence of its many activists to the Sufi traditions. In present conditions the radical Islamists are aspiring to strengthen their positions in various areas of the republic, in particular in its central and southern part. Great significance is paid to the access beyond the borders of the Uzbek community and propaganda among the Tajik population. Recruitment of supporters in the ranks of leaders of the leading political parties, the governmental departments, in particular in power structures, is a special priority. >From the point of view of radical Islamists, the present position of the IRP gives it a unique opportunity to raise own influence in the republic. It is dictated by the change of the IRP leadership (caused by the death of its head Said Abdullo Nuri and heavy illness of one of the leaders, Mohammad Sharif Himmatzoda), and also by an aggravation of contradictions between regional groupings inside of the party. The developed situation, in opinion of the radical Islamists, allows to even more weaken the IRP positions and to draw on the party a part of its supporters. Various ways are considered how to promote an internal split within the IRP have been reviewed with this purpose. The same attention is given to an activization of propaganda campaign against this party. Foreign Islamists believe that it is necessary to bring to a focus the contacts of the IRP acting chairman, Muhiddin Kabiri, with Americans, and also to concentrate on growth of the pro-Shia moods among a part of its activists. At the same time, in a view of the presidential elections planned this November in Tajikistan, armed activity of radical Islamists is also possible. Similar actions might be presented as expression of <national protest> against an antidemocratic character of the pre-election campaign and electoral process. One should expect also the growth of Jihadist displays in the northwestern areas of Tajikistan. First, this territory is considered as one of the regional jumping-off places in the activity of Islamists on the Uzbek direction. Besides, the Jihadist actions in the area promote the general aggravation of the situation in Ferghana valley and to preservation of tension between Tashkent and Dushanbe. Kyrgyzstan The same as other nomadic people of the Central Asia in the past, spreaders of Islam among Kyrgyz population were the Sufi brotherhoods. They kept a special position in the Kyrgyz society down to the first decades of the Soviet authority. As a result of efforts of the Communist regime, Islam in Kyrgyzstan got mainly household character. Simultaneously, the same as in the neighboring Kazakhstan, distinctions in Islamization were traditionally kept between the southwest areas and other part of the republic. It is promoted by an ethno-political factor. The southwest extremity of Kyrgyzstan adjoins the Uzbek border and the significant part of local population is made by Uzbeks. Spreading of Islam was taking place here from the territory of modern Uzbekistan. Local Uzbeks who are more religious than Kyrgyz, also contributed to the Islamization of the neighbors. Northern region, in the days of Russian colonization and the Soviet authority, became a place of mass settlement of representatives of Slavic people. Kyrgyz living there even up to that had been to a lesser degree subjected to the influence of Islam than their southern fellow tribesmen, and in due course had undergone also significant cultural assimilation with the Slavic migrants. For the first time the supporters of Islamic fundamentalism in Kyrgyzstan appeared in the south in the 1980s, under influence of the Uzbek part of Ferghana valley. They consisted of Uzbek inhabitants of the rural areas surrounding the cities of Osh and Jalalabad. The further distribution of radical Islam was promoted by revival of the spiritual life of the republic, begun in second half of the 1980s and amplified after finding independence in 1991. Preachers, funds and religious organizations from the Middle East and also training of the Kyrgyz youth in the Islamic centers of Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Turkey have played a special role. Migration to the south of Kyrgyzstan of supporters of Islamic opposition of Uzbekistan had also a considerable value. All these processes, level with the liberal attitude of authorities to religious influences from abroad and numerous social and economic problems, have led to formation in the south of a significant layer of the population sympathizing Islamists. From the middle of the 1990s various fundamentalist organizations of the Middle East or Uzbek origin started to operate here. As in Kazakhstan and Tajikistan, the greatest activity in the field of propagation was shown by the representatives of Hizb ut-Tahrir. Similarly to situation in the two specified republics, originally they were limited to propaganda among the Uzbek population of the southwestern areas. However last years Hizb ut-Tahrir has spread its activity to the Kyrgyz population in the country's central and northern areas. The change of power <http://www.axisglobe.com/article.asp?article=67> in Kyrgyzstan, that took place March, 2005, promoted <http://www.axisglobe.com/article.asp?article=804> internal political destabilization in the republic, growth of influence of the organized crime, new repartition of the property. It has caused an even greater aggravation of inveterate social and economic problems. Secret services and law enforcement bodies that had noticeably lowered their efficiency (that they could not particularly trot out anyway) had in parallel undergone personnel cleanings and reorganization. All this created favorable conditions for the activization of the radical Islamists who considered Kyrgyzstan as the most convenient jumping-off place for the activity on the Uzbek direction. This May-July some armed conflicts between Islamists and employees of power structures took place in the south of the republic. Under pressure and with an assistance of Uzbekistan, the Kyrgyz authorities have begun large-scale campaign against supporters of the radical Islam. It includes mass searches in houses of the suspects and arrests of Islamists, actions on revealing of figures of official clergy sympathizing them, and also preparation of measures on toughening the control over activity of mosques, independent Islamic preachers and foreign organizations. Killing of the extremely popular imam Muhammadrafik Kamalov has caused particular indignation of the religious part of the population in the south of republic. He was shot dead on August 6 during exchange of firing between the employees of power structures and a group of Islamists. The arisen situation creates favorable conditions for expansion of operations of Islamists in the south of the republic. Charges of Bishkek in persecutions of Islamic clergy and simple believers in cooperation with the <anti-Islamic> regime of Tashkent is serving as an ideal occasion for this purpose. Especially, for a long time in the Southwest Kyrgyzstan there are fighting groups of Islamic movement of Turkestan, most part of them are submitted to the local representative of the organization, Rasul Akhunov. Rendering of the financial and military help by it from abroad (through Afghanistan) considerably facilitates almost the full absence of control over the Kyrgyz side of the border with Northwest Tajikistan. Besides, the local population also consists mainly of Uzbeks; their considerable part sympathizes with Islamists. Against this background, in all Central Asia, the most perspective for the international Jihadist movements is making efforts in Kyrgyzstan. [Non-text portions of this message have been removed] -------------------------- Want to discuss this topic? 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