Iran can be trusted to act like the vicious, lying, treacherous barbaric
Muslim terrorists that they are.
 
No surprises there.
 
Bruce
 
 
 
http://www.meforum.org/article/1002
Can Iran Be Trusted?
by Michael Rubin,  AEI Middle Eastern Outlook,  1 September 2006
 
 
Diplomacy to resolve concerns over Iran's nuclear program continues with no
clear resolution in sight. Most officials seek to avoid military
confrontation. After receiving Iran's refusal to demands that it suspend
uranium enrichment, both Moscow and Paris urged Washington not to escalate
the dispute.[1] Serious U.S. analysts agree with the costs of military
action. The Iranian government could ratchet up its sponsorship of terror,
U.S. troops in Iraq could be vulnerable to Tehran's proxy militias, ordinary
Iranian citizens could rally around the nationalist flag, and targeted
bombing of Iranian facilities could delay the Islamic Republic's program,
not end it.
 
But will diplomacy be enough to stop the Islamic Republic's acquisition of
nuclear weapons? What enables diplomacy is trust that the opposing side will
honor its commitments. Tehran's track record does not create confidence. In
its formative revolutionary years, the reformist heyday, and even today, the
Iranian leadership has had a consistent record of antipathy toward
diplomatic convention and violation of agreements.
 
 
The Embassy Seizure
 
It has become fashionable to blame the United States for poor relations with
Iran, but within months of the Islamic Revolution, Washington was willing to
reestablish diplomatic relations. On November 1, 1979, Iranian foreign
minister Ibrahim Yazdi met with Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Jimmy
Carter's national security advisor, in Algiers to discuss resumption of
relations. Three days later, in reaction, Iranian students "following the
link of the Imam [Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini]" attacked the U.S. embassy in
Tehran, taking fifty-two diplomats hostage. The day after the hostage
seizure, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini gave their actions a ringing
endorsement. Even Warren Christopher, at the time deputy secretary of state
and a dove on Iran, regarded such action as a "flagrant violation" of the
1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and the 1963 Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations.[2]
 
U.S. officials sought to let cooler heads prevail. On November 6, 1979,
National Security Council officials leaked to the Washington Post that there
would be "no change in the status quo--no military alert, no movement of
forces, no resort to military contingency plans."[3] Any effort to give
diplomacy a chance backfired. Both Khomeini's son and Khomeini's future
successor and current Supreme Leader, Ali Kha-manei, visited the embassy
soon after its seizure, underscoring official contempt for international
protocols.[4]
 
But can poor decisions more than a quarter century ago be applicable to
Iranian diplomacy today? Not by themselves. While the Iranian leadership
often demands apologies for transgressions both real and imagined,[5] it
continues to uphold the righteousness of hostage seizure, underscoring the
prevalent attitude in Tehran toward diplomatic convention. Photographs taken
earlier this year inside the former U.S. embassy in Tehran show bound
mannequins dressed in U.S. military uniforms and a banner quoting Supreme
Leader Khamenei celebrating Iranian "neutralization" of "arrogant plots."
Individual trees in the embassy garden are draped with banners calling for
America's demise.
 
 
Broken Promises
 
In the aftermath of the hostage situation, the Reagan administration took a
pragmatic approach toward engaging Iran. While the Iran-Contra Affair is
remembered today for the Reagan administration's illegal attempts to
circumvent the Congressional prohibition of the funding of the Nicaraguan
resistance, from a diplomatic perspective, the duplicity of Iranian
politicians--many of whom still wield significant power in Tehran--is also
important. A week after former U.S. national security advisor Robert
McFarlane's secret 1986 trip to Tehran, Mehdi Hashemi, the son-in-law of
Khomeini's deputy Hossein Ali Montazeri, leaked word of secret talks in
pamphlets distributed at the University of Tehran. Six months later,
Montazeri or his immediate aides--there were conflicting admissions--leaked
word of McFarlane's meetings in the pro-Syrian Lebanese news magazine Ash
Shira'a.[6] On November 4, 1986, the seventh anniversary of the embassy
seizure, former president and Expediency Council chairman Ali Akbar Hashemi
Rafsanjani confirmed the meeting to the international press.[7] Regardless
of questions over the wisdom of the arms-for-hostages negotiations, the
episode represented a serious, sensitive, and covert attempt to reach out to
the Iranian government. U.S. authorities trusted the Iranians to keep their
silence. Regardless of the reason, Iranian officials--and ultimately
Rafsanjani--broke their word.
 
 
The Rushdie Rules
 
Yet another incident demonstrates just how poorly the Iranian government
fares in keeping its promises. On February 14, 1989, Iranian Supreme Leader
Khomeini issued a declaration calling for author Salman Rushdie's death.
Four months before Khomeini's death, then-president Khamenei demanded that
Rushdie apologize in exchange for cancellation of a religious edict ordering
his murder. Rushdie apologized, but the Iranian government nevertheless kept
the bounty in place.[8] To Iran's hard-line clergy, Rushdie's apology became
further evidence of his guilt.
 
Outright Iranian lying should not surprise us; what should is how Western
governments repeatedly fall prey to such deceptions. On September 24, 1998,
the Iranian government said it would do nothing to harm Rushdie, acceding to
the British Foreign Office's chief condition for the restoration of
diplomatic relations.[9] But on February 14, 1999, Iranian security officers
reaffirmed their intention to carry out Rushdie's death sentence.[10] On May
19, 1999, a day after London and Tehran agreed to once again exchange
ambassadors, the Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran radio commentary
called Rushdie an "apostate," making his murder lawful under Islamic law.
The incident is not forgotten in Iran. On February 12, 2005, the Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps issued a statement declaring, "The day will come
when they will punish the apostate Rushdie for his scandalous acts and
insults against the Koran and the Prophet."[11]
 
 
The Business of Deception
 
Iranian diplomatic promises are especially unreliable when made in the
course of deals that involve commercial enrichment or incentives. On
November 8, 1996, Iranian deputy prime minister Mahmoud Vaezi promised to
help locate Ron Arad, an Israeli airman lost over Lebanon a decade earlier
and captured by a pro-Iranian militia. "It is not a political but a
humanitarian question," an Iranian member of Vaezi's delegation
explained.[12] But after the French and Iranian governments concluded a deal
for Iran to purchase ten Airbus jumbo jets and $500 million in
communications satellites, and agreed that the French company Total would
develop Iran's oil fields, the Iranian foreign ministry reversed its
position on Arad.[13] While Vaezi may have intended his statements to help
pave the way for a deal, the incident shows how, rather than build goodwill
to achieve a solution for longstanding problems, granting carrots or
commercial incentives may undercut Iranian cooperation.
 
The Iranian government has also shown that it subordinates its contracts and
commitments to the efficacy of official ideology. On May 8, 2004, the
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps rolled tanks onto the runway at the new
Imam Khomeini International Airport to prevent the Turkish-Austrian
consortium TAV from taking over operation of the facility.[14] Contractual
and diplomatic obligations meant little. The airport remained closed for
much of the following year. Finally, on March 3, 2005, Iranian transport
minister Mohammad Rahmati said, "We have separated the fate of Imam Khomeini
Airport from that of TAV."15 The Revolutionary Guard won. Later that year,
the intelligence ministry and hard-line parliamentarians helped scuttle a
signed $3 billion agreement with the Turkish cellular phone company Turkcell
because, they said, the Turkish company was insufficiently opposed to
Israel.16 Most importantly, it is these military and security forces, and
not the diplomatic corps, which hold the files on advanced weaponry and the
military nuclear program. Even if Iran's diplomats were sincere, they would
not necessarily know about--let alone have the power to negotiate on behalf
of--these other bureaucracies.
 
 
Afghanistan and Iraq: Saying One Thing, Doing Another
 
Perhaps all diplomats spin or mislead to put the best face on their
country's actions. Iranian diplomats, though, often go further and
fabricate. Despite promises of noninterference and, indeed, cooperation,
officials in Tehran have sought to undermine stability in both Afghanistan
and Iraq.
 
Afghanistan is often lauded as a successful model for U.S.-Iranian
cooperation. While United Nations secretary general Kofi Annan praised
Iran's "great support"[17] to Afghanistan, and a former National Security
Council staffer lauded Iranian cooperation with Washington over
Afghanistan,[18] the reality was less rosy. Both former parliamentary
speaker and leading cleric Ali-Akbar Nateq-Nuri and Hussein Ibrahimi,
Khamenei's personal representative for Afghanistan, urged Afghan clerics to
resist U.S. plans and goals for Afghanistan.[19] On March 8, 2002, Afghan
commanders intercepted twelve Iranian agents and proxies who were organizing
armed resistance among Afghan commanders.[20] Iranian assurances of
noninterference were false.
 
Still, U.S. and British officials sought to obtain an agreement that Iran
would not interfere prior to the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom. British
foreign secretary Jack Straw elicited a promise from Iranian foreign
minister Kamal Kharrazi, who pledged Iranian noninterference. Mohammad Javad
Zarif, Iran's ambassador to the United Nations, repeated this pledge to
Zalmay Khalilzad, then President George W. Bush's envoy to the free Iraqis.
But Iran's diplomacy was a diversion. Soon after Saddam's fall, the Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps, with the acquiescence of the Islamic Republic's
supreme leadership, moved to infiltrate into the country 2,000 fighters,
militiamen, and Qods Force personnel replete with radio transmitters, money,
pamphlets, and supplies.[21] Whether Kharrazi and Zarif knew of the
duplicity or not is irrelevant. Either they lied outright or they revealed
themselves to be out of the decision-making process and, therefore, not
credible negotiating partners. If they were not sincere, they revealed how
ill-advised entering into diplomatic agreements with Tehran is. It was not
long before the White House acknowledged concerns over the infiltration.[22]
By October 2003, coalition forces had detained more than a hundred Iranians
in Iraq.[23]
 
Again, the Iranian foreign minister promised good behavior. On November 18,
2003, Iran's official news agency reported that Kharrazi had promised Jalal
Talabani, leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and rotating president
of the Iraqi Governing Council, that Iran would not interfere in Iraqi
affairs. This time Kharrazi, aware of Iranian activities in Iraq, lied
outright. Ali Nurizadeh, an Iranian reporter in London often viewed by
analysts as close to former president Mohammad Khatami and the "reformist"
camp, subsequently reported on a growing Iranian intelligence and Qods Force
network across Iraq.[24] The following week, Nurizadeh reported on the
Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps's involvement with Iraqi firebrand Muqtada
al-Sadr's militia.[25] Nevertheless, the top Iranian diplomat in
Baghdad--himself a member of the Qods Force--insisted that "Iran will not
accept anything that destabilizes Iraq."[26] Four months later, Iraqi forces
captured thirty Iranians fighting alongside Sadr's militia,[27] and
Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati, secretary of the powerful Guardian Council, praised
Sadr's resistance. "I should really thank and praise those who are resisting
the blood thirsty wolves," he said as guest orator at Iran's official Friday
sermon.[28] U.S. officials in Iraq say that such Iranian duplicity still
continues there.[29]
 
 
A Nuclear Iran?
 
Iran's track record of deceit would not matter so much if the stakes to U.S.
national security were not now so great. But a nuclear Iran would represent
a fundamental shift in strategic balance. Iranian officials often say that
their nuclear program is peaceful. On August 27, 2006, Kazem Jalali, the
rapporteur of the parliament's National Security and Foreign Policy
Commission, said, "No one in Iran defends production of atomic bombs or use
of the nuclear technology for non-peaceful purposes."[30] That is not quite
true. Statements by regime ideologues and insiders give reason to doubt
this.
 
On December 14, 2001, Rafsanjani, arguably the second most powerful man in
Iran, declared, "The use of an atomic bomb against Israel would totally
destroy Israel, while the same against the Islamic world would only cause
damage. Such a scenario is not inconceivable."[31] Iran Emrooz (Iran Today)
quoted Ayatollah Mohammad Baqer Kharrazi, secretary-general of Iranian
Hezbollah, as saying in a February 14, 2005, speech, "We are able to produce
atomic bombs and we will do that. We shouldn't be afraid of anyone. The U.S.
is not more than a barking dog."[32]
 
On May 29, 2005, Hojjat ol-Islam Gholam Reza Hasani, the Supreme Leader's
personal representative to the province of West Azerbaijan, declared
possession of nuclear weapons to be one of Iran's top goals. "An atom bomb .
. . must be produced as well," he said."That is because the Qur'an has told
Muslims to 'get strong and amass all the forces at your disposal to be
strong.'"[33] Hasani's unpopularity among many Iranians is irrelevant. As a
confidant of the Supreme Leader, Hasani provides a window into his thinking.
In February 2006, Rooz (Day), an Iranian website close to the Islamic
Republic's reformist camp, quoted Mohsen Gharavian, a Qom theologian close
to Ayatollah Mohammad Taghi Mesbah Yazdi, one of the Islamic Republic's
staunchest ideologues, as saying it was only "natural" for the Islamic
Republic to possess nuclear weapons.[34]
 
Distrust over Iranian intentions is not based solely upon Iranian
statements, but also upon Tehran's actions. In December 2002, satellite
photos confirmed reports that the Iranian government was building an
undeclared uranium enrichment plant at Natanz, about 130 miles south of
Tehran, and a heavy water plant at Khondab, about thirty-two miles northwest
of the town of Arak.[35]
 
In February 2003, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) sent a team
of inspectors to confirm Iranian statements that "the activities of the
Islamic Republic are totally transparent, clear, and peaceful."[36] Their
subsequent report showed the depth of Iranian subterfuge. Iran had completed
164 centrifuges, was working on 1,000 more, and had designed the facility to
house at least 50,000. Furthermore, the inspection revealed that Tehran had
not acknowledged import of almost a ton of uranium from China, nor could the
Iranian nuclear agency account for some missing processed uranium.[37]
 
The Iranian government's initial claims that its program was indigenous and
entirely peaceful were false. As the IAEA noted,
 
"The role of uranium metal in Iran's declared nuclear fuel cycle still needs
to be fully understood, since neither its light water reactors nor its
planned heavy water reactors require uranium metal for fuel."[38]
 
After inspectors caught Iran in a lie, Iranian officials changed their
story. They abandoned previous statements about the indigenous nature of
their program and blamed the presence of highly enriched uranium traces on
contaminated equipment imported into Iran,[39] most likely from Pakistan.
Patrick Clawson, coauthor of Checking Iran's Nuclear Ambitions, observed,
"If true, that means Iran has in fact had substantial foreign assistance and
has been effective at concealing that assistance."[40]
 
Iranian scientists later acknowledged experimenting with the chemical
separation of polonium. Polonium-210 is used to initiate the chain reaction
leading to the detonation of a nuclear bomb.[41] Although Iranian officials
then assured the IAEA that they would shortly stop enriching uranium, they
did not.[42] Again, Tehran had lied to win short-term diplomatic goodwill.
On August 10, 2004, Kharrazi said that Iran would not resume uranium
enrichment unless there was a significant change in national interest.[43]
The pause in enrichment lasted just seven weeks more, even though there had
been no significant change; if anything, with U.S. forces engaged in a
bloody counterinsurgency in Iraq and gasoline prices at records highs,
Tehran's geopolitical position had grown more secure. Whether Kharrazi
intended to deceive should be irrelevant from the Western perspective. In
April 2004, the IAEA again found traces of bomb-grade uranium at other
sites.[44] Iran had lied again. On September 24, 2004, the IAEA Board of
Governors met in Vienna, Austria, and after recalling a litany of Iranian
mistruths, found that "Iran's many failures and breaches of its obligations
to comply with its NPT [Non-Proliferation Treaty] Safeguards Agreement . . .
constitute non-compliance."[45]
 
If not lying outright, Tehran also continues to violate the spirit of the
NPT by signing--albeit refusing to ratify--the Additional Protocol. In
effect, this means that the Iranian government gains the advantages of
access to technology sharing, but does not adhere to the more rigorous
inspection demanded by the agreement.[46] Iranian authorities also broke
their pledge to uphold the Additional Protocol's standards pending
ratification.[47] Earlier this year, according to the Associated Press, the
Iranian government turned away IAEA inspectors from the nuclear facility at
Natanz, a violation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.[48]
 
 
Conclusions
 
On August 26, 1987, President Ronald Reagan defended his nuclear diplomacy
and deal-making with the Soviet Union. Speaking at a town hall meeting in
California, he declared,
 
"We are near an historic agreement that could eliminate a whole class of
missiles. If it is signed, we shall rely not on trust, but on the evidence
of our own eyes that it is being implemented. As the Russians themselves
say, doveryai no proveryai--trust but verify. And that we shall do."[49]
 
Reagan's diplomacy was successful. The Soviet Union, at the time, was a far
more powerful adversary. Rather than engage in diplomacy for its own sake,
the White House ensured that mechanisms were in place to make sure Moscow
kept its word. With regard to Iran's nuclear program, the reverse is true.
Tehran has repeatedly promised, but never verified.
 
While diplomacy necessarily involves talking to adversaries, it is dangerous
to assume that both Washington and Tehran operate from the same set of
ground rules. From its very inception, the Islamic Republic eschewed the
convention of international relations and diplomacy. Khomeini sought to
establish a theocracy on Shi'ite religious principles. As such, his writings
are illuminating. In several essays, he spoke of the Shi'ite concept of
taqiya, religious dissimulation. Railing against the plots of the West in a
series of lectures delivered in Najaf in 1970, Khomeini spoke of the
necessity to engage in such religiously sanctioned lying.[50] While many
analysts are unaware of taqiya and many academics stigmatize discussion of
its extent and derivations for fear of portraying Iran in a negative light,
the concept nonetheless influences Tehran's diplomacy. If the Islamic
Republic perceives itself as under threat,[51] its leaders may not only feel
compelled to lie, but may also feel justified in so doing. From a religious
and political perspective, the ends justify the means. Hence, Khomeini saw
nothing wrong with his state-ment to the Guardian, shortly before the
Islamic Republic: "I don't want to have the power of government in my hand;
I am not interested in personal power."[52] Tehran may still conduct
diplomacy to fish for incentive and reward--and they may demand apologies
and use the rhetoric of victimization to win further concessions and
position--but, at its core, Iranian diplomacy is insincere. The Iranian
leadership will say anything and do anything to buy the time necessary to
acquire nuclear capability.
 
 
Michael Rubin is a resident scholar at AEI. AEI research assistant Jeffrey
Azarva provided research assistance and editorial associate Nicole Passan
worked with Mr. Rubin to edit and produce this Middle Eastern Outlook.
 
 
1. Steven Lee Myers, "Russia Says Iran Sanctions Are Premature," New York
Times, August 25, 2006; Maggie Farley, "U.S. May Curb Iran," Los Angeles
Times, August 26, 2006.
2. Warren Christopher, ed., American Hostages in Iran (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1985), 11.
3. John M. Goshko and J. P. Smith, "Bazargan Government Resigns; Carter,
Security Aides Meet Twice," Washington Post, November 7, 1979. Then-National
Security Council staffer Gary Sick later described the meeting in "Military
Options and Constraints," in Warren Christopher, ed., American Hostages in
Iran, 144-47.
4. Massoumeh Ebtekar, Takeover in Tehran: The Inside Story of the 1979 U.S.
Embassy Capture (Vancouver: Talon Books, 2000), 86.
5. At one point, Iranian officials demanded that President Jimmy Carter
apologize to Iran in order to secure hostage release (Scott Armstrong,
"Top-Secret 'Iran Papers' Outline Role of U.S. There," Washington Post,
September 19, 1980). In 1999, the Iranian government demanded that President
Bill Clinton apologize for the 1988 downing of an Iranian passenger jet by
the U.S.S. Vincennes. President Ronald Reagan had already expressed regret
for the incident more than a decade before. On March 17, 2000, U.S.
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright acknowledged "responsibility" for such
transgressions as supporting the 1953 coup against Prime Minister Muhammad
Musaddiq, the quarter century of "sustained backing to the Shah's regime,"
and for U.S. support for Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War (Secretary of State
Madeleine Albright, remarks before the American-Iranian Council, March 17,
2000, Washington, D.C., Office of the Spokesman, U.S. Department of State).
Still, two years later, Iranian President Muhammad Khatami demanded that the
United States apologize for "misdeeds of the past" (Islamic Republic News
Agency, July 14, 2002).
6. Nora Boustany, "Beirut Magazine Says McFarlane Secretly Visited Tehran,"
Washington Post, November 4, 1986; Stanley Reed, "'Beirut Rag:' Al Shiraa
Magazine," The Nation, December 20, 1986.
7. John Tower, The Tower Commission Report (New York: Bantam, 1987), 51.
8. Jonathan Randal, "Novelist Apologizes to Moslems," Washington Post,
February 18, 1989. Many Iranian intellectuals and Arab writers have
acknowledged the Iranian leadership's improper treatment of Rushdie. See
Pour Rushdie: Cent Intellectuels Arabes et Musulmans pour la Liberté
d'Expression [For Rushdie: One-Hundred Arab and Muslim Scholars for Freedom
of Expression] (Paris: La Découverte, 1993).
9. Ian Black, "Rushdie Breakthrough," Guardian (London), September 25, 1998.
10. "Threat to Rushdie Reaffirmed," Financial Times, February 15, 1999.
11. "Iran Hardliners Say Rushdie Still Faces Execution," Agence France
Presse, February 13, 2005.
12. "Iran Agrees to Help Find Israeli Flier Ron Arad," Agence France Presse,
November 8, 1996.
13. "Iran Denies Helping to Find Israeli Pilot," Agence France Presse,
November 11, 1996.
14. Aftab-e Yazd, May 8, 2004; "New Tehran Airport Remains Closed," Fars
News Agency, May 11, 2004; Karl Vick, "Politics on Collision Course at
Shuttered Iranian Airport," Washington Post, August 10, 2004.
15. "Iran to Reopen New Airport," Gulf Daily News (Bahrain), March 3, 2005.
16. "Iran Government Faces Opposition to Turkish Investment," Turkish Daily
News, July 28, 2004; Mohsen Asgari and Gareth Smith, "Conservatives Flex
Muscles in Iran's New Parliament," Financial Times, September 24, 2004;
"Turkcell Provides Update on the Progress of Its Investment in Iran,"
Wireless News, September 25, 2004; and "Irancell Replaces Turkcell with
South African MTN," Islamic Republic News Agency, September 11, 2005.
17. Office of the UN Secretary General, "Press Conference with Foreign
Minister Kamal Kharrazi" (press conference, Tehran, Iran, January 26, 2002).
18. CFR.org, "Flynt Leverett: Bush Administration 'Not Serious' about
Dealing with Iran," Council on Foreign Relations interview, March 31, 2006.
19. Bill Samii, "Tehran Continues Afghan 'Psyops,'" Radio Free Europe/Radio
Liberty Iran Report, January 28, 2002.
20. Douglas Jehl, "A Nation Challenged: Outside Influences," New York Times,
March 9, 2002.
21. Ali Nurizadeh, "Revolutionary Guards Accompanied Supreme Council for
Islamic Revolution," Ash-Sharq al-Awsat, April 25, 2003.
22. Ari Fleischer, White House press briefing, April 23, 2003.
23. "Tehran Makes Official Protest to US over Arrests of Iranians in Iraq,"
Agence France Presse, October 23, 2003.|
24. Ali Nurizadeh, "Former Iranian Intelligence Officer: Tehran Is Deploying
Its Agents in Iraq from North to South," Ash-Sharq al-Awsat, April 3, 2004.
25. Ali Nurizadeh, "Iranian Source: Revolutionary Guard Trains 1,000 Muqtada
al-Sadr Supporters on Guerilla Warfare," Ash-Sharq al-Awsat, April 9, 2004.
26. Hambastegi (Tehran), April 18, 2004.
27. Michael Howard, "Iraq Crisis: Rift Grows as Iranians Caught Fighting for
Sadr," Guardian, August 13, 2004. Additionally, Nurizadeh reported remarks
by Qods Force commander Qasem Soleymani, who bragged about Iranian
assistance to terrorist leader Abu-Mus'ab al-Zarqawi (Ali Nurizadeh,
"Iranian Admission of Providing Facilities to Al-Zarqawi,"
Ash-Sharq al-Awsat, August 11, 2004.)
28. Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran, August 13, 2004.
29. Jonathan Finer and Ellen Knickmeyer, "Envoy Accuses Iran of Duplicity on
Iraq," Washington Post, March 24, 2006.
30. "Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy Center of Iran's Strategy," Fars News
Agency, August 28, 2006.
31. Islamic Republic News Agency, December 14, 2001.
32. "Iranian Hardliner Says Iran Will Produce Atomic Bomb," IranMania.com,
February 14, 2005.
33. Baztab News Agency, May 29, 2005.
34. Colin Freeman and Philip Sherwell, "Iranian Fatwa Approves Use of
Nuclear Weapons," Daily Telegraph, February 19, 2006. Gharavian later
backtracked from his comments (Islamic Republic News Agency, February 21,
2006).
35. Glenn Kessler, "Nuclear Sites in Iran Worry U.S. Officials," Washington
Post, December 14, 2002. In defiance of the United Nations, the Iranian
government began operating the Khondab plant on August 26, 2006 (Ali Akbar
Dareini, "Defying U.N., Iran Opens Nuclear Reactor," Associated Press,
August 26, 2006).
36. Kamal Kharrazi, as quoted by the BBC, "Iran Defiant on Nuclear Plans,"
December 14, 2002.
37. IAEA, Board of Governors, "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards
Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran," GOV/2003/40, June 6, 2003.
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid., GOV/2003/63, August 26, 2003.
40. Patrick Clawson, "Gaining Support for Action on Iran's Nuclear Program,"
Policy Watch 784 (Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Washington,
D.C., August 27, 2003).
41. IAEA, Board of Governors, "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards
Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran," GOV/2004/11, March 13, 2004.
42. Ibid., GOV/2004/60, September 1, 2004. In November 2004, Iranian
authorities again agreed to suspend enrichment; on August 15, 2005,
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad announced an "irreversible" resumption of
uranium enrichment (Islamic Republic News Agency, August 15, 2005).
43. "FM Says Iran Has Suspended Uranium Programme," Deutsche Presse-Agentur,
August 10, 2004, citing the Iranian Student News Agency.
44. Louis Charbonneau, "More Bomb-Grade Uranium Found in Iran," Reuters,
April 2, 2004.
45. IAEA, Board of Governors, "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards
Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran," GOV/2005/77, September 24, 2005.
46. Chen Zak, Iran's Nuclear Policy and the IAEA: An Evaluation of Program
93+2 (Washington: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2002), 10-18;
IAEA, "Iran Signs Additional Protocol on Nuclear Safeguards," staff report,
December 18, 2003.
47. IAEA, "Iran Signs Additional Protocol on Nuclear Safeguards," staff
report, December 18, 2003.
48. Michael Slackman, "Iran Defiant on Nuclear Program as Deadline
Approaches," New York Times, August 22, 2006.
49. "Excerpts from President's Speech in California on U.S.-Soviet
Relations," New York Times, August 27, 1987.
50. Imam Khomeini, "Islamic Government" [Hukumat-e Islami], in Islam and
Revolution, Hamid Algar, ed. (London: KPI, 1981), 34, 72, 95, 133, 144, 147.
51. There is no way to sidestep or ameliorate the pressure the Islamic
Republic feels. It has little to do with either U.S. involvement in
Afghanistan or Iraq; Iran's nuclear program predates both. At its core, the
problem is that the Islamic Republic is not a status quo power. It seeks to
export its ideology and interprets resistance as hostility.
52. Guardian (press conference with Ayatollah Khomeini, November 16, 1978),
as quoted in Jalal Matini, "The Most Truthful Individual in Recent History,"
Iranshenasi 14, no. 4 (Winter 2003).
 
 
 


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