http://www.ratzingerfanclub.com/Neuhaus/
The Liberalism of John Paul II
Richard John Neuhaus,  First Things 73 (May 1997): 16-21.
 
 
It is no secret that when Centesimus Annus appeared in 1991 some of us
viewed it not only as an important teaching moment but also as a vindication
of our understanding of Catholic social doctrine. There was a great
temptation to declare triumphantly, "I told you so." That temptation was not
always resisted as it should have been. This contributed to a degree of
polarization over the encyclical. Liberals who paid any attention at all to
the document were not convinced of the demise of socialism and lifted up
passages that they thought supportive of their collectivist dream. But, for
the most part, liberals paid little attention. As with the other great
teaching documents of the pontificate of John Paul II, the appearance of
Centesimus Annus was for most liberal Catholics a nonevent.
 
The stronger polarization developed between certain conservatives and those
called neoconservatives, the former accusing the latter of hijacking this
pontificate, and Centesimus Annus in particular, in order to gain
magisterial legitimation for what is called democratic capitalism or liberal
democracy. The neoconservatives are described, and sometimes describe
themselves, as advancing "The Murray Project," referring to the effort of
the late Father John Courtney Murray to square Catholic teaching with the
American democratic experiment. The conservative critics-for instance,
Professor David Schindler of the John Paul II Institute in Washington,
D.C.-accuse Murray and those like him of selling out authentic Catholic
teaching to a desiccated and desiccating liberalism.
 
Schindler writes in his recent book, Heart of the World, Center of the
Church: "My argument, then, offered in the name of de Lubac and Pope John
Paul II as authentic interpreters of the Second Vatican Council, has two
main implications. First, it demands that we challenge the regnant
liberalism which would claim that it (alone) is empty of religious theory in
its interpretation of the First Amendment and indeed of Western
constitutionalism more generally. Secondly, it demands that we seek a truly
'Catholic Moment' in America [as distinct from Richard John Neuhaus'
'Catholic Moment'], understood, that is, not as another Murrayite moment but
as a truly Johannine (John Paul II) moment. This means that we must expose
the con game of liberalism which enables it, precisely without argument, to
privilege its place in the public order."
 
In his book, and repeatedly in the pages of the English edition of Communio,
of which he is the editor, Schindler assaults the liberal "con game" in
which he thinks some of us are complicit. I confess that I find this
somewhat frustrating. In my experience, David Schindler is a friendly
fellow. We have engaged our differences in both private and public
exchanges, after which he ends up agreeing that there is no substantive
disagreement between us. I always look forward to our next amicable
conversation, and brace myself for his next public attack.
 
I do think there is an important difference between us. It is not, or at
least it is not chiefly, a difference over Catholic theology. The
difference, rather, is that Prof. Schindler and those who are associated
with his criticism tend to put the worst possible construction upon the
liberal tradition, and on the American cultural, legal, and political
expression of that tradition. In doing so, I believe Prof. Schindler and his
friends hand an undeserved victory to those who interpret the liberal
tradition in ways that we all deplore. With John Courtney Murray, I suggest
that our task is to contend for an interpretation of liberalism that is
compatible with the fullness of Catholic truth.
 
There is no doubt that the American experiment is constituted in the liberal
tradition. Since we cannot go back to the eighteenth century and
reconstitute it on different foundations, we must hope that the foundations
on which it is constituted are not those described by Ronald Dworkin, John
Rawls, Richard Rorty-and David Schindler. Toward the end of understanding
the liberal tradition as consistent with Catholic truth, Centesimus Annus is
an invaluable guide.
 
Liberalism, needless to say, is a wondrously pliable term. There is the
laissez- faire economic liberalism condemned by Leo XIII in Rerum Novarum,
and also by John Paul II. In American political culture that liberalism goes
by the name of libertarianism, and, despite its many talented apologists,
including Charles Murray (no relation to John Courtney), it has never
acquired many adherents beyond what Russell Kirk called its "chirping
sectaries." In the American context, libertarianism remains in the largest
part a thought experiment for college sophomores of all ages.
 
The liberalism so fiercely criticized today is not limited to
libertarianism. At the hands of the critics, the republican liberalism of
virtue and the communitarian liberalism of Tocquevillian civil society come
off little better than libertarianism. David Schindler has good ecumenical
company in attacking liberalism tout court. Stanley Hauerwas, a Methodist
theologian at Duke University, has in books beyond number been assaulting,
hammering, pummeling, and battering it with magnificent aplomb. Liberalism
and all its ways and all its pomps has more recently taken a severe beating
from Oliver O'Donovan, Regius Professor of Theology at Oxford. Despite his
Anglican bias against what he calls "papalism," I most warmly recommend his
book, The Desire of the Nations: Rediscovering the Roots of Political
Theology (Cambridge University Press). It is not only a devastatingly
convincing critique of a certain version of liberalism, but also a
fascinating examination of what the idea of "Christendom" might mean in our
moment of modernity's discontent.
 
We can summarize some of the salient points in the indictment offered by the
Christian critics of liberalism and modernity (the two terms usually being
more or less interchangeable). Whether it be the enchanted G. K. Chesterton,
the near-magisterial Alasdair MacIntyre, the caustic George Grant, the
swashbuckling Stan Hauerwas, the daring O'Donovan, or the melancholic David
Schindler, the indictment tends to be much the same. Lest there be any
misunderstanding, let me say that I find myself in warm agreement with the
indictment of a certain kind of liberalism. The contention turns on what we
mean by liberalism.
 
The first charge is that Christian thinkers have been too ready to trim the
Christian message in order to accommodate the ruling cultural paradigm of
liberalism. I definitely agree. That, however, is more accurately seen as an
indictment of Christian thinkers, not of liberalism. If we are hesitant to
declare in public that Jesus Christ is Lord, the fault is in ourselves. We
cannot plead the excuse that liberalism made us do it. John Rawls or Richard
Rorty or the Supreme Court, claiming to speak in the name of liberalism, may
have intimidated us, but the fault is with our timidity.
 
Other points in the indictment of liberalism are variously expressed. It is
charged that liberalism is purely procedural. Excluding the consideration of
ends, liberalism claims to be only about means, but in fact disguises its
ends in its means. Thus Father Murray's construal of the First Amendment as
"articles of peace" is in fact-or so the indictment reads-a surrender to the
inherently antireligious bias of liberalism. In short, the claimed
"neutrality" of liberalism is anything but neutral. Liberalism, it is
charged, is premised upon the fiction of a "social contract" that is, in
turn, premised exclusively upon self-interest. Liberalism denies, or at
least requires agnosticism about, transcendent truth or divine law,
recognizing no higher rule than the self-interested human will. Liberalism's
idea of freedom is freedom from any commanding truth that might impinge upon
the totally voluntaristic basis of social order.
 
These liberal dogmas, it is further charged, are inextricably tied to the
dynamics of capitalism. Liberal dogma and market dynamics are the mutually
reinforcing foundation and end of a social order that is entirely and
without remainder in the service of individualistic choices by the
sovereign, autonomous, and unencumbered Self. The wages of liberalism is
consumerism, and consumerism is all-consuming. The end result is what some
critics call "liberal totalitarianism."
 
It is an impressive indictment, and it is supported by impressive evidence.
Against each of the distortions mentioned, I have written at length, as have
others who are favorably disposed toward liberal democracy or, as some
prefer, democratic capitalism. But that is just the point: one may argue
that the indictment is an indictment of the distortions of liberalism. If
that is the case, we are contending for the soul of the liberal tradition.
 
A personal word might be in order. In the 1960s I was very much a man of the
left. Not the left of countercultural drug-tripping and generalized
hedonism, but the left exemplified by, for instance, the civil rights
movement under the leadership of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. In the latter
half of the 1960s this began to change with the advent of the debate over
what was then called "liberalized" abortion law. By 1967 I was writing about
the "two liberalisms"-one, like that earlier civil rights movement,
inclusive of the vulnerable and driven by a transcendent order of justice,
the other exclusive and recognizing no law higher than individual
willfulness. My argument was that, by embracing the cause of abortion,
liberals were abandoning the first liberalism that has sustained all that is
hopeful in the American experiment.
 
That is my argument still today. It is, I believe, crucially important that
that argument prevail in the years ahead. There is no going back to
reconstitute the American order on a foundation other than the liberal
tradition. A great chasm has opened between the liberal tradition and what
today is called liberalism. That is why some of us are called conservatives.
Conservatism that is authentically and constructively American conservatism
is conservatism in the cause of reappropriating and revitalizing the liberal
tradition.
 
Toward that end, Centesimus Annus, as I said, is an invaluable guide. The
document is often described as an encyclical on economics, but I suggest
that is somewhat misleading. Certainly it addresses economic questions in
considerable detail. One reason for that is that the encyclical is
commemorating and developing the argument of Rerum Novarum, which was much
and rightly concerned about the problems of the worker and the threat of
class warfare in an earlier phase of capitalism. Another reason for the
focus on economics is that the Pope is addressing the situation following
the Western-assisted suicide of the Soviet empire, and that empire had
justified itself by a false ideology that reduced the human phenomenon to
the economic dimension. In explaining why that ideology is false and in
pointing the way toward a more promising future, it was necessary for the
encyclical to pay close attention to economics.
 
It is more accurate, however, to say that Centesimus Annus is about the free
society, including economic freedom. The discussion of Rerum Novarum, of the
right understanding of property and exchange, and of the circumstances
following the momentous events of 1989, culminates in chapters V and VI,
"State and Culture," and "The Person Is the Way of the Church." When we
consider the encyclical in relation to American liberalism, several cautions
are in order. Centesimus Annus is not a free-standing text. It must be
understood within the large corpus of this most energetic teaching
pontificate, and, beyond that, in the context of modern Catholic social
doctrine dating from Rerum Novarum. Even further, it must be understood in
continuity with the Church's teaching ministry through the centuries. Then
too, we must always be mindful that the Pope is writing for and to the
universal Church.
 
Keeping these and other cautions in mind, however, one cannot help but be
struck by how much Centesimus Annus is a reading of "the signs of the time"
with specific reference to the world-historical experiences of this century.
The encyclical is not historicist, in the narrow sense of that term, but it
is firmly and determinedly located in a historical moment. And, while it is
not a free- standing text, one can through this one text trace the
controlling themes of this teaching pontificate. Although it is written to
and for the universal Church, the Church in each place is invited and
obliged to read the encyclical as though it were addressed to its own
specific circumstance.
 
Moreover, I am confident that we as Americans make no mistake when we think
that the American experiment is a very major presence in Centesimus Annus.
After all, the Western democracies, and the United States most particularly,
are the historically available alternatives to the socialism that so
miserably failed. I think it true to say that in this pontificate, for the
first time, magisterial teaching about modernity, democracy, and human
freedom has a stronger reference to the Revolution of 1776 than to the
French Revolution of 1789. It is, then, neither chauvinistic nor parochial
to read Centesimus Annus with particular reference to the American
experiment. On the contrary, it is the course of fidelity, made imperative
by the duty to appropriate magisterial teaching to our own circumstance, and
by the powerful awareness of the American experiment in the mind of the
encyclical's author.
 
There is no more common criticism of the liberal tradition than that it is
premised upon unbridled "individualism." CA speaks of the "individual" and
even of the "autonomous subject" (13), but most typically refers to the
"person." Citing the earlier encyclical Redemptor Hominis, John Paul writes
that "this human person is the primary route that the Church must travel in
fulfilling her mission . . . the way traced out by Christ himself, the way
that leads invariably through the mystery of the Incarnation and
Redemption." He then adds the remarkable statement, "This, and this alone,
is the principle which inspires the Church's social doctrine." (53)
 
This, and this alone. He writes, "The Church has gradually developed that
doctrine in a systematic way," above all in the past century. Very
gradually, we might add without disrespect. In the later encyclical
Veritatis Splendor, John Paul pays fulsome tribute to modernity and its
development of the understanding of the dignity of the individual and of
individual freedom. Individualism is one of the signal achievements of
modernity or, if you will, of the liberal tradition. Nor should we deny that
this achievement was effected in frequent tension with, and even conflict
with, the Catholic Church. One important reason for such conflict, of
course, was that the cause of freedom was perceived as marching under the
radically anticlerical and anti-Christian banners of 1789. It is a signal
achievement of this pontificate that it has so clearly replanted the idea of
the individual and of freedom in the rich soil of Christian truth from
which, in its convoluted and conflicted development, it had been uprooted.
Only as it is deeply rooted in the truth about the human person will the
flower of freedom flourish in the future.
 
It is a mistake to pit, as some do pit, modern individualism against a more
organic Catholic understanding of community. Rather should we enter into a
sympathetic liaison with the modern achievement of the idea of the
individual, grounding it more firmly and richly in the understanding of the
person destined from eternity to eternity for communion with God. The danger
of rejecting individualism is that the real-world alternative is not a
Catholic understanding of communio but a falling back into the collectivisms
that are the great enemy of the freedom to which we are called. As CA
reminds us, "We are not dealing here with humanity in the 'abstract,' but
with the real, 'concrete,' 'historical' person." The problem with the
contemporary distortion of the individual as the autonomous, unencumbered,
sovereign Self is not that it is wrong about the awesome dignity of the
individual, but that it cuts the self off from the source of that dignity.
The first cause of this error, says CA, is atheism. (13)
 
"It is by responding to the call of God contained in the being of things
that man becomes aware of his transcendent dignity. Every individual must
give this response, which constitutes the apex of his humanity, and no
social mechanism or collective subject can substitute for it." (13) The
great error of both collectivist determinism and of individualistic license
is that their understanding of human freedom is detached from obedience to
the truth. (17) Culture is a communal phenomenon, but it is in the service
of the person's response to transcendent truth. In one of the most
suggestive passages of the encyclical, John Paul writes, "At the heart of
every culture lies the attitude a person takes to the greatest mystery: the
mystery of God. Different cultures are basically different ways of facing
the question of the meaning of personal existence." (24)
 
We are brought back to the remarkable proposition about the flourishing of
the human person. "This, and this alone, is the principle which inspires the
Church's social doctrine." This is not individualism in the pejorative
sense, but it is commensurable with the modern achievement of the idea of
the individual. It is commensurable with the constituting ideas of the
American experiment, in which the state is understood to be in the service
of freedom, and freedom is understood as what the Founders called "ordered
liberty"-liberty ordered to the truth. And there are, as the Declaration of
Independence declares, "self- evident truths" that ground such freedom and
direct it to the transcendent ends of "Nature and Nature's God."
 
The theistic references of the Declaration are not, as some contemporary
commentators claim, simply crowd-pleasing asides but are integral to the
moral argument of the document-and the Declaration is, above all, a moral
argument. Moreover, such references must be understood in the context of the
innumerable statements by all the Founders that this constitutional order is
premised upon moral truths secured by religion. The American experiment is
constituted by a Puritan-Lockean synthesis that in recent decades has been
bowdlerized to fit the secularist prejudices of our academic elites. It is
imperative that we challenge the bowdlerized version of the founding that
has been fobbed off on several generations of students, from grade school
through graduate school, and take our American history straight.
 
It will be protested by some that this is mere "civic religion." But we have
missed the point of CA if we think there is anything "mere" about sustaining
a public order that acknowledges the transcendent source and end of human
existence. Of course such formal acknowledgment provides only a very thin
and attenuated theology, but it creates the condition within which the
Church can propose a rich and adequate account of the human story. But that,
it is objected, is just the problem: In a liberal society the Church can
only propose its truth, putting the gospel on the market place as one
consumer item among others.
 
This is a frequently heard objection, and we have to wonder what people mean
by it. Are they suggesting that the Church should coerce people to obey the
truth? In the encyclical on evangelization, Redemptoris Missio, the Pope
says, "The Church imposes nothing, she only proposes." She would not impose
if she could. Authentic faith is of necessity an act of freedom. If we fail
to understand this, it is to be feared that we fail to understand what John
Paul calls the principle which alone inspires the Church's social doctrine.
The Church is to propose-relentlessly, boldly, persuasively, winsomely. If
we who are the Church are not doing that, the fault is not with liberalism
but with ourselves. Although the Church's message provides a secure
grounding for liberalism, liberalism is not the content of the Church's
message. It is simply the condition for the Church to invite free persons to
live in the communio of Christ and his Mystical Body, which communion is
infinitely deeper, richer, and fuller than the liberal social order-or, for
that matter, any social order short of the right ordering of all things in
the Kingdom of God.
 
Few things are more important to the free society than the idea and reality
of the limited state. However much the courts and secular intellectuals may
have denied it in recent decades, the American order is inexplicable apart
from the acknowledgment of a sovereignty higher than the state. As in "one
nation under God," meaning a nation under judgment. Christians understand
and publicly declare that higher sovereignty in the simple proposition,
"Jesus Christ is Lord." It is not necessary for the state to declare that
Jesus Christ is Lord. Nor, at least in the American circumstance and any
forseeable reconfiguration of that circumstance, is it desirable that the
state declare that Jesus Christ is Lord. The role of the limited state is to
respect the political sovereignty of the people who acknowledge a
sovereignty higher than their own. As the encyclical states, "Through
Christ's sacrifice on the cross, the victory of the Kingdom of God has been
achieved once and for all." (25) That victory denotes the highest
sovereignty by which the state is limited, and the proclamation of that
victory is the most important political contribution of the Church. In a
democratic society that has been effectively evangelized, citizens do not
ask the state to confess the lordship of Christ. Their only demand is that
the state be respectful of the fact that a majority of its citizens confess
the lordship of Christ. We affirm not a confessional state but a
confessional society, always remembering that the state is the servant of
society, which is prior to the state.
 
The Church also makes an invaluable political contribution by insisting upon
the limits of politics. The great danger, says CA, is that "politics becomes
a 'secular religion' which operates under the illusion of creating paradise
in this world. But no political society . . . can ever be confused with the
Kingdom of God. . . . By presuming to anticipate judgment here and now,
people put themselves in the place of God and set themselves against the
patience of God." The power of grace "penetrates" the political order,
especially as the laity take the lead in the exercise of Christian public
responsibility, but there can be no pretensions that earthly politics will
create the final right order for which our hearts yearn. (25)
 
As in the liberal order the ambitions of the state are checked by the
democratic assertion of a higher sovereignty and by the limits of politics
itself, so those ambitions are checked by diverse "sovereignties" within
society itself. With Leo XIII, John Paul declares that "the individual, the
family, and society are prior to the State." The state exists to serve and
protect individuals and institutions that have priority. (11) Human persons
and what I have elsewhere described as the mediating institutions of society
"enjoy their own spheres of autonomy and sovereignty," according to CA. (45)
These spheres of sovereignty are smaller than the state, but they are not
lower than the state.
 
The striking modernity of the encyclical's argument is evident also in its
understanding of the state. Unlike earlier formulations, the state is not
situated within a hierarchy of authorities, descending from the rule of God
to the rule of the lord of the manor. The argument of CA is profoundly
democratic. Christ is sovereign over all, and that sovereignty is asserted
by those who acknowledge the sovereignty of Christ. The unlimited state,
whether based on Marxist atheism or the engineering designs of Enlightenment
rationalism, aspires to totalitarian control. "Thus there is a denial of the
supreme insight concerning man's true greatness, his transcendence in
respect to earthly realities, the contradiction in his heart between the
desire for the fullness of what is good and his own inability to attain it
and, above all, the need for salvation which results from this situation."
(13) The limited state is kept limited by the democratic assertion of the
transcendent aspiration of the human heart.
 
In this connection, John Paul infuses the doctrine of subsidiarity with new
vitality by the use of a most suggestive phrase, "the subjectivity of
society." "The social nature of man . . . is realized in various
intermediary groups, beginning with the family and including economic,
social, political, and cultural groups which stem from human nature itself
and have their own autonomy, always with a view to the common good." (13) In
the free society, the state is one institution, one player, among others. It
is an indispensable player in its service to all the other players, but it
is subject to the subjectivity of society, and the subjectivity of society
consists in free persons and free persons in community living in obedience
to God and solidarity with one another. There is in CA and in other writings
of this pontificate, I believe, a fresh and compelling theory of democracy
that awaits systematic development by the next generation.
 
There must be a cultivated skepticism about the state if it is to be kept
limited. "To that end, it is preferable that each power be balanced by other
powers and by other spheres of responsibility which keep it within proper
bounds." (44) Skepticism regarding the power of the state does not mean,
however, skepticism about the purposes that the state is to serve. Quite the
opposite is the case. Only when those purposes are clearly and unambiguously
asserted can the state be held accountable. Section 45 of CA clearly and
unambiguously challenges the point at which contemporary liberalism has most
severely distorted the meaning of democracy in the liberal tradition. Here
is the crucial paragraph:
 
Authentic democracy is possible only in a state ruled by law, and on the
basis of a correct conception of the human person. It requires that the
necessary conditions be present for the advancement both of the individual
through education and formation in true ideals, and of the "subjectivity" of
society through the creation of structures of participation and shared
responsibility. [Then comes the vital passage.] Nowadays there is a tendency
to claim that agnosticism and skeptical relativism are the philosophy and
the basic attitude which correspond to democratic forms of political life.
Those who are convinced that they know the truth and firmly adhere to it are
considered unreliable from a democratic point of view, since they do not
accept that the truth is determined by the majority, or that it is subject
to variation according to different political trends. It must be observed in
this regard that if there is no ultimate truth to guide and direct political
activity, then ideas and convictions can easily be manipulated for reasons
of power. As history demonstrates, a democracy without values easily turns
into open or thinly disguised totalitarianism.
 
The importance of this paragraph, and its pertinence to our American
situation, can hardly be overestimated. The dogmatic insistence upon
agnosticism in public discourse and decision making has created what I have
called "the naked public square." People who, like the Founders, hold
certain truths to be self-evident are today "considered unreliable from a
democratic point of view." In a usurpation of power that indeed threatens a
"thinly disguised totalitarianism," the courts have presumed to declare that
the separation of church and state means the separation of religion and
religiously grounded morality from public life, which means the separation
of the deepest convictions of the people from politics, which means the end
of democracy and, in fact, the end of politics. Thank God, we are not there
yet. But it is the direction in which we in the United States have been
moving these last several decades, and it is the real and present danger
requiring those of us called conservatives to rally to the defense of the
liberal tradition.
 
In contending for the soul of liberalism, we must be sympathetically alert
to some of our fellow citizens who honestly believe that any appeal to
transcendent truth poses the threat of theocracy. John Paul recognizes how
widespread that misunderstanding is, and therefore immediately follows the
above passage with this:
 
Nor does the Church close her eyes to the danger of fanaticism or
fundamentalism among those who, in the name of an ideology which purports to
be scientific or religious, claim the right to impose on others their own
concept of what is true and good. Christian truth is not of this kind. Since
it is not an ideology, the Christian faith does not presume to imprison
changing sociopolitical realities in a rigid schema, and it recognizes that
human life is realized in history in conditions that are diverse and
imperfect. Furthermore, in constantly reaffirming the transcendent dignity
of the person, the Church's method is always that of respect for freedom.
 
Let it be candidly said that that has not always appeared to be the Church's
method. We should not leave it to others to point this out. In Tertio
Millennio Adveniente (As the Third Millennium Nears) and on many other
occasions, the Pope has candidly called upon Christians to acknowledge the
ways that, individually and corporately, they have failed to respect the
dignity and freedom of others. That acknowledgment must, however, be joined
to two other propositions. First: When, in the name of democracy,
transcendent truth is excluded from the public square, the result is "open
or thinly disguised totalitarianism." Second: Democratic totalitarianism,
which recognizes no higher truth than majority rule, creates a treacherously
dangerous circumstance for minorities.
 
We could go on to examine other themes of Centesimus Annus that can be
correlated with the liberal tradition, rejuvenating that tradition and
turning it in more promising directions. There is, for instance, the
connection between freedom and virtue, both personal and public, which must
evoke intensified effort toward the evangelizing and reevangelizing of
society. The stakes in that effort are very high, as John Paul sets forth
with such urgency in Evangelium Vitae's dramatic portrayal of the conflict
between "the culture of life" and "the culture of death." But these and
other questions are for another time. Indeed, as I have suggested, it will
be the work of generations to systematically unfold and disseminate the
remarkable teaching ministry of this pontificate.
 
I began with some comments on Centesimus Annus and what some call "The
Murray Project." Nobody should try to usurp the authority of magisterial
documents in order to advance particular intra-Catholic partisan arguments.
Before the magisterium of the Church we are all learners. Our purpose must
be sentire cum ecclesia, to think with the Church. I know that I have
learned from and have been changed by Centesimus Annus, and I trust that
will continue to be the case. In no way should the encyclical be interpreted
as an unqualified affirmation of the American experiment. In many ways, it
is a searing criticism of what that experiment has become under the
influence of contemporary liberalisms. Yet I do believe CA is commensurate
with the American liberal tradition, and in critical continuity with the
great work of John Courtney Murray. I believe that is the case, and I hope
that is the case, for we have not the luxury of imagining the reconstitution
of this social and political order on foundations other than the liberal
tradition.
 
As sympathetic as we may be to some of the determined critics of liberalism,
we do well to remind ourselves that all temporal orders short of the Kingdom
of God are profoundly unsatisfactory. When we survey the depredations and
ravages of our social, political, and religious circumstance, it is tempting
to look for someone or something to blame. It is easy to say, "Liberalism
made us do it." But liberalism is freedom, and what we do with freedom is
charged to our account. For American Christians, and for Catholics in
particular, there is nothing that has been done wrong that could not have
been done differently. Amidst the depredations and ravages of an American
experiment that once exalted the human spirit, and may do so again,
Centesimus Annus invites us to reappropriate and rebuild the liberal
tradition.
 
 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
----
 
 
Richard John Neuhaus is Editor-in-Chief of First Things. This article is
adapted from a paper delivered at a conference sponsored by the Ethics and
Public Policy Center marking the fifth anniversary of Centesimus Annus.
 


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