http://washingtontimes.com/functions/print.php?StoryID=20061130-084531-1117r

 

 <http://www.washingtontimes.com/op-ed/20061130-084531-1117r.htm> James
Baker's record

James Baker, co-chairman of the Iraq Study Group, cuts an impressive figure,
having put together a record of extraordinary successes in both the private
sector and government service, including stints as secretary of state,
secretary of the treasury and White House chief of staff. But the
capabilities that enable someone to rise to the top of the corporate world
and become a success in navigating Washington bureaucracies are not always
transferable to diplomacy -- especially when it comes to dealing with rogue
states. Mr. Baker's mixed record as secretary of state under President
George H.W. Bush from 1989 until August 1992 -- when he resigned at the
behest of the White House to chair Mr. Bush's unsuccessful re-election
campaign -- illustrates this. 
    On the positive side, Mr. Baker's State Department (thanks in large part
to the work of then-Assistant Secretary of State for International
Organizations John Bolton) won repeal of the notorious 1975 U.N. resolution
that equated Zionism with racism. Following Saddam Hussein's invasion of
Kuwait on Aug. 2, 1990, Mr. Baker on the whole performed ably in putting
together an international coalition in support of forcing Iraq out of
Kuwait. Were it not for Mr. Baker's success in winning U.N. Security Council
support for a resolution, it is doubtful that the Bush administration could
have persuaded the House and Senate, which were in Democratic hands, to
approve the use of force in Iraq. 
    But all too often, Mr. Baker's tenure as secretary of state was
characterized by a disconcerting tendency to focus on winning the kind of
short-term diplomatic victories that ended up costing the United States a
great deal in the medium and longer term. This was particularly true of U.S.
policy toward Saddam prior to the invasion of Kuwait and to Syrian strongman
Hafez Assad. In the case of Iraq, one could plausibly argue in favor of U.S.
efforts to engage Saddam during the 1980-88 war with Iran, arguably the most
dangerous threat to U.S. interests in the region. The problem with Mr.
Baker's approach was that such policies continued after the conclusion of
the war -- even as it became clear that Saddam was girding for conflict with
his Arab neighbors and Israel. In fact, throughout 1989 and 1990, Mr.
Baker's State Department spent much of its time fending off efforts by
Democratic and Republican lawmakers and officials in other federal agencies
to prevent transfers of militarily related technology to Iraq. The same was
true for agricultural subsidies and Export-Import Bank credits benefiting
Saddam's regime. These policies were pursued by the State Department until
shortly before the invasion of Kuwait. 
    In February 1990, for example, just one month after the president waived
a congressional prohibition on Export-Import Bank financing for Iraq,
Assistant Secretary of State for Near East Affairs John Kelly pressed for
continuation of Commodity Credit Corp. subsidies for agricultural deals with
Iraq. The State Department continued lobbying for these subsidies even after
the Agriculture Department suspended them because of fraud and concern that
the money was being diverted to Saddam's military. Also, the Baker State
Department stood alone among U.S. agencies in opposing a sting operation
that would have prevented Saddam from obtaining kryton switches that are
used to detonate nuclear weapons. 
    After the invasion of Kuwait, Mr. Baker, intent on securing Arab support
for military action against Saddam, traveled to Syria in an effort to woo
Mr. Assad, who demanded a free hand to act against Lebanese Christians. One
month later, Syrian forces invaded Christian areas of Lebanon, massacred
hundreds of Lebanese and consolidated their control over the country. It is
no exaggeration to say that many of the problems Lebanon faces today -- with
a weakened Christian minority and moderate Muslims up against powerful
Islamofascist forces -- are traceable to Mr. Baker's green light to Mr.
Assad. 



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