http://www.familysecuritymatters.org/global.php?id=%20490298
Exclusive: The Curious Case of Nawaf Obaid and Prince Turki
Stephen Schwartz
Author: Stephen Schwartz
Source: The Family Security Foundation, Inc.
Date: December 13, 2006
Saudi palace intrigue has found a new battleground - the United States press
- even though to the casual observer, there is no battle occurring. But as
FSM Contributing Editor Stephen Schwartz meticulously unwinds and describes
the "trial balloon" in the Washington Post that may have burst in the face
of the man flying it, one is made aware of the many curiosities of Saudi
actions in the West. Read his analysis.
The Curious Case of Nawaf Obaid and Prince Turki
By Stephen Schwartz
Nawaf Obaid is a glib Saudi representative who for some time sported a
luxuriant, back-of-the-collar hairdo on American television - rather a
novelty among those speaking for the desert kingdom, where mullahs are
preferred to mullets. He has been known since the mid-1990s as an
indefatigable Washington gadfly.
Obaid has been associated with the Washington Institute for Near East Policy
(WINEP), and most recently was affiliated with the Center for Strategic and
International Studies (CSIS). In 1999 he published, in the Middle East
Quarterly (MEQ), a study of Wahhabism, the fundamentalist cult that is the
Saudi state religion and which inspires Al-Qaida. There he issued a
warning against the Wahhabis - who he called by that name, without adopting
the term "Salafi" or any other deceptive terms. He wrote, "American analysts
have underestimated, overlooked, or misunderstood the nature, strength, and
goals of the Wahhabi movement in Saudi Arabia. This led to a failure to
predict the oil embargo, the ferocity of anti-American sentiments after the
Kuwait war, and to understand what the Taliban would become."
After the atrocities of September 11, 2001, Nawaf Obaid could have added the
rise of Al-Qaida to his roster of unexpected results of Western
obliviousness about the Wahhabis. But curiously, he did not. Rather, he
suddenly forgot all that he had previously said about Wahhabism, and on
cable TV talk shows tried to deny that "Wahhabism" even existed. According
to him, the concept was an invention of authors like myself, who he claimed
knew nothing of the kingdom.
Last year Saudi Prince Bandar bin Sultan bin Abd al-Aziz, the wheeling,
dealing, and vodka-serving Saudi ambassador to the U.S., departed
Washington. Bandar had once bragged that unlike Israel, the Saudis did not
need a formal lobby in America, because they had a grip on the White House.
The kingdom appointed a new ambassador, Prince Turki al-Faisal. Turki is
more sophisticated than most of the desert denizens who come to Washington,
and he hired the slick Obaid as his "private security and energy adviser."
Obaid therefore operated in the shadow world powerful Saudis typically
prefer - he was both a D.C. think-tank "expert" and a semi-official
functionary. He remained a narcissistic fool, according to Saudi dissidents.
Then Nawaf Obaid did something extremely provocative. On
November 29, 2006, The Washington Post published a shocking op-ed column
signed by him, titled "Stepping Into Iraq." Therein, Obaid warned, in
aggressive language, that "massive Saudi intervention" would support Sunni
Arab terrorists if the U.S.-led coalition were to leave Iraq abruptly.
Further, according to the arrogant Obaid, "it would be impossible to ensure
that Saudi-funded militias wouldn't attack U.S. troops." A Saudi thrust
into Iraq on the Sunni side must be considered inevitable: "Saudi engagement
in Iraq carries great risks - it could spark a regional war. So be it: The
consequences of inaction are far worse."
Obaid was even impudent enough to allege that when Vice
President Dick Cheney met with Saudi King Abdullah late in November,
Abdullah delivered the same menacing message to Cheney. Obaid's inciting
language was especially outrageous to those like myself who follow Saudi
events closely, because it has been obvious in recent months that King
Abdullah wants exactly the opposite outcome. The king, as Obaid himself
admits, seeks reconciliation between Iraqi Sunnis and Shias, not more Sunni
violence.
Extremist Saudis (among whom I do not count King Abdullah) were, not long
ago, happy to see Wahhabi bloodshed carried out far from their borders, in
the U.S. on 9/11, in Israel, in Afghanistan, and elsewhere. But the fire
of the Sunni jihad burns too hot for them when it flares up on the northern
border of the kingdom itself. No normal person wants a house ablaze next
door.
The consequences are already felt: Sunni Arab terror in Iraq draws most of
its "foreign fighter" volunteers from the Saudi kingdom. When they are
killed, their biographies and photographs appear in Saudi media. Some of
them have come back to Saudi Arabia complaining that the Iraqis did not
desire the establishment of a Taliban regime; but these veterans of mass
murder in Iraq nonetheless express a renewed desire to halt change in the
Saudi kingdom.
So Nawaf Obaid, speaking from the pages of one of America's
leading newspapers, issued a threat: play the Saudi way or risk even worse
terrorism in Iraq. Soon, more curious events transpired. The Saudi
government immediately repudiated Obaid's statements, and within a week he
who had once flaunted his mullet in the green rooms of American cable
networks was fired from his job as a Saudi adviser. In an admirably
cold-blooded and even amusing dismissal comment, Ambassador Turki said of
Obaid, "We felt that we could add more credibility to his claims as an
independent contractor by terminating our consultancy agreement with him."
What really happened here? Will Saudi Arabia send armed fighters
into Iraq on the pretext of protecting Sunni Arabs, but also with the
inclination to attack U.S.-led coalition forces? Credible sources from
inside the kingdom say no. Rather, they point out that an anti-reform
clique in the royal family opposes King Abdullah's efforts for peace in
Iraq. Nawaf Obaid allegedly published his screed in the Post as a trial
balloon for these ultra-reactionaries. Post columnist David Ignatius called
it a "bargaining chip" [note: the italics appeared in Ignatius' column]. But
Ambassador Turki reported to King Abdullah, and Obaid was supposed to work
for Turki. Obaid overstepped his bounds, as a pawn in an anti-Abdullah
conspiracy... or so it appeared.
But then Prince Turki abruptly resigned and flew home. Was he a
victim of Obaid's intrigues, or a participant in them? Following on his
hilarious explanation for Obaid's firing, Turki had recourse to the oldest
excuse known in Washington: he suddenly "wanted to spend more time with his
family."
If it is not beyond imagining that Wahhabi maniacs could try to
bring about a Saudi invasion of Iraq, it is much more realistic to think
that the moment is coming, and soon, when Abdullah will consolidate his
power and may strike decisively against the Wahhabis. While Nawaf Obaid lost
his job, some of those who share his dreams of aggravated meddling in Iraq
may lose their heads.
Another question remains: how did Obaid's manifesto make into
the pages of the Post? The newspaper reported on Obaid's firing from Saudi
service in a diffident manner, merely reprinting a wire service account but
inserting the following novel comment: "[Fred Hiatt, The Post's editorial
page editor, declined to comment on Turki's announcement.]"
As a former op-ed editor for the San Francisco Chronicle, I see
more issues here: will the Post now publish columns by Saudi dissidents and
their supporters, to provide balance? Did Obaid himself submit his text, was
it offered by Turki's embassy, or was it solicited by someone at the Post
who shares the crazed view that the Saudis must be appeased at any price?
The curiosities that accompany Saudi actions in the West will
get more, rather than less, common. Nawaf Obaid may have revealed, and
prevented, a major change for the worse. Don't believe the Saudi hype, and
watch this space!
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