http://ict.org.il/apage/9772.php
Grand Delusion? The European Union's Contacts with Hamas The history and prospects of European Union contacts with Hamas - the Islamist organization responsible for repeated terrorist attacks in Israel and the Palestinian territories - assume special significance as the Palestinians prepare for legislative elections on January 25, 2006, with opinion surveys showing Hamas gaining ground against the factionalized governing party, Fatah. While the U.S. government has sanctioned no dialogue with Hamas, and the U.S. Congress would likely halt aid to the Palestinian Authority were Hamas to assume power, the European position has been more ambiguous, and may evolve further in response to the outcome of elections. Close observers of Hamas, which is categorized by the EU and Washington as a terrorist organization, express grave reservations about the utility of EU-Hamas dialogue - past, present or future. "Any dialogue with Hamas will only legitimize the terrorist activities of this Islamist organization," according to Dr. Reuven Erlich, director of the Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, in Israel. "How would an American official react if he was told that Al-Qaeda was going to sit in the Afghani parliament?" asks Erlich. "Just like Al-Qaeda, Hamas - a terrorist organization that kills innocent civilians - cannot be considered a political partner." Erlich insists that there is no ideological difference between the two organizations. The only difference between Al-Qaeda and Hamas, according to Dr. Eli Carmon, of the Interdisciplinary Center in Herzliya, is of a strategic nature: Al-Qaeda's goal is to throw Americans out of Muslim countries in order to defeat "moderate" regimes and restore the Caliphate (in other words, the unity of the Muslim nation), which will in turn allow for the liberation of Palestine. Hamas, however, thinks of the establishment of an Islamic Palestinian state as a catalyst to accelerate the Islamist revolution. In fact, Al-Qaeda and Hamas pursue the same final goal: the establishment of the Caliphate. The unity of the Muslim nation, in the ideology of both extremist organizations, is a precursor to the Islamicization of the world, accomplished through the conquest of the West, starting with Europe. The foregoing analysis poses a challenge to those - particularly in the European Union - who maintain a distinction between so-called "nationalist Islamists" (with whom they consider dialogue possible, and with whom Hamas is sometimes grouped), and those Islamists who are engaged in a global struggle (with whom no dialogue is possible). Carmon is alarmed at the history and extent of contacts between EU officials and Hamas representatives. In particular, Carmon makes note of a transcript, seized by the Israel Defense Forces in June 2002 at the headquarters of Palestinian Preventive Security Services, of a secret meeting between Hamas and Alistair Crooke, who was at the time EU Middle East Envoy Miguel Moratinos's advisor for security affairs. Crooke met with a delegation led by Sheikh Ahmed Yassin (Hamas's founder and spiritual leader), of whom he specifically asked - according to the transcript - that their meeting remain secret, so that Israel and the U.S. would not be able to use the information. During the Crooke-Yassin meeting, the EU official expressed his desire to pursue dialogue with Hamas, whose "social works" he said he admires. He also underlined that he did not consider Hamas's political branch a terrorist organization. Carmon further mentions a declaration made by Javier Solana, Secretary-General of the Council of the European Union, on the BBC on November 25, 2004, in which he affirms having had direct contact with Hamas. This information was corroborated by an article published in March 2005 by the London-based Arab paper al-Shark al-Awsat, which told of meetings between EU representatives and Hamas in Damascus and Beirut, in which the removal of Hamas from the list of terrorist organizations was discussed. EU views on Hamas evolved as the election approached. In December 2005, Solana hinted that continued EU engagement with the PA in the event that Hamas gained power in the January election would depend on Hamas renouncing violence. Just this week, EU External Relations Commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner declined to rule out a suspension of EU aid to the PA should Hamas assume power - although direct budgetary assistance is now frozen over financial irregularities. Ferrero-Waldner said the EU "will continue to offer our support to all those who seek peace by peaceful means." According to Carmon, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon erred when he did not demand that the Palestinian Authority disarm Hamas prior to the Gaza disengagement. Egypt, he says, compounded the error when it treated Hamas as the PA's equal during the negotiations in Cairo of a cease-fire that was supposed to engage all Palestinian factions. Agreeing with Erlich, Carmon thinks that European and other officials would be weakening the PA and undercutting the prospects of long-term stability and peace if they pursued dialogue with Hamas; with the Palestinian legislative elections looming, signaling the possibility of such dialogue now would only further legitimize and embolden the organization, to the detriment of the PA and of the authority of PA President Mahmoud Abbas. Allowing Hamas - without abandoning its weapons or renouncing its charter, which calls for Israel's destruction - to participate in the Palestinian elections goes against EU laws that disqualify from the political process any party that advocates violence or racism. And such participation disserves the goal of establishing Palestinian democratic processes and traditions. In Israel, it should be noted, in order to protect the integrity of the state's democratic institutions, authorities have banned the extremist party Kach, founded by the late Rabbi Meir Kahane. Including anti-democratic, armed factions in elections - and in government - does not advance democracy; it retards it. Substantial parliamentary representation by Hamas, now considered likely, will pose a significant obstacle to efforts to reinvigorate the peace process, says Carmon. Unwilling, for ideological reasons, to recognize and engage Israel, and unable to succeed against Israel militarily, Hamas will likely prefer to assume a blocking role, complicating efforts by Abbas - should he retain power - to advance relations with Israel through negotiations. In this context, Abbas deludes himself if he thinks he will be able to disarm Hamas and dismantle its armed branch after the elections. Carmon has no doubt that Hamas will resume terrorist activities after the elections. He recalls Sheikh Yassin's declaration: "Israel will be destroyed in 2043, which will allow for the establishment of an Islamist state in Palestine." Kadoura Fares, a representative of the young Fatah guard in the National Palestinian Council and someone close to Marwan Barghouti, does not share these views. "It is in our interest to integrate Hamas in the political system," he said. "By rejecting it to the extra-parliamentary opposition, we would only help radicalize it, pushing it in the path of Al-Qaeda." Fares nonetheless recognizes that a political party that sponsors its own armed militia poses a problem. "All the militias will have to disappear, including Fatah's - but the collective decision to lay down arms has not been taken yet because of the continuation of the occupation." According to Fares, the end of the armed struggle will occur when Israel enters into serious negotiations; for now, despite the Gaza disengagement, he sees no contradictions between the existence of the armed branch of Hamas and the fact that the organization is actively participating in elections. He suggests that sooner or later, the different Palestinian armed factions will have to integrate into the official forces of the PA. In the meantime, Fares favors dialogue between Hamas and the international community. "Hamas has to understand that it is in its own interest to participate in the political game," he says. "Acceding to the rank of interlocutor can only encourage Hamas to renounce terrorism and become a real political party." "In any case," declares Dr. Nabil Kukali, director of the Palestinian Center for Public Opinion, "the EU must respect the right of the Palestinians." In his view, Western rejection of Hamas would strengthen the organization's standing among Palestinians, stirring hostility to outside pressure. Kukali foresees increasing Hamas involvement in Palestinian political institutions, and suggests the organization should be encouraged in that direction - despite its violent record and rejectionist charter. Today, he asserts, there is an agreement between Hamas and the PA, and Hamas accepts the agreements between Abbas and Sharon matter-of-factly. He believes it is important to entertain a dialogue with the organization, even if it does not lay down arms and renounce armed struggle. In any event, while dialogue at the highest levels appears to have fallen off, EU contact with Hamas in recent months has continued. Kukali confirms that in June 2005 meetings took place between EU officials and Hamas, following Hamas's victory in municipal elections in the Palestinian territories. At the time, the paper al-Shark Al-Awsat and the Agence France Presse in Jerusalem referred to these meetings and quoted a European official as saying that they were devoted to "technical matters." Following these meetings, the then-Israeli Foreign Minister, Silvan Shalom, voiced grave concern about the long-term risks of such contacts. Kukali's position may reflect the sentiments of a significant portion of Palestinian public opinion that considers violence an acceptable accompaniment to any negotiation with Israel. According to him, Hamas is first and foremost a nationalist movement, despite being Islamist, and de facto acknowledges the Oslo Agreements by taking part in the parliamentary elections. Hamas, he thinks, is not in a position to destroy the policies of Mahmoud Abbas, who was elected by the people and whose expressed opposition to violence is widely known. But whether Hamas as a rejectionist - and murderous - movement behaves when in power as it has in opposition, only the election and time will reveal. Nabil Amr, former Palestinian Information Minister and survivor of an assassination attempt in 2004 attributed to loyalists of then-PA Chairman Yasir Arafat, prefers not to counsel the EU on whether dialogue with Hamas is desirable or potentially fruitful. "Europeans," he says, "know exactly what they ought to do or not. It is not for us to say whether they should talk to Hamas. What is very important, however, is that they establish an open dialogue with Mahmoud Abbas. To fully support peace and democracy, unflinching support must be given to the PA." The question of disarming the militias is first a matter for the Palestinians, Amr continues. "The initiative must come from the Palestinians and, in particular, from Hamas." Amr is in favor of Hamas's participation in the January 25 elections, but he also thinks that the organization must commit to respecting the democratic political process. Hamas must recognize there is only one authority, one rule and one armed force which is legal and legitimate. Amr is convinced that the problem of armed militias has to be solved, because their very existence is incompatible with the establishment of a democratic regime. The results will be clear very soon, he adds. "After the elections, the Europeans, the Americans and the Israelis will be able to draw their own political conclusion." This Transatlantic Backgrounder was prepared with the assistance of proche-orient.info. 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