http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2007/02/cya_security_1.html


CYA Security


Since 9/11, we've spent hundreds of billions of dollars defending ourselves
from terrorist attacks. Stories about the ineffectiveness of many of these
security measures are common, but less so are discussions of why they are so
ineffective. In short: much of our country's counterterrorism security
spending is not designed to protect us from the terrorists, but instead to
protect our public officials from criticism when another attack occurs.

Boston, January 31: As part of a guerilla marketing campaign, a series of
amateur-looking blinking signs depicting characters in the Aqua Teen Hunger
Force, a show on the Cartoon Network, were placed on bridges, near a medical
center, underneath an interstate highway, and in other crowded public
places. 

Police  <http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2007/02/nonterrorist_em.html>
mistook these signs for bombs and shut down parts of the city, eventually
spending over $1M sorting it out. Authorities blasted the stunt as a
terrorist hoax, while others ridiculed the Boston authorities for
overreacting. Almost no one looked beyond the finger pointing and jeering to
discuss exactly why the Boston authorities overreacted so badly. They
overreacted because the signs were weird.

If someone left a backpack full of explosives in a crowded movie theater, or
detonated a truck bomb in the middle of a tunnel, no one would demand to
know why the police hadn't noticed it beforehand. But if a weird device with
blinking lights and wires turned out to be a bomb -- what every movie bomb
looks like -- there would be inquiries and demands for resignations. It took
the police two weeks to notice the Mooninite blinkies, but once they did,
they overreacted because their jobs were at stake.

This is "Cover Your Ass" security, and unfortunately it's very common.

Airplane security seems to forever be
<http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2006/08/terrorism_secur.html> looking
backwards. Pre-9/11, it was bombs, guns, and knives. Then it was small
blades and box cutters. Richard Reid tried to blow up a plane, and suddenly
we all have to take off our shoes. And after last summer's liquid plot,
we're stuck with a series of nonsensical bans on liquids and gels.

Once you think about this in terms of CYA, it starts to make sense. The TSA
wants to be sure that if there's another airplane terrorist attack, it's not
held responsible for letting it slip through. One year ago, no one could
blame the TSA for not detecting liquids. But since everything seems obvious
in hindsight, it's basic job preservation to defend against what the
terrorists tried last time.

We saw this kind of CYA security when Boston and New York randomly
<http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2005/07/searching_bags.html> checked
bags on the subways after the London bombing, or when buildings started
sprouting concrete barriers after the Oklahoma City bombing. We also see it
in ineffective attempts to detect nuclear bombs; authorities employ CYA
security against the media-driven threat so they can say "we tried." 

At the same time, we're ignoring threat possibilities that don't make the
news as much -- against chemical plants, for example. But if there were ever
an attack, that would change quickly.

CYA also explains the TSA's inability to take anyone off the
<http://www.schneier.com/essay-052.html> no-fly list, no matter how
innocent. No one is willing to risk his career on removing someone from the
no-fly list who might -- no matter how remote the possibility -- turn out to
be the next terrorist mastermind.

Another form of CYA security is the overly specific countermeasures we see
during big events like the
<http://entertainment.iafrica.com/news/929710.htm> Olympics and the
<http://www.news24.com/News24/Entertainment/Oscars/0,,2-1225-1569_1665860,00
.html> Oscars, or in protecting
<http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2005/09/major_security.html> small
<http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2006/03/80_cameras_for.html> towns.
In all those cases, those in charge of the specific security don't dare
return the money with a message "use this for more effective general
countermeasures." If they were wrong and something happened, they'd lose
their jobs.

And finally, we're seeing CYA security on the national level, from our
politicians. We might be better off as a nation funding intelligence
gathering and Arabic translators, but it's a better re-election strategy to
fund something visible but ineffective, like a
<http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2007/01/realid_costs_an.html>
national ID card or a  <http://www.slate.com/id/2143104/> wall between the
U.S. and Mexico.

Securing our nation from threats that are weird, threats that either
happened before or captured the media's imagination, and overly specific
threats are all examples of CYA security. It happens not because the
authorities involved -- the Boston police, the TSA, and so on -- are not
competent, or not doing their job. It happens because there isn't sufficient
national oversight, planning, and coordination.

People and organizations respond to incentives. We can't expect the Boston
police, the TSA, the guy who runs security for the Oscars, or local public
officials to balance their own security needs against the security of the
nation. They're all going to respond to the particular incentives imposed
from above. What we need is a coherent antiterrorism policy at the national
level: one based on real threat assessments, instead of fear-mongering,
re-election strategies, or pork-barrel politics.

Sadly, though, there might not be a solution. All the money is in
fear-mongering, re-election strategies, and pork-barrel politics. And, like
so many things, security follows the money.



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