"May"????

 

It is Islamic.

 

Bruce

 

 

Thailand insurgency may have links to the broader world of radical Islam

Friday, March 9, 2007

Last modified Friday, March 9, 2007 7:23 PM PST

By: DENIS D. GRAY and VIJAY JOSHI - Associated Press

Thailand insurgency may have links to the broader world of radical Islam

http://www.nctimes.com/articles/2007/03/10/news/nation/1_07_473_9_07.txt

 

THANNAM THIP, Thailand -- A shallow river, deep jungles and a 12-mile wall
mark the divide not just between Thailand and Malaysia but between Southeast
Asia's Muslim and Buddhist worlds.

 

This ragged stretch of border is viewed by some as a potential front in the
Muslim insurgency wracking southern Thailand, mysterious in its goals and
undeterred either by government crackdowns or by peace overtures.

 

People on both sides of the border share ethnicity, language and religion --
Islam. Muslim-run soup restaurants on the Malaysian side are suspected of
being funding sources for the rebels, and this has become an irritant in
relations between two countries that are mainstays of the Southeast Asian
alliance.

 

Analysts are divided over whether Thai insurgents are plugging into a
broader Islamic movement or would rather confine their fight to winning some
degree of autonomy. But an Associated Press investigation indicates the
separatist rebellion, which has already taken the lives of more than 2,000
people, is making outside connections:

 

-- Young Thai Muslims -- thousands, by Thai government estimate -- are being
educated in neighboring Muslim countries and the Middle East, with an
unknown number returning as recruiters or actual participants in the
insurgency. Some may be receiving military training while abroad.

 

-- Reports persist that some Indonesians or other foreigners are training
and fighting with the rebels, though none has been captured and the reports
are unconfirmed.

 

-- Islamic radicals around the world are increasingly setting their sights
on the insurgency. An Arab Web site appeared in January, dedicated
exclusively to southern Thailand and believed the first of its kind. Couched
in Islamic rhetoric, the site backs independence for southern Thais.

 

-- Malaysia denies providing any support, mindful that the insurgency could
infect its own predominantly Muslim population. But the Thai government is
worried enough to be proposing a longer wall than the barrier the Malaysians
built in Cold War times to stop smugglers and communist guerrillas.

 

"We know when some of them cross the border and report it to our Foreign
Ministry and the Malaysian military, but nobody ever gets caught," said Lt.
Chatchai Kitkhunthot in this frontier village. He was one of several Thai
army officers and local officials who pinpointed infiltration and escape
routes across the border on maps and the ground.

 

"Basically the southern Thailand conflict is becoming more regionalized. But
we are at the very early stage of it," says Rohan Gunaratna, who heads the
International Center for Political Violence and Terrorism Research in
Singapore and wrote "Inside al-Qaida: Global Network of Terror." Islamic
militancy is spreading in Southeast Asia, he says, and "What is happening in
Thailand will not be an exception."

 

Others disagree, likening the insurgency to the Muslim uprising in
Indonesia's Aceh province, which shunned foreign help and was resolved with
U.N. mediation.

 

"They are fighting for a separate state so they don't want one which is
going to be run by outsiders," says a Western official in Bangkok who is
knowledgeable about anti-terrorism efforts and spoke on condition of
anonymity.

 

The insurgents, according to the Thai military, number 3,000 to 5,000, with
some 10,000 to 12,000 sympathizers out of a Muslim population of 3 million
in the southernmost provinces of Yala, Narathiwat and Pattani which border
Malaysia. They are secretive, brutal, effective, and "We don't know when or
where they will attack next," says Col. Wichai Thongdaeng, an army spokesman
in the south.

 

An independent sultanate until it was merged into Thailand a century ago,
the southern provinces have seen rebellions come and go. In the latest,
which began in early 2004, the rebels have torched schools, bombed banks,
beheaded some 25 people and shot teachers, policemen, government officials
and just ordinary citizens. More than half the victims have been Muslims
suspected of collaborating with authorities -- teachers, civil servants,
policemen.

 

In one recent incident, says army Lt. Jenkila Somboon, three Muslim rubber
tappers were shot to death because their village was getting too friendly
with the soldiers.

 

Little is known about the insurgents, or "juwae" -- the local word for
fighters. They have revealed no program, leadership roster or even a name.
Their only public forms of communication are threatening leaflets. But Thai
intelligence officers who have interrogated defectors or captured insurgents
say that at least some of the groups are fighting for an independent,
Islamic state.

 

"If you go to work, we will kill you cruelly. We will wait for you 24 hours
a day, follow you wherever you go," said one recent leaflet obtained by The
AP, ordering Buddhists in one area to leave within three days. It's not
known whether they left, but the insurgency has already displaced hundreds
of villagers.

 

International Risk, a Hong Kong-based consultancy, calls the insurgency the
world's "new terrorism front line," but its shadowy nature accounts in part
for the differing assessments of outside involvement.

 

Thai leaders and intelligence officials say that loose, personal ties but no
formal links currently exist between the domestic militants and networks
such as al-Qaida and Jemaah Islamiyah, Southeast Asia's foremost terrorist
organization.

 

The main conduits for militancy, they say, are Thai Muslims who study in
Muslim countries ranging from Malaysia to Libya, then come back and spread
their knowledge in religious schools. These form the breeding grounds of the
insurgency, which Thai officials believe also attract funding from the
Middle East that is partly channeled into the rebels' hands.

 

Former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra alleged that Malaysia harbored
military training camps for the Thais, and some Western intelligence experts
maintain that promising youths are systematically culled for training
abroad, including the Middle East, and farmed out to key cells on their
return.

 

Then there's an Indonesian connection going back to the late 1980s and early
1990s, when Thai and Indonesian militants trained together in Afghan-run
camps on the Pakistan-Afghan border.

 

Between 1999 and 2003, Thai students held regular paramilitary sessions in
Bandung, Indonesia, with the top "one or two" then sent to Mindanao in the
southern Philippines, another region wracked by Islamic rebellion, for more
combat training, said Col. Wichai Chucherd, defense attachDe at the Thai
embassy in Indonesia.

 

An Indonesian military intelligence report seen by The AP on the Bandung
training says the presence of Thai separatists on Indonesian soil is
worrying "because they could form links with Jemaah Islamiyah members who
are now in Indonesia."

 

Thai insurgents provided support for frequent visits by Jemaah Islamiyah's
alleged operations chief Riduan Isamuddin, also known as Hambali, who was
captured in Thailand in 2003 and is now in U.S. custody.

 

But no foreign fighters have been captured or killed in southern Thailand,
although Thai army officers say a small number are believed to be around.

 

Col. Pornthep Kalamphasut, deputy commander of the army's "hearts and minds"
operation in the south, said some communication intercepts among the rebels
have been in the Indonesian language. Col. Saksri Ngoypatphan, who commands
units in two volatile districts, said defectors talk of tall non-Thais,
often hooded, being involved in training.

 

But of greater concern among the Thai military is the winding 402-mile
border with Malaysia.

 

Crossing the frontier is easy, using such corridors as the Hala Bala
Wildlife Sanctuary, an area of deep jungle, said Phuchit Saechan, the
headman of Thannam Thip. His village abuts the wall that Thailand wants to
replace with a 16-mile barrier.

 

"The border doesn't mean much. We are the same people on both sides," said
Mohammad Nor Ali, a restaurant owner near the lightly policed immigration
checkpoint in Rantau Panjang, on the Malaysian side of the frontier in
Kelantan state.

 

He acknowledged being sympathetic to the Thai Muslims' fight "because they
are our brothers."

 

Gunaratna, the Singapore-based analyst, says despite official Malaysian
denials, northern Malaysia "remains an active intellectual and material
support base for the insurgent groups active in southern Thailand."

 

As financing goes, it is the ubiquitous soup restaurants run by Thai Muslims
in Malaysia which have lately become the issue, after Thai Prime Minister
Surayud Chulanont claimed many of them were a significant source of funding
and recruitment of separatists.

 

Malaysian authorities took offense and issued indignant denials.

 

Malaysia's government is aware that the insurgency could embolden its own
radicals. "We must not allow any breeding ground for terrorism to exist or
to be nurtured," says Foreign Minister Syed Hamid Albar.

 

But Malaysia must also tread a fine line, curbing extremism without
alienating its own people. Despite Thai pleas with its Muslim neighbor
states for more cooperation, there have been no joint operations or even a
common intelligence database.

 

Thailand's military regime, which overthrew Thaksin's elected government,
says it has adopted a "hearts and minds" strategy rather than brute force to
end the insurgency.

 

"We want to de-couple the south from international Islamic terrorism," said
Foreign Minister Nitya Pibulsonggram in an interview. "Cooperation with
Malaysia is really the key."

 

-- Denis Gray reported from the Thai side of the border and Vijay Joshi from
the Malaysian side. Rungrawee C. Pinyorat and Sutin Wannabovorn in Bangkok,
Chris Brummit in Indonesia, and Jim Gomez in Manila, Phillipines,
contributed to this report.

 

AT A GLANCE: Thailand's Muslim insurgency

 

Major incidents in the Muslim separatist insurgency in southern Thailand:

 

2004

 

Jan. 4: At least 100 insurgents attack Thai army base in Narathiwat
province, seizing more than 400 weapons and ammunition.

 

April 22: Assailants set fire to about 50 public buildings in Narathiwat
district and kill two firefighters in near simultaneous attacks.

 

April 28: Security forces storm Krue Se mosque in Pattani province that had
been seized by militants, kill 107 Muslims and fight insurgents at 11 points
in three provinces.

 

Oct. 25: Security forces confront Muslim protesters at Tak Bai police
station in Narathiwat, resulting in the deaths of 85, mostly by suffocation
after troops stuff prisoners into army trucks.

 

2005:

 

July 14: Insurgents set off six near-simultaneous bombs in the capital of
Yala province, plunging city into darkness and engaging troops in
firefights.

 

Aug. 30-31: Insurgents stage attacks, bombings and arson across wide areas
of southern Thailand including Malaysian border region. Killing of Muslim
clergyman reportedly sparks flight of 131 villagers into Malaysia.

 

Sept. 21: Angry Muslim villagers stab to death two soldiers being held
captive in Tanyonglimo village in Narathiwat district.

 

2006

 

Aug. 31: Twenty-two bombs explode almost simultaneously inside commercial
banks in Yala province, killing one and injuring 27.

 

Sept. 16: Six bombs at a key commercial and tourist district in Songkhla
province kill four and injure 60.

 

Dec. 31: Nine bombs explode across Thailand's capital, Bangkok, on New
Year's Eve, killing three and wounding 40. This despite peace overtures by
the military which seized power the previous September.

 

2007

 

Feb. 18-19: Twenty-nine bombs explode in 45 minutes in several districts
across the south, targeting mostly karaoke bars. Seven are killed, more than
50 wounded.

 

AT A GLANCE: Facts about Thailand's Muslim insurgency

 

Thailand's Muslim insurgency, which has raged since early 2004, is still
largely a domestic affair but there are fears it could attract foreign
fighters if government peace efforts fail. Some facts about the rebellion:

 

REGION OF CONFLICT: Thailand's three southernmost provinces -- Yala, Pattani
and Narathiwat -- bordering Malaysia, an area about the size of Connecticut.

 

THE INSURGENTS: The Thai military says hardcore insurgents number some
3,000-5,000 with another 10,000-12,000 sympathizers. The rebels are
secretive about their goals, but seem to seek a state separate from
predominantly Buddhist Thailand.

 

GOVERNMENT FORCES: More than 30,000 military and police are fighting the
rebels. An earlier iron-fisted policy has been replaced by emphasis on
winning "hearts and minds" and apologizing for past misdeeds, but violence
continues.

 

THE VICTIMS: More than 2,000 people have been killed by suspected
insurgents, over half of them Muslims believed to be collaborating with the
authorities. Thai security forces, sometimes employing brutal tactics,
killed nearly 200 suspected alleged rebels in two notorious incidents in
2004.

 

HISTORY: The three provinces were annexed by the central government in 1902
after several centuries of unrest. Recent decades have seen separatist
movements ebb and flow. This is Thailand's poorest region, and complaints of
government neglect feed discontent.

 

 

 

  
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