<http://www.familysecuritymatters.org/global.php?id=826551> http://www.familysecuritymatters.org/global.php?id=826551
An Al-Qaeda Letter You Haven't Seen By James Forest, Ph.D. On January 8 of this year, a U.S. AC-130 gunship struck a suspected al-Qaeda target in southern Somalia. Weeks earlier, Ethiopian troops backed by the U.S. invaded the country and quickly drove out the Council of Islamic Courts (CIC), a group of Islamists who had seized power in mid-2006. While some members of this group fled into the thick forests near the Kenyan border (and were subsequently destroyed), many of them simply melded back into their local villages and prepared for an insurgency. Indeed, on January 5 of this year, a <http://voanews.com/english/archive/2007-01/2007-01-05-voa35.cfm?CFID=125054 160&CFTOKEN=14256257> message from al-Qaeda deputy leader Ayman al-Zawahri was posted to a website used by Muslim extremist groups, urging Somalis to launch an Iraq-style guerrilla war against Ethiopian forces. Apparently, his admonitions have been heeded. On March 20, insurgents attacked the seaport of Mogadishu, the country's capital, as African Union (AU) troops sought to secure the area for AU military equipment arriving by sea. A UN convoy was also attacked earlier in the week, and three Somali policemen were wounded. The similarities between Iraq and the growing insurgency in Somalia are striking. Mortars, rocket fire, random shootings, and other forms of irregular warfare against foreign troops are common to both conflicts. The involvement of al-Qaeda is another important commonality. Indeed, the U.S. intelligence community (and our allies) have long been concerned about the Islamic extremist network's ties throughout the Horn of Africa. <http://www.rand.org/commentary/011407SDUT.html> According to RAND terrorism expert Brian Jenkins, "For more than 15 years, al-Qaeda's leadership has sought to exploit Somalia's conflicts. Osama bin Laden saw America's military intervention - to escort and deliver international food aid to alleviate famine - in Somalia in 1992, coming on the heels of the deployment of American forces to Saudi Arabia during the first Gulf War, as part of an infidel scheme to control the region. Bin Laden sent al-Qaeda veterans from Afghanistan, Pakistan and Yemen to Somalia to help train local fighters." Today, according to the U.S. Department of State, <http://www.state.gov/p/af/rls/fs/2007/79383.htm> there are several al-Qaeda operatives and affiliates at large in Somalia, including: - Fazul Abdullah Mohammed (aka Harun Fazul), a senior al-Qaeda operative in East Africa who was indicted for his alleged involvement in the bombings of the United States Embassies in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya, on August 7, 1998. - Abu Talha al-Sudani, a senior al-Qaeda figure in East Africa since the early 1990s who has been implicated in the 1998 bombings of the United States Embassies in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya. He is considered to be highly skilled with mortar weapons, and planned a trip to Somalia in 1993 with other al-Qaeda figures to oppose U.S. forces there, and is believed to have cased the U.S. military base in Djibouti in 2003 in preparation for possible attacks. - Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan, a senior al-Qaeda operative in East Africa who is wanted for questioning in connection with the 2002 attacks against a hotel and an Israeli airliner in Mombasa, Kenya. - Issa Osman Issa, an al-Qaeda operative implicated in the 2002 attacks in Mombasa, Kenya who has maintained contact with the radical al <http://voanews.com/english/archive/2007-01/2007-01-05-voa35.cfm?CFID=125054 160&CFTOKEN=14256257> Shabaab organization affiliated with the Council of Islamic Courts (CIC), and commanded CIC militia near the interim capital of Baidoa. - Mukhtar Robow (aka Abu Mansoor), a member of the radical al Shabaab <http://www.somalilandtimes.net/sl/2005/238/4.shtml> organization as well as a military commander and deputy in the security department of the CIC Executive Council who provided logistical support for al-Qaeda operatives inside Somalia. - Hassan Abdullah al-Turki, who is a member of the CIC Consultative (Shura) Council, and was implicated in the murder of an American citizen inside Somalia in 1999. - Aden Hashi Ayrow, a leader of the radical al Shabaab organization and a military commander for the CIC, who trained with al-Qaeda in Afghanistan prior to 2001. He is held responsible for the assassination of a Somali peace activist in July 2005 and was implicated in the murder of an Italian nun in Mogadishu in September 2006. - Ahmed Abdi Godane, a leader of the radical al Shabaab organization who trained and fought with al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, and has been implicated in the murders of Western aid workers in Somaliland in 2003 and 2004. - Ibrahim Haji Jama (aka al Afghani), a leader of the radical al Shabaab organization who trained and fought in Afghanistan and Kashmir before returning to Somalia in the early 1990s. In sum, recent pronouncements about (and airstrikes against) al-Qaeda's presence in Somalia make more sense and deserve more attention than what is being represented in mainstream media coverage of these events. One unique source of evidence about this terror network's presence in the region comes from al-Qaeda itself. The Letter In early 2006, <http://ctc.usma.edu/> the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point released a series of al-Qaeda documents captured in Afghanistan and elsewhere, along with an analysis of what we can learn from these materials about the organizational challenges and vulnerabilities faced by the terror network's leaders. In one of these documents ( <http://www.ctc.usma.edu/aq_600113.asp> available online in both its original Arabic and English translation), an al-Qaeda operative named Omar al-Sumali describes in considerable detail a reconnaissance trip he took from Nairobi, Kenya to Kambooni, Somalia. The author's main intent in this document is to convince al-Qaeda leaders to send money, men, and material to the region because he is convinced that Kambooni is an ideal place for al-Qaeda to set up camp. He does not provide a comprehensive terrain analysis, but mentions that someone has done one previously, suggesting that al-Qaeda has already been conducting extensive research on the region before it moves in to establish a base there. He does, however, provide a number of important details, such as the time and distance it takes to travel between locations such as Mombassa and Malindi, the security measures of those places, a description of those individuals and groups that inhabit and frequent the cities and islands, potential routes for transporting weapons and operatives, and the cost of hiring local transportation services. More importantly, the document offers a detailed analysis of the security situation in and around Kambooni, along with the social and political relations of the three main tribes (the Bajuni, Ogaden, and Jal Jaal) of coastal northern Kenya and southern coastal Somalia. For the most part, according to al-Sumali, these tribes are very accepting of his Jihadi "brothers." In one instance, "they were visited by the Bajuni who asked them to stay and govern, and secure the city," a plea to keep robbers out of the city and encourage fishermen to come into the village. Omar describes this particular tribes' peaceful nature, and notes that when fighting erupts they simply move away. In contrast, the Ogaden are described as "constantly fighting with other tribes in the area," and the author notes that when they "found out that we were friendly with the Majertain . . . they kept quiet and shunned us." For their part, the Jal Jaal tribe are described as the most impoverished and desperate, and thus likely to acquiesce to any demands al-Qaeda might place on them for shelter or support. Overall, while there are key differences among the tribes in the region, and it is unlikely that any of them would provide soldiers to al-Qaeda, the ability to freely maneuver within this area and the possibility of receiving logistical support is certainly attractive to the terror network. Al-Qaeda knows that they will win the minds and support of these people if they are to succeed in establishing a base of operations in southern Somalia. Luckily for them, the region is already home to various flavors of extreme Islamist ideology. Groups such as <http://tkb.org/Group.jsp?groupID=4329> al-Ittihaad al-Islami (AIAI) - a fundamentalist organization that seeks to create an Islamic state in Somalia and Ethiopia - have been on the U.S. list of foreign terrorist organizations for many years. The report by Omar al-Sumali describes the efforts of a Sheikh Hassan, who sought to teach and spread among the receptive locals (presumably) the type of salafist jihadist ideology that is embraced by Osama bin Laden and his followers. This is unsurprising: Al-Qaeda has consistently demonstrated an understanding of how important perceptions and strategic influence can be to strengthening support for their cause. In general, the document represents the type of intelligence preparation of the battlefield that the U.S. army does, and should come be expected of a sophisticated network like al-Qaeda. The author's focus on the tribal politics is particular noteworthy, in that it reflects a critical understanding of how the local environment could support their operations. The region appears to offer an enabling environment (to include security, economics and politics) that al-Qaeda could manipulate to its advantage. We have already seen they are capable of manipulating other enabling environments (like Iraq) in ways that present serious challenges to the achievement of our national security objectives. With this in mind, the need to respond comprehensively to the situation in Somalia comes into sharper focus. The U.S. and our allies must intervene in Somalia before al-Qaeda develops a stronghold in the region. It will be much easier to prevent their establishment of a significant presence in this area than to disband it once it is established. According to a January 2007 speech by Jendayi Frazer, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, <http://www.state.gov/p/af/rls/rm/79013.htm> there are three primary U.S. policy priorities for Somalia. First, mobilize international support to help build the governance capacity of the Transitional Federal Institutions. Next, move forward with the deployment of an African stabilization force in Somalia. And third, encourage inclusive political dialogue between the Transitional Federal Institutions and other key Somali stakeholders. These priorities address core security and political issues, but we must also respond to the informational and economic challenges if we are to avoid another potential Afghanistan-style safe haven for al-Qaeda. We must convince the inhabitants of the region that any alliance with al-Qaeda threatens their own security and prosperity. We must also capture their hearts and minds. Where there is already a need for security (e.g., protecting villagers from local privateers and bandits), we must ensure it is provided by lawful authorities. Where there is economic desperation, a lack of health services and widespread deprivation and human indignity, we must focus our nation's soft power resources in ways that will modify the local environment to al-Qaeda's disadvantage. Military strikes and political discussions among warlords and other Somali elites are necessary - but insufficient - responses to the challenge of transnational terrorism that we now face in the Horn of Africa. [Non-text portions of this message have been removed] -------------------------- Want to discuss this topic? Head on over to our discussion list, [EMAIL PROTECTED] -------------------------- Brooks Isoldi, editor [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.intellnet.org Post message: [email protected] Subscribe: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Unsubscribe: [EMAIL PROTECTED] *** FAIR USE NOTICE. This message contains copyrighted material whose use has not been specifically authorized by the copyright owner. OSINT, as a part of The Intelligence Network, is making it available without profit to OSINT YahooGroups members who have expressed a prior interest in receiving the included information in their efforts to advance the understanding of intelligence and law enforcement organizations, their activities, methods, techniques, human rights, civil liberties, social justice and other intelligence related issues, for non-profit research and educational purposes only. We believe that this constitutes a 'fair use' of the copyrighted material as provided for in section 107 of the U.S. Copyright Law. If you wish to use this copyrighted material for purposes of your own that go beyond 'fair use,' you must obtain permission from the copyright owner. For more information go to: http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/107.shtml Yahoo! Groups Links <*> To visit your group on the web, go to: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/osint/ <*> Your email settings: Individual Email | Traditional <*> To change settings online go to: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/osint/join (Yahoo! ID required) <*> To change settings via email: mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] <*> To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to: [EMAIL PROTECTED] <*> Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to: http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/
