http://www.adirondackdailyenterprise.com/news/articles.asp?articleID=5615
Terrorism, Part 6 of 6: Anti-terrorist strategies, present and future
By GEORGE J. BRYJAK, Special to the Enterprise
Terrorism
A series by George J. Bryjak
¯Part 1: Defining terrorism, in its many varieties
¯Part 2: Ideology, desperation motivate terrorists
¯Part 3: Biological, chemical and nuclear threats
¯Part 4: Killing in the name of God
¯Part 5: Feminization of suicide bombing
¯Part 6: Anti-terrorist strategies, present and future
Counter-terrorism is the use of personnel and resources to preempt, disrupt
or destroy capabilities of terrorists and their support networks. Of the
numerous strategies utilized to combat terrorism, three are of particular
importance.
Intelligence gathering entails obtaining accurate information on terrorist
groups their size, training, location, sources of income and weapons,
decision-making strategies, target selections, etc. Intelligence analysts
piece bits of information together in the hope of undermining terrorist
operations.
An increasingly important component of intelligence gathering is monitoring
communications channels. This includes a variety of technical interventions
ranging from old-fashioned wiretapping to the penetration of terrorists
computers.
Covert intelligence gathering has been a highly controversial issue in
democratic societies (including the United States) as it has the potential
to undermine fundamental privacy rights. For example, will the federal
government limit surveillance to those organizations that are real and
immediate threats to the nation, or will it also target political enemies
(who do not advocate or engage in violence) for surveillance, harassment,
even destruction? In the 1960s, the government monitored the activities of
individuals (including Martin Luther King Jr.) and organizations in the
civil rights movement as well as those who opposed the Vietnam War, thus
undermining a basic tenet of the American way of life guaranteed by the
Constitution.
The American Civil Liberties Union reports that in the year following the
2001 terrorist attacks on this country, the Denver Police Department
maintained intelligence files on approximately 3,200 individuals and 208
organizations. These groups included Amnesty International, the American
Friends Committee (a pacifist Quaker organization) and the American Indian
Movement.
Target-hardening involves making potential terrorist targets safe and
secure, with airport metal detectors and random searches of passengers the
most familiar examples of this tactic. There are at least two drawbacks to
this approach. First, corporate America often resists implementing these
procedures out of fear that they will inconvenience and eventually alienate
customers. After Pan American Flight 103 exploded over Lockerbie, Scotland
in 1988, killing all 259 people aboard, the U.S. government proposed more
extensive safety baggage checks. However, the airlines balked, arguing these
procedures took too long. The government argued to the contrary, but backed
down.
Other reasons for resisting target hardening are nothing less than absurd.
Less than two months after the 2001 terrorist attacks on New York City and
Washington D.C., an airport manager would not approve the installation of a
baggage screening machine because the machine did not fit the lobbys color
scheme.
A second limitation to target hardening is what criminologists call
displacement. When primary targets are sufficiently hardened, criminals
often turn their attention to softer objectives. For example, increased
police presence in one neighborhood is likely to produce more crime in
adjacent neighborhoods as street criminals rationally move to locales with
fewer officers on patrol. Cynthia Lum of George Washington University and
her colleagues found that while metal detectors at airports reduced
hijackings, there may be a displacement or substitution effect as other
kinds of terrorism (assassinations, bombings and hostage taking) increase.
They also discovered that fortifying embassies to protect diplomats did not
appear to reduce the number of attacks on these targets.
When people hear the words counter-terrorism, the first thing that
typically comes to mind is a military response, or the use of force.
Domestically, local and state police, along with the FBI, can and have used
armed force against terrorist groups working in this country. On occasion,
the U.S. military has been deployed to locate and destroy terrorist targets
in foreign countries. Within a month of the Sept. 11, 2001 attack on New
York City and Washington D.C., the U.S. military launched a major offensive
against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, hoping to destroy or disrupt Al
Qaeda networks.
The use of force is the most controversial counter-terrorism strategy. The
soft-line approach advocates negotiating with terrorists in order to secure
the release of hostages and/or terminate the attack as quickly and
bloodlessly as possible. Although governments hope that once they resolve a
terrorist incident via negotiation and appeasement their tormentors will
leave and never return, typically the opposite happens. The original
terrorist group as well as other extremist organizations now emboldened by
this display of weakness are likely to increase both the frequency of
attacks and their demands. As Paul Wilkinson notes, In terrorism, nothing
succeeds like success.
For hard-liners, any negotiation with or concession to terrorists is
unacceptable. Adherents of this position usually advocate the death penalty
for convicted terrorists. While the get-tough, no-nonsense approach
(especially executing terrorists) has a gut-level appeal for many, there are
formidable arguments against it. To begin, fanatical terrorists will hardly
be deterred by the death penalty. In fact, they may relish the thought of
becoming martyrs (after a highly publicized trial) and securing a niche, as
Wilkinson notes, in revolutionary history. Martyrdom can also be a
powerful force in gaining converts to the terrorist cause and, quite
possibly, attracting new members to the extremist organization. Finally,
terrorists may engage in an escalated wave of attacks (assassinations,
suicide bomb attacks, taking hostages) to secure the release of condemned
colleagues, and/or they may exact a high measure of revenge if their
comrades are executed.
Hard-liners such as Paul Bremmer (1988) argue that after the United States
bombed the headquarters of Libyas Colonel Qaddafi in 1986, incidents of
terrorism declined dramatically as many as 35 attacks planned for the
coming weeks were aborted. Opponents of this position counter by stating
that no nation has been more forceful in lashing out against terrorism than
Israel. Yet terrorist attacks against Israel continue on a regular basis.
Despite the best efforts of the international community to reduce if not
eliminate terrorism, this activity will persist for a number of reasons.
First, the world is replete with religious and/or ethnic groups demanding
greater autonomy or full independence from their host countries.
Organizations such as Islamic Jihad in Palestine, the Tamil Tigers in Sri
Lanka and rebel Chechen groups in Russia, unable to realize their political
goals via peaceful means, have turned to terrorism. Governments unwilling to
grant these minority groups greater autonomy or independence often engage in
state terrorism to thwart their goals or destroy them.
Second, like other significant political-economic-demographic movements in
history, globalization the mass migration of jobs, capital, industry and
people across societies will produce winners and losers. In an era of
unprecedented consumption on the part of the international upper class and a
burgeoning global middle class, the impoverished masses of the 21st century
are not likely to endure their misery in silence. When and where violence
can disrupt global commerce and bring attention to their plight, some of
these individuals will resort to terrorist activity.
A clash of world cultures will also be a significant factor in future
terrorism. In his book Runaway World, Anthony Giddens states that the
battleground of the twenty-first century will pit fundamentalism against
cosmopolitan tolerance. Fundamentalists of all religious and political
persuasions have a deep distrust if not outright hatred for modernity. For
Giddens, while cosmopolitans embrace cultural complexity, fundamentalists
find it disturbing and dangerous. ... They take refuge in a renewed and
purified tradition and quite often, violence. A major component of
fundamentalism is radical Islam. According to the National Intelligence
Councils Mapping the Global Future project, Radical Islam will have a
significant global impact ... rallying disparate ethnic and national groups
and perhaps even creating an authority that transcends national boundaries.
Finally, world population will increase from approximately 6.5 billion
individuals in 2006 to 9 billion people by mid-century. To the extent that
terrorists are drawn from the lower classes, recruiters will have no
difficulty attracting eager followers. Streets of giant Third World cities
already teeming with young, impoverished males will experience a significant
increase in this terrorism-prone population.
All relevant indicators point to an extended period of terrorist activity.
Unless a new spirit of international understanding and diplomacy takes hold,
an ongoing, high-stakes chess match between terrorists and counter-terrorism
experts will determine the level of death, destruction, and destabilization
wrought upon the global community.
SOURCES:
Bremmer, P. (1988), Terrorism: Myth and Realities, U.S. Department of
State Bulletin, No. 88, pp. 61-64
Cooper, R. and R. Simon (2001, Nov. 17), Doubts Linger on Airport Safety,
Los Angeles Times
Dreyfus, R. (2002), The Cops are Watching You, The Nation, Vol. 274, No.
21, pp. 12-15
Giddens, A. (2002), Runaway World: How Globalization is Reshaping Our
Lives, Routledge: New York
Kushner, H. (2003), The Encyclopedia of Terrorism, Sage Publications:
Thousand Oaks, Calif.
Lum, C., L. Kennedy and A. Sherley (2006), The Effectiveness of
Counter-Terrorism Strategies, The Campbell Collaboration,
http://www.campbellcollaboration.org
Mapping the Global Future: Report of the National Intelligence Councils
2020 Project (2006), National Intelligence Council, http:www.dni.gov
Rohrich, R. (2001, Nov. 5), A Gap in Aviation Security, Los Angeles Times
Wilkinson, P. (1986), Terrorism Versus Liberal Democracy: The Problem of
Response, in W. Gutteridge (ed), Contemporary Terrorism, Facts on File:
New York
George J. Bryjak was a sociology professor for 24 years at the University of
San Diego. Now retired, he lives in Bloomingdale.
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