http://www.adirondackdailyenterprise.com/include/articles.asp?articleID=5540
Terrorism, Part 3 of 6: The ultimate terrorist threat: Biological, chemical
and nuclear weapons
By GEORGE J. BRYJAK, Special to the Enterprise
Terrorism
A series by George J. Bryjak
¯Part 1: Defining terrorism, in its many varieties
¯Part 2: Ideology, desperation motivate terrorists
¯Part 3: Biological, chemical and nuclear threats
¯Part 4: Killing in the name of God
¯Part 5: Feminization of suicide bombing
¯Part 6: Anti-terrorist strategies, present and future
A particularly sinister and deadly category of weapons may signal a new era
of global terrorism. Many experts are of the opinion that its no longer a
question of if but only a matter of time before a biological, chemical or
nuclear terrorist attack occurs. However, there is considerable disagreement
regarding the effectiveness of these attacks, as measured by physical
destruction and human casualties.
Writing in the Journal of the American Medical Association, Jeffrey Simon
noted that biological warfare (BW) attacks could result in hundreds of
thousands, even millions of casualties. Inasmuch as BW agents are
invisible, tasteless and odorless, no one would realize that an onslaught
had begun. Simon speculated on how such an attack might be launched:
The aerosol release of BW agents could be accomplished in several ways,
including the following:
¯using low-flying planes, crop dusters or trucks equipped with spray tanks
and releasing BW agents upwind of populated areas
¯leaving aerosol containers filled with BW agents and timing devices in
subways, airports, air conditioning/heating systems in buildings or other
crowded places
¯directly contaminating bulk food supplies in restaurants, supermarkets or
other places with a BW agent.
In 1995, members of a religious cult in Japan released nerve gas (sarin) on
a Tokyo subway train, killing 12 people and hospitalizing more than 5,000.
Had the attack been better planned, the delivery system more sophisticated
and the sarin gas of higher quality, tens of thousands of people would have
died. While the number of casualties was relatively low, the assailants were
successful in creating widespread fear among residents of the worlds
largest metropolitan area.
Richard Danzig, a biowarfare consultant with the Pentagon, notes that while
there are between 1,000 and 10,000 weaponeers worldwide with biological
arms experience, there are at least one million, perhaps many million
broadly skilled scientists who could construct bioweapons: It seems
likely that, over a period between a few months and a few years, broadly
skilled individuals equipped with modest laboratory equipment can develop
biological weapons. Only a thin wall of ignorance and inexperience now
protects us. If Danzig is correct, Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups will
have the knowledge and ability to construct bioweapons in the near future.
Terrorists would not have to obtain deadly chemicals and fashion them into
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to launch a successful attack. According
to a U.S. Environmental Protection Agency report, 123 chemical facilities
across the country have toxic worst-case scenarios wherein more than one
million people would be at risk of exposure if poisonous gases were
released. A terrorist attack on one or more of these facilities, which many
experts believe have less-than-adequate security, could produce massive
casualties.
Terrorism expert Harvey Kushner is more cautious in his assessment of a BW
threat. The Long Island University professor argues that the
much-talked-about scenario of poisoning a major citys water supply would be
difficult to accomplish. The immense volume of water in reservoirs would
dilute a relatively small amount of a toxic agent to the point that it would
be inconsequential. Underwater aquifers are not readily accessible and are
all but immune from being poisoned.
Regarding the future of chemical terrorism, Kushner notes that its not
likely members of terrorist organizations can make or dispense the large
quantities of these agents needed to inflict mass casualties, Nor are they
likely to have access to the weapon delivery platforms (artillery, aircraft,
missiles) available to organized military units. Kushner concedes the
release of limited quantities of chemical agents could produce widespread
disruption and panic, triggering a chain of events that might disrupt
commerce in a city.
The nightmare scenario that terrorist experts, government officials and law
enforcement officials are most concerned about is an attack with nuclear
weapons. Kushner believes there is little chance that terrorists could
acquire or build a conventional nuclear weapon on their own: We can say
with complete confidence that it would be nearly impossible for a terrorist
organization that did not have the support of a government to produce the
fissionable uranium or plutonium for a fission bomb from raw materials.
However, a study by five former nuclear weapons engineers concluded that a
sophisticated terrorist group would have the capability of constructing a
workable nuclear bomb from stolen plutonium and highly enriched uranium. In
the years following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the chances of
terrorists obtaining fissionable material increased as a consequence of poor
salaries and low morale among scientific personnel, as well as lax security
at weapons laboratories.
William Langewiesche, author of the forthcoming book, The Atomic Bazaar,
argues that while the odds of a terrorist organization constructing a
nuclear bomb are long, the task is not impossible. Building such a device
would take approximately four months, with the likely venue a Third World
city where governmental control is lax and corruption rampant.
In his book, Al Qaeda: Brotherhood of Terror, Paul Williams states that
before 9/11, President Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair were
warned that Osama bin Laden had purchased 20 suitcase nuclear weapons
(sometimes called backpack nukes because of their small size) from Chechen
Mafia figures for $30 million in cash and two tons of opium. Speaking of
nuclear weapons, bin Laden reputedly told a Pakistani journalist in 2001,
Theyre not hard to obtain if you have contacts in Russia with other
Islamist groups.
The nuclear scenario is especially ominous in light of the fact that six
million containers arrive via ship at U.S. coastal cities every year. Only a
fraction of these containers are thoroughly searched by Customs officials. A
backpack nuke detonated in the center of a major city could kill tens of
thousands of people and expose millions more to radiation poisoning.
Williams statement on the sale of these weapons to bin Laden is plausible
given that a Russian general testified to the U.S. House of Representatives
that approximately 40 suitcase-size nuclear devices in his countrys
military arsenal were missing. This claim was denied by Russian authorities.
Some experts believe that if terrorist organizations ever employ nuclear
weapons, theyre most likely to be radiological dispersal devices (RDDs) or
dirty bombs. An RDD is a conventional weapon (an artillery shell, for
example) that, when detonated, spreads radioactive material and contaminates
a geographic area. Writing in a Naval Post Graduate School publication, Jack
Boureston and Charles Mahaffey argue that RDDs would fill the needs of
terrorists for a number of reasons.
To begin, the ingredients are readily available via commercial enterprises,
medical facilities, university laboratories and waste products from nuclear
reactors. Second, because the radiological materials in these devices are
less radioactive than the compounds in a nuclear weapon, they are much
easier to handle when constructing and transporting. Finally, constructing
one of these devices is relatively simple as one need only wrap a
radioactive material around conventional explosives.
Paul Zimmerman, a nuclear physicist in the Department of War Studies at
Kings College, London, notes that polonium, the substance that killed
former Russian spy Alexander Litvinenko, is available on Amazon.com in
products with about 10 percent of a lethal dose. A polonium device
exploded in a packed arena or on a crowded street could kill dozens or
hundreds. First responders unaware of the chemical makeup of the bomb
might be among the worst wounded.
To demonstrate the Russian governments vulnerability to a DDS attack,
Islamic radicals planted, but did not detonate, a dirty bomb in a Moscow
Park. Theres no reason to believe that a motivated terrorist group couldnt
do the same in an American city, this time with a catastrophic outcome.
SOURCES:
Allen-Mills, T. and U. Mahnamaimi (2005, Jan. 2), Al-Qaeda Seeks Toxins for
Biowarfare Attack, The London Times, http:wwwtimesonline.co.uk
Bin Ladens Nuclear Weapons (1998, winter), The Muslim Magazine, Vol. 2,
No. 1
Blair, B. (2001), What if Terrorists Go Nuclear? Center for Defense
Information Terrorism Project, http://www.cdi.org
Boureston, J. and C. Mahaffey (2003, Oct. 1), Al Qaeda and Mass Casualty
Terrorism: Assessing the Threat, Center for Contemporary Conflict, Naval
Post Graduate School, www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/oct03/terrorism.pdf
Bush, Blair, Warned of Bin Laden Nukes (2002, Dec. 14), World Net Daily,
http://www.worldnetdaily.com
Kushner, H. (2003), The Encyclopedia of Terrorism, Sage Publications,
Thousand Oaks, Calif.
Langewiesche, W. (2006, December), How to Get a Nuclear Bomb, The Atlantic
Monthly,
Mintz, J. (2004, Dec. 30), Technical Hurdles Separate Terrorists from
Biowarfare, The Washington Post
Nuclear Terrorism How to Prevent It (2005), Nuclear Control Institute,
http://www.nci.org.nic.nt.htm
Simon, J. (1997), Biological Terrorism: Preparing to Meet the Threat,
Journal of the American Medical Association, 278:95, pp. 428-430
Williams, P. (2002), Al Qaeda: Brotherhood of Terror, Alpha Publications:
New York
Zimmerman, P (2006, Dec. 19), The Smoky Bomb Threat, New York Times
George J. Bryjak was a sociology professor for 24 years at the University of
San Diego. Now retired, he lives in Bloomingdale.
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