The Brotherhood and America Part Six 21/03/2007 By Manal Lutfi http://www.aawsat. <http://www.aawsat.com/english/news.asp?section=3&id=8381> com/english/news.asp?section=3&id=8381 Washington D. C., Asharq Al-Awsat- "Fear" is a key word when considering the future of the relationship between the Muslim Brotherhood and the US. This multifaceted fear can be explained for a number of reasons. There is the well-known anxiety of what the Islamists would do if they came to power in one country or another and how this would affect American interests. There is the fear that US relations with regional allies will deteriorate if they began dialogue with moderate Islamic organizations, who have proven to have street influence and are capable of winning elections. The third concern is that a dialogue is not opened with these groups, and one of them rise to power. It is due to this mixed bag of fears that is difficult to lay down a clear US policy. A study written by David Shankar and published by Washington Institute for Near East Policy, in November 2006, discussed the various strategies that could be considered if the Islamists rose to power through an election. The first strategy Shankar suggests is to isolate Islamist groups politically and financially by first drawing a clear distinction between "non-Islamist Muslims" and "Islamists" and secondly increasing the political cost for governments or parties dealing or allying with Islamists (including banning financial grants and imposing economic constraints). The second strategy is to delay the spread of democracy in the region, based on a refutation of George Bush's fundamental notion on the close relation between political despotism and the spread of terrorism [supporting evidence is the existence of terrorist movements in democratic states such as the Basque National Liberation Movement in Spain, the Japanese Red Army in Japan and the Red Brigades in Italy]. Delaying the spread of democracy in the region will prevent Islamists from coming to power but will not affect the course of the American war on terror. The third strategy is to integrate moderate Islamists without waiting to strengthen the liberal current; however, this option should be resorted to along with consolidating regional cultural and educational reforms and recognizing that this option shall not be without cost. But why discuss the future of Muslim Brotherhood/US relations? Do some American officials and researchers believe that there are common interests shared by both parties? And if so, is it better to put the future of relations on the table? The answer is yes; there are some who believe in the possibility and necessity of dialog to maintain US interests in the region. Discussing this point, a key US State Department official told Asharq al Awsat that there is an agenda of common interests between Islamists and the Americans in some regional states, but that America does not want to publicly show its interest in one group or another for fear of the so-called American "kiss of death". After all, any political current that is directly backed by America has many shadows of doubt cast across it. Speaking to Asharq al Awsat, on the condition of remaining anonymous, the American official said, "I think there can be an agenda of common interests between Islamists and the US administration; however, this should not to be overestimated. The fact is that there is currently no common agenda, although many people think it already exists. For example, we criticize the Syrian regime, as does the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria, however this does not imply that we work with the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria or work against the Syrian regime. So, one has to be careful to avoid exaggeration. There is a common agenda but this does not mean we work closely together. We adhere to American non-intervention in internal partisan policies, we support political process transparency and election monitoring, but we do not want to select favorites because we fear the American "kiss of death". We reject the "kiss of death" notion for any Arab world party or direct US support because this is forbidden and this does not serve the interests of America or these parties." For his part, John Alterman, the director of the Middle East Programme at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, stresses that there is increasing understanding of political Islam in Washington, pointing out that regional governments no longer monopolize political power. He cited last summers events, when the Middle East witnessed an unprecedented escalation of violence, both in Iraq (between the Americans and the "resistance" forces or "militants", who are armed organizations rather than governments) and in Lebanon as a war broke out between Israel and Hezbollah (which is not a government either), indicating that this is a reason for concern. "If we look at governments alone, we will miss part of the picture," he said, explaining that the rise of armed organizations, non-official political bodies and Islamic organizations has to be accompanied by changes in how American policy in the region is formulated. "America often talks to Islamists. In the cases where dialogue does not exist, the main obstacles arise from some rejections by regional governments, rather than from hesitation by the US administration. But if we are serious, we have to interact with politically active groups, and the Muslim Brotherhood is definitely a key part of local political interactions in the region. However, questions will remain about how Islamists would act if they gained more political power and about the relationship between political Islam and violence", he told Asharq al Awsat. Alterman said there must be ongoing discussions in Washington on the relationship with Islamic organizations. In fact, one reason why it is difficult to determine the US policies dealing with Islamists is the existence of the push and pull between some State Department officials and US ambassadors to the region. State Department officials may propose contacts with one Islamist party while embassies in respective capitals are more interested in maintaining diplomatic relations, and even in consolidating such relations, especially with America's key allies in the region. In this respect Alterman says, "There is a difference between realizing information and wisdom. There are people inside the administration who have information but it is not integrated correctly so as to be comprehensible to senior administration officials and therefore the whole picture is sometimes lost. Most foreign US policies are put in force by the various US embassies in world's capitals and embassies depend on the existence of strong relations with the governments of these countries. So on the whole, in the administration there may be people who believe in opening dialogues with Islamists, but the focus of embassies in respective countries is focused on strong bilateral relations." If the American fear of angering Washington's regional allies plays a key role in formulating the future of relations between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Americans, there is another fear factor that has to be considered. Attention must be paid to the agendas and goals of the Islamists, and consideration must be taken into whether they will not harm US interests in the region or turn against the principles of pluralism that brought them to power. Marina Ottaway, the Director of Middle East Program at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, says that there is a mistrust, even of the so-called "moderate Islamists", as it is suggested that they are not loyal to democracy, they just use democracy as a means to come to power, and that if they came to power they would turn against democracy. The cause, she explained, is the existence of a deep misunderstanding of Islamists and the view that they are "non-democrats", as well as the existence of the concept of the clash of civilizations and regarding Islamists as anti civil freedoms. "I think a dialogue with Islamists will lead to a return to a foreign policy concept that is comparable to the state of affairs during the Cold War-maintaining an interest in a state (the Soviet Union) that poses a great risk to us, rather than going to war. The solution to getting out of this situation is to open dialogue, gain understanding and differentiate between dangerous and non-dangerous groups; after all, there is the international terrorism challenge to consider" she added. While some maintain that the goal of dialogue with Islamists is to improve America's image in the region, Daniel Kurtzer, the former US Ambassador to Egypt, played down this argument, pointing out that chief among these goals is to explain the US policy; "We believe that if we better understand people, they will be less hostile towards us. We see unfounded reports in American newspapers and this happens in regional countries also. Sometimes newspapers and other media outlets publish and broadcast reports that are simply untrue but people tend to believe them, drawing false conclusions about America. So the first goal of dialogue is to give an accurate picture of America, of who we are and of what issues concern us. The second goal of dialogue is to listen to the viewpoints of the "other". We hear of the Muslim Brotherhood, the Jamaa Islamiya, Hamas and Hezbollah. If we talk with people from these organizations, we can better understand their positions on supporting terrorism, peace, Israel, America and many other issues. The third goal of dialogue is for the administration to see whether or not there are practical techniques to move forward. For example, we have in place a policy on spreading democracy in the region. The Bush administration is strict in pushing this, but all administrations sought to make success in spreading democracy. It is important to seek to understand what this means and whether there is a potential to increase the number of states involved in the agenda of democratic transformation, not according to the American culture but rather according to the respective cultures of these countries-the cultures of Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait," he added. In fact, there is a correlation between dialogue with Islamists and American efforts to boost political and constitutional reform in the region. Some officials and researchers interviewed by Asharq al Awsat believe that the key is to back the truly moderate Islamic organizations that have introduced remarkable changes to their political and intellectual discourse, actions and practices. Support for these moderate Islamic organizations is accompanied by real pressure on US allies in the region to forge ahead on the track of political reform rather than take a step forward then another step back, as is happening in some regional countries. Amongst the factors that encourage such a proposal is that Islamic organizations in the region have increased internal intellectual debates regarding their agendas and positions towards many issues. They include the Muslim Brotherhood and the Center Party in Egypt, the Islamic Constitutional Movement in Kuwait and its debates on the political participation of women, the Islamic Action Front in Jordan and Hamas in Palestine. In this respect, Marina Ottaway says, "There is an ongoing debate within the Islamic movements, such as with the Muslim Brotherhood group in Egypt. There is a more moderate, flexible and reformative wing that talks of laws drafted within and conforming to an Islamic framework; yet they do not mean a literal interpretation of Islamic Sharia like the 7th century interpretations. When we talk of the application of sharia laws we mean the hadd penalties and personal status law, not the legislation regulating everyday life, such as traffic laws, water distribution or taxes. The majority of laws in the region today are based on the French laws. There is also the hardline wing within the Muslim Brotherhood leadership that wants the application of sharia." Ottaway notes that centrist organisations in Egypt, Justice and Development Party in Morocco, the brotherhood in Kuwait have become more flexible. "I do not believe this poses a threat to America," she emphasized. However, she blamed the US administration for observing the ongoing debate between "moderate" Islamists and "hardline" Islamists (without taking a particular position) to see who will be successful, pointing out that because the victory of those who call for jihad against the "infidels" will not be good for America, the administrations has to do one of two things. First is to press for the changing of laws regulating political parties and second, allowing the creation of more moderate Islamic political parties. She pointed out that the registration of Egypt's center party, as a political party was rejected about three times. "However, does America have to back moderate Islamic parties such as the center party? I'm not sure this will help the center party. I think if the US supported any political organization, this would be viewed with suspicion. This has happened with liberal groups in the past. This concern is what the US State Department dubbed "the kiss of death". It is amongst the difficulties facing the formulation of the American policy towards Islamists in the region." The American official, however, sought to give regional people and governments a role in solving this dilemma based on his rejection of the statement that "America is both problem and solution" - pointing out that the fate and future of the region lies in the hands of its people rather than the hands of America in spite of Washington's influence that cannot be underestimated. "There is difference between supporting democracy and supporting parties. American concerns go beyond the issue of Islamists. Where is the region heading and what is its future? What is its future model? Is there any future model or will the situation remain the same? Whose thoughts will prevail? Moderate Islamists or Takfiris and Al Qaeda? This is the 1 million dollar question, and I do not know the answer. America is marginal in this internal debate, as is Israel. America can facilitate or hinder, but the solution to the issue lies with the Arabs. There is a major problem in the Arab world - a form of inferiority complex. The problem is always with the others - e.g. the Americans and Israelis are to blame. I know that America's image is a bad one, and that Israel's is even worse, but the problem is that there exists an obsession with focusing on the external rather than internal factors. I think that local internal factors are more important to consider, for instance, Syria blames the state of internal conditions on the confrontation with Israel, although Syria is not engaged in direct confrontation with Israel (or is only engaged through Lebanon). Syria uses Israel as a cover up for internal mistakes. Regional problems and solutions do not lie with America. We deal with the current regimes and so do the entire world", the American official pointed out. The views of American officials differ on Islamists in the region, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood. But can one talk of the "friends" and "enemies" of Islamists in Washington? Scott Carpenter, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State and Coordinator of the Middle East and North Africa Partnership Initiative, told Asharq al Awsat that one cannot talk of the "friends" and "enemies" of Islamists inside the administration. "We believe that all political players desirous of political participation have to comply with the principles of democracy, pluralism, minority rights, market economy and modernization. I do not believe there are friends and enemies. Rather there is a pragmatic process concerning Islamists and other political forces," he added. Carpenter said that there are American research centers that encourage dialogue with Islamists, but that this is not binding to policy makers in America since those are mere views expressed. Carpenter cites the Council on Foreign Relations, as one of those centers that encourage dialogue with Islamists. Founded in 1921, the Council on Foreign Relations is headed by Richard Haas. Amongst its key researchers are Vali Nasr and Noah Feldman, both of whom are defenders of practical dealings with Islamists in the region away from ideology and preconceptions, viewing the shifts taking place on the Islamic map objectively. It is one of the centers that focus on foreign policy issues and seek to offer work sheets and advice to American policy makers. However, the center, which publishes Foreign Affairs journal, was not spared controversy in several situations, last of which was when it hosted Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad last year, to deliver a speech on his vision of world politics as he took part in UN General Assembly meetings. Although it is not easy to determine who in the administration does not want openness with Islamists, Marina Ottaway, draws attention to the fact that within the administration there are neo-Conservative politicians who do not back the idea of openness to Islamists, pointing out that these officials maintain that it is not possible for the American values to coincide with the values of Islamic organizations, even if they are moderate ones. She points out that the neo-Conservative concept suggests that "America does not have to adapt itself to what already exists because it has the power to change it", and therefore their approach is to surround Islamists or ignore their presence on the regional political scene. ..................................................................... 2007-03-21 00:00:00 The constitutional amendments and the credibility of the MB http://www.mideastw <http://www.mideastwire.com/topstory.php?id=14455> ire.com/topstory.php?id=14455 Khaled Mamdouh, an editor and staff writer for Islamonline, wrote on Al-Arabiya.net, a Saudi-owned online news service on March 21 that: "The MPs of the opposition - whether from the Muslim Brotherhood or independents - threatened to resign from the People's Assembly in protest against the constitutional amendments as a final step to prevent the ratification of these amendments which were proposed by Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and approved by the Shura Council and the People's Assembly afterwards. What really happened?! "What happened was that the MPs of the opposition - the majority of whom are from the MB - opted for keeping immunity and the parliamentary seat while resorting to the boycotting of the sessions in which these amendments were subjected to voting. The fig leaf thus fell from what is known as the opposition led by the MB, and it proved through this position that the interest of the MB - regardless of what it is - was above the interest of the nation. Therefore, what is the difference between it [the MB-led opposition] and the regime?! "The People's Assembly ratified the constitutional amendments despite all the "televised" protests and all the sit-ins, the demonstrations and the banners raised by the parliamentarians who belong to the Muslim Brotherhood, which believes it is the main opposition power in the country. History will mention that these disastrous amendments at the level of some articles were ratified by the Egyptian parliament while a little less than a third of its members were from the opposition!! The question which raises itself now is why didn't the MB's deputies resign from the parliament since they were unable to prevent this catastrophe which they depicted to the people as being a "consecration of the police state"? "Are they so eager to hold on to their seats and immunity regardless of their inefficiency in serving the public interest or preventing the harm imposed on it? Following its position on the "scandalous" constitutional amendments, the MB has proven that its interest is one thing and the public interest is another. When there is a conflict between both, no need to think about it and to hell with public interest! This odd position makes us wonder: Did the ruling regime in Egypt allow the MB to be present so intensively in the People's Assembly to fulfill their role in the comedy known as "political action" in protected Egypt?! "There is not one convincing or acceptable justification for why the MB's deputies did not resign from the People's Assembly following this masquerade called "constitutional amendments", unless they are afraid of "being arrested" as it was said by MP Mustafa Bakri during the meeting held by the deputies of the opposition among independent figures, MB members and parties last Saturday to discuss the "idea" of a collective resignation!! But what is keeping the Egyptian security from arresting them in the first place? It is the immunity?! What about Ayman Nour? Wasn't his immunity lifted and wasn't he tried and imprisoned within a few days?!... "I don't know what could've happened had they all resigned, but at least this step would've maintained their credibility and helped expose the ruling regime and shown it as it really is. As for what they did in terms of condemnation, wearing black ribbons and sitting on mats in the street[:] it was just "a show" that changed nothing. We congratulate the ruling regime for its amendments and its opposition and its MB which he produced and trained well. As for the people, they have God to protect them!!!" - Al Arabiya.net, Middle East .................................................................... Baathism on the Nile http://abuaardvark. <http://abuaardvark.typepad.com/abuaardvark/2007/03/baathism_on_the.html> typepad.com/abuaardvark/2007/03/baathism_on_the.html In five days Egypt is scheduled to hold a national referendum on changes to its Constitution. Even veteran Egyptian opposition figures, well versed in the regime's authoritarian ways, have expressed shock at the choice of March 26 for the referendum. This is a travesty, a crude mockery of promises of political reform, and something which deserves widespread international mockery and condemnation. Here's why: The actual language of those changes was only finalized in a marathon Parliamentary session two days ago, giving the Egyptian citizenry less than a week to learn about the changes and make up their minds. Does anybody really think that voters could conceivably come to terms with the complex and varied changes on offer in such a short time? Of course not. That's the point. As al-Masry al-Youm bluntly reports, giving less than a week means that there will be no chance for any kind of real protest movement to take shape. The changes were passed almost exclusively by the ruling party. Over 100 opposition deputies - not only Muslim Brotherhood deputies, as has been widely reported - boycotted the final vote and demonstrated outside the Parliament during the proceedings. NDP deputies quite appropriatedly celebrated its "victory" by launching into the Baathist chant "With spirit, with blood, we sacrifice ourselves for you, oh Mubarak." This is what America's support for Egyptian "reform" has brought: Baathism on the Nile. The changes are blatantly, almost absurdly, authoritarian and antidemocratic. Judicial oversight of elections will be eliminated; even NDP strategist Ali al-Din Hilal admits that this makes cheating much easier (which of course is the point). Contested Presidential elections will be virtually impossible, since candidates must come from a licensed party with so much representation in all elected bodies that in practice only the NDP will ever get over the bar. Parties based on religion would be explicitly banned, making it impossible for the Muslim Brotherhood to form a political party and participate openly in the political process. But it isn't just the MB: the regime, under NDP control, will retain an iron grip on the licensing of political parties, and judging by past practice will use this control to exclude not only the Muslim Brotherhood but any other promising political party. "Counter-terrorism" provisions will render a whole range of highly controversial, intrusive security practices Constitutional, making the de facto security state into a de jure security state. The NDP majority which passed the reforms was itself achieved through blatant electoral falsifications and fraud. The most famous case is that of Gamal Heshmat, a popular Muslim Brotherhood Deputy, whose sweeping victory over NDP bigwig Mustafa al-Fiqi simply disappeared in the counting room; a whistleblower article by Noha al-Zeini, the supervising judge, uncovered the fraud everyone suspected but nobody had yet been able to prove. But the Heshmat case is only the tip of the iceberg. After the Muslim Brotherhood successes in the first (of three) rounds of voting, the regime cracked down sharply, arresting large numbers of Brotherhood members, harrassing voters and journalists, blockading voting stations, and - yes - cheating. The Constitutional reforms and referendum are taking place in an atmosphere of rather intense repression of activists, bloggers, protestors, and the Muslim Brotherhood. The regime is taking no chances. I hope everyone reads these accounts of how state security goons are treating political activists, liberals and Islamists alike. I suspect that the crackdown on bloggers may have a lot to do with their successful project of "citizen monitoring" of the Parliamentary elections, where ordinary people with camera phones documented all kinds of electoral abuses to the regime's embarrassment. This time, no chances. The judges appear to be planning to monitor the referendum - we'll see if they get the chance to do so honestly. Amnesty International has described the changes as "the biggest threat to Egyptian democracy since emergency laws passed after the assassination of President Anwar Sadat by Islamist extremists in 1981." That's exactly right. Except these aren't emergency laws: this revises the Constitution itself. I said this on Friday, but let me say it again, slowly. Mubarak is about to do exactly what he always accuses Islamists of secretly planning: win an election and then use his majority to abolish democracy. The opposition, from the MB to Kefaya, has been placed in an impossible position. Participating in the referendum will legitimize the results, particularly since nobody doubts for an instant that the regime will falsify the results if they go badly. The most extreme option, a collective resignation from Parliament, seems to have been taken off the table: even the MB seems to feel that this would be going too far, and that this would only please the government which would be able to replace the troublesome MB deputies with more accomodating deputies. That leaves only boycott, which will not in the end have much impact - as above, even if only 10% turn out and vote, the regime will happily claim 70%. The best and only real option: mobilize sustained, critical international media attention to stigmatize and embarrass the Egyptian regime. Al-Jazeera has been giving full voice to the Egyptian opposition, but the Saudi press is mostly ignoring it, probably because the Saudis don't really like democratic reforms and they are currently comfortably aligned with Cairo and Washington against Iran. Al-Arabiya currently does not have a single front page story about the Egyptian crisis (though this may change over the course of the day, of course), while between al-Hayat and al-Sharq al-Awsat there is exactly one story, a scathing opinion piece by Fahmy Howeydi, who can write whatever he wants to write because he's Fahmy Howeydi... except in Egypt, where al-Ahram refused to run this highly critical piece in his usual weekly column spot. Some Egyptian papers, like al-Masry al-Youm, are doing a good job, but it's often been noted that they have this margin of freedom precisely because of their relatively limited influence and reach. At the end of the day, there's only one opinion which Mubarak and the NDP really care about: the United States. The Constitutional crisis has not been front page news here, and even where it has been covered, the criticism has been tepid. The State Department's spokesman took some questions about this yesterday. To his credit, he said that some of the changes "raised questions," and that Egypt didn't seem to be meeting its own benchmarks for reform - the statements which al-Jazeera chose to highlight - but he went out of his way to praise Egypt's general commitment to political reform and its progress to date. He even rather absurdly suggested that a week might be plenty of time for Egypt's citizens to become fully informed and vote. But he did make sure to say the magic words for which Mubarak's people were waiting: "I frankly don't want to insert the United States Government in the middle of what should be a domestic political event in Egypt." So there you go. The United States no longer considers Egyptian or Arab political reform to be any of its business. As long as the United States refuses to put any real teeth into international dissatisfaction, its "reservations" can be safely ignored. In response to Amnesty International, Egypt's Foreign Minister declared that "It is not the right of non-Egyptians to comment or simply pass an opinion on a purely internal question, that is, on the constitution [of Egypt] and its national laws." The United States agrees. This isn't a surprise any more, but I suppose it's good to have the clarity. Posted on March 21, 2007 . <http://geo.yahoo.com/serv?s=97359714/grpId=8471547/grpspId=1705240519/msgId =12367/stime=1174513579/nc1=4438967/nc2=3848613/nc3=3848584> [Non-text portions of this message have been removed] -------------------------- Want to discuss this topic? 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