Despite criticism and the reality that one can never negotiate with
terrorists or NKoreans...
 
B
 

http://in.today.reuters.com/news/newsArticle.aspx?type=worldNews
<http://in.today.reuters.com/news/newsArticle.aspx?type=worldNews&storyID=20
07-05-20T182520Z_01_NOOTR_RTRJONC_0_India-299109-1.xml&archived=False>
&storyID=2007-05-20T182520Z_01_NOOTR_RTRJONC_0_India-299109-1.xml&archived=F
alse
Korea deal
ANALYSIS - Despite criticism, U.S. sticks with North Korea deal
Sun May 20, 2007 6:32 PM IST


By Carol Giacomo, Diplomatic Correspondent

WASHINGTON (Reuters) - A snag in what is probably the easiest phase of the
North Korea nuclear agreement has sparked new criticism of the Bush
administration but U.S. officials appear committed to pursuing a solution,
even if it reverses previous policy.

More than a month after Pyongyang was due to shut down its Yongbyon nuclear
complex under a Feb 13 deal, it has not done so, insisting it first receive
$25 million in once-frozen accounts.

"It's tricky but I think some way forward will be found because everybody
has such an interest in getting this issue stabilized," said Gary Samore, a
non-proliferation expert and vice president at the Council on Foreign
Relations.

The funds are held in the Macau-based Banco Delta Asia or BDA and the U.S.
State Department has been trying to persuade international and U.S. banks,
including Wachovia Corp., to facilitate a transfer of the accounts to the
North.

Whether other options are being actively discussed is unknown.

Because the U.S. Treasury Department blacklisted BDA on grounds that it is
tainted by Pyongyang's counterfeiting and other illicit activities,
reputable institutions have been reluctant to risk handling the funds.

PATIENCE DISPLAYED

Keen for a foreign policy success, President George W. Bush, who once
branded North Korea part of an "axis of evil", and top aides have shown
unusual patience as the BDA issue plays out.

The hard-won Feb. 13 deal, achieved after North Korea tested a nuclear
weapon last October, must not be allowed to founder over the relatively
paltry sum of $25 million, chief U.S. negotiator Christopher Hill and other
officials have insisted.

But critics disagree.

John Bolton, a leading opponent of North Korea when he was Bush's U.N. envoy
and top non-proliferation expert, excoriated the U.S. approach in a Wall
Street Journal column this week and urged Bush to withdraw from the Feb. 13
deal.

He argued that despite the agreement, there is still no sign Pyongyang will
forsake nuclear weapons or that it made significant concessions, since the
50 megawatt nuclear reactor at Yongbyon is near the end of its life span
anyway.

More alarming, Bolton and other critics said, is a reversal of policy that
is undermining U.S. credibility and muscle as Washington confronts not only
North Korea but Iran as well.

On moving against BDA in September 2005, the Treasury said it had taken law
enforcement actions that could only be reversed when Pyongyang halted
counterfeiting, drug and cigarette smuggling -- practices officials say
continue even now.

Administration hardliners had long advocated such pressure -- isolating
North Korea from the international financial community -- as the only way to
force change in Pyongyang's behavior or perhaps topple the system.

They were so sure the pressures would stay in place until the Pyongyang
government collapsed, that they gave little thought to how the penalties
could be lifted as part of a diplomatic settlement, officials said.

SHIFTING POLICY

But when it became apparent there would be no negotiations or nuclear deal
with North Korea if the funds were not released, Bush at first agreed
Pyongyang could get some of the money back and then relented in giving all
of it back.

Finally, after insisting it had done all it could by acquiescing in the
funds' release, the United States agreed to find a bank to handle the BDA
transfer, a move critics say will allow Pyongyang back into the
international financial system.

It is "perplexing to see the U.S. now take a series of unilateral steps to
unravel this policy (of U.N. sanctions and related actions) and reward North
Korea for doing ... well nothing," Michael Green, a former White House Asia
adviser during the period when Bush refused to talk to Pyongyang, wrote in
the Financial Times.

Experts say the BDA impasse is particularly dispiriting because it was
supposed to be the easy first phase of the Feb. 13 agreement when, after
North Korea froze Yongbyon and allowed U.N. inspectors back into the
country, the United States and its partners -- South Korea, Japan, Russia
and China -- were to ensure Pyongyang received political and economic
benefits.

In the next phase, Pyongyang is supposed to give a complete inventory of its
nuclear facilities and weapons, and eventually dismantle the entire program
-- the ultimate test of its intentions.

"They will go ahead and implement the first phase of the agreement (but
given all the problems) I don't think the second phase is likely to make
much progress, at least during this administration," Samore said.

 



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