http://www.westernresistance.com/blog/archives/003791.html
June 19, 2007 The Islamists' Nuclear Terrorist Threat - 1 of 2 This article by Adrian Morgan (Giraldus Cambrensis of Western Resistance) appeared earlier today in Family <http://www.familysecuritymatters.org/global.php?id=1075695> Security Matters and is reproduced with their permission. The Islamists' Nuclear Terrorist Threat Part One (of Two) Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism Law Enforcement Conference On June 11 last week, a five-day conference began at the Intercontinental Miami Hotel, to discuss the threat of nuclear terrorism. The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism Law Enforcement Conference was attended by about 500 law enforcement officers. Speakers included Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales, Ms Frances Fragos Townsend, Homeland Security Advisor to the President and Dr. Richard Falkenrath of the NYPD, Deputy Commissioner, Counterterrorism for the City of New York. Several US government agencies were represented at the conference. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the European Union had also sent representatives to witness the proceedings. The meeting coincided with another conference in the same program, which took place simultaneously in Astana, the capital of Kazakhstan. There were satellite link-ups to the Kazakh convention, where representatives of 40 nations were present. The Miami and Astana conferences were the latest to be held to discuss the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, a program which was officially announced on July 15, 2006 <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/07/20060715-3.html> , during the G8 summit in St Petersburg, Russia. Originally a joint US/Russian initiative, the program is now subscribed to by 50 other nations. On October 29-30, 2006, the inaugural conference of the program in Rabat, Morocco, was attended by representatives of 12 nations. That event saw Morocco <http://english.people.com.cn/200611/01/eng20061101_317185.html> becoming the 13th member of the program, and concluded with a resolution to fight the threat of nuclear terrorism from a broad front, involving other willing nations, to create a "vast alliance". The second conference took place in Ankara, Turkey, in February <http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/WO0703/S00127.htm> . Mueller <http://www.fbi.gov/libref/directors/images/mueller_large.jpg> The opening speech of the Miami conference was made by the head of the FBI, Robert S. Mueller III <http://www.fbi.gov/libref/directors/directmain.htm> . In this speech, Mr Mueller stated that the need to secure "loose nuclear material" was paramount. He said <http://www.fbi.gov/pressrel/speeches/mueller061107.htm> : " Al Qaeda has demonstrated a clear intent to acquire weapons of mass destruction. In 1993, Osama bin Laden attempted to buy uranium from a source in the Sudan. He has stated that it is Al Qaeda's duty to acquire weapons of mass destruction. And he has made repeated recruiting pitches for experts in chemistry, physics, and explosives to join his terrorist movement.... We have often said that the next terrorist attack is not a question of if, but when. If we up the ante to a nuclear terrorist attack, we know it is a question of if, but we cannot let it become a question of when. Now is the time to act." On Tuesday June 12 <http://www.winknews.com/news/local/7962987.html> , Dr. Richard Falkenrath addressed the conference and spoke of security agencies' preoccupations with the dangers of shipping containers potentially carrying nuclear components. He said: "This is the big focus. I don't know why they've gotten so much attention. They are important and I am not suggesting to ignore them, but they should not be the focus of attention above and beyond all others as a potential delivery vehicle." He warned that trucks and vans (which are easy to acquire and pass unnoticed in large cities) and also small aircraft and light vessels, could become the vectors by which nuclear weapons could be transported. On the same day, Vayl Oxford, Director of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office in the Department of Homeland Security, said that the US Coast Guard would be furnished with radiation detection technology. He said that more than 90% of all cargo entering the US is already being scanned for radiological content. He said that agents of the FBI are detailed full-time to the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office. Dr Vahid Majidi, head of the FBI's Weapons of Mass Destruction Directorate spoke <http://www.fbi.gov/page2/june07/nuclear061507.htm> of the conference's success in "opening a dialogue with our partner agencies and the international community on the entire scope of weapons of mass destruction." He mentioned bilateral agreements which took place last week between the US and five nations which would lead to greater intelligence cooperation. Those countries are Russia, Ukraine, Turkey, Chile, and Mexico. robot <http://www.fbi.gov/headlines/bomb_robot061407.jpg> On Wednesday <http://www.fbi.gov/page2/june07/nuclear061407.htm> at Miami's Orange Bowl, delegates from 28 nations watched a demonstration of how law enforcement officers would tackle a radiological dispersal device ("dirty bomb" or RDD) being constructed in a mock warehouse. Two SWAT teams and a team from the Department of Energy Radiological Assistance Program descended on the scene. Once the radiological materials and "dirty bomb" were "discovered", these were neutralized by a robot, which sprayed water onto them. There is a real need for agencies to be prepared for the threat of a nuclear attack, but while making preparations to combat such a scenario, government agencies seem to be simultaneously trying to avoid spreading panic. The FBI <http://www.fbi.gov/page2/june07/nuclear061507.htm> writes on its website "even if the likelihood of such an attack in the near-term is fairly low". Fissile Nuclear Devices There are valid reasons to be concerned about the plausibility of a nuclear attack, and particularly one aimed at the heart of a major US city, such as Washington DC or New York. The simplest <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/13840.pdf> nuclear fission device would involve highly enriched uranium (HEU), in a "gun-assembly" of the type used in Hiroshima. Essentially, the Hiroshima A-bomb comprised a six foot-long gun barrel, only six inches in diameter, and sealed at both ends. One end of the barrel contained a mass of Uranium-235, with a second mass housed in the center of the barrel. At the opposing end, sealed within the barrel, were conventional explosives. Once detonated, the conventional explosives propelled the central mass of uranium isotope into the mass at the opposing end, causing nuclear fission. nuke <http://z.about.com/d/inventors/1/0/W/9/nuke1.jpg> The minimum amount <http://muller.lbl.gov/TRessays/09_Lowest_Tech_Atom_Bomb.htm> of HEU needed for a fissile device is far more than weapons-grade plutonium - about 25 kilograms or 55 pounds, though with a beryllium reflector less than 15 kilograms (33 pounds) is needed. Hiroshima's "Little Boy" bomb is said <http://www.wisconsinproject.org/pubs/articles/2001/bomb%20facts.htm> to have contained 60 kilograms (132 lbs) of uranium-235. The "Fat Man" bomb which was detonated at Nagasaki contained 6.1 kilograms of plutonium-239. To extract 25 kilograms of easily fissionable HEU from natural uranium, a starting quantity of 3,570 kilograms or 7,860 pounds is required. The "yield" of the Hiroshima bomb was about 10 kilotons - i.e. it had the destructive power of 10,000 tons of TNT. It detonated in mid-air and killed <http://inventors.about.com/library/weekly/aa050300a.htm> 66,000 people instantly. Half a mile from the explosion's center, there was total vaporization, destruction within a mile radius, and within a two and a half mile radius, everything flammable caught fire. The HEU in the Hiroshima bomb was only 80% pure <http://www.nci.org/g-h/heuib1.htm> . About 12 kilograms of extremely pure HEU could feasibly produce a fissile device with a yield of 10-20 kilotons. Detonated from the ground, the most likely terrorist scenario, the extent of destruction from a 10-20 kilotons would not be as high as that witnessed at Hiroshima, but as I will explain in Part Two, it would still be catastrophic. To prepare weapons-grade uranium-235, specialized centrifuges, uranium hexaflouride gas and other components are required. These components are strictly controlled in the West. Despite this, Abdul Qadeer Khan was able, with the assistance of Dutch citizen Henk <http://www.westernresistance.com/blog/archives/000834.html> Slebos, to import vital nuclear bomb components to Pakistan. A. Q. Khan went on to create Pakistan's first nuclear bombs, which were detonated on May 28, <http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/pakistan/nuke/index.html> 1998. AQKhan <http://www.truthout.org/imgs.art_01/3.112804C-1.jpg> A. Q. Khan admitted in February 2004 that he sold nuclear secrets to Iran, Libya and North Korea, but was subsequently pardoned <http://www.dawn.com/2004/02/06/top1.htm> by President Pervez Musharraf. The fruits of Khan's subterfuge have been devastating. In September 2005 <http://www.voanews.com/english/archive/2005-09/2005-09-14-voa17.cfm?CFID=16 3525063&CFTOKEN=99990485> Musharraf admitted that Khan had illegally sent centrifuges to North Korea, and on October 9, 2006 <http://www.westernresistance.com/blog/archives/003167.html> Pyongyang detonated its first nuclear bomb. Shortly after Khan's 2004 televised confession, Sri Lankan "middleman" Buhary Syed Abu Tahir stated <http://www.dawn.com/2004/02/21/top3.htm> that around 2001, Khan sent enriched uranium to Libya. Abu Tahir, who resides in Dubai and Malaysia, where he is married to a Malaysian national, was not prosecuted for his involvement in the illegal shipments. Malaysia claimed <http://edition.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/asiapcf/02/20/nuclear.malaysia/> he had broken no national law. Around 1994-5, Khan had sent two containers of used centrifuge components to Iran. These had been shipped via Dubai, where Khan had an apartment. Iran paid $3 million for this consignment. On Tuesday April 11, 2006 <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml;jsessionid=2XG4VXFZ4N1XHQFIQMGSF F4AVCBQWIV0?xml=/news/2006/04/12/wiran12.xml> Iran's president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, announced on national TV that his country had enriched uranium to a level required for nuclear fuel, though only on a "laboratory scale". While Ahmadinejad claimed that "our enemies cannot do a damned thing", his audience chanted "Death to America". At its nuclear facilities in Isfahan, Iran then had 164 enrichment centrifuges. Mohammad Saeedi, Iran's deputy nuclear chief, announced on April 12, 2006 <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2006/04/13/wiran13.xml > that in the fall of 2006 the nation would begin to construct a 3,000-centrifuge plant, followed by a 54,000 centrifuge plant at an underground facility at Natanz. It is only a matter of time before Iran possesses the means to create its own uranium-235. As it already funds terror group Hamas, and is implacably hostile to Israel, it is likely that Iran will voluntarily donate uranium-235 to terrorist causes, if it does not attack Israel on its own initiative. Uranium-235 is less detectable to radiological sensors than plutonium, particularly if it is surrounded by lead. The costs of producing this material are astronomical, but attempts to obtain such enriched uranium have been made on numerous occasions by members of Al Qaeda. Osama bin Laden is on record as stating that obtaining nuclear weaponry is a "religious obligation". In 2002, authors M & G Bunn produced a report for the International Atomic Energy Agency (pdf format) entitled "Reducing the Threat of Nuclear Theft and Sabotage <http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Features/Nuclear_Terrorism/bunn02.pdf> ". The authors stated (p 3) that "there have been a number of confirmed cases of theft of kilogram quantities of weapons-usable material in the former Soviet Union. Russian officials have confirmed that as recently as 1998, there was an insider conspiracy at one of Russia's largest nuclear weapons facilities to steal 18.5 kilograms of HEU - one that was stopped before the material actually left the gates." The authors recommended that more cooperation was needed between Russia and America to consolidate their defenses against terrorists' acquisition of nuclear materials, and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism certainly aims to fulfill that requirement. In June <http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/oct03/terrorism.asp> 2003, Jane's Intelligence Digest reported that since 1992 there were 175 attempts by criminals and/or terrorists to acquire or smuggle radioactive substances. In 1998 in Italy criminals were caught attempting to sell 19.9% enriched uranium, and in April 2000 Colombia, a small consignment of HEU - 66% of which contained uranium-235 - was discovered in the possession of an animal feed salesman. In the same month an amount of enriched uranium weighing 920 grams was seized in the former Soviet state of Georgia. In July 2001 <http://www.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0,,526856,00.html> , a quantity of 1.7 kilograms of uranium-235 was discovered in Georgia, apparently on its way to Turkey. The material was thought at the time to have come from a Russian submarine. In the same month, five grams of enriched uranium were discovered in Paris, and in Germany, a man was arrested for stealing contaminated plutonium. In 2004 <http://www.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0,,1315847,00.html> in Kyrgyzstan in Central Asia, a smuggler was found to have kept 60 small containers of weapons-grade plutonium-239 in a sheepfold. Earlier in the same year, two Kyrgyz citizens were jailed for trying to sell 110 grams of the isotope cesium-137 (one of the radioactive byproducts released in the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear accident), which could have been used to create a "dirty bomb". In September 2004 <http://observer.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0,,801176,00.html> , a quantity of 15 kilograms of weapons-grade uranium-235 (enough to create small fissile device) was discovered in Sanliurfa, Turkey. The material was hidden under the seat of a taxi. There will be obstacles for terrorists to overcome before a working fissile nuclear device is created, but with rogue Islamist states such as Iran close to preparing their own weapons grade HEU, such a scenario may be closer than we care to acknowledge. Pakistan was the latest nation <http://news.findlaw.com/wash/s/20070615/20070615144755.html> to join the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, and it maintains that its nuclear facilities are fully secured. However, should Pakistan fall to a Talibanized regime, the likelihood of such materials being sold or exported becomes high. Another scenario discussed by Bunn and Bunn in 2002 was an attack upon an existing nuclear facility. Even if such an attack took place at a depot for spent nuclear fuel, depriving it of its water-cooling systems, a subsequent conflagration (if it reached 900 degrees Celsius) could cause a zirconium fire, leading to the release of radioactive cesium isotopes. There have already been two thwarted attempts by Islamists to sabotage the nuclear research facility at Lucas Heights in Sydney, Australia, which could similarly lead to the release of isotopes such as those released at Chernobyl (cesium-134 and -137, and iodine-131). When this nuclear accident occurred in the Ukraine on April 26, 1986, these isotopes were carried 1,300 miles westward to north Wales. Here rain caused sheep-grazing land to be contaminated with isotopes of cesium which remain two decades later <http://www.food.gov.uk/multimedia/pdfs/rife11ch9.pdf> . The main regional economy of lamb production was devastated. In Part Two, I will discuss the (perhaps more likely) scenario of an attack by an RDD or "dirty bomb". I will also analyze the findings of various studies which detail the responses to, and likely outcomes of, attacks by both fissile devices and RDDs. Adrian Morgan http://www.westernresistance.com/blog/archives/003792.html The Islamists' Nuclear Terrorist Threat Part Two (of Two) Radiological Dispersal Devices Padilla <http://www.document.no/weblogg/archives/bilder/jose-padilla.jpg> The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism Law Enforcement Conference in Miami last week took place in an appropriate location. The suspected terrorist Jose Padilla is currently on trial in the city. He became the first person to be incarcerated under the terms of the Patriot Act for his alleged attempts to create a "dirty bomb" or RDD. This plot had apparently been hatched in Lahore, Pakistan, in 2001 with Abu Zubadayah, an Al Qaeda member who was arrested in Pakistan in March 2002. Zubadayah informed FBI operatives that the plot to create a "dirty bomb" or "radiological dispersion device" (RDD) would have involved radioactive materials stolen from within the US. The target of the attack would have been Washington DC. Two months after Zubadayah was apprehended, Padilla was arrested in May 2002 at Chicago's O'Hare International Airport as he arrived in the US. Deapite Zubadayah's testimony, Padilla is <http://edition.cnn.com/2005/LAW/11/22/padilla.case/index.html> not being charged with the plot to create an RDD. Zubadayah (also spelled "Zubaydah") <http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/1945765.stm> claimed to his interrogators that Al Qaeda had the "know-how" to create an RDD. He also claimed that Al Qaeda had been plotting an attack upon American banks. That information was treated by US officials with some skepticism, even though it led to an FBI alert. The information Zubadayah gave is now, in the light of the conviction of Dhiren Barot, probably based on accurate sources. A radiological dispersion device relies upon a radioactive material with a long half-life being combined with conventional explosives. Once the explosives are detonated, the radioactive particles are dispersed into the environment. Potential radioactive isotopes which <http://www.remm.nlm.gov/rdd.htm> could be used in an RDD include the following, accompanied by their half-life duration: Americium-241 (432.7 years) Californium-252 (2.6 years) Cesium-137 (30 years) Cobalt-60 (5.3 years) Iridium-192 (74 days) Plutonium-238 (88 years) Polonium-210 (140 days) Radium-226 (1,600 years) Strontium-90 (29 years) All of the above, apart from strontium-90 and polonium-210 give out gamma rays, while all except polonium-210 give out beta particles. Americium-241, californium-252, plutonium-238, polonium-210 and radium-226 additionally give out alpha particles. Alpha particles, which are composed of protons and neutrons, cannot penetrate human skin, but when a radioactive isotope enters the body via inhalation or via a cut (possible in the initial explosion of an RDD) its emission of alpha particles can cause major damage to the functions of cells and thus affect internal organs. When Alexander Litvinenko was poisoned on <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alexander_Litvinenko_poisoning> November 1, 2006 with polonium-210, which only gives out alpha particles, systemic tissue and nerve damage caused him to die within three weeks in acute discomfort. Beta particles are high energy electrons, which can travel further than alpha particles, being stopped by 10 feet of air, less than two inches of water, or a thin layer of glass or metal. Direct <http://www.epa.gov/radiation/understand/beta.htm> exposure to beta particles can cause burns to the skin, but like alpha particles, beta radiation is dangerous when carried into the body, disrupting cell function. Beta particles' ability to penetrate further into tissue makes the damage they cause to be more severe. Gamma rays are "quanta" - packets of high energy which can <http://www.aboutnuclear.org/view.cgi?fC=Radiation_and_Radioactivity,Types_o f_Radiation,Gamma_Rays> penetrate 13 feet of water, two meters of concrete or one and a quarter feet of lead. These rays can penetrate right through a human body and their physical <http://www.epa.gov/radiation/understand/gamma.htm> effects are far more serious. The <http://www.epa.gov/radiation/understand/health_effects.htm> general effects of radiation poisoning involve "ionizing" of atoms and breaking chemical bonds in molecules. Depending on the doses and duration, cancers can form later in the body. Strontium-90 and radium-226 have chemical similarities to calcium, and can thus collect in bones and teeth and eventually cause bone cancer. The problems created by a radiological dispersion device are essentially the same as nuclear "fallout" from a fissile device. The initial death toll from an RDD will mainly be caused by the conventional explosives which are used to disperse the radionuclides. Symptoms created by the radiation will appear later, depending on how far people have become exposed. Al Qaeda has been active in its pursuit of an RDD. In <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/2711645.stm> January 2003 British intelligence officials revealed that Osama bin Laden had obtained radionuclides from the Taliban, and had ben developing a dirty bomb in Herat in Afghanistan. Al Qaeda also had produced manuals on how to employ RDDs for maximum effect. In <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/article587022.ece> 2005 an Al Qaeda website presented the details of how to assemble an RDD in the form of an 80-page manual. The Arabic-language website, called Al-Firdaws (Paradise), had received 57,000 hits. It advised readers to seek out radium-226. This substance is not easily available, but in an RDD could render an area unsafe for 1,600 years. John Hassard, reader in physics at Imperial College, London said of the guide: "Normally you just get generic principles, but this appears to be more like a proper instruction manual... A lot of effort has been put into it." Shukrijumah <http://www.rewardsforjustice.net/images/elshukrijumah4.jpe> In Canada in <http://www.washtimes.com/national/20031016-110337-4698r.htm> 2003 al Qaeda suspect and son of a radical imam Adnan El Shukrijumah was being sought by the CIA and FBI. This man had in the previous year posed as a student at McMaster University in Hamilton, Ontario. The university has a 5 megawatt nuclear research reactor. With other associates, Guyana-born Shukrijumah had reportedly <http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=46158> stolen 180 pounds of nuclear waste from the university. He is still <http://www.fbi.gov/terrorinfo/elshukrijumah.htm> wanted by the FBI and features on the US <http://www.rewardsforjustice.net/english/index.cfm?page=El_Shukrijumah> Rewards for Justice register, where a bounty of up to $5 million rests on his head. Dhiren Barot was an Indian-born British citizen, who not only planned to attack American banks, but had also developed details plans to detonate a dirty bomb in the US. Barot was arrested in 2004, along with seven individuals who were to act as operatives in his terror cell. Barot himself was sentenced on November 7, 2006 to life imprisonment, to serve a minimum of 40 years in jail. This tariff was later reduced on appeal to 30 years' minimum. On <http://www.westernresistance.com/blog/archives/003787.html> June 15, 2007 the seven members of his cell were jailed for a total time of 136 years. Barot had devised several attack scenarios, involving gas canisters placed in rented stretch limos, and his projected targets were sites in the UK and US. In America, he had <http://www.guardian.co.uk/terrorism/story/0,,1920900,00.html> planned attacks against the International Monetary Fund and World Bank in Washington, the New York Stock Exchange and Citigroup buildings in New York, and the Prudential building in Newark. In April 2001, Barot had traveled with associates Qaisar Shaffi and Nadeem Tarmohamed to the United States to perform reconnaissance of the sites he intended to attack. Barot knew Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, who planned the 9/11 attacks, and on <http://www.met.police.uk/pressbureau/rhyme/mpgclip8.mpg> a video taken by Barot of the World Trade Center, he chillingly turned the camera on its side and made the sound of an explosion. Barot kept most of the details of his plans on the hard drive of his computer, with some kept at the homes of trusted members of his cell. In addition to plotting attack scenarios involving explosives, Barot had also amassed details of a plot to carry out a "dirty bomb" attack. Though heavily censored by the Metropolitan Police, Barot's feasibility study can be found <http://www.met.police.uk/pressbureau/rhyme/terror65-04mas11.pdf> here (pdf format). Barot <http://www.met.police.uk/pressbureau/rhyme/terror65-04barot.jpg> The substances which Barot examined were americium-241, californium-252, cesium-137, cobalt-60 and strontium-90. He additionally examined tritium, which is a radioactive isotope of hydrogen, which exists as a gas and thus would be more difficult to incorporate into an RDD. Barot noted that tritium would "rise into the sky once released". He liked cesium-137 as it is "both powerful and widely available". It would also chemically bond with building materials, making cleanup difficult. He wrote: "When constructing an RDD (radioactive dispersal device a.k.a. Dirty Bomb) you face constraints arising from the radioactivity of the source. To cause a large amount of radioactive contamination, we would be drawn toward very high activity sources. However, in order to prepare the source for effective dispersal by removing the shielding, we would risk exposing ourselves to lethal doses. Even in suicidal missions, we might not live long enough to deliver a very highly radioactive RDD that uses gamma-emitting sources and is not shielded. If we tried to protect ourselves by shielding the source, the weight of the RDD could significantly increase thereby increasing the difficulty of delivering the device and causing successful dispersion of the radioactive material." Barot quoted <http://www.its.caltech.edu/~koonin/> Dr Steven E. Koonin a nuclear physicist who was provost at California Institute of Technology until 2004: "If just three curies (a fraction of a gram) of an appropriate isotope was spread over a square mile, the area would become uninhabitable according to the recommended exposure limits protecting the general population. While the direct health effect would be minimal (for each 100,000 people exposed, some 4 cancer deaths would would be added to the 20,000 lifetime cancers that would have occurred otherwise) the psychological effects would be enormous." Barot was also aware of the economic effects of an RDD attack. He wrote that such an attack would "create panic and potentially large economic consequences... long-term increases in cancer incidence, long-term denial of property use, disruption of services, and property and facility decontamination needs." He mused: A few grams of cobalt-60 with several pounds of explosives are enough to close an area the size of Manhattan. Unfortunately the carrier will be one of the many victims once the device has been detonated." Barot's isotope of choice was americium-241, derived from plutonium, which "meets the criteria I have set". It is easily available in smoke detectors in minute amounts, and as it emits alpha particles Barot claimed it would be "harmless" for the user. As it decays, americium-241 does <http://www.epa.gov/radiation/radionuclides/americium.htm> emit gamma rays at an energy level higher than radium-226 (the radionuclide suggested on the "Al-Firdaws" Al Qaeda website), but less than cesium-137 and considerably less than cobalt-60. Contemplating The Unthinkable Detonation of a nuclear fissile device is a "worst-case scenario". As outlined in Part One, the most likely form of terrorist fissile device would be a "gun barrel" bomb, containing between 12 and 25 grams of extremely pure uranium-235, with a yield of between 10 and 20 kilotons. To gain a perspective of how much of an area would be affected by such a device, detonated at ground level, the Federation of American Scientists have produced a "bomb-a-city" <http://www.fas.org/main/content.jsp?formAction=297&contentId=367> calculator. The huge amounts of casualties and panic a fissile device would cause would also be followed by massive economic costs of cleanup. Winds could spread the fallout over a wide area. The cleanup costs following either a fissile or an RDD device could be astronomical. So how prepared are the authorities for the scenarios of fissile or RDD attack? On <http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/structure/editorial_0766.shtm> April 15, 2005 the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office was created to "improve the Nation's capability to detect and report unauthorized attempts to import, possess, store, develop, or transport nuclear or radiological material". It is obvious that the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism is now involving numerous agencies within America to be prepared for such events. However, even though increased awareness, coordinated strategies and good intelligence are essential for combatting radiological attack, the nightmare scenario of such an attack happening would still be catastrophic. In <http://usinfo.state.gov/xarchives/display.html?p=washfile-english&y=2007&m= January&x=20070126164006beekcmd0.8759577> January this year, Homeland Security chief Michael Chertoff warned: "You can't put that genie back in the bottle once a weapon of mass destruction or a nuclear bomb gets into the hands of a terrorist." In 2003, ABT Associates produced a <http://www.abtassociates.com/reports/es-economic_impact_of_nuclear_terroris t_attacks.pdf> report which stated that a 10-20 kiloton nuclear bomb, smuggled into a US port via a container, could create between 50,000 and 1 million deaths depending on the population and size of the city. The economic loss from property damage, trade disruption, and indirect costs would come, in the first year to an amount from hundreds of billions to trillions of dollars. The economic cost of lives lost would be from $150 billion to $3 trillion (30% of US GDP). In <http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/2006/RAND_TR391.pdf> 2006 the Rand Corporation produced a report entitled "Considering the Effects of a Catastrophic Terrorist Attack", which envisaged a container carrying a 10 kiloton nuclear bomb being detonated at ground level at a pier at the Port of Long Beach, Los Angeles. 60,000 could die in the blast, with 150,000 exposed to hazardous levels of radiation. 6 million people would try to flee, and 2-3 million people lying in fallout zones would need rehousing. Costs would be $300 billion for homes lost, $20 billion in lives lost, $350,000 in insurance, $80 billion worker's compensation, etc. The total cost would be 1 trillion dollars. The Belfer Center at Harvard University produced in May this year a 25-page <http://bcsia.ksg.harvard.edu/BCSIA_content/documents/DayAfterWorkshopReport _May2007.pdf> report entitled "The Day After: Action in the 24 Hours Following a Nuclear Blast in an American City". The scenario discussed involved a 10 kiloton fissile device being detonated at ground level. The report includes the gloomy statement: "The federal government should stop pretending that state and local officials will be able to control the situation on the Day After," and suggests that in the manner of the Hurricane Katrina disaster, most cities and states would be "overwhelmed" by the scale of the challenge. They also warn of potential "follow-up" attacks either in the same city or in other centers of administration/population. The authors suggest a return of "fallout shelters", which had been abandoned by civic defense strategists in the era of the Soviet nuclear threat. At that time, faced with the threat of multiple nuclear warheads, these shelters had fallen out of favor, but now they could be vital in saving lives in the immediate aftermath of an attack. They also suggest that emergency service providers and citizens within the affected area would have to accept living with long-term radiation levels higher than currently recommended. diagram <http://environment.pnl.gov/accomplishments/accomp-540.jpg> Figures above, on the economic damage from a nuclear blast, could be conservative estimates. In 2005, Barbara A. Reichmuth with researchers from the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory produced a report for the DHS, entitled "Economic Consequences of a Radiological/Nuclear Attack: Cleanup Standards Significantly Affect Cost." There comes a point when practical economics has to make a trade-off with decontamination standards. In the event of a 13-kiloton bomb on New York City, the costs of cleanup and other costs could come close to the entire US GDP in one year. Reichmuth <http://environment.pnl.gov/accompprodline/prodline_detail.asp?id=540> said: "That's not just government expenditures, that's the entire output of the U.S. economy, every factory, store and business, for a full year." The costs of decontaminating NYC after a 13-kiloton blast could be $1 trillion if a 5 rem per year standard was followed, and four times as much if a more stringent standard of 15 millirem/y was the objective. Reichmuth said: "At some point it may become so cost prohibitive to cleanup, given current technologies, that you may decide to sacrifice an area, i.e., not clean it up." The variability in how far cleanup operations are taken applies also to the scenario of an RDD attack. On <http://a257.g.akamaitech.net/7/257/2422/01jan20061800/edocket.access.gpo.go v/2006/05-24521.htm> January 3, 2006, the Department for Homeland Security published its Dirty Bomb Cleanup Guidance. The guidance set practical standards of contamination cleanup that were not <http://www.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2006/1/3/213449.shtml> within the recommended "safe" doses of radiation exposure which are usually enjoyed by US citizens. For this, groups such as <http://www.nirs.org/alerts/04-04-2006/1> NIRS were critical. They claimed that the DHS Federal Emergency Management would allow people to return to areas with unsafe radiation levels (10,000 millirems a year) which "would cause cancer in 1/4 to 1/3 of the people exposed." Donald Tighe, a spokesman for the White House Office of Science and Technology said that no numerical standard on cleanup was provided because of the variability of contaminant scenarios. He <http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2006-01-04-bomb-guidelines_x.htm> said: "This is the feedback we've gotten from state and local officials. (They want) a flexible approach." The standard of 10,000 millirems a year is claimed by the London-based International Commission on Radiation Protection to be an acceptable exposure level. In <http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/S_T_TechAssess_ERDAP_June05.pdf> June 2005 a DHS report highlighted the shortfalls of medical assessments in the event of an "emergency radiation dose" scenario, which would include the immediate aftermath of an RDD attack. This stated: "Presently available methods are not satisfactory for managing the medical casualties from an R/N event and there is urgent need to develop new capabilities to assess radiation dose quickly with at least moderate precision. Assessment of emesis is only a rough indicator of acute exposure and can never be relied upon alone, especially for quantitative information... there is an urgent need to develop novel emerging technologies to supplement the current capabilities for assessing emergency radiation doses." There are potential treatments for radiation poisoning such as potassium iodide (No-Rad). <http://www.fda.gov/cder/drug/infopage/DTPA/QandA_DTPA.htm> Injections of pentetate calcium trisodium or pentetate zinc trisodium (Ca-DPTA or Zn-DPTA) can be administered in the event of ingestion of americium-241. These bind to the radionuclide, as well as to plutonium, and are excreted in the urine. The FDA has said that these drugs are "stored in sufficient quantity to provide treatment if there is an emergency." Other radionuclides require <http://www.remm.nlm.gov/int_contamination.htm#isotopestable_2> other treatments. Despite such treatments being available to ameliorate the effects of radionuclide ingestion, they would need to be administered as soon as possible after an attack. In the case of an RDD attack, the panic following the conventional explosion which accompanies radiological dispersion could delay both the analysis of the component isotope, and consequently delay patient diagnosis and treatment. The consequences of a nuclear or RDD attack are horrendous. Yet all people should be aware that Islamist terrorists are actively intending to commit these acts. The only ways that citizens can protect themselves against such scenarios are to remain forever vigilant, to report radicals to the authorities, and to support all government measures to strengthen intelligence and prevention. [Non-text portions of this message have been removed] -------------------------- Want to discuss this topic? Head on over to our discussion list, [EMAIL PROTECTED] -------------------------- Brooks Isoldi, editor [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.intellnet.org Post message: [email protected] Subscribe: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Unsubscribe: [EMAIL PROTECTED] *** FAIR USE NOTICE. 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