The reinvention of al-Qaeda 
Network's leadership has rebuilt, with fresh faces and a savvy media arm
By Craig Whitlock 
The Washington Post
Updated: 9:34 p.m. PT Sept 8, 2007

PESHAWAR, Pakistan - When Osama
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/world/specials/terror/binladen.html#pr
ofile> bin Laden resurfaced Friday in a 26-minute videotaped speech, his
most important message was one left unsaid: We have survived. 

The last time bin Laden showed his face to the world was three years ago, in
October 2004. Since then, al-Qaeda
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Al+Qaeda?tid=informline> 's
core leadership -- dubbed al-Qaeda Central by intelligence analysts -- has
grown stronger, rebuilding the organizational framework that was badly
damaged after the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/world/countries/afghanistan.html?nav=e
l> , according to counterterrorism officials in Pakistan
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Pakistan?tid=informline> ,
the United States and Europe
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Europe?tid=informline> . 

It has accomplished this revival, the officials said in interviews, by
drawing on lessons learned during 15 years of failed campaigns to destroy
it. In that period, bin Laden and his followers have outfoxed powerful
enemies from the Soviet army to the Saudi royal family to the CIA. 

Dodging the U.S.
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/U.S.+Armed+Forces?tid=infor
mline> military in Afghanistan after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, al-Qaeda
Central reconstituted itself across the Pakistani border, returning to the
rugged tribal areas surrounding the organization's birthplace, the dusty
frontier city of Peshawar
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Peshawar?tid=informline> .
In the first few years, Pakistani and U.S. authorities captured many senior
leaders; in the past 18 months, no major figure has been killed or caught in
Pakistan. 

Al-Qaeda Central moved quickly to overcome extensive leadership losses by
promoting loyalists who had served alongside bin Laden for years. It
restarted fundraising, recruiting and training. And it expanded its media
arm into perhaps the most effective propaganda machine ever assembled by a
terrorist or insurgent network. 

'Not just as a loose bunch of guys'
Today, al-Qaeda operates much the way it did before 2001. The network is
governed by a shura, or leadership council, that meets regularly and reports
to bin Laden, who continues to approve some major decisions, according to a
senior U.S. intelligence official. About 200 people belong to the core group
and many receive regular salaries, another senior U.S. intelligence official
said. 

"They do appear to meet with a frequency that enables them to act as an
organization and not just as a loose bunch of guys," the second official
said. 

Operatives are organized into cells with separate missions, such as
fundraising or logistics, and may know the identities of only a few
individuals in their circle to prevent infiltration, Pakistani officials
said. Most leaders are based in Pakistan, although many travel to
Afghanistan and occasionally farther afield, to Iraq
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/world/countries/iraq.html?nav=el> ,
Turkey
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Turkey?tid=informline> ,
Iran
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/world/countries/iran.html?nav=el> ,
the Caucasus
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Caucasus?tid=informline>
region and North
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/North+Africa?tid=informline
> Africa . 

Counterterrorism officials were slow to grasp the resurrection of al-Qaeda
Central. For years, many U.S. and European intelligence officials
characterized it as a spent force, limited to providing inspiration for
loosely affiliated regional networks. Bombings in Europe and the Middle
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Middle+East?tid=informline>
East were blamed on homegrown cells of militants, operating independently of
bin Laden. 


Victory declared too soon?
On June 24, 2003, President
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/George+W.+Bush?tid=informli
ne> Bush declared al-Qaeda's leadership largely defunct. At a Camp
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Camp+David?tid=informline>
David summit, Bush praised Pakistan's Gen. Pervez
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Pervez+Musharraf?tid=inform
line> Musharraf , crediting his country with apprehending more than 500
members of al-Qaeda and the Taliban
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/The+Taliban?tid=informline>
. 

"Thanks to President Musharraf's leadership, on the al-Qaeda front we've
dismantled the chief operators," Bush said. Although bin Laden was still at
large, his lieutenants were "no longer a threat to the United States or
Pakistan," Bush added. 

Six months later, Musharraf was nearly killed in an assassination attempt by
al-Qaeda operatives. Shortly afterward, a group of al-Qaeda leaders held a
summit of their own in the Pakistani region of Waziristan
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Waziristan?tid=informline>
, where they plotted fresh attacks thousands of miles away in Britain
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/world/countries/greatbritain.html?nav=
el> , including targets in London
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/London?tid=informline> and
financial institutions in the United States, according to Pakistani
officials. 

Pulling the strings
Many U.S., Pakistani and European intelligence officials now agree that
al-Qaeda's ability to launch operations around the globe didn't diminish
after the invasion of Afghanistan as much as previously thought. Further
investigation has shown, for example, that al-Qaeda's leadership, with bin
Laden's direct blessing, made the decision to activate sleeper cells in
Saudi
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/world/countries/saudiarabia.html?nav=e
l> Arabia in 2003, prompting a wave of car bombings and assassination
attempts that the Saudi government has only recently brought under control. 

>From hideouts in Pakistan, according to court testimony and interviews, bin
Laden's deputies ordered attacks on a Tunisian synagogue in 2002, a British
consulate and bank in Istanbul
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Istanbul?tid=informline> in
2003, and the London transit system in 2005. 

U.S intelligence officials also blame the al-Qaeda brain trust for
orchestrating dozens of other failed plots, including a plan to blow up
transatlantic flights from Britain in August 2006. 

"All this business about them being isolated or cut off is whistling past
the graveyard," said Michael Scheuer, a former CIA
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Central+Intelligence+Agency
?tid=informline> analyst who led the agency's unit assigned to track bin
Laden. "We're looking at an organization that is extraordinarily adept at
succession planning. They were built to survive, like the Afghans were
against the Russians." 


A failed strike
After nightfall on Jan. 13, 2006, an unmanned Predator aircraft guided by
the CIA fired missiles at two houses in the northwestern Pakistani village
of Damadola, a few miles from the Afghan border. 

The target was a dinner celebrating the Muslim holiday of Eid al-Adha. CIA
officials had received intelligence that Ayman
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/world/specials/terror/zawahiri.html#pr
ofile> al-Zawahiri , al-Qaeda's deputy leader, had been invited to attend. 

The missiles destroyed the houses and killed more than a dozen people.
Zawahiri was not among them, but Pakistani officials soon said the
fatalities included several other high-ranking al-Qaeda leaders. 

Musharraf identified one of the dead as Midhat Mursi al-Sayid Umar, an
Egyptian who had overseen al-Qaeda's research into chemical weapons and
carried a $5 million U.S. government bounty on his head. 

Musharraf and other Pakistani officials said those buried in the rubble also
included Abu Obaidah al-Masri, the Egyptian chief of the al-Qaeda military
wing that plots attacks in the West; Khalid
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/world/specials/terror/habib.html#profi
le> Habib , a field commander for al-Qaeda in Afghanistan; and Zawahiri's
son-in-law, Abdul Rahman al-Maghribi. 

A near-miss?
U.S. and Pakistani officials now say that none of those al-Qaeda leaders
perished in the strike and that only local villagers were killed. The $5
million reward for Umar's capture remains on offer. Masri has continued to
rise in the al-Qaeda structure, U.S. officials say, and six months after his
supposed death was helping in the failed effort to put bombs aboard
airliners flying from Britain. 

Mahmood Shah, who at the time of the strike was Pakistan's security chief
for the region, said intelligence for the Predator mission stemmed in part
from the interrogation of another al-Qaeda leader, Abu Faraj al-Libi, who
had been captured eight months earlier in the city of Mardan, also in
Pakistan's northwest. 

At the time, Shah said, U.S. and Pakistani officials thought merely that the
timing of the strike was slightly off and that they had barely missed
Zawahiri. Now, he said, he thinks Zawahiri and the others were never there.
"I just think the information was not correct," he said. 

Hitting a wall
The only publicized success in the nearly 20 months since the Damadola
attack came on April 12, 2006, when Muhsin Musa Matwalli Atwah, an Egyptian
al-Qaeda operative indicted for involvement in the 1998 attacks on U.S.
embassies in East
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/East+Africa?tid=informline>
Africa , was killed in North
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/North+Waziristan?tid=inform
line> Waziristan . 

Otherwise, the search for al-Qaeda's leaders in Pakistan has hit a wall.
Shah said information concerning their whereabouts has grown scarcer and
less reliable. By his account, Pakistani security officials haven't come
across a single trace of bin Laden in the tribal areas. Occasionally, they
have received tips regarding Zawahiri and others, he said, but only several
weeks after the trail has run cold. 

"We'd hear about their presence two months after the fact. It's just not
actionable intelligence," Shah said. "This inner core has absolutely stopped
using electronic technology to communicate with each other. That is why the
Americans have such trouble finding them." 

On Jan. 30, 2006, two weeks after the Damadola missile strike, al-Qaeda
released a videotape on the Internet in which Zawahiri taunted his pursuers.
"Bush, do you know where I am?" the Egyptian radical said. "I am among the
Muslim masses!" 


Al-Qaeda's 'deep bench'
A major factor in al-Qaeda's resurgence has been its ability to swiftly
replace fallen or captured commanders. 

CIA
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Michael+Hayden?tid=informli
ne> Director Michael V. Hayden told Congress in November that the core
leadership had benefited from a "deep bench of lower-ranking personnel
capable of stepping up to assume leadership responsibilities." Many are
veteran jihadists who have fought in Afghanistan and conflicts elsewhere for
decades. 

Intelligence officials and analysts said al-Qaeda's central command remains
dominated by Egyptians, primarily associates of Zawahiri, who formally
merged his Egyptian Islamic Jihad organization with al-Qaeda in 1998. 

One Egyptian who has taken on a bigger role is Mustafa
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/world/specials/terror/yazid.html#profi
le> Abu al-Yazid , an accountant by training who served as bin Laden's
financial manager during his exile in Sudan
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Sudan?tid=informline> in
the 1990s. In May, al-Qaeda announced that Yazid had been appointed its
overall leader in Afghanistan and liaison with the Taliban. 

Yazid, 51, was an original member of al-Qaeda's Shura Council and served
time in an Egyptian prison with Zawahiri in the early 1980s after both were
convicted of participating in the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar
Sadat. 

Although he disagreed with bin Laden over the Sept. 11 attacks -- calling
them a tactical mistake that resulted in the Taliban's fall from power --
Yazid remains close to the Saudi emir and is trusted by other jihad groups,
said Yasser al-Sirri, an Egyptian political exile and director of the
London-based Islamic Observation Center. 

"Bin Laden appointed him as a conciliatory figure," Sirri said in an
interview. "It's because of his credibility. He gets along well with the
Pashtuns, with the Taliban -- he gets along well with everybody." 


Fresh faces gain influence
Several other fresh faces in the leadership are former members of the Libyan
Islamic Fighting Group, a now-defunct network that used to operate at arm's
length from al-Qaeda. 

Among them is Abu
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/world/specials/terror/laith.html#profi
le> Laith al-Libi, the nom de guerre of a longtime jihadist who fought
Soviet troops in Afghanistan, spent two years in prison in Saudi Arabia for
covert activities there and organized a failed plot to overthrow Libyan
ruler Moammar Gaddafi in the mid-1990s. 

He began to work closely with bin Laden in 1999 and impressed al-Qaeda's
command by leading the retreat from Kabul
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Kabul?tid=informline> in
2001 after the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, said Noman Benotman, a former
member of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group. 

"The Saudis and others said, 'Who the hell is this guy?' They were
impressed," Benotman said in an interview in London. "He can create
operations. He can lead on the front lines. He knows when to attack, when to
withdraw." 

Abu Laith al-Libi has run training camps in Afghanistan in recent years for
al-Qaeda and orchestrated a suicide attack on the U.S. air base in Bagram,
killing 23 people, during a visit by Vice
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Dick+Cheney?tid=informline>
President Cheney in February, according to U.S. military officials. 

Atiyah
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/world/specials/terror/rahman.html#prof
ile> Abd al-Rahman , a Libyan believed to be in his late 30s, has meanwhile
acted as a liaison between al-Qaeda's leadership in Pakistan and al-Qaeda
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Al+Qaeda+in+Iraq?tid=inform
line> in Iraq , a predominantly Sunni insurgent movement that is believed
responsible for some of the deadliest bomb attacks on Shiite civilians in
Iraq and is one of the U.S. military's fiercest foes. The group professes
loyalty to bin Laden; intelligence analysts are divided as to whether he
exercises real control over it. 

Rahman has also operated as a bin Laden emissary to militant groups in North
Africa that joined forces in January to form al-Qaeda
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Al+Qaeda+in+the+Maghreb?tid
=informline> in the Islamic Maghreb . 

Words from 'the clouds'
Much remains unknown about the internal workings of al-Qaeda Central. As
with the old Soviet leadership in the
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Moscow+Kremlin?tid=informli
ne> Kremlin , U.S. analysts scrutinize public statements issued by the
network for clues on who wields influence. 

One figure attracting interest is a Libyan known as Abu
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/world/specials/terror/yahya.html#profi
le> Yahya al-Libi , who gained notoriety after he and three other al-Qaeda
prisoners escaped from a high-security U.S. military prison in Bagram in
July 2005. 

Since then, he has appeared on more than a dozen videos produced by
al-Qaeda's media arm. His speeches and treatises are so numerous that some
analysts speculate he is being groomed to join bin Laden's inner circle.
"Abu Yahya al-Libi is now the most visible face of al-Qaeda, surpassing
al-Zawahiri, and in fact all of the jihadists," said Ben Venzke, chief
executive of IntelCenter, a private terrorism research group that does work
for the U.S. government. 

In his videos, Abu Yahya al-Libi dresses the part of a gun-toting holy
warrior but has made his reputation as a religious hard-liner. He frequently
criticizes other Muslims as heretics; favorite targets include Shiites,
Hamas
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Hamas?tid=informline> and
the Saudi royal family. 

"He's young, but he's very smart," Benotman said. "For his career, the sky's
the limit." 

Since 2000, al-Qaeda has run its own media production company, al-Sahab,
which means "the clouds" in Arabic, an allusion to the misty mountain peaks
of Afghanistan. 


Harnessing the Web
Until two years ago, al-Sahab was dependent on broadcasters such as the
al-Jazeera satellite television network to air its videos and could
distribute only short clips on the Internet. But then it achieved a
spectacular breakthrough. Taking advantage of technological advances and
bandwidth expansion, it began posting videos directly on the Internet,
relying on an anonymous global network of webmasters to shield their
electronic tracks. 

In 2005, al-Sahab released 16 videos. This year, it has produced four times
that number. Quality has improved markedly, with most videos now including
subtitles in several languages and sometimes 3-D animation. 

"If you want to stop al-Qaeda on the communications front, you should
concentrate on their IT manager instead of Osama," said Muhammad Amir Rana,
director of the Pak Institute for Peace Studies, a research group in Lahore
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Lahore?tid=informline> ,
Pakistan, that studies militant groups. 

Al-Sahab can now record and release videos with astonishing speed. When
Pakistani forces stormed Islamabad
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Islamabad?tid=informline>
's Red
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Lal+Masjid?tid=informline>
Mosque on July 10, resulting in more than 80 deaths, Zawahiri responded the
next day with an audiotaped speech, calling the raid "an act of criminal
aggression." 

Covering their tracks
Al-Sahab mixes low-tech and high-tech tricks to prevent spy agencies from
blocking its releases or tracing videos back to their source, said Evan F.
Kohlmann, a New
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/New+York?tid=informline>
York -based counterterrorism analyst. 

The videos are routed through a chain of couriers who hand-deliver them to
computer gurus, probably in Pakistan, he said. 

They, in turn, electronically send the files to others around the world who
upload them to free or hijacked Web sites. 

"The process of tracing this stuff back is not that easy," Kohlmann said.
"They've created breaks in the distribution chain, both electronic breaks
and human breaks." 


A protective network
In July, U.S. intelligence agencies published a report concluding that
al-Qaeda Central had regrouped in remote northwestern Pakistan, aided by a
2005 decision by the Pakistani government to declare a truce with Taliban
forces and withdraw troops from the tribal area of Waziristan. 

Latif Afridi, a Pashtun tribal elder, said that many places along Pakistan's
border with Afghanistan have been effectively taken over by foreign
militants, mostly Uzbeks, Tajiks, Chechens and Arabs. Although they are not
all associated with al-Qaeda, bin Laden's network has been able to rely on
them for protection, he said. 

"We have al-Qaeda, we have Taliban, we have foreigners, and we have
Pakistani-trained militant groups that have been banned," Afridi said in an
interview in Peshawar. "They're running the show." 

Pakistani and U.S. intelligence officials said the number of militant
training camps has surged along the border. But unlike al-Qaeda's fixed
camps in Afghanistan before 2001, they consist of small groups that gather
for a few days for firearms or bombmaking practice before disbanding, making
them hard to detect. 


'The good hunter hunts on foot'
The truce between the Taliban and the Pakistani
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Pakistani+Armed+Forces?tid=
informline> military collapsed in North Waziristan in July and in South
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/South+Waziristan?tid=inform
line> Waziristan a month later. Since then, Pakistani forces have reentered
the tribal areas and resumed clashes with the Taliban and other militants. 

But Asad Durrani, a retired chief of Pakistan's powerful spy agency, the
Inter-Services Intelligence bureau, said it would take more than military
intervention to capture al-Qaeda leaders. 

Durrani said U.S. bombing campaigns along the Afghan-Pakistani border had
thoroughly alienated civilians who otherwise might help root out al-Qaeda
commanders. "The first instinct you Americans have is military power --
dropping bombs," he said. "This was absolutely 100 percent guaranteed not to
succeed, and it's continued that way for the past six years." 

He said it would take a concentrated, methodical approach to find bin Laden
and his deputies, relying on human intelligence and simple detective work. 

"If they are there, sit back, be patient," Durrani advised. "The good hunter
hunts on foot." 

Special correspondent Munir Ladaa in Berlin and researchers Alice Crites and
Julie Tate in Washington contributed to this report. 


C 2007 The Washington Post Company

URL: http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/20665671/

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