http://news.yahoo.com/s/csm/20070920/wl_csm/opolice_1
<http://news.yahoo.com/s/csm/20070920/wl_csm/opolice_1&printer=1;_ylt=Amybuo
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Uphill battle to bolster Afghan police 

 

Behind one nondescript front door after another, Afghan police backed up by
US and Afghan Army soldiers search for weapons, demonstrating a police
presence they hope will weaken the grip of militants in this corner of
southeast Afghanistan.

In mud-walled compounds, they find an assault rifle hidden in a haystack,
ancient single-shot weapons from past Afghan wars, and a half-filled box of
Soviet ammunition, pried open like a tin of sardines.

But in one living room, a determined Afghan policeman points to the lock on
a trunk, ready to break it. The owner says there are no guns inside, just
wedding items - and someone else has the key.

The Afghans make a decision aimed at winning a friend, not creating a new
enemy. "The commander is a good man. He's not going to break the lock," US
Army Maj. Craig Blando tells the home-owner. "Remember how fair and honest
the police were."

"Sometimes it's better to build goodwill," explains Major Blando, a native
of Cedar Rapids, Iowa, who heads a team of US soldiers working alongside
Afghan police units meant to take on permanent security duties here. "That's
what we're fighting [for], to get the people to start believing in the
police."

Until now, that would have been a leap of faith, in a country where nascent
security forces - and local Afghans seen to collaborate with them - are
often targeted by Taliban-led insurgents. And despite some progress, key
questions remain about the ability of police to hold the line, dogged as
they are by meager ranks, corruption, and lower pay than that for Army
recruits - not to mention less armor and firepower. Just as in Iraq, US and
Afghan commanders say, successful local forces are a prerequisite for US
withdrawal.

Monthly police salaries have just been raised to match those of Army
soldiers, from $70 to $100, but inequalities rankle. Far more are on
payrolls than show up for work. Infighting continues between the police and
Army, as Afghan commanders still debate each force's role in fighting
"terrorists."

"These people work with the Taliban 90 percent; only 10 percent are willing
to work with the government," says 1st Lt. Taj Gul, an officer of the Afghan
National Police (ANP) who carries a pistol while his unit knocks on doors in
the farming village of Chawni. "They need to use their weapons to keep
order, not to undermine it."

In this sweep, the weapons haul collected over two days was small, Afghan
officers complained, because a US psychological operations unit broadcast
advance warning about the searches. But the real aim was to push out
militants and show a government presence - a key step in the US
counterinsurgency strategy for Afghanistan.

"One of the things we are trying to do is allow the Afghans to lead as much
as possible from the front, with us mentoring," says Maj. Steve Boesen, who
works alongside Afghan troops. "So at some point we can pull out, and they
can sustain themselves."

Lack of trust among local AfghansPolice commanders are counting on
recruiting drives and hearts-and-minds missions likeOperation Khyber, which
targeted three districts of Paktia Province, to bolster their ranks and
reputations. The eight police in Swak district are meant to number 50; local
elders have volunteered 13 auxiliaries for training and duties.

"The [local] people were under the control of the enemy," says Col. Abdul
Wahab, the gray-bearded commander of the Paktia police Quick Reaction Force.
"When they see the training, and the auxiliary police coming back with jobs,
we hope it will cause others to come."

But the work is risky. Last year three of the colonel's policemen were
killed. And already this year he has lost six men - four of them to a
sophisticated ambush. Nationally, the interior ministry in Kabul stated
earlier this month that more than 500 police lost their lives in the
previous five months.

One aim of Khyber was to increase confidence so local Afghans "will trust us
. and they will see that the government of Afghanistan is trying to support
the people," says Colonel Wahab of the operation that ended last week.

But nearly six years after the fall of the Taliban, senior commanders of
both the police and army are still debating their roles. A directive from
the Ministry of Interior last year gave latitude for both forces to "wage
war" against militants, but the dispute spilled over into a recent regional
security meeting in Gardez.

Operation Khyber was a "success," Maj. Gen. Abdul Khaliq, the 203rd Corps
commander of the Afghan National Army (ANA), told US and Afghan officers who
were present. "But unfortunately, the ANP is not able to take over and keep
those achievements." Police officers are reluctant to accept jobs in Paktia,
he said, "because they know they will be killed."

In six months, 52 of his soldiers died in attacks, with more than 100
wounded and many vehicles lost, General Khaliq said. "And still there is no
sign of the ANP. I don't want the police to go alone, [but] in a place where
there should be 40 ANP, you can't find more than five."

The regional police commander complains that his men are spread too thin and
obliged to both catch criminals and "fight against terrorists," though with
far fewer privileges than the Army. 


"The ANP do not have the [protective] gear, but they are not fighting in the
same trenches as the ANA," said police Maj. Gen. Abdul Fatah Farogh. 


US soldiers embedded as mentors with Afghan police units say they see slow
but steady progress - and often more hope than among similar units in Iraq.
The Afghan police recruits "are good guys, but they are poorly trained,
poorly fed, and poorly paid," says US Army Sgt. Willie Davis of Dillon, S.C.



"It's an uphill battle," says Sgt. First Class Jeff Bailey of Syracuse,
N.Y., noting that while the police rarely get a cold reception during
searches, the "noticeable lack of military-aged males when we roll in"
reflects distrust of the units. 


Afghan police often overhear radio chatter and have spoken directly to
insurgents, asking them to come down from the mountains to "talk," says Sgt.
Bailey. Once the insurgents taunted in reply: "We'll send down suicide
bombers." 


The episode shows one challenge to the budding police force. "You come here
and spend money in the daytime," a storekeeper told Spc. Stephen Myers of
Myrtle Beach, S.C., when he was patrolling with Afghan police. "The Taliban
come and spend money at night." 


Signs of Taliban in their midstAnd militants are not always up in the
mountains, if the hunch of Afghan officers conducting searches in Chawni is
any measure. One house exhibited steel beams in the roof, brick walls, a
porcelain sink in the hall, tinted windows and electricity - all uncommon in
these poor parts, raising police suspicions. 


Qomandan, a young man who wore a flashy, kitschy gold watch, said 45 people
lived here; five brothers' families. 


"We would appreciate if you would help the police in this area," Blando told
him. "Yes," the man replied. "They have hard work in this area." 


But the Afghan police didn't buy it. Hours later, they drove by the
compound's ornate metal front door shouting "Taliban! Taliban!" to each
other, knowingly.

 



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