http://www.city-journal.org/html/eon2007-09-20.html
 
The Blue Front Line in the War on Terror
For cops, crime fighting and counterterrorism go hand in hand.
20 September 2007 

Lately, a growing chorus has charged that terrorist threats are overblown
and make local police waste limited resources chasing nonexistent
bogeymen-even as traditional crime ticks upward in many American cities.
This line of thinking is misguided for two reasons. First, as the recently
foiled plot to attack U.S. targets in Germany shows, the terrorist threat
remains very real. Second, the choice between counterterrorism and
traditional crime fighting is a false one. In fact, good police work is good
counterterrorism. For example, in 2005, in Torrance, California, police
arrested two men for robbing a gas station-and wound up uncovering a
militant Islamic plot to attack Los Angeles-area synagogues and military
installations.

Good information is perhaps the strongest weapon we have to combat both
terrorism and common crime. The failure of the intelligence and law
enforcement communities to "connect the dots," as the 9/11 Commission put
it, helped prevent us from disrupting al-Qaida's 2001 attacks. By contrast,
police forces' success in reducing crime during the 1990s was due to their
ability to connect the dots through Compstat (a police planning and
accountability mechanism) and other kinds of crime analysis.

But for dots to be connected, whether they have to do with crime or with
terrorism, information must be available to those who can best use it-and
that frequently means local law enforcement. The good news is that since
9/11, law enforcement agencies have been working together better than ever
before. Driving this change, at least in part, is Washington's gradual
realization that the nation's 800,000 state and local police are our
country's "first preventers"-who stop terrorist acts before they
occur-rather than just "first responders," who react after an attack has
taken place. State and local police have foiled a growing number of
homegrown terror plots, including the Torrance case, though they have not
garnered much national attention.

Information sharing between the federal government and state and local
police has also improved. The FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Forces, which
integrate local, state, and federal agencies, have tripled in number, from
34 before 9/11 to more than 100 today. The LAPD and other large police
departments across the country maintain active communication and cooperation
with the Department of Homeland Security and the FBI. The creation of state
and regional "fusion centers," which pool and analyze information from
multiple jurisdictions, represents another advance. These centers, now
established in nearly every state, should be crucial in the years ahead in
improving our capabilities for intelligence gathering and sharing.

The sobering news, however, is that we still have a long way to go in
achieving a true homeland security partnership, one that processes and
shares information in a meaningful, timely manner. Compstat, as practiced in
cities like New York and Los Angeles, provides a model for such sharing. Yet
despite the effective partnership between locals and feds, the relationship
is inherently asymmetrical. A local police chief's access to meaningful and
timely information often depends significantly on his relationship with the
FBI's Special Agent in Charge or with the U.S. Attorney. In some cities,
local chiefs find themselves relying on CNN as their primary source of
information.

Further, a recent congressional report noted several issues preventing
fusion centers from reaching their full potential. The report questioned how
much intelligence "fusing" actually goes on at the centers: even though
different law enforcement agencies may have representatives physically
present, the report concluded, "collocation alone does not constitute
fusion." Also, our government needs to vet and streamline the myriad
databases that it now keeps on terror suspects and criminals. And most
important is developing uniform training procedures and standards on how
intelligence is gathered, stored, and accessed in order to safeguard
citizens' privacy and civil rights. To give credit where it is due, the
Department of Homeland Security is aware of many of these problems and has
recently taken steps to address them. But the early experiences of local
police with fusion centers are worrisome: many have yet to see anything of
value to help them fight either crime or terrorism.

Consequently, instead of relying solely on the federal government for
intelligence, many state and local police departments have started to create
their own systems-assembling their own databases and setting up their own
DNA labs, for example. Some, like New York City, are doing it on their own;
others, like Los Angeles, lacking New York's resources, are doing it in
collaboration <file:///C:/html/17_3_preventing_terrorism.html>  with other
police departments in the region.

But critics who see all this as distracting local police from their basic
functions may be imperiling our safety. We lost the 1960s' "war on crime"
partly because we misunderstood the role of local police; we lost the "war
on drugs" because we misjudged the capacity of local police. We do not want
to lose the war on terror for similar reasons.

William J. Bratton is the chief of the Los Angeles Police Department. George
L. Kelling is a professor in the School of Criminal Justice, Rutgers-Newark
University, and a senior fellow at the Manhattan Institute. R. P. Eddy is
executive director of the Manhattan Institute's Center for Policing
Terrorism, which recently released a new report
<http://www.manhattan-institute.org/html/ptr_02.htm> on fusion centers.

 



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