IDF Special Units http://www.omedia.org/Show_Article.asp?DynamicContentID=2641 <http://www.omedia.org/Show_Article.asp?DynamicContentID=2641&MenuID=603> &MenuID=603 >From naval commandos to undercover units operating behind enemy lines, the IDF's special units play an important role both in peacetime and war Yoaz Hendel (10/10/2007) Part I of this two-part series focuses on the history of various units and what they share in common The intense soul-searching in the IDF in light of the operational problems exposed in the Second Lebanon War has reinvigorated a process already underway for several years regarding the role of special units, both in peacetime and emergency situations. The belated inclusion of special units in the Second Lebanon War, the operations in Baalbek and in Tyre that drew broad media coverage and the high capabilities demonstrated in the 24 special operations that were not exposed in the media highlighted the gap between the potential of the special units and their limited use during the war. A significant percentage of the quality manpower of these units in the regular forces and the reserves, the expensive equipment and the combat skills acquired during many years of training were left out of the combat in Lebanon due to a lack of contingency plans for times of emergency and the small number of actual missions. This articles surveys the operational concept of the special units in the IDF, their assignments and possible alternatives for change, against the background of both the limited combat that Israel has faced in recent years and the challenges of conventional warfare that have once again become part of future scenarios. What is a Special Unit? Like in any every army, the IDF exhibits a structural tension between the desire for quantitative power, which enables an easier victory on the battlefield, and the burden of a multi-dimensional entity. The "large military" is not designed to deal with non-routine tasks or threats, and the principles of initiative, flexibility and stratagems are not sufficiently expressed while dealing with an enemy that is outside the bounds of the recognizable "playing field." The role of the special units is to provide an operational solution to the military needs of the intersection of what is known and what has disappeared from the strict, traditional military view. According to the IDF definition, special units forces require varied combat training. They have a high level of basic combat skills, and since their assignment is the performance of special operations, they are organized to operate in small units. World War II was the final catalyst for the establishment of special units. The need for a force that would carry out special operations in which air, land, and sea capabilities were combined pushed Col. Hadley Clark, one of the assistants to the British military's chief of staff, to establish an independent force within the British armed forces. The success of the forces that were established on the basis of this idea injected new blood into the veins of the British military's attack capability - an ability that had been seriously damaged by German advances in those years. In August 1953, Unit 101 was established in the IDF. Similar to the British Special Forces, Unit 101 did incursions, i.e. penetrating forces into enemy territory, the performing a certain task and returning the forces to IDF bases. The unit operated until January 1954, but its unique character, its operational achievements and the training of its personnel established norms and became part of the combat doctrine of the IDF. When Unit 101 was created, the State of Israel had a naval commando unit that was comprised of naval troops (Palyam) and Shachar troops, who served mostly in Military Intelligence. (Shachar was a division of the Palmach that typically operated behind enemy lines disguised as Arabs). Nonetheless, the establishment of 101 was a watershed event from the point of view of the IDF's operational concept. The unit's activities succeeded in creating a significant cognitive effect among the enemy, and even more important, its soldiers succeeded in building a new ethos of the fighting Zionist, which greatly appealed to the Israeli public. Ever since then the IDF has managed to maintain the unique image of the special forces. Their clandestine activities, the tremendous curiosity they arise and their aura of forces with unlimited abilities have often directly influenced the national mood (e.g. the boost in morale following the Entebbe Operation in contrast with the "Lebanon effect," which intensified following the navy commando disaster in 1997), public opinion of the IDF, and motivation among new recruits.[i] <http://www.omedia.org/admin/scripts/blank.gif#_edn1> Over time the IDF cast three central units as leaders among the specials units: Shayetet ("flotilla") 13, the naval commando unit; the General Staff Special Reconnaissance Unit, attached to military intelligence; and Shaldag, the air force commando unit. From a command standpoint the three units are subject to the branch headquarters (air, sea, intelligence), and not to an operational brigade. There are other select units in the IDF, both in reconnaissance roles under the command of the various brigades, and in specialty roles, such as the Engineer Corps' bomb unit. The high quality of these units and the desire of the IDF's senior command echelons to use them in peacetime as well have at times blurred the structural separation between them and the units the IDF defines as "special units." For this reason, particularly in recent years, the three leading special units perform tasks similar to those placed upon the top units in the territorial command system and vice-versa. A specific example is the special task assigned to the Maglan unit (which is not included in the military definition of the special units) in the Second Lebanon War, the same task that was carried out by the Shaldag unit in Operation Grapes of Wrath ten years earlier. Nonetheless, for special tasks that require a non-routine military solution, depart outside the command jurisdiction or have the potential for systemic repercussions, the General Staff is careful to use the special units as the main force. Thus there are tasks whose nature determines the assignment to a particular unit, and there are tasks placed on a wide variety of elite units. Other than the fact that the label "special tasks" carries with it tremendous prestige, the special units also enjoy material benefits. The IDF invests tremendous resources in maintaining special abilities, far more than investments in other top units. Hence the covert struggle among the units over the right to enter the prestigious club of the special units and to earn a greater piece of the budget pie. Despite the variety of challenges faced by the IDF special units, a number of similarities can also be identified: * Tremendous resources, translating into an ability to cull the highest quality manpower from the pool of new recruits, to invest time and money in training and to maintain the unit with regular training activity over a more prolonged period than in other military units. * The three units mentioned have long-range transport means that enable them to move secretly to reach distant targets. They have special combat equipment that allows them to maintain combat readiness and survivability in the field over time; they also have a unique intelligence envelope that enables operational precision. * These first two characteristics give rise to the special nature of the tasks placed upon these units and their position in the command hierarchy. The three special units are not directly subordinate to the ground forces command or the operational brigades, even though a significant portion of their activities is performed on land. Similar to all top army units, they maintain a tight reciprocal relationship with the ground force and its tasks, but as opposed to them, they are not subordinate to this command authority. The command assignment of the units for the most part prescribes their traditional mission, whereby the naval commando is tasked to attack harbors and ports; Shaldag is tasked to provide assistance for air force missions; and the General Staff Special Reconnaissance Unit carries out intelligence operations deep in enemy territory. Some of these missions are planned in advance to be carried out on the first night of a war, and some are intended to be carried out on a routine basis. Over the years, the weight of the core roles has shifted due to intensive development of long-range combat equipment (which constitutes a more efficient and less dangerous alternative for the forces) and today special units generally perform complicated actions both in the various command areas and outside them during peacetime. Another associated role that has developed since the 1980s is operation during terrorist attacks, which means maintaining tactical readiness for hostage taking. The Operational Concept According to the IDF's definition, special units are permanently subordinate "to the General Staff or the highest military headquarters or the war theater headquarters or a chief headquarters (such as the Air Force or Navy Headquarters), and during non-war times they are generally used at the initiative of the government and the Defense Minister or with their approval." The multiplicity of subordinations that appears in the definition is not coincidental; the special units lack a permanent command and work for a number of "commander-managers." While a structural assignment does exist, the operational possibilities of the units do not match the ability of the organizations to which they are attached. The significance of this is that in many cases, from a professional standpoint, the corps that is in command over a special unit has difficulty serving as the overall authority, and thus requires external operational assistance from outside the corps. For example: An idea for an operation or attack by the naval commandos connected to a ground-based operation would presumably be approved at the Naval Command Headquarters, which is almost completely composed of naval personnel, i.e. sailors by training. However, the ability of this staff to assess ground-based attack actions, the size of forces, equipment and additional measures is limited, since it has little or no experience with these criteria. Therefore, approval of a plan for distant ground operations, even if it begins with naval activity, must involve additional professionals. Similarly Air Force Headquarters would find it professionally difficult to supervise the ground-based actions of Shaldag, and Military Intelligence would be hard-pressed to assess operations by the General Staff Special Reconnaissance Unit. For this reason, operation of special forces during wartime is concentrated at three central levels. At the first level the special forces are operated under corps or branch command with the intention of carrying out special operations. The purpose of these operations is to provide solutions to complicated problems facing regular forces (many times this difficulty derives from the mission's distance from Israel). These operations are undertaken under the purview of the General Staff, meaning outside the theater boundaries of the territorial commands, but the command subordination is to the responsible branch. Consider, for instance, the commando takeover of the Karine A ship. For the purpose of the example: the geographical theater boundary of the Southern Command passes through the Straits of Tiran, while the takeover plan was to have been conducted south of this boundary, so the geographic operational space for the mission was under the responsibility of the General Staff. In general, as in this operation, the General Staff is interested in having command input in such a sensitive operation, and therefore also takes part in the approvals process and even in the planning process. In wartime, however, an operation of this type could take place in the General Staff sphere without the General Staff being involved in it at all, since at that time command attention turns to the larger battle. At the second level the special units are used in the "classic" manner for the purpose of carrying out special missions. These actions are undertaken in the General Staff sector with the approval of the General Staff and at its direction, and for the most part, the General Staff initiates/leads the process. An example is Operation Sharp and Smooth in Baalbek from the Second Lebanon War. In this operation, the General Staff special reconnaissance unit and the Shaldag unit were sent to an area outside the operational sphere of Northern Command. The initiative for the operation came from the General Staff echelons, which believed that such an action had the potential to positively affect the military and the Israeli public. At the time of the operation, a dispute developed regarding the appointment of a commander for the operation. The authority for the appointment was held by Chief of Staff Dan Halutz, who ultimately awarded it to the commander of the air force as a representative of the General Staff. At the third level, the special units are directly subordinate to the command spheres, either during wartime, but for the most part, during times of routine. For example: in the Northern Command, until the IDF's withdrawal from Lebanon, the special units were activated from time to time for "red-line infiltration" missions, i.e. beyond the northern edge of the security zone. From a command standpoint, these operations were conducted by the territorial divisions; the relevant corps "loaned" the unit to the territorial command for the entire period of the combat mission. Accordingly, the expenses of the action were divided evenly between the command and the relevant corps. Upon completion of the operation and its review, the units would return to the command subordination of the corps from which it came. Since the beginning of the limited confrontation in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip, this temporary loan has become more routine. The special units (mainly naval commando and Shaldag) have been integrated quite frequently into targeted operations against terrorist organization. There is a mutual interest in the integration: the special units want to maintain operational readiness and a high level of training, and mainly take part in the general effort, while the commands involved, mainly the territorial brigades, benefit from quality manpower, advanced abilities and the creation of deterrence through daring operations deep in Palestinian territory. _____ <http://www.omedia.org/admin/scripts/blank.gif#_ftnref1> Yoaz Hendel, Neubauer junior research associate at INSS (F)AIR USE NOTICE: All original content and/or articles and graphics in this message are copyrighted, unless specifically noted otherwise. All rights to these copyrighted items are reserved. 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