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ThreatsWatch.Org - PrincipalAnalysis: The Domestic Intelligence Imperative

Yesterday, October 10, 2007, 2:38:32 PM | Michael Tanji
<http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/threatswatch/combined/~3/168522565/> Go to
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Driven to desperation by restrictive information sharing rules, and
concerned about the terrorist threat to their homes and loved ones, at least
five American intelligence officers established a domestic espionage ring.
The target of their actions: the federal government. The beneficiary of
their actions: Los Angeles. How has it come to this, that otherwise
patriotic and loyal citizens feel compelled to work against their government
in order to serve and protect their communities?

Testimony
<http://www.signonsandiego.com/uniontrib/20071006/news_1n6spies.html> by
former Gunnery Sgt. Gary Maziarz, who received a 26 month prison sentence
for his cooperation with federal prosecutors, revealed that his colleagues
in the reserve military intelligence community were using their occasional
access to national-level intelligence on terrorism to support their day
jobs: countering terrorism at the local government level. One member of the
ring works in the Los Angeles Sheriff's Department and the other in the
LAPD. Maziarz, then an intelligence analyst at Camp Pendleton, was
invaluable to the ring because of his ability to regularly access national
intelligence databases and pass a steady stream of information to his
accomplices on terrorism suspects in the LA area.

There is no shortage of press reports about the intelligence community's
efforts to improve information sharing amongst its various components as
well as state and local security organizations. Improved information sharing
was a goal of intelligence reform legislation and a variety of policy,
procedure and technology efforts within the community are trying to make
sharing more efficient and effective. It has not been reported what efforts
if any the spy ring might have taken to work within the system to get
terrorism intelligence held by national agencies down to the city-level.
However, it is likely that seasoned intelligence professionals (at least two
members of the spy ring were Colonels) at least tried to work through
official channels.We are left to assume that an honest effort was made, but
that the results were less than optimal.

The importance of sharing intelligence information both horizontally among
peers and vertically among those working different levels of the same
intelligence problem cannot be overstated. No one agency has the complete
picture of what is going on in the world. Masters of the big-picture are
often woefully ignorant of details on the ground; those working the
nitty-gritty of problem often toil in ignorance over what role their work
plays in the larger scheme of things. The members of this spy ring, and many
others like them, stand astride both worlds and realize how vast these gaps
are. They understand how useful national resources can be once turned on
foreign infiltrators and domestic traitors, but their actions have likely
set back the cause of sharing more than it might have helped it.

All of our intelligence capabilities are employed for naught if the
information they produce does not get into the hands of those who can best
use it. Under the compartmentalization system in the foreign intelligence
environment (the practice of keeping discrete parts of a larger effort
separate so that only a few people had the full picture of any given
program) you could be assured that those operating at the highest levels
were making the most informed decisions. Any appearance of inaction or
confusion about a strategic move was merely the result of security-enforced
ignorance. That this nation has never had a domestic intelligence capability
means that our national security leadership is ill-equipped to operate in
the domain. Consequently, we cannot assume with any confidence that the lack
of sharing is the result of a conscious decision to keep certain people out
of the loop. The odds are better that information is not getting to the
right place because a) the person that has it does not know the entirety of
those who should receive it or b) those that need it have no way of knowing
what to ask for or if it even exists.

Most of these problems could be solved or at least alleviated with the
establishment of a true, independent domestic intelligence agency. Such an
agency could operate with new, effective and legally acceptable policies and
procedures to ensure that we can monitor those we need to and avoid
infringing the rights of innocents. A new agency would also establish a new
culture that is more attuned to the domestic mission and not encumbered by
the foreign-intelligence mindset that is used to holding everyone - even
sister agencies - at arm's length.

Having a single place to go for information about the domestic threat would
greatly simplify and speed information sharing efforts. Currently a major
metro police department like Los Angeles might have separate relationships
with the CIA, DEA, FBI, NSA, DHS, and various Pentagon elements. Each agency
has its own policy and procedure for sharing information, communications
channels, delivery mechanisms and security restrictions. Data may also be
delivered in formats that are incompatible with local databases or
analytical software, adding an additional layer of complexity; lengthening
the time analysts need to make sense of the information they are provided,
and shortening the time officers can respond to threats.

A single domestic agency is also likely to mean a more open environment in
which goals and strategies can be discussed and disagreement arbitrated.
Having a single forum for addressing these issues can only help improve
understanding between largely incompatible cultures of intelligence and law
enforcement. Cops have to understand that one arrest now could mean missing
out on the chance to make ten arrests later; spooks have to appreciate the
tactile, personal and deadly operating environment in which cops operate. 

A dedicated domestic intelligence capability is a necessity that is long
overdue. If things hold true to form we are likely to suffer another attack
on the homeland before the widespread realization sets in that bloated and
ill-conceived measures like the Department of Homeland Security are not the
answer to our domestic security woes. A domestic intelligence capability is
a hard sell, but the threats are real and the risks of not having such a
capability exceedingly high. That we lack the political will to attempt to
solve this problem before it is too late speaks more ill of those who chose
not to change the system, than of those who felt compelled to break it.

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