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at-we-know-today/
 
 
<http://armiesofliberation.com/archives/2007/10/12/the-uss-cole-bombing-what
-we-know-today/> The USS Cole Bombing: What We Know Today


Seven Years Ago Today

On October 12, 2000 two Yemeni suicide bombers rammed an explosives-laden
dingy into an American destroyer, the USS Cole. Seventeen US service members
were killed and forty-nine injured. The destroyer had been invited by the
Yemeni government to refuel in the port of Aden. 

 USS Cole.jpg <http://mypetjawa.mu.nu/archives/USS%20Cole.jpg> 

In the light of historical perspective, several facts have become clear.
Intelligence warnings generated prior to the attack were never forwarded to
the commander of the Cole. The investigation afterwards was marred by turf
wars within the US government, leaving links between the Cole bombing and
the attacks of 9/11 unexplored. The Yemeni government worked diligently to
limit the scope of the US investigation. Almost all the Yemenis involved in
the Cole bombing are free today. The involvement of some Yemeni officials in
the bombing is documented; however, the scope of that involvement is not.

THE YEMEN SIDE

The 1990's

Military commander and presidential half brother, Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar
recruited fighters for bin Laden in the 1980's and set up training camps in
Yemen. Thousands of Yemenis at all levels were active in the Afghan
conflict. After the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan, the
Yemeni regime welcomed thousands of both Yemeni and non-Yemeni "Afghan
Arabs" back to Yemen. Many of these hard core Islamists were militarily
deployed in defense of the regime during its civil war in 1994 against
Southern Socialists. As a result, many Afghan Arabs and other Islamic
militants who fought in 1994 against "apostate" socialists are today
ensconced in high level government positions. Others were absorbed into the
military and security forces. 

Through the 1990's, both Osama bin Laden and Aiman Zawaheri traveled in and
out and around Yemen on many occasions, often meeting religious leaders and
prominent persons. Bin Laden delivered sermons in Yemeni mosques and
purportedly held a six hour meeting with Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar in Sana'a
airport in 1996. 

Bin Laden made a deal with the Yemeni government in 1999, according to the
9/11 Commission Report. After Al-Qaeda operative Tawfiq (Khallad) bin Attash
was arrested in Yemen, Bin Laden contacted a Yemeni official and bargained
for Attash's release. The Yemeni regime released Attash and promised not to
confront al-Qaeda. In exchange, Bin Laden pledged not to attack Yemen. This
pattern of negotiation continues today. 


 attash USS Cole.jpg
<http://mypetjawa.mu.nu/archives/attash%20USS%20Cole.jpg> 


 

Tawfiq bin Attash

In 1999, Attash returned to Afghanistan. In January 2000, Attash along with
Yemeni Fahd al-Quso attended a high level al-Qaeda meeting in Malaysia at
which the attacks on the USS Cole and the World Trade Center were discussed
and planned. Attash, who was captured by US forces in Pakistan in 2003,
confessed to organizing the Cole attack according to a military transcripts
released at his hearing held at Guantanamo Bay. Al-Quso who helped prepared
the bombing of the USS Cole was found guilty in a Yemeni court. 

Bombers Tipped Off?

In 2000, security concerns in Dijoubouti made Aden port only a slightly more
attractive choice for refueling the Cole. Refueling at sea was also
certainly an option. However, the US was concerned with rebuilding relations
with Yemen. Relations had cooled significantly after the first Gulf War when
Yemen, holding a Security Council seat, supported long time ally Saddam
Hussein against the US. 

One lingering question about the Cole bombing is whether the bombers had
advance knowledge about the arrival of the USS Cole. Oddly, the Yemeni
government denied receiving information about the impending arrival of the
USS Cole. Yemeni President Saleh said, "The Americans made a mistake when
they entered the port with such a large size and greatly valuable destroyer
without guarding or notifying the Yemeni side to provide such protection,"
the Yemen Times reported in November 2000. However, General Anthony Zinni,
former Centcom commander, noted in his 2000 congressional testimony that,
"The force protection in the port is the responsibility of the Yemeni
government." He noted that specific arrangements for the visit are, "done
with the port authority, and the government of Yemeni officials; their
security forces." He also indicated that such notice is normally issued by
the United States to a foreign government about two weeks prior to the
arrival of a US vessel. 


 uss cole 2000.jpg <http://mypetjawa.mu.nu/archives/uss%20cole%202000.jpg> 

Lawrence Wright in The Looming Tower notes, "The FBI was convinced that the
bombers had been tipped off about the arrival of the Cole, and they wanted
to expand the investigation to include a member of the president's own
family and a colonel in the PSO." The Yemeni government denied these
requests while blaming the US for bombing its own ship. In July 2001, a top
Yemeni official told the Egyptian governmental weekly, Al-Ahram Al-Arabi,
that the Yemeni investigation indicated that the US intentionally blew up
the Cole as a pretext for invasion. He said the US planned on turning the
port of Aden into a US naval base. In December 2005, President Saleh
repeated these claims on national TV, stating, "there was a plan to occupy
Aden" after the Cole bombing. However notorious the Yemeni regime may be for
duplicity, and many within the US administration excuse these statements as
understandable domestic posturing, the fact remains there are many
indications of regime complicity in the bombing of the USS Cole. 

As noted by a 2007 US Congressional Research Service report, "Yemeni
authorities did not fully cooperate in the investigation of the Cole
bombing." US investigators were prevented from directly interrogating Yemeni
suspects, and were forced to submit their questions on paper. The Yemeni
officials also hid evidence. According to Lawrence Wright, "The Yemenis
finally produced a videotape taken by a harborside security camera, but it
appeared to have been edited to delete the crucial moment of explosion." The
Yemeni government's lack of cooperation with federal investigators was most
like designed to protect upper level officials complicit in the attack.

One document admitted by the Yemeni court in the 2003 trial of five accused
Cole plotters was an official letter from Yemen's then interior minister,
Hussain Arab, which instructed Yemeni security forces to give safe passage
and cooperation to Muhammed Omar al-Harazi a/k/a Abd al-Rahman Al-Nashiri
from April to December 2000. Other documents used by the bombers included
arms permits normally issued by the Ministry of the Interior which were said
to be a forgery, the Yemen Times reported in 2005. 

The Yemeni Opposition Group, the Southern Democratic Assembly based in the
UK, issued a statement in November 2006 prior to a London Donors Conference
on Yemen which reads in part, "Both the evidence and information indicate
that who carried out the bombing attack on the American Warship USS Cole in
Aden port in October 2000 are well-known bodies to the Yemeni regime and
some of who were involved still in their jobs." 

In May 2001, UPI reported, "According to several US government sources, one
of the reasons the attack on the Cole succeeded was involvement by the
'highest levels' of the Yemen government of President Ali Abdallah Saleh,
although Saleh himself personally was not." However this is not a view
shared by the former commander of the Yemeni Navy at the time of the Cole
bombing. In an interview after he defected to the UK, Commander Ahmed
Al-Hassani said that President Saleh knew in advance of the bombing.
Al-Hassani pointed out that the night before the bombing, President Saleh
sent his Interior Minister and Political Security Minister from the capital
Sana'a to Aden where the USS Cole was bombed hours later.

The Cole Bombers

The Yemeni justice system is highly corrupt, politicized and irregular. Thus
it is unsurprising that with few exceptions, the Cole plotters and their
co-conspirators were given light sentences, were released early, were never
charged or escaped jail multiple times. Some convicted terrorists were later
given government jobs, money, land and/or a car in order to facilitate their
reintegration into society, the Yemeni government says. The regime defends
these actions as a practical way to diminish the threat of future terror
attacks. Others see these accommodations as a reward. 

The Yemeni government named Jamal Muhammad al-Badawi as the leader of the
group, Abdu al-Rahim al-Nashiri as the financier and several others as
involved, including two policemen who provided false documents. However
shortly after, Mohammed Hamdi al-Ahdal was listed as one of the main
operatives and financiers of the plot. 

Six convicted Cole conspirators' appeal verdict was rendered in March of
2005 wherein the Yemeni court reduced Mamoon Amswah's sentence from eight to
five years. The court upheld the death penalty for Abdu al-Rahim al-Nashiri,
who is in US custody. Fahd Al-Quso who helped prepare the bombing and was
supposed to videotape the explosion had his ten year prison sentence upheld.
Ali Mohamed Murakab and Morad al-Sorori both retained five year sentences
for forging identification documents. 

Jamal al-Badawi was originally sentenced to death by a Yemeni court for his
involvement in the attack. The sentence was commuted upon appeal to fifteen
years in prison. However, al-Badawi managed to escape from jail twice and is
currently at large. 


 al-badawi.jpg <http://mypetjawa.mu.nu/archives/al-badawi.jpg> 
Jamal Al-Badawi

Ten prisoners linked to the USS Cole bombing, including Jamal al-Badawi and
Fahd al-Quso, escaped from an Aden jail in 2003. Other 2003 Aden escapees
included Khaldoun Al-Hukaimi and Saleh Mana. The pair was reported to have
committed suicide attacks in Iraq in 2005, RayNews reported.

Both al-Quso and al-Badawi were recaptured in March 2004. Jamal Al-Badawi
escaped from prison again in 2006 along with 17 others involved in the USS
Cole bombing. Shortly after the escape, Yemen's Specialized Penal Court
ordered the release of Hadi Saleh Al-Waeli suspected of selling arms,
ammunition and explosives to the terrorists who bombed the USS Cole
Destroyer at Aden Port in 2000. 

In 2003, Yemen arrested Mohammed Hamdi al-Ahdal. On the US list of most
wanted terrorists in Yemen. Al-Ahdal is believed to be one of the
masterminds of the Cole bombing. Yemen refused to allow US federal
investigators access to Al-Ahdal, insisting instead that the FBI submit
questions for al-Ahdal in writing. Sources indicated to the Yemen Times that
al-Ahdal had confessed to "being in charge of technical and financial
preparations" for both the Cole and Limburg attacks. Al-Ahdal was tried and
convicted in 2006 on charges of distributing money for al-Qaeda. No charges
were brought relating to the Cole bombing. He was sentenced to 37 months in
prison, and with time served, was released shortly thereafter. In 2006,
Ghalib Al-Zaidi was also charged with harboring al-Ahdal for a month
following the Cole bombing; al-Zaidi was sentenced to three years time
served and released. 

THE US SIDE

Turf Wars Hamper Investigation 

The FBI's ability to investigate the bombing was curtailed not only by the
Yemeni government but also by the US State Department, which was interested
in maintaining good relation with Yemen. Lead FBI investigator and one of
the US's foremost al-Qaeda experts, John O'Neill "had come to believe that
some Yemeni officials were not being forthcoming about information from
(Fahd) al Quso and other suspects," Frontline reported. However, the US
ambassador to Yemen clashed with O'Neill, hampering the FBI's
investigations. Tensions between O'Neill and Ambassador to Yemen, Barbara
Bodine, escalated to the point where Bodine actively lobbied to have O'Neill
taken off the case. According to Barry Mawn, O'Neill's boss who was called
in to investigated the dispute, "it was clear that she simply hated his
guts." Bodine was O'Neill's only detractor, Mawn found. Bodine prohibited
O'Neill's re-entry into Yemen after he withdrew his team in response to a
threat against his agents. According to Cooperative Research, "without
(O'Neill's) influential presence, the Yemeni government will not allow an
interrogation." 

Similarly, the CIA failed to share intelligence with the FBI after the Cole
bombing, and connections between the USS Cole bombing and 9/11 were left
unexplored. The CIA did not forward information about Tawfiq bin-Attash
(a/k/a Khallad) when requested by the FBI. The FBI had growing suspicions of
a second attack when it was discovered that prior to the Cole bombing, money
was taken out of Yemen by al-Quso and given to Attash. The CIA was aware of
the 2000 Malaysia meeting among several high level al-Qaeda operatives,
including calls between Malaysia and Yemen. The CIA had photos of both
Attash and al-Quso at the Malysia meeting; however it withheld the photos
and other information about the meeting from the FBI. 

Warnings Not Circulated

The failure of the US embassy and the CIA to support the FBI's investigation
after the Cole bombing was preceded by a lack of US intelligence
coordination before the bombing. Richard Clarke, the National Security
Council adviser stated to CNN shortly after the bombing that there was "no
basis" for saying that the USS Cole bombing was an intelligence failure on
the part of the US intelligence community. However, a secret Pentagon
intelligence unit known as Able Danger identified increased al-Qaeda
activity in Aden prior to the Cole attack two weeks before the attack and
again two days before the terrorist attack. 

The New York Post reported that Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer, the Defense
Intelligence Agency's former liaison to Able Danger said Capt. Scott
Phillpott, Able Danger's leader, briefed Gen. Peter Schoomaker, former head
of Special Operations Command about the findings on Yemen "two or three
weeks" before the Cole attack. "Yemen was elevated by Able Danger to be one
of the top three hot spots for al Qaeda in the entire world," Shaffer said. 


 Lt Col. Anthony Shaffer.jpg
<http://mypetjawa.mu.nu/archives/Lt%20Col.%20Anthony%20Shaffer.jpg> 
Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer

Congressman Kurt Weldon in a 2005 Congressional floor speech said, "They
(Able Danger) also identified the threat to the USS Cole two weeks before
the attack, and two days before the attack were screaming not to let the USS
Cole come into the harbor at Yemen because they knew something was about to
happen." The Scramento Bee reported that "Two Able Danger analysts briefed
Gen. Peter Schoomaker, then head of U.S. Special Operations Command, on
their findings.two days before the attack on the Cole." The commander of the
USS Cole, Kirk Lippold, never received the warning.

Another intelligence analyst, Kie Fallis, at the Defense Intelligence Agency
also advised several of his superiors of the heightened risk in Yemen and
indications of terror activities in Aden prior to the attack. An official
warning was not generated. As Senator Pat Roberts noted during Congress'
Joint Inquiry into the 9/11 attacks, "(Fallis) attempted in vain - in vain,
to convince his superiors to issue a threat warning in August of 2000.His
warnings were considered - I think they were called anomalies, not
connections. And we now know different. The NSA issued the warning the day
after the attack." 

Tommy Franks, commander of Centcom at the time of the Cole bombing testified
before Congress that he never received any warning regarding Aden, nor did
he review the decision of his predecessor General Zinni to refuel at Aden
port. Naval Commander Lippold has been blocked from promotion and, as a
result of the US Navy's "up or out policy", is being forced into retirement.
Able Danger's Anthony Shaeffer had his security clearance was revoked in
2006 and his family's health insurance cancelled, apparently in retribution
for speaking out. Kie Fallis quit DIA in protest the day after the bombings.


Back to the future

The bombing of the USS Cole was one incident in a pattern of escalating
al-Qaeda attacks on the US that began with the 1993 World Trade Center
bombing and culminated in 2001 with the deaths of nearly 3000 US citizens.
In the wake of 9/11, structural procedures and adjustments have been
instituted to break down the wall between US intelligence agencies. However,
the tension caused by maintaining the semi-cooperation of "allies" in
counter-terror efforts remains a vital issue, and no better example exists
than US-Yemeni relations. 


 saleh and condi.jpg
<http://mypetjawa.mu.nu/archives/saleh%20and%20condi.jpg> 
Yemeni President Saleh and US Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice 

In 2007, international cooperation is essential in uncovering terrorists'
plans, networks and operatives. However, many find the US focus on
counter-terror both myopic and counter-productive in dealing with its
allies. This view is widely held by Yemeni reformers who pay the price for
their advocacy in blood. The US is perceived as tacitly approving of civil
and human rights abuses as long as the regime is forth coming with
counter-terror cooperation. Yemen's progressives have a message that
undermines the dictatorship, regressive forces and the terrorists.
Consequently, reformists are targeted by the regime and labeled un-Islamic
and Western stooges in the public media. 

Yemen uses and exports Islamic fanatics as a tool of domestic and foreign
policy. After the empowerment of Hamas in a democratic election, the
idealistic US push for democratization and reform in the Middle East was met
by the real-politik fears of radical Islamists gaining political power. In
Yemen, radical Islamists already have political power and government jobs,
as evidenced by the state's failure to thwart terrorist financing, media
incitement, mosque incitement, material support and moral support for
terrorism. With or without official political status, elections or
recognition, Yemeni Islamist militants are capable of influencing the regime
and deploying state resources. And these political players are more
dangerous when they are playing the game underground, while an enormous game
of charades takes place in the media.

The days of "with us or against us" are certainly over as the intertwined
structure between dictatorships and terrorists becomes clearer. To undermine
one is to undermine the other, to support one supports the other. The
natural alliance between indigenous reformists and the United States is
dysfunctional in the current climate, leaving both more vulnerable. However,
there are many in the Yemeni administration and some in the opposition who
are quite patriotic and in favor of reform and modernization. Somehow the US
must become as good at playing both sides of the fence as the Yemeni regime
is. 



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