Asymmetric Warfare


BY MARK STEYN
October 15, 2007
URL: http://www.nysun.com/article/64547

Peter Robinson, a Reagan speechwriter in the last years of the Cold War,
posed an interesting question the other day. He noted that on February 22nd
1946, a mere six months after the end of the Second World War, George
Kennan, a U.S. diplomat in Moscow, sent his famous 5,000-word telegram that
laid out the stakes of the Cold War and the nature of the enemy, and that
that "Long Telegram" in essence shaped the way America thought about the
conflict all the way up to the fall of the Berlin Wall four decades later.
And what Mr. Robinson wondered was this:

"Here we are today, more than six years after 9/11. Does anyone believe a
new ‘Long Telegram' has yet been written? And accepted throughout the senior
levels of the government?"

Answer: No. Because, if it had, you'd hear it echoed in public — just as the
Long Telegram provided the underpinning of the Truman Doctrine a year later.
Kennan himself had differences with Truman and successive presidents over
what he regarded as their misinterpretation, but, granted all that, most of
what turned up over the next 40 years — the Cuban missile crisis, the
Vietnam war, Soviet subversion in Africa and Europe, Grenada and Afghanistan
— is consistent with the conflict as laid out by one relatively minor State
Department functionary decades earlier.

Why can't we do that today?

Well, one reason is we're not really comfortable with ideology, either ours
or anybody else's. Insofar as we have an ideology it's a belief in the
virtues of "multiculturalism," "tolerance," "celebrate diversity" — a
bumper-sticker ideology that is, in effect, an anti-ideology which
explicitly rejects the very idea of drawing distinctions between your
beliefs and anybody else's.

Less sentimental chaps may (at least privately) regard the above as bunk,
and prefer to place their faith in economics and technology. In Britain in
the 1960s, the political class declared that the country "needed" mass
immigration. When the less enlightened lower orders in northern England
fretted that they would lose their towns to the "Pakis," they were dismissed
as paranoid racists. The experts were right in a narrow, economic sense: The
immigrants became mill workers and bus drivers. But the paranoid racists
were right, too: The mills closed anyway, and mosques sprouted in their
place; and Oldham and Dewesbury adopted the arranged cousin-marriage
traditions of Mirpur in Pakistan; and Yorkshire can now boast among its
native sons the July 7th London Tube bombers. The experts thought economics
trumped all; the knuckle-dragging masses had a more basic unease, convinced
that it's culture that's determinative.

To take another example, on CNN the other night Anderson Cooper was worrying
about the homicide rate in Philadelphia. The city of brotherly love is the
murder capital of the nation, and CNN had dispatched a reporter to interview
the grieving mother of a young black boy killed while riding his bicycle in
the street. Apparently, a couple of cars had got backed up behind him, and
an impatient passenger in one of them pulled out a gun and shot the kid.
Anderson Cooper then went to commercials and, when he returned, introduced a
report on how easy it is to buy guns in Philadelphia and how local
politicians are reluctant to do anything about it. This is, again, an
argument only the expert class could make. In the 1990s, the number of guns
in America went up by 40 million but the murder rate fell dramatically. If
firearms availability were the determining factor, Vermont and Switzerland
would have high murder rates. Yet in Montpelier or Geneva the solution to a
boy carelessly bicycling in front of you down a city street when you're in a
hurry is not to grab your gun and blow him away. It's the culture, not the
technology.

Very few members of the transnational jet set want to hear this. They're
convinced that economic and technological factors shape the world all but
exclusively, and that the sexy buzz words — "globalization," "networking" —
cure all ills. You may recall the famous Golden Arches thesis promulgated by
The New York Times' Thomas Friedman — that countries with McDonald's
franchises don't go to war with each other. Tell it to the Serbs. When the
Iron Curtain fell, Yugoslavia was, economically, the best-positioned of the
recovering Communist states. But, given the choice between expanding the
already booming vacation resorts of the Dalmatian coast for their eager
Anglo-German tourist clientele or reducing Croatia and Bosnia and Kosovo to
rubble over ethno-linguistic differences no outsider can even discern
("Serbo-Croat"?), Yugoslavia opted for the latter.

As I wrote in my book, the most successful example of globalization is not
Starbucks or McDonald's but Wahhabism, an obscure backwater variant of Islam
practiced by a few Bedouin deadbeats that Saudi oil wealth has now exported
to every corner of the earth — to Waziristan, Indonesia, the Caucasus, the
Balkans, Amsterdam, Stockholm, Toronto, Portland, Dearborn and Falls Church.
You can live on the other side of the planet and, when Starbucks opens up in
town, you might acquire a taste for a decaf latte, but that's it: otherwise,
life goes on. By contrast, when the Saudi-funded preachers hung out their
shingles on every Main Street in the west, they radicalized a significant
chunk of young European Muslims: they transformed not just their beverage
habits but the way they look at the societies in which they live.

So many of the Administration's present problems derive from a squeamishness
about ideological confrontation that any effective "Long Telegram" would
have to address. When the President declared a "war on terror," cynics
understood that he had no particular interest in the IRA or the Tamil
Tigers, but that he was constrained from identifying the real enemy in any
meaningful sense: In the fall of 2001, a war on Islamic this or Islamo that
would have caused too many problems with General Musharraf and the House of
Saud and other chaps he wanted to keep on side. But it's one reason, for
example, why the Democrats, as soon as it suited them, had no difficulty
detaching the Iraq front from the broader war. If it's a "war on terror"
against terrorist organizations, well, Saddam is a head of state and Iraq is
a sovereign nation: the 1946 "Long Telegram" was long enough to embrace
events in Ethiopia and Grenada 30 years later, but the "war on terror"
template doesn't comfortably extend to Iraq. Nor to the remorseless
Wahhabist subversion of Europe. Nor to the Palestinian Authority, where
Condi Rice is currently presiding over the latest reprise of the usual
"peace process" clichés designed to persuade Israel to make concessions to a
populace which largely believes everything the Al Qaeda guys do. The
state-funded (which means European- and U.S.-taxpayer funded) Palestinian
newspaper published a cartoon this September celebrating 9/11 as a great
victory.

Perhaps we need more investment in jobs. Or maybe guns are too easily
available in Gaza. Or, if guns aren't, self-detonating schoolkids certainly
are. This is the ultimate asymmetric warfare: we're trying to beat back
ideology with complacent western assumptions. Not a good bet.

© 2007 Mark Steyn

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