The new Taliban

http://observer.guardian.co.uk/world/story/0,,2190875,00.html?gusrc=rss
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In a swath of territory across Afghanistan and Pakistan, a wild and lawless
new state is being born. As warlords struggle for control and Islamic
militants pour in, Jason Burke travels deep into the region to reveal hidden
forces fuelling a growing conflict in the front line of the 'War on Terror' 

Sunday October 14, 2007
 <http://www.observer.co.uk/> The Observer 


The bomb was far from the biggest seen on the North-West Frontier but it did
its job well. Placed in a water cooler, it ripped through the Nishtar Abad
music market, sending shards of glass and splintered CDs in all directions.
'Miraculously, no one was killed,' said Mohammed Azam, who was shopping for
presents for the Muslim holiday of Eid this weekend. Twenty people were
injured, three seriously, and a dozen shops gutted. 
 
For the police chief of Peshawar, the dusty Pakistan city 40 miles from the
Afghan border, it was clear who planted last Tuesday's bomb. 'We suspect the
involvement of those people who in recent months had sent letters to the CD
and video shops, warning them to shut their businesses, saying it is against
Islam,' Abdul Majid Marwat said. 

The 'Pakistan Taliban' - or one of the various groups claiming the name -
had struck again. Within hours the debris was being cleared away and the
blood wiped off the walls. 'This is the life we lead,' said Azam.' We have
no choice but to continue.' 


The Pakistan Taliban's campaigns go way beyond bombing music shops. Fifty
miles south of Peshawar last week, a full-scale pitched battle, complete
with air strikes and artillery barrages, raged between the Pakistani army
and local and international militants dug into fortified positions in remote
tribal villages. By the time a fragile calm had settled on the rocky hills,
scattered palm trees and desiccated fields of Mir Ali, 50 soldiers, a 100 or
so militants and around 100 civilians had died. Given the inaccessibility of
the battlefield and the conflicting claims of the military and their
opponents, accurate casualty figures are simply not available. 


What is not in doubt is the scale of the fighting. It was a bloody week for
everyone as half a dozen ragged conflicts raged across a stretch of land the
size of Britain, from the Indus river to the central highlands of Pakistan. 


The weekend before had seen an American soldier and a handful of Afghans
killed in Kabul; last Monday saw the latest in a spate of suicide bombings
attributed to the Taliban in Afghanistan when a bicycle bomber hit a convoy
of Nato troops moving through the British-held town of Lashkar Gah, injuring
two civilians. Towards the end of the week, around 100 Taliban stormed a
remote police post close to Afghanistan's border with Iran, sparking lengthy
exchanges that left 10 militants and a police officer dead. An Australian
died when his armoured vehicle was hit by a massive remote-detonated mine,
the 192nd coalition soldier killed this year in Afghanistan. 


The death of David Pearce, 41, made this year the bloodiest for foreign
soldiers deployed in Afghanistan since the days of the Soviet occupation.
The number of Afghan civilians who have died in the fighting this year is
already higher than that for any year since the vicious civil war that tore
the country apart in the early Nineties. 


In both Afghanistan and Pakistan, analysts talk of an explosion of violence.
Tensions were so high last week that when a gas cylinder exploded in an
affluent suburb of Islamabad, already hit by a bloody series of suicide
bombings, it was initially thought to be yet another terrorist blast. 


For some, the ongoing violence in south-west Asia is simple to explain: the
Taliban, reconstituted after the defeat of 2001, and with the help of
al-Qaeda's Osama bin Laden and his key lieutenants such as Ayman al-Zawahiri
and Abu Yahya al-Libi, are battling their way back to power in Afghanistan
and, perhaps worse, fast making progress towards seizing power in
nuclear-capable Pakistan. 


But the reality is far more complicated. It is hard to make sense of one of
the most confusing conflicts of modern times, a war with no defined fronts,
waged with tactics that range from those of the dynamite-throwing anarchists
of the late 19th century to those of the Western Front trench stalemate in
1916, and sometimes to state-of-the-art 'fourth generation' 21st-century
warfare. 


Across an area that stretches through Pakistani cities such as Peshawar,
Islamabad and Karachi, through Kabul and Kandahar, to remote villages and
Nato bases in southern Afghanistan, it is possible to unpick the intricate
detail of the battle for the strategic centre of the War on Terror. What
emerges is a picture not of a single movement or insurgency called 'the
Taliban', but of a new state without formal borders or even a name, a state
that is currently nothing more than a chaotic confederation of warlords'
fiefdoms spanning one of the most critical parts of the world and with the
potential to escalate into a very real presence - with devastating
consequences for global security. 


And this weekend, the 'centre of the centre', as one western official called
it, was the small, scruffy town of Mir Ali. 


In the lulls between fighting last week, soldiers and militants retrieved
their dead. Among the corpses buried within hours according to Islamic
custom were a couple of Arabs and several Uzbeks. The find confirmed the
worst fears of Western intelligence services. Over recent years it has
become increasingly obvious that bin Laden's al-Qaeda group has been able to
rebuild a version of the terrorist infrastructure that existed in
Afghanistan in the late Nineties. 


Volunteers, many of them British, have travelled in a steady stream to
training camps. They have included key members of the 7/7 London bombing
plot and those convicted in the recent Operation Crevice trial. A new 'high
command', including a high proportion of Egyptians and Saudis, has taken on
the task of directing strikes around the globe, and into Pakistan (where
President Pervez Musharraf remains a key target), and providing technical
and financial assistance to chosen allies in Afghanistan. 


The training camps are 'rudimentary', according to Pakistani government and
Western intelligence sources, but despite steady losses - a missile fired
from a Predator drone killed Abu Hamza Rabia, the al-Qaeda number three, in
a house in Mir Ali last November - there is no shortage of militants to fill
the gaps. 'The number three position in al-Qaeda, "director of external
operations", is one of the jobs with the shortest life expectancies in the
world,' said a UK-based intelligence source. 'But that does not stop people
volunteering for it.' 


Equally troubling is the renewed activity of al-Qaeda-affiliated groups such
as the Uzbeks under Tahir Yuldashev, brutal commander of the Islamic
Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), and Pakistani militant groups that have moved
into the hills after losing Islamabad's backing. According to Brigadier
Mehmud Shah, there are several hundred Uzbek fighters in and around Mir Ali,
all set on killing as many Pakistani soldiers as possible. 'In 2003, there
were around 600 Uzbek fighters, now there are more than three times that
figure,' said Shah, a retired Pakistani officer who oversaw security on the
frontier until last year. The influx has been fuelled by fierce repression
in Uzbekistan itself, ruled by Stalinist dictator Islam Karimov. 


Last month, a terrorist plot was uncovered in Germany after American
intelligence intercepted emails from a breakaway faction of the IMU to
German converts who had travelled to the North-West Frontier to be trained.
The increasing internationalisation of the militant presence in the
Pakistani tribal areas recalls the worst days of the late Nineties, when
scores of different groups were based in Afghanistan, all plotting violence
in the Middle East or the West. Already, British intelligence experts are
describing the Pakistani tribal areas as 'the Grand Central Station' of
modern Islamic militancy. 


Again, however, the situation is complex. In many parts of the border
country, the Uzbeks are far from welcome and have fought pitched battles
with local tribes. An estimated 200 were killed in fighting between Pashtuns
and 'foreigners' in the south Waziristan agency earlier this year. But few
doubt that the Uzbeks - and al-Qaeda - have enough allies, enough respect
and enough money to ensure a welcome in the hills around Miram Shah and Mir
Ali for a long time yet. 


The Torchi river snakes down from the high mountains along the
Afghan-Pakistan frontier to the Indus and eventually into the Arabian Sea.
Mir Ali lies where the river hits the flatlands. It is a ragged settlement
of half a dozen villages grouped around a scruffy bazaar on a crossroads and
a concrete ramp that serves as a bridge over the river. 


Last week, Pakistani soldiers took heavy casualties as they tried to battle
their way in. Despite air strikes reducing dozens of the mud houses to dust
and fierce fighting between the low walls and across the dried-out fields
and sparse orchards, they had made little progress by this weekend despite
talk of a 'major push' before the Eid festival. Refugees fleeing the area
spoke of a 'rain' of missiles and shells. 


'We don't have any place to live,' said Mohamed Anwar. 'We have sent our
children to other areas because we are scared that the bombing could start
again.' With the fragile truce barely holding, renewed fighting is almost
certain in the days that come. 


Few observers were surprised at the lack of progress. Pakistan now has
101,000 troops deployed in the semi-autonomous badlands along the frontier,
but they face daunting obstacles. Mir Ali is in the North Waziristan tribal
agency, one of seven agencies stretching along the strategically crucial
frontier area where the authority of the Pakistani government is, under an
agreement concluded by British imperial administrators anxious to pacify the
warlike and truculent Pashtun tribes, constitutionally limited to the roads
and a narrow strip either side just 10 yards wide. There is no tax
collection, justice system or police force. 


A second difficulty is the terrain. On both sides of the highly porous
border, there are very few roads, high ridges provide vantage points and
frequent gorges are perfect for ambushes. Those forests that have yet to be
stripped of their valuable timber give excellent cover. Even the houses are
fortified. With its high hills and populated plains, the terrain is similar
to that where British troops are deployed in southern Afghanistan. 


As in the restive south and east of Afghanistan, the agencies are populated
by self-ruling Pashtun tribes for whom war has been a way of life for
centuries. 'A Pashtun takes his Kalashnikov out with him like a westerner
takes his mobile phone,' said Latif Afridi, a local tribal leader. 'They
learn to shoot when they learn to walk.' 


Inter-tribal violence is a continual backdrop to life on the frontier. Last
week, tribes west of Peshawar battled over rights to grazing, water and
other scarce resources with mortars and machine-guns, oblivious to the
global conflict unfolding around them. And experience gained in the war
against the former Soviet Union in Afghanistan, when many Pashtuns in the
region fought against the Red Army and its local auxiliaries, has forged a
new style of warfare where combat is no longer seen as an extension of
negotiation but as a bid to annihilate the opponent. 


Finally, there is Islam. In recent years the radical new ideology of Middle
Eastern militants such as bin Laden has spread among the Pashtun tribes in
both Afghanistan and Pakistan, providing a new language and justification
for age-old resentments against central authority, buttressed by new ideas
about 'the global attack on Islam by the West' and a powerful call to
'jihad'. 


One powerful factor has been the massive growth in recent decades of the
hardline Deobandi traditionalist school of Islam. With tribal leaders losing
their authority in the new radicalised environment, the clerics are more
influential than ever. 'The traditional structure with tribal chiefs, big
landowners or merchants and religious figures sharing power has broken
down,' Professor Zia Ullah, of Peshawar University, told The Observer. 'At
the moment it is the mullah and the talib [religious student] who are in
charge. A system that has lasted centuries has been overturned.' 


It is these mullahs, whose religious education is often minimal, who are
forming the private militias labelled 'the Pakistan Taliban'. In fact, they
are little more than a fractious confederation of mini-states run by
warlords. Together they have succeeded in expelling almost all
representatives of any government authority from their territory and in
doing so, some analysts fear, have laid the foundations for a state without
borders or flags, but which has a justice system and a common ethnicity,
ideology, culture and religion. And it was this fragmented, chaotic,
embryonic state's soldiers that were fighting so hard at Mir Ali last week. 


Carry on up the road that slices through Mir Ali bazaar, heading west into
the mountains, and you will soon come to Miram Shah. Lying in a hollow below
a crucial pass over the mountains, the small town was a crucial support base
for the mujahideen who fought the Soviets. One of their leaders, an Afghan
tribal chief called Jalaluddin Haqqani, held Miram Shah as a personal
fiefdom for decades, building a mosque and a huge religious school on its
outskirts. Haqqani, a senior cleric, or maulvi, in the Deobandi school of
Islam, is now old and ailing - some intelligence sources believe him to be
dead - but his son, Sirajuddin Haqqani, has taken over and is as active as
his father ever was. If anyone is going to be president of this new state it
is he. 


Little is known about Sirajuddin Haqqani. According to Brigadier Shah, the
Pakistani army is 'currently fighting blindfold', and western intelligence
agencies admit a 'lack of visibility' in the tribal areas. However, all
believe that Haqqani is the dominant figure among the warlords hacking out
their fiefdoms in the tribal areas. 


'[Sirajuddin Haqqani] is at the top of the food chain,' said one western
military official in Islamabad. 'He's one of the few people everyone listens
to.' Sources told The Observer that it was Haqqani who, four weeks ago,
brought three different warlords together to provide a big enough force to
take on the Pakistani army around Mir Ali. 


But Haqqani, who is believed to be in his forties, has another key role to
play. He has inherited the influence his father built over 20 years well
beyond the tribal zones of Pakistan. That influence stretches across eastern
Afghanistan as far as Ghazni and even into Uruzgan, where the Australian
soldier was killed last week. 


As in Pakistan, the Afghan Pashtun tribes do not unconditionally obey one
commander but Jalaluddin Haqqani and his son have been able to draw together
a complex web of links of allegiance, some based on tribal loyalty, others
inspired by religious devotion to the senior Deobandi cleric that Haqqani is
(or was), still more by a quasi-national response to what is perceived to be
a 'foreign' invasion and occupation that threatens to change Afghan society
for ever. 


'We respect Maulvi Haqqani,' one tribal leader told The Observer by
telephone from the Pakistani town of Kohat. 'He has always been a true
mujahed [freedom fighter], fighting the Russians and the Americans and the
British. And he has built many schools and mosques.' 


Another reason the Haqqani dynasty is so powerful is its wealth. This allows
them to buy the loyalty that their religious and jihadi credentials do not
win them. That money comes from smuggling opium, weapons and timber out of
Afghanistan as well as from quasi-legitimate businesses. It also comes in
direct donations from backers in Gulf Arab states such as Kuwait and Saudi
Arabia - until 2001, Jalaluddin Haqqani was a frequent visitor to the Gulf
and one of his wives is from a wealthy family in the United Arab Emirates -
and from indirect donations via the scores of Islamic charities which gather
the 10 per cent zakat levy that every devout Muslim gives to religious
causes. 


Cash is a critical commodity throughout the 'south-western Asian theatre'.
Though not among the prime motivations for many Afghan fighters, money is
necessary for weapons, equipment and for the tribal auxiliaries who will
turn out to protect drug shipments and boost numbers for major one-off
attacks. To bolster a recent, and rapidly broken, peace agreement in the
tribal zones on their side of the frontier, Pakistani army commanders
distributed sums ranging from £10,000 to £100,000 to five leaders of
militant militias who promised to lay down their arms. The money, the men
said, was needed to pay back advances given to them by 'al-Qaeda' to fight
the Islamabad government's forces. 


But the militias, like the Haqqanis, are not loyal to bin Laden, according
to Peshawar-based analyst Ashraf Ali. 'Baitullah Mahsud [one of the key
leaders of the militant militias on the Pakistan side of the border]
recently said that neither bin Laden nor al-Qaeda was his leader,' Ali said.
'His leader was Mullah Omar [the ousted Afghan leader].' 


In the sprawling multinational base in Kandahar there is one hangar riddled
with rusty bullet holes and shrapnel marks. It stands in stark contrast to
the pristine new constructions - including a Pizza Hut outlet, a Burger King
and a full-sized chapel - elsewhere in the vast complex that the
headquarters of Nato's Regional Command South in Afghanistan has become over
the six years western forces have been fighting in Afghanistan. The hangar
is known as the Taliban's Last Stand, and was left as a memento to the
defeat of the hardline Islamic militia in 2001. It has since become
something of an embarrassment. 


The latest contingent of British troops to deploy in Afghanistan, 52
Brigade, arrived last week. Most will be based in Helmand, the province to
the west of Kandahar. From their bases in places such as Lashkar Gah and
Kajaki, the activities of the Haqqanis and the Pakistan Taliban will seem a
long way away. 


Analysts are split over the links between the two wings of the Taliban.
According to Brigadier Shah, 'the Afghan Taliban have no extraterritorial
operations or ambitions'. 'Communications among senior leaders we
intercepted showed us that [the Afghan Taliban] considered the Pakistan
Taliban as a burden and requested them to fight Pakistan but not come into
Afghanistan,' Shah told The Observer. 


But others are less convinced. 'The situation is so complex that you cannot
draw a line between the Afghan and the Pakistan Taliban,' said Ashraf Ali,
the analyst. 


Certainly Mullah Omar, the one-eyed cleric who has led the Afghan Taliban
since its creation in 1993, is respected by everyone on both sides of the
border, including the Haqqanis. 'If there is one chief, it is him,' one
official in Islamabad said. 'If Talibanistan suddenly came into being, he
would be the president.' 


But the links that tie the two halves of the Taliban together go way beyond
shared allegiances. A United Nations report into the new phenomenon of
suicide bombers in Afghanistan stated that 'much (but not all) of the
recruiting and training happens' in Pakistan. 


'While suicide attackers elsewhere in the world tend not to be poor and
uneducated, Afghanistan's attackers appear to be young, uneducated and often
drawn from religious schools in Pakistan,' the report stated. Government and
military sources in Kabul told The Observer that many bombers came from the
Haqqanis' madrassas [religious schools] around Miram Shah, others from the
system of Deobandi madrassas around Quetta. 


In Peshawar, The Observer found evidence that one bomber who killed himself
in Kandahar last autumn was recruited in the small town of Charsadda north
east of the Pakistani frontier city by a Pakistani group. The bomber, who
had no previous involvement with radical Islam, had travelled nearly 500
miles, from one side of the border to the other, to attack western troops. 


Equally, though substantial funding is generated within Afghanistan from
taxes on the sale of opium and contributions from wealthy sympathisers, much
of the funding of the Afghan Taliban comes from across the border. Weapons
from stores in Pakistan or from gun factories such as that at Darra Adam
Khel to the south of Peshawar - temporarily occupied in August by a group of
Pakistan Taliban - cross the mountains to be used against Nato forces too. 


And though much of the fighting in Helmand or in Kandahar is in part based
on tribal rivalries, cross-border personal links, not least through the
Deobandi religious network, play a key role. 'At the end of the day, it is
all about who knows who,' said one Kabul-based intelligence official.
Maulana Rahat Hussain, a senior cleric interviewed by The Observer in
Peshawar last week, reeled off a list of his classmates at the massive
Binoria madrassa in Karachi, Pakistan's largest city and commercial centre,
who had all become senior figures in the Taliban. 


'They were and are and will forever be my brothers,' Hussain, the deputy
secretary of the Deobandi-linked political party that has run Peshawar for
the past five years, said. 'They are fighting an occupying force and
inshallah they will be victorious.' 


On the ground, differences disappear. Hundreds of thousands of Afghans
displaced in the Eighties and early Nineties grew up in refugee camps in
Pakistan or studied in religious schools there. 'Telling the two apart is
impossible,' one British officer in Helmand told The Observer. 'We have
found bodies with pockets full of Pakistani currency. But does that mean
it's an Afghan or a Pakistani? Round here the distinction is meaningless.
Nation states don't really exist in the way we imagine them to.' 


And though British intelligence officers and diplomats who have served on
both sides of the frontier stress that there are considerable differences
between the Afghan and Pakistan Taliban, cautioning that 'to conflate the
two' would be a serious error, they admit that there are many links too.
'The short-term objectives may differ but if you are looking for shared
long-term aims or a common world view, culture, language and so on, they are
very close indeed,' one official, a veteran observer of the region, said
last week. 


Nato officers in Kabul dismiss the suicide bombings as 'not a strategic
threat', but senior officers admit privately that there is a danger that the
south and east of Afghanistan, already well beyond the authority of Kabul,
will effectively translate 'de facto autonomy' into independence. That
raises the spectre of the confederation of warlord states that is in the
process of emerging on the Pakistani side of the border effectively trebling
in size with the addition of the Taliban-controlled zones in Afghanistan. 


'It would be the United Taliban Emirates and it would be a very nasty place
indeed,' one said. 'It would be the biggest and most defensible terrorist
safe haven the world has ever seen.' 


Few are hopeful that a swift solution will be found to the problem posed by
the emerging state without a state on the borders of Afghanistan. The
Pakistani army, according to western defence officials in Islamabad, lacks
the doctrine or the equipment or the will to take on the forces against
them. 'They are demoralised. They are taking heavy casualties, having
hundreds of guys captured. They are in real trouble up there,' said one. 


Nor is the Pakistani army's will to fight unquestionable. 'The men and the
officers are sick of fighting America's war,' said one recently retired
general in Islamabad. 'Why should we kill other Pakistanis and other Muslims
or sacrifice our lives for President Bush? It is not just the tribesmen who
are anti-American. The whole country is.' 


There are frequent allegations that the Pakistani intelligence services are
helping the Taliban on both sides of the border. 'There is no institutional
policy to provide support for the militants but it may well be happening at
a low level with some individuals pursuing their own agendas,' said one
Islamabad-based defence official. 'I have never seen a smoking gun though.' 


There is general recognition that the Nato alliance and the Taliban, who are
increasingly relying on amateurish suicide bombings, have fought each other
to a standstill. Nato partners such as Germany, the Netherlands and France
are tiring of a war that British commanders admit may take '30 years to
win'. British ministers have suggested talking to the Taliban - something
President Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan has offered to do. Earlier this month
he made a personal plea to Mullah Omar to negotiate and stop 'the
destruction of [his] country'. 


But the confederation of warlords, Pakistan Taliban, Deobandi religious
networks, businessmen and smugglers, the veterans such as Haqqani and the
newcomers who have seized power in villages like Mir Ali will not give way
easily. 


'The loose, chaotic quasi-state which we are seeing emerging has been in the
process of being built since the early days of the war against the Soviets
30 years ago,' said one western diplomat in Pakistan. 'It is going to take
that long, if not longer, to dismantle.' 


Rise of the radicals 


Taliban literally means 'students'. Originally mainly ethnic Pashtuns, many
footsoldiers came from radical seminaries in Pakistan, where two million
Afghans sought refuge from two decades of war. 


Soviet troops left Afghanistan in 1989. The pro-Soviet government fell in
1992; rebel factions took power but then began infighting. Thousands died in
a vicious civil war. The Taliban emerged as a real force in 1994. In 1996
they captured Kabul. They were forced out in 2001 by a US-led invasion, but
staged a comeback last year. 


The Taliban believe in a strict interpretation of Islamic law and last month
produced a constitution. Executions are carried out in public. Women are
fully covered and are not permitted education. Men should wear beards, and
light entertainment - music, television and film - is deemed to be
anti-Islamic. 


Poppy production in Afghanistan rose dramatically after the 2001 invasion
destabilised a shaky economy, leading more and more farmers to turn to opium
production to survive. The country provides 86 per cent of the world's
supply of the drug.

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