The Cole Bombing in Yemen: A Seven Year Perspective
Jane Novak - 10/12/2007 

http://globalpolitician.com/articledes.asp?ID=3607 
<http://globalpolitician.com/articledes.asp?ID=3607&cid=2&sid=90> &cid=2&sid=90
On October 12, 2000 two Yemeni suicide bombers rammed an explosives-laden dingy 
into an American destroyer, the USS Cole. Seventeen US service members were 
killed and forty-nine injured. The destroyer had been invited by the Yemeni 
government to refuel in the port of Aden.

In the light of historical perspective, several facts have become clear. 
Intelligence warnings generated prior to the attack were never forwarded to the 
commander of the Cole. The investigation afterwards was marred by turf wars 
within the US government, leaving links between the Cole bombing and the 
attacks of 9/11 unexplored. The Yemeni government worked diligently to limit 
the scope of the US investigation. Almost all the Yemenis involved in the Cole 
bombing are walking free. The involvement of some Yemeni officials in the 
bombing is documented; however, the scope of that involvement is not.

THE YEMEN SIDE

The 1990's

Military commander and presidential half brother, Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar recruited 
fighters for bin Laden in the 1980's and set up training camps in Yemen. 
Thousands of Yemenis at all levels were active in the Afghan conflict. After 
the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan, the Yemeni regime welcomed 
thousands of both Yemeni and non-Yemeni "Afghan Arabs" back to Yemen. Many of 
these hard core Islamists were militarily deployed in defense of the regime 
during its civil war in 1994 against Southern Socialists. As a result, many 
Afghan Arabs and other Islamic militants who fought in 1994 against "apostate" 
socialists are today ensconced in high level government positions. Others were 
absorbed into the military and security forces.

Through the 1990's, both Osama bin Laden and Aiman Zawaheri traveled in and out 
and around Yemen on many occasions, often meeting religious leaders and 
prominent persons. Bin Laden delivered sermons in Yemeni mosques and 
purportedly held a six hour meeting with Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar in Sana'a airport 
in 1996.

Bin Laden made a deal with the Yemeni government in 1999, according to the 9/11 
Commission Report. After A l-Qaeda operative Khallad bin Attash was arrested in 
Yemen, Bin Laden contacted a Yemeni official and bargained for Attash's 
release. The Yemeni regime released Attash and promised not to confront 
al-Qaeda. In exchange, Bin Laden pledged not to attack Yemen. This pattern of 
negotiation continues today.

In 1999, Attash returned to Afghanistan. In January 2000 Attash along with 
Yemeni Fahd al-Quso attended a high level al-Qaeda meeting in Malaysia at which 
the attacks on the USS Cole and the World Trade Center were discussed and 
planned. Attash, who was captured by US forces in Pakistan in 2003, confessed 
to organizing the Cole attack according to a military transcripts released at 
his hearing held at Guantanamo Bay. Al-Quso who helped prepared the bombing of 
the USS Cole was found guilty in a Yemeni court.

Were the Bombers Tipped Off?

In 2000, security concerns in Dijoubouti made Aden port only a slightly more 
attractive choice for refueling the Cole. Refueling at sea was also certainly 
an option. However, the US was concerned with rebuilding relations with Yemen. 
Relations had cooled significantly after the first Gulf War when Yemen, holding 
a Security Council seat, supported long time ally Saddam Hussein against the 
US. 

One lingering question about the Cole bombing is whether the bombers had 
advance knowledge about the arrival of the USS Cole. Oddly, the Yemeni 
government denied receiving information about the impending arrival of the USS 
Cole. Yemeni President Saleh said, "The Americans made a mistake when they 
entered the port with such a large size and greatly valuable destroyer without 
guarding or notifying the Yemeni side to provide such protection," the Yemen 
Times reported in November 2000. However, General Anthony Zinni, former Centcom 
commander, noted in his 2000 congressional testimony that, "The force 
protection in the port is the responsibility of the Yemeni government." He 
noted that specific arrangements for the visit are, "done with the port 
authority, and the government of Yemeni officials; their security forces." He 
also indicated that such notice is normally issued by the United States to a 
foreign government about two weeks prior to the arrival of a US vessel.

Lawrence Wright in The Looming Tower notes, "The FBI was convinced that the 
bombers had been tipped off about the arrival of the Cole, and they wanted to 
expand the investigation to include a member of the president's own family and 
a colonel in the PSO." The Yemeni government denied these requests while 
blaming the US for bombing its own ship. In July 2001, a top Yemeni official 
told the Egyptian governmental weekly, Al-Ahram Al-Arabi, that the Yemeni 
investigation indicated that the US intentionally blew up the Cole as a pretext 
for invasion. He said the US planned on turning the port of Aden into a US 
naval base. In December 2005, President Saleh repeated these claims on national 
TV, stating, "there was a plan to occupy Aden" after the Cole bombing. However 
notorious the Yemeni regime may be for duplicity, and many within the US 
administration excuse these statements as understandable domestic posturing, 
the fact remains there are many indications of regime complicity in the bombing 
of the USS Cole.



As noted by a 2007 US Congressional Research Service report, " Yemeni 
authorities did not fully cooperate in the investigation of the Cole bombing." 
US investigators were prevented from directly interrogating Yemeni suspects, 
and were forced to submit their questions on paper. The Yemeni officials also 
hid evidence. According to Lawrence Wright, "The Yemenis finally produced a 
videotape taken by a harborside security camera, but it appeared to have been 
edited to delete the crucial moment of explosion…" T he Yemeni government's 
lack of cooperation with federal investigators was most like designed to 
protect upper level officials complicit in the attack.

One document admitted by the Yemeni court in the 2003 trial of five accused 
Cole plotters was an official letter from Yemen's then interior minister, 
Hussain Arab, which instructed Yemeni security forces to give safe passage and 
cooperation to Muhammed Omar al-Harazi a/k/a Abd al-Rahman Al-Nashiri from 
April to December 2000. Other documents used by the bombers included arms 
permits normally issued by the Ministry of the Interior which were said to be a 
forgery, the Yemen Times reported in 2005.

The Yemeni Opposition Group, the Southern Democratic Assembly based in the UK, 
issued a statement in November 2006 prior to a London Donors Conference on 
Yemen which reads in part, " Both the evidence and information indicate that 
who carried out the bombing attack on the American Warship USS Cole in Aden 
port in October 2000 are well-known bodies to the Yemeni regime and some of who 
were involved still in their jobs."

In May 2001, UPI reported, "According to several US government sources, one of 
the reasons the attack on the Cole succeeded was involvement by the 'highest 
levels' of the Yemen government of President Ali Abdallah Saleh, although Saleh 
himself personally was not." However this is not a view shared by the former 
commander of the Yemeni Navy at the time of the Cole bombing. In an interview 
after he defected to the UK, Commander Ahmed Al-Hassani said that President 
Saleh knew in advance of the bombing. Al-Hassani pointed out that the night 
before the bombing, President Saleh sent his Interior Minister and Political 
Security Minister from the capital Sana'a to Aden where the USS Cole was bombed 
hours later.

The Cole Bombers

The Yemeni justice system is highly corrupt, politicized and irregular. Thus it 
is unsurprising that with few exceptions, the Cole plotters and their 
co-conspirators were given light sentences, were released early, were never 
charged or escaped jail multiple times. Some convicted terrorists were later 
given government jobs, money, land and a car in order to facilitate their 
reintegration into society, the Yemeni government says. The regime defends 
these actions as a practical way to diminish the threat of future terror 
attacks. Others see these accommodations as a reward.

The Yemeni government named Jamal Muhammad al-Badawi as the leader of the 
group, Abdu al-Rahim al-Nashiri as the financier and several others as 
involved, including two policemen who provided false documents. However shortly 
after, Mohammed Hamdi al-Ahdal was listed as one of the main operatives and 
financiers of the plot.

Six convicted Cole conspirators' appeal verdict was rendered in March of 2005 
wherein the Yemeni court reduced Mamoon Amswah's sentence from eight to five 
years. The court upheld the death penalty for Abdu al-Rahim al-Nashiri, who is 
in US custody. Fahd Al-Quso who helped prepare the bombing and was supposed to 
videotape the explosion had his ten year prison sentence upheld. Ali Mohamed 
Murakab and Morad al-Sorori both retained five year sentences for forging 
identification documents.

Jamal al-Badawi was originally sentenced to death by a Yemeni court for his 
involvement in the attack. The sentence was commuted upon appeal to fifteen 
years in prison. However, al-Badawi managed to escape from jail twice and is 
currently at large. Ten prisoners linked to the USS Cole bombing, including 
Jamal al-Badawi and Fahd al-Quso, escaped from an Aden jail in 2003. Other 2003 
Aden escapees included Khaldoun Al-Hukaimi and Saleh Mana. The pair was 
reported to have committed suicide attacks in Iraq in 2005, RayNews reported.

After their escape from prison, in May 2003 Jamal Al-Badawi and Fahd al-Quso 
were indicted on over fifty terror related offenses by a federal grand jury in 
Manhattan, New York for plotting the attack on the Cole. Both al-Quso and 
al-Badawi were recaptured in March 2004. Jamal Al-Badawi escaped from prison 
again in 2006 along with 17 others involved in the USS Cole bombing. Shortly 
after the escape, Yemen's Specialized Penal Court ordered the release of Hadi 
Saleh Al-Waeli suspected of selling arms, ammunition and explosives to the 
terrorists who bombed the USS Cole Destroyer at Aden Port in 2000.

In 2003, Yemen arrested Mohammed Hamdi al-Ahdal. On the US list of most wanted 
terrorists in Yemen. Al-Ahdal is believed to be one of the masterminds of the 
Cole bombing. Yemen refused to allow US federal investigators access to 
Al-Ahdal, insisting instead that the FBI submit questions for al-Ahdal in 
writing. Sources indicated to the Yemen Times that al-Ahdal had confessed to 
"being in charge of technical and financial preparations" for both the Cole and 
Limburg attacks. Al-Ahdal was tried and convicted in 2006 on charges of 
distributing money for al-Qaeda. No charges were brought relating to the Cole 
bombing. He was sentenced to 37 months in prison, and with time served, was 
released shortly thereafter. In 2006, Ghalib Al-Zaidi was also charged with 
harboring al-Ahdal for a month following the Cole bombing; al-Zaidi was 
sentenced to three years time served and released.

THE US SIDE

Turf Wars Hamper Investigation

The FBI's ability to investigate the bombing was curtailed not only by the 
Yemeni government but also by the US State Department, which was interested in 
maintaining good relation with Yemen. Lead FBI investigator and one of the US's 
foremost al-Qaeda experts, John O'Neill " had come to believe that some Yemeni 
officials were not being forthcoming about information from (Fahd) al Quso and 
other suspects," Frontline reported. However, the US ambassador to Yemen 
clashed with O'Neill, hampering the FBI's investigations . Tensions between 
O'Neill and Ambassador to Yemen, Barbara Bodine, escalated to the point where 
Bodine actively lobbied to have O'Neill taken off the case. According to Barry 
Mawn, O'Neill's boss who was called in to investigated the dispute, "it was 
clear that she simply hated his guts." Bodine was O'Neill's only detractor, 
Mawn found. Bodine prohibited O'Neill's re-entry into Yemen after he withdrew 
his team in response to a threat against his agents. According to Cooperative 
Research, "without (O'Neill's) influential presence, the Yemeni government will 
not allow an interrogation."

Similarly, the CIA failed to share intelligence with the FBI after the Cole 
bombing, and connections between the USS Cole bombing and 9/11 were left 
unexplored. The CIA did not forward information about Tawfiq bin-Attash (a/k/a 
Khallad) when requested by the FBI. The FBI had growing suspicions of a second 
attack when it was discovered that prior to the Cole bombing, money was taken 
out of Yemen by al-Quso and given to Attash. The CIA was aware of the 2000 
Malaysia meeting among several high level al-Qaeda operatives, including calls 
between Malaysia and Yemen. The CIA had photos of both Attash and al-Quso at 
the Malysia meeting; however it withheld the photos and other information about 
the meeting from the FBI.

Warnings Before Not Circulated

The failure of the US embassy and the CIA to support the FBI's investigation 
after the Cole bombing was preceded by a lack of US intelligence coordination 
before the bombing. Richard Clarke, the National Security Council adviser 
stated to CNN shortly after the bombing that there was "no basis" for saying 
that the USS Cole bombing was an intelligence failure on the part of the US 
intelligence community. However, a secret Pentagon intelligence unit known as 
Able Danger identified increased al-Qaeda activity in Aden prior to the Cole 
attack two weeks before the attack and again two days before the terrorist 
attack.

The New York Post reported that Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer, the Defense 
Intelligence Agency's former liaison to Able Danger said Capt. Scott Phillpott, 
Able Danger's leader, briefed Gen. Peter Schoomaker, former head of Special 
Operations Command about the findings on Yemen "two or three weeks" before the 
Cole attack. " Yemen was elevated by Able Danger to be one of the top three hot 
spots for al Qaeda in the entire world," Shaffer said.

Congressman Kurt Weldon in a 2005 Congressional floor speech said, "They (Able 
Danger) also identified the threat to the USS Cole two weeks before the attack, 
and two days before the attack were screaming not to let the USS Cole come into 
the harbor at Yemen because they knew something was about to happen." The 
Scramento Bee reported that "Two Able Danger analysts briefed Gen. Peter 
Schoomaker, then head of U.S. Special Operations Command, on their 
findings…two days before the attack on the Cole." The commander of the USS 
Cole, Kirk Lippold, never received the warning.

Another intelligence analyst, Kie Fallis, at the Defense Intelligence Agency 
also advised several of his superiors of the heightened risk in Yemen and 
indications of terror activities in Aden prior to the attack. An official 
warning was not generated. As Senator Pat Roberts noted during Congress' Joint 
Inquiry into the 9/11 attacks, "(Fallis) attempted in vain -- in vain, to 
convince his superiors to issue a threat warning in August of 2000…His 
warnings were considered -- I think they were called anomalies, not 
connections. And we now know different. The NSA issued the warning the day 
after the attack."

Tommy Franks, commander of Centcom at the time of the Cole bombing testified 
before Congress that he never received any warning regarding Aden, nor did he 
review the decision of his predecessor General Zinni to refuel at Aden port. 
Naval Commander Lippold has been blocked from promotion and, as a result of the 
US Navy's "up or out policy", is being forced into retirement. Able Danger's 
Anthony Shaeffer had his security clearance was revoked in 2006 and his 
family's health insurance cancelled, apparently in retribution for speaking 
out. Kie Fallis quit DIA in protest the day after the bombings.

Back to the future

The bombing of the USS Cole was one incident in a pattern of escalating 
al-Qaeda attacks on the US that began with the 1993 World Trade Center bombing 
and culminated in 2001 with the deaths of nearly 3000 US citizens. In the wake 
of 9/11, structural procedures and adjustments have been instituted to break 
down the wall between US intelligence agencies. However, the tension caused by 
maintaining the semi-cooperation of "allies" in counter-terror efforts remains 
a vital issue, and no better example exists than US-Yemeni relations.

In 2007, international cooperation is essential in uncovering terrorists' 
plans, networks and operatives. However, many find the US focus on 
counter-terror both myopic and counter-productive in dealing with its allies. 
This view is widely held by Yemeni reformers who pay the price for their 
advocacy in blood. The US is perceived as tacitly approving of civil and human 
rights abuses as long as the regime is forth coming with counter-terror 
cooperation. Yemen's progressives have a message that undermines the 
dictatorship, regressive forces and the terrorists. Consequently, reformists 
are targeted by the regime and labeled un-Islamic and Western stooges in the 
public media.

Yemen uses and exports Islamic fanatics as a tool of domestic and foreign 
policy. After the empowerment of Hamas in a democratic election, the idealistic 
US push for democratization and reform in the Middle East was met by the 
real-politik fears of radical Islamists gaining political power. In Yemen, 
radical Islamists already have political power and government jobs, as 
evidenced by the state's failure to thwart terrorist financing, media 
incitement, mosque incitement, material support and moral support for 
terrorism. With or without official political status, elections or recognition, 
Yemeni Islamist militants are capable of influencing the regime and deploying 
state resources. And these political players are more dangerous when they are 
playing the game underground, while an enormous game of charades takes place in 
the media.

The days of "with us or against us" are certainly over as the intertwined 
structure between dictatorships and terrorists becomes clearer. To undermine 
one is to undermine the other, to support one supports the other. The natural 
alliance between indigenous reformists and the United States is dysfunctional 
in the current climate, leaving both more vulnerable. However, there are many 
in the Yemeni administration and some in the opposition who are quite patriotic 
and in favor of reform and modernization. Somehow the US must become as good at 
playing both sides of the fence as the Yemeni regime is. 

Jane Novak ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) reports on Yemen for the Global Politician. She 
runs a website which is currently banned in Yemen. Ms. Novak appeared on 
al-Jazeera as an expert on Yemen in courts around the world that have accepted 
her testimony as an expert.
        
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