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White guys with guns: Canada's military in Afghanistan
by Dave Markland
October 15, 2007
The current incarnation of the Canadian military mission in Afghanistan
began in February of 2006, and followed earlier military commitments
beginning in the fall of 2001. Now operating mainly under NATO command as
part of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), the array of
Canadian Forces' roles has several notable aspects, some of which overlap:
about 1200 troops make up the Canadian battle group headquartered at
Kandahar Airfield, along with several hundred support personnel; over 100
soldiers comprise the bulk of the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) based
out Camp Nathan Smith in Kandahar City; the Operational Mentoring and
Liaison Team (omelette), which embeds with and trains Afghan troops; and
the Strategic Advisory Team (SAT) which is embedded with various Afghan
government ministries in Kabul. In total, some 2500 personnel make up the
conventional forces deployed in Afghanistan. Additionally, an unknown number
of JTF-2 special forces work alongside special forces from the US and other
countries as part of Operation Enduring Freedom. Very little is known about
their role.
With a few exceptions, media coverage of the mission has been generally
sympathetic to the claims and actions of Canadian military officials. It is
the purpose of this essay to shed light on the less-reported aspects of the
mission, about which our military and government officials rarely speak.
The spectacle at Kandahar Air Field (KAF) seems reminiscent of the bar scene
in Star Wars. An enormous, Russian-built complex, KAF sits on the edge of
the vast desert in southern Afghanistan which straddles the border with
Pakistan amidst Pashtun territory. Journalists describe a steady of flow of
soldiers from several countries, many of whom are off-limits to reporters.
American and Canadian special forces, for instance, cannot be interviewed or
even mentioned by the press. And those troops may not be the only ones
keeping a low profile, as "a senior British officer said there last autumn
that he was convinced the Taliban had many spies on the base".
Apart from the multinational tutoring in special ops and media relations,
there may be other important skills being disseminated at KAF. A Norwegian
newspaper caused a stir early this year when it reported on sworn testimony
by several US interrogators who had worked at the base and described some of
the goings-on, including the widespread use of torture.
But what about off-base, where the mission actually takes place, among the
Afghan population? There, NATO forces are engaged in what military
strategists term the "inkspot strategy" of counter-insurgency. Essentially
this means that NATO ground troops, with air support, clear a given area of
armed insurgents and hand over control of the territory to Afghan National
Army (ANA) troops who in turn hand off the area to Afghan National Police
(ANP) units. Then, development projects are launched with the intention of
strengthening the population's allegiance to the national government.
The mission of the Canadian Forces is of a type which is wholly new to them,
and seriously at odds with what many feel is the traditional role of our
forces - i.e. peacekeeping. A Globe and Mail editorial marks the shift: the
"new era of peacemaking", we are told, demands "pitched battles over a few
metres of road". Others are not so quick to put on kid gloves when
describing the mission. Scott Taylor, editor of Canadian military magazine
Esprit de Corps, skips the linguistic niceties and describes Canadian troops
in Afghanistan simply as "occupying forces".
How do soldiers themselves view their task? "Hours of boredom and then an
intense moment of adrenaline," says one 25-year-old Canadian Forces gunner.
"One fellow compares the subliminally percussive sensation to sex", relates
a Toronto Star reporter. Another soldier reports vengeance and geopolitics
as his motivator: "I have absolutely no problem killing them," asserts a
battle group sergeant. "They started this on September 11. We're just
bringing the fight back to them".
Indeed, many soldiers have taken up their tasks with gusto. Others,
meanwhile, have been disappointed when the fight wasn't as hot as they
expected. Shortly after arrival in Kandahar, members of the Van Doos
regiment "étaient un peu frustrés de participer à une mission de
reconstruction et auraient préféré combattre à leur arrivée en Afghanistan."
("were a little frustrated to be taking part in a reconstruction mission and
would have preferred to fight upon their arrival in Afghanistan").
If all this Rambo-style readiness sounds to some like an echo of American
military bravado, there may be good reason for it. Working in close quarters
with their US counterparts seems to have caused a certain mindset to rub off
on Canadian officers, exemplified by NATO spokesman James Appathurai. "NATO
forces have the right and the responsibility to protect their mission,"
asserts the former employee of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. "That
includes the right -- and indeed, if the commander deems it necessary -- the
responsibility to take pre-emptive action".
The M777 - 'Take that house out'
One of the key tools in Canada's version of "peacemaking", the British-made
M777 Howitzer gun, which can shoot 6 inch-diameter bullets a distance of
30km (22 miles), has reportedly been dubbed the Desert dragon by insurgent
fighters. Acquired by the Canadian Forces in the fall of 2005, the weapon
has gained a devoted fan base among military brass. "When the infantry, for
example, come up against a couple of houses where they would suffer
casualties going in and clearing that house of the enemy, even though they
would win, it's sort of nice to be able to stand back and turn to the tanker
and say, 'Take that house out.'" So explained retired Major-General Lewis
MacKenzie, who has been doing near full-time public relations for the war.
Afghan bystanders, ceaselessly endangered by NATO operations, might disagree
with MacKenzie that the experience is "sort of nice".
Getting into the spirit of things, the Globe and Mail's Gloria Galloway
extols the benefits of the M777: "They are a good negotiation tool; in
trying to persuade Afghans not to help the Taliban, Canadians can
demonstrate the consequences of bad behaviour by radioing to a launcher many
kilometres away, and suddenly the Afghan farmer is left with a large hole in
his field and a new appreciation of NATO firepower". Galloway seems to be
using the word "negotiation" in a technical sense; others less skilled in
journalism or public relations might use words like "extortion" or
"coercion".
Foreign troops mentor from a distance
The use of the long-distance "negotiating tool", combined with "close air
support" (CAS), underlines the sometimes cautious, circumspect nature of
NATO's presence in southern Afghanistan. Indeed, various media have reported
on the hide-and-seek nature of counter-insurgency in Afghanistan. "The U.S.
and NATO forces only venture out to conduct special operations. Routine
patrolling and intelligence gathering is the responsibility of the nascent
Afghan National Army," writes John Cherian. Further, he asserts that
"loyalty of the Afghan Security Forces cannot be taken for granted... For
instance, General Bismillah Khan, Chief of Staff of the Afghan National
Army, is a former warlord".
Writing from Helmand province, the Globe and Mail's Graeme Smith remarks
that "British troops were effectively under siege at their patrol base in
Sangin [Helmand province] last year". And this fact isn't winning many
friends for the foreign forces: "Those foreign [expletive deleted] say there
is security - its a lie," charged one Afghan army commander. "They dont
risk their asses out here. There are Taleban right in the district centre,
but the British and the Americans stay in their holes".
While Canadian soldiers appear to have been spared such disparaging
accusations, it is worth noting the disproportionate share of risk alloted
to Afghan forces. Afghan army and police officers accompanying NATO troops
sustain about 90% of the total combat injuries.
Mercenaries
So what is an occupying army, huddled behind the wire, supposed to do? Well,
if you are NATO then you go ahead and pay some trustworthy locals to fight
for you. That is, you hire mercenaries. Under the headline, "British hire
anti-Taliban mercenaries", the Times of London reports on "newly formed
tribal police who will be recruited by paying a higher rate than the
Taliban."
Canadian forces, too, are getting in on the action. "For five years Col.
Toorjan, a turbaned, tough-as-nails, 33-year-old soldier, has been working
alongside U.S. and Canadian forces in Afghanistan as a paid mercenary
commander," reports Canada's National Post. "Today, his militia force of 60
Afghan fighters guards Camp Nathan Smith, the Canadian provincial
reconstruction team site (PRT) in Kandahar, and guides Canadian soldiers on
their patrols outside the base." Toorjan and his armed men "wield
significant influence in Kandahar's complex security web", making him a
treasured ally, though before 9/11 he was "in effect a warlord", said the
second-in-command of Canada's Provincial Reconstruction Team.
The use of mercenaries, it should be noted, runs counter to the
International Convention on Mercenaries (1989). Canada, however, along with
the USA, the UK and many others, is not a signatory to that treaty.
Air strikes
The use of mercenaries isn't the only indication that NATO/US troops are
ill-equipped for this war. The reliance on air power, which has been a vital
part of this confrontation since the US-led assault began in October of
2001, has brought wide-spread condemnation for the risk to civilians which
it entails. Thousands of civilians have perished under US and NATO bombs
since 2001, prompting numerous calls by Afghan President Karzai for more
caution on the part of western forces.
In the current situation, it is largely American aircraft which carry out
air assaults. (The British, French, Germans and others have also committed
aircraft, which are largely used in transport or surveillance.) Called
"close air support" (CAS), these war planes are routinely called in by
ground forces when they locate insurgent fighters. The CAS might deliver
bombs, missiles, shells or simply a "show of force" to destroy or deter
those fighters. But these attacks are a blunt instrument, and civilian
casualties are a frequent consequence. "[P]ushing into insurgent-held
territory", writes Terri Judd of the Independent, "increases the danger of
civilian casualties, especially when outnumbered troops call in air
strikes".
The results of this type of assault have been a humanitarian and public
relations disaster for NATO and US forces. NATOs tactics are increasingly
endangering the civilians that they are supposed to be protecting, and
turning the local population against them, observed Sam Zia-Zarifi, the
Afghanistan researcher for Human Rights Watch. Yet the foreign forces appear
to have expended little effort to ameliorate the situation, as the rate of
air attacks through the summer and into the fall of 2007 demonstrate: Close
air support missions have been launched at a remarkably steady rate of about
40 per day.
The sheer danger of these air operations has not been lost on international
observers on the ground. Human rights expert and UN official in Afghanistan
Javier Leon Diaz, responding to concerns over mounting civilian casualties,
expressed his opinion that NATO/US air attacks may constitute a "grave
breach" of the Geneva Conventions. Here, Diaz no doubt refers to Article 51
of the 1977 Protocols, which bans "indiscrimate" attacks, defined as attacks
which harm civilians and/or civilian objects "which would be excessive in
relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated."
Engaging (suspected) Taliban
While western military officials repeatedly affirm their desire to protect
the Afghan population, at least one account indicates that NATO efforts to
avoid causing harm to civilians are less than vigorous. Canadian military
historian Sean Maloney, writing in Maclean's magazine, describes a nighttime
attack by Canadian Forces in Kandahar province: "Canadian artillery
thundered to cut off and destroy the escaping enemy. Little was left to
chance: troops knew the enemy had depopulated the area so there was little
fear of civilian casualties." Note that if Maloney's account is accurate,
Canadian troops relied on Taliban fighters to ensure the battleground was
free of civilians.
Armed confrontations aren't the only situations where civilian lives are put
at risk, for "sometimes all it takes to be labelled a terrorist is a smart
turban and pocketful of Pakistan cash", remarks journalist Richard Foot.
Foot writes of witnessing one such incident where a suspect was fruitlessly
interrogated and finally let go. "For two hours, Canadians questioned,
cursed at and threatened their suspect in search of answers," he writes.
"They bound his wrists and turned him over to the small unit of Afghan army
troops who had accompanied the Canadians".
Sometimes Canadian troops go beyond curses and threats, according to
correspondent Graeme Smith of the Globe and Mail. Smith's April 2007
dispatches, featuring a series of testimonials by Afghan prisoners, sparked
what has been called the "torture scandal" by Canadian media; the term
denotes torture of suspected Taliban by Afghan security forces, which caused
quite a stir. But none of the barrage of commentary which followed from his
reports made mention of possible abuse by Canadian soldiers. One of Smith's
sources makes precisely that accusation, however faintly: "Tila Mohammed,
18, said Canadians detained him at a farmhouse where he had been living and
working as a labourer for a wealthy landowner. He claimed the Canadians
kicked him a little as he was being detained, but added that the troops
later helped him stay cool in the late summer heat by spraying him with
water."
A similar lack of outcry greeted a pair of incidents nearly a year earlier.
Following an August 2006 suicide bombing in Kandahar City which killed one
Canadian soldier, Afghan journalists "reported being fired upon by the
Canadians when they tried to capture video and pictures at the bombing
site", according to the Canadian Press. But the attacked journalists were
the lucky ones that day, as a young Afghan boy was shot dead by jittery
Canadian troops who had recently begun their mission in the country.
However, the deputy commander of the Canadian mission assured everyone that
the tragic incident was not the result of inexperience: "Initial impressions
right now are the soldiers did what they had to do," commented Col. Fred
Lewis.
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