Where the Jihad Lives Now
Islamic militants have spread beyond their tribal bases, and have the run of
an unstable, nuclear-armed nation.
By Ron Moreau
NEWSWEEK
Updated: 4:08 PM ET Oct 20, 2007

Benazir Bhutto was worried she would not survive the day. It was, for her,
to be a moment of joyous return after eight years of exile, but also an hour
of great peril. Just before she left Dubai for Pakistan on Thursday, Oct.
18, Bhutto directed that a letter be hand-delivered to Pervez Musharraf, the
embattled Pakistani autocrat with whom she had negotiated a tenuous
political alliance. If anything happens to me, please investigate the
following individuals in your government, she wrote, according to an account
given to NEWSWEEK by her husband, Asif Ali Zardari. Bhutto, Pakistan's
former prime minister, then proceeded to name several senior security
officials she considered to be enemies, Zardari said. Principal among those
she identified, according to another supporter who works for her Pakistan
People's Party, was Ejaz Shah, the head of Pakistan's shadowy Intelligence
Bureau, which runs domestic surveillance in somewhat the way M.I.5 does in
Britain. Shah, a longtime associate of Musharraf's, is believed by Bhutto
supporters to have Islamist sympathies. And Bhutto had boldly challenged
Pakistan's Muslim extremists, declaring before her arrival that "the
terrorists are trying to take over my country, and we have to stop them."

Bhutto was certainly prescient about the threat. On Thursday, as her
motorcade inched along a parade route guarded by roughly 20,000 Pakistani
security forces, one or more suicide bombers set off twin explosions that
killed at least 134 bystanders and police, and injured 450 others. The bombs
narrowly missed Bhutto, who had ducked into her armored truck minutes
before. Shaken but uninjured, she was rushed to safety. Musharraf's
government quickly fingered Baitullah Mehsud, a longtime Taliban supporter
and director of some of the most lethal training facilities for suicide
bombers in the far-off mountains of Waziristan. Mehsud had reportedly
threatened Bhutto. She and her husband, however, pointed much closer to
home. "We do not buy that it was Mehsud," Zardari told NEWSWEEK. There was
no immediate evidence that Shah was connected to the bombing. At a news
conference the next day, though, Bhutto noted that the streetlights had
mysteriously been turned off on her parade route and said: "I am not
accusing the government. I am accusing people, certain individuals who abuse
their positions. Who abuse their powers."

Whoever the real culprits turn out to be, the truth is that Pakistan's
government has only itself to blame for the carnage in Karachi. Pakistani
leaders created the Islamist monster that now operates with near impunity
throughout the country. Militant Islamist groups that were originally
recruited, trained and armed by Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence
agency (ISI) have since become Islamabad's deadliest enemies. Twice they
have nearly succeeded in assassinating Musharraf, who was once among their
strongest supporters. In the last six years extremists have killed more than
1,000 Pakistani troops.

Today no other country on earth is arguably more dangerous than Pakistan. It
has everything Osama bin Laden could ask for: political instability, a
trusted network of radical Islamists, an abundance of angry young
anti-Western recruits, secluded training areas, access to state-of-the-art
electronic technology, regular air service to the West and security services
that don't always do what they're supposed to do. (Unlike in Iraq or
Afghanistan, there also aren't thousands of American troops hunting down
would-be terrorists.) Then there's the country's large and growing nuclear
program. "If you were to look around the world for where Al Qaeda is going
to find its bomb, it's right in their backyard," says Bruce Riedel, the
former senior director for South Asia on the National Security Council.

The conventional story about Pakistan has been that it is an unstable
nuclear power, with distant tribal areas in terrorist hands. What is new,
and more frightening, is the extent to which Taliban and Qaeda elements have
now turned much of the country, including some cities, into a base that
gives jihadists more room to maneuver, both in Pakistan and beyond.

In recent months, as Musharraf has grown more and more unpopular after eight
years of rule, Islamists have been emboldened. The homegrown militants who
have hidden Al Qaeda's leaders since the end of 2001 are no longer
restricted to untamed mountain villages along the border. These Islamist
fighters now operate relatively freely in cities like Karachi-a process the
U.S. and Pakistani governments call "Talibanization." Hammered by suicide
bombers and Iraq-style IEDs and reluctant to make war on its countrymen,
Pakistan's demoralized military seems incapable of stopping the jihadists
even in the cities. "Until I return to fight, I'll feel safe and relaxed
here," Abdul Majadd, a Taliban commander who was badly wounded this summer
during a fire fight against British troops in Afghanistan, told NEWSWEEK
recently after he was evacuated to Karachi for emergency care.

Militancy is woven into the fabric of Pakistani society. At independence in
1947, the country's whisky-swilling founder, Mohammed Ali Jinnah, used Islam
to forge a sense of national identity. Since then the various military
dictators who have periodically ruled the country have found jihad to be a
convenient means of distracting their citizens and furthering their
foreign-policy aims. Gen. Zia ul-Haq turned Pakistan into a base for the
mujahedin waging war on the Soviets in Afghanistan-and won billions in
American aid in the process. In the 1990s, after the Soviet defeat, generals
like Musharraf dispatched thousands of those fighters to wage a guerrilla
campaign in Kashmir. Many trained across the border in Afghanistan, in the
same camps that Al Qaeda had set up under the Taliban.

After 9/11 Musharraf promised Washington that he would cut off support for
such groups, including the Taliban. Early on, he authorized the arrests of
several top Qaeda leaders in Pakistani cities, including Khalid Sheikh
Mohammed, the mastermind of the 9/11 attacks, and Abu Zubaydah, a top Qaeda
organizer. But Musharraf's efforts have always been somewhat halfhearted,
constrained by the deep sympathies that many of his countrymen have for
jihadists. For decades Pakistanis were taught that the guerrillas were
Muslim heroes, fighting for national honor and security. Such loyalties
cannot be turned off like a tap. Several of the militants' onetime
spymasters, both inside and outside the government, maintain links to their
former charges. The security services will go after certain
figures-particularly foreign Qaeda fighters-but ask others simply to lie
low. Many officials-even many ordinary citizens-still think the jihadists
should be preserved for future use as a strategic weapon, especially against
India, long after America's War on Terror is over.

The safe haven provided by Pakistan has already had dire effects on U.S. and
NATO efforts to fight the resurgent Taliban next door in Afghanistan.
Taliban fighters now pretty much come and go as they please inside Pakistan.
Their sick and injured get patched up in private hospitals there. Guns and
supplies are readily available, and in the winter, when fighting
traditionally dies down in Afghanistan, thousands retire to the country's
thriving madrassas to study the Qur'an. Some of the brainier operatives
attend courses in computer technology, video production and even English.
Far from keeping a low profile, the visiting fighters attend services at
local mosques, where after prayers they speak to the congregation,
soliciting donations to support the war against the West. "Pakistan is like
your shoulder that supports your RPG," Taliban commander Mullah Momin Ahmed
told NEWSWEEK, barely a month before a U.S. airstrike killed him last
September in Afghanistan's eastern Ghazni province. "Without it you couldn't
fight. Thank God Pakistan is not against us."

Dozens of Taliban commanders have moved their wives and children to
Pakistan, where they live in the suburbs of cities like Peshawar and
Islamabad. This keeps them out of the reach of Afghan authorities, who have
been known to arrest relatives in order to track down guerrilla fighters.
Mullah Shabir Ahmad is a member of the Taliban's 30-man ruling council, or
shura. He's moved his family to a modest neighborhood of nearly identical
brick and mud-brick houses in Quetta. Inside his home he shows a visiting
NEWSWEEK reporter a room filled with new bolts of cloth, Ramadan gifts from
the city's Taliban sympathizers. He spends roughly half the year inside
Pakistan, shuttling between Quetta, Karachi, Peshawar and the tribal belt to
raise funds, recruit new fighters and plot strategy with other commanders.

The insurgents have no centralized supply system. Instead, each senior
provincial commander operates his own network. Din Mohammad, a tall, portly
man in his mid-30s, looks after the needs of insurgents who fight for
commander Gul Agha in southern Helmand province. With cash from Afghanistan
and from his own fund-raising efforts he buys shoes and warm clothes for
Taliban fighters, walkie-talkies and satellite phones-even weapons,
explosives and remote-control devices. The benign stuff he trucks into
Afghanistan openly. The lethal items are hidden in shipments of clothes and
food or under the baggage of Afghan refugees on their way home. Some Taliban
chiefs prefer to shop for themselves. Earlier this month Mullah Rehmat, a
Taliban commander, rested at a youth hostel in Peshawar while he waited for
the master gunsmiths of Dera Adam Khel village to finish a $750 sniper rifle
he'd ordered.

The contrast to 2002 is striking. Back then, in the first flush of
Musharraf's crackdown on extremists, a NEWSWEEK reporter met Agha Jan, a
former senior Taliban Defense Ministry official, in an orchard outside the
city of Quetta. A nervous Jan recounted how he had to change homes every two
nights for fear of capture, and he fled when some local villagers
approached. Jan now has a house outside Quetta, where he lives when he's not
fighting with Taliban forces across the border in his native Zabul province.
Reporters in Peshawar, a strategic Pakistani border city some 50 miles east
of the historic Khyber Pass and the Afghan border, say it's not unusual
these days to receive phone calls from visiting Taliban commanders offering
interviews, or asking where to find a cheap hotel, a good restaurant or a
new cell phone.

Last August, a NEWSWEEK reporter received a phone call from the spokesman
for a senior Taliban leader, inviting him for dinner at a popular restaurant
in Peshawar. The reporter replied that he was already there. As he looked
around, he saw the smiling jihadist sitting a few tables away. They shared a
kilo of Afghan barbecue as the spokesman confidently talked about the
Taliban's resurgence in Afghanistan and how comfortable they felt operating
inside Pakistani cities and in the frontier tribal area. "The biggest chink
in Musharraf's armor is his failure to move against the Taliban,
particularly in the cities," says Samina Ahmed, the South Asia director of
the International Crisis Group in Islamabad. "The brains, the ones who plan
the operations, are not necessarily in the boonies or in the sticks, they're
in cities like Quetta. Can he pick them up? Easily."

Taliban fighters say they are careful not to antagonize their hosts; the
attacks against Pakistani troops have generally been conducted by Pakistani
tribals, sometimes with the support of Qaeda operatives. But that's a fine
distinction. "If you take away that support the Taliban are getting from
across the border in Pakistan, it would be much easier for U.S., NATO and
Afghan government forces to confront the Taliban inside Afghanistan," says
Ahmed. Each group may have its own agenda, but they all share a visceral
hatred of America and its regional allies-including Musharraf. The Taliban
also work closely with Qaeda leaders in the tribal regions, planning attacks
together and pooling their skills.

The Taliban presence began to grow out of control after Musharraf, his Army
bloodied by incursions into South Wa-ziristan, cut a peace deal with the
tribal region's Mehsud clan in 2005. He made another such truce with tribal
militants in North Waziristan in 2006. The ceasefire agreements were
publicly announced as treaties with tribal elders. Nothing could be farther
from the truth. The deals were made directly with the militant leaders,
their frontmen or terrified tribal elders who did the militants' bidding. As
a result they were worthless: the militants had no intention of keeping
their promise to stop the passage of arms and fighters across the Afghan
border. While the Army halted offensive operations and dismantled
checkpoints, the militants helped the Taliban and Al Qaeda regroup and
reinfiltrate back into Afghanistan.

Those forces, all working together, have brought the Afghan jihad home to
Pakistan. Within the tribes' ancient mud-walled fortresses they run training
courses for insurgent recruits and suicide bombers. Some graduates travel to
Afghanistan to fight beside the Taliban. Others will stay in the tribal area
to fight the Pakistani Army, while others are sent out to hit targets in
places like Karachi. Several terrorist plots in Britain have been traced
back to the tribal areas.

Now the Pakistani government is bearing the brunt of the attacks. The threat
turned critical in July, when more than 100 militants died in a weeklong
shoot-out with government forces at Islamabad's Red Mosque. In retaliation,
tribal suicide bombers have managed to penetrate highly guarded military
facilities in the capital, the Army headquarters at Rawalpindi and
elsewhere, killing scores. Authorities say that until the showdown, the Red
Mosque had served as a way station and munitions depot for hundreds of
fighters shuttling between Pakistan's cities and the tribal areas. It
reopened Oct. 3, and preachers there are once again denouncing Musharraf and
his partnership with the West. A similar message was delivered to Bhutto
before she came home. Last week, speaking by satellite phone from the South
Waziristan tribal area, a senior militant commander named Haji Muhamad Omar
called Bhutto an agent of Washington. "She doesn't come back by her own
choice. The United States and Britain are bringing her back to fight against
the mujahedin," he said.

The militants dominate in areas beyond the tribal areas as well. Armed
groups have effectively seized control in places like the picturesque Swat
Valley, where a jihadi leader named Mullah Fazlullah rides a black horse and
commands hundreds of men under the noses of a nearby Pakistani Army division
that seldom leaves its barracks. Peshawar is perhaps the most important
production and distribution center for Taliban and other Islamist material.
Jihadi CD and DVD shops abound. One small shop features large posters of the
notorious Taliban commander Mullah Dadullah Akhund, who was killed in
Helmand earlier this year, and pictures of Guant?namo inmates in their
orange jumpsuits behind barbed wire.

The Afghan refugee camps around Peshawar, meanwhile, have become vast
jihadist sanctuaries. The Jalozai and Shamshatu camps, each housing some
100,000 Afghan refugees, date back to the war against the Soviets.
Complaints from the Afghan government have forced Islamabad and the U.N.
High Commissioner for Refugees to begin the long process of emptying
Jalozai, a job that's supposed to be completed by next spring. Many of the
camp's high-walled compounds are already abandoned. But few Jalozai
residents are returning to Afghanistan when they leave the camps. Most are
settling in Peshawar or other towns in the vicinity, which will allow the
Taliban more space to operate in. A local mullah was arrested in Jalozai
earlier this year after three Pakistani militants blew themselves up while
using his house as a bomb factory.

The Shamshatu camp, just south of Peshawar, is the personal fiefdom of the
notorious Afghan warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. His guerrillas, the
Hizb-i-Islami ("Party of Islam"), operate mainly in Afghanistan's Kunar
province, but Shamshatu is their power base, in effect an autonomous enclave
within Pakistan. Like Jalozai, the place resembles a sprawling, labyrinthine
Afghan village of mud-brick houses surrounded by high mud walls, and it's
ruled by strict, Taliban-style Islamic law. Music is forbidden-even musical
ringtones on cell phones. So is tobacco. Women are banned from venturing
outside except in the company of a male relative. (There are girls' schools,
though: unlike his Taliban allies, Hekmatyar believes in women's education.)

Shamshatu contains high-security areas that are out of bounds even to camp
residents. Camp residents say Hekmatyar's men run private jails in these
off- limits areas. Recently a woman who lived in the camp dared to go
shopping alone. When she entered a small electronics shop, gunmen followed
her. They forced the shopkeeper to close his store, detained the woman and
telephoned her husband. "If you won't kill her, we will," they told him,
before handing her over with a warning that if they caught her again without
an escort, they would kill her. Then they confiscated the shopkeeper's goods
and threw him out of the camp.

Musharraf says his forces are doing everything possible to halt the
jihadists' spread. Pakistan's president has shown he can deliver when he
must. Late last February, just as Vice President Dick Cheney arrived in
Islamabad to pressure Musharraf to fight harder against the Islamists,
Pakistani military-intelligence agents in Quetta suddenly captured Mullah
Obaidullah Akhund. As the Taliban's Defense minister and one of Mullah
Omar's key deputies, he was the highest-ranking Taliban official the
Pakistanis had ever taken into custody. A couple of months earlier, Pakistan
reportedly informed U.S. forces in Afghanistan that another senior Taliban
leader, Mullah Akhtar Mohammad Osmani, was heading into Afghanistan from
Quetta. A U.S. airstrike promptly killed him, just inside Afghanistan. But
those cases remain exceptional.

U.S. government officials say that Musharraf's government still has tight
control over the nation's nuclear-weapons program. Still, radicals would not
need to steal a whole bomb in order to create havoc. Pakistan has never made
a public accounting of its nuclear materials, and last year its Atomic
Energy Agency began publishing ads in newspapers instructing the public
about how to recognize radioactive materials and their symbols. The ads were
quickly withdrawn after they incited fears that fissile material had gone
missing. But Pervez Hoodbhoy, a noted nuclear physicist at Quaid-i-Azam
University in Islamabad, says outside experts don't really know how much
highly enriched uranium Pakistan has produced in the past and how much
remains in existing stocks. "No one has a real idea about that," he says.
"That means that stuff could have gotten out. Little bits here or there. But
we really don't know."

In Washington, a senior administration official involved in counterterrorism
said U.S. intelligence is chronically fearful that Islamists might get hold
of nuclear material, equipment or know-how in Pakistan. He recalled that
after 9/11, a group of rogue Pakistani nuclear scientists met with Osama bin
Laden. "Given that history, we continue to look at this issue very closely,"
he said, speaking on condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of
the issue.

It's not surprising that Pakistani authorities might give the Taliban
special treatment. The country's intelligence officers and military men have
maintained close personal relations with senior Taliban leaders ever since
the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s. Western military and
diplomatic officials say they doubt that Pakistan is still actively
assisting Afghan insurgents-but they don't think it's trying very hard to
stop them, either. "I'm not delusional," says a Western military official in
Islamabad, not wishing to be quoted by name on such a sensitive topic.
"Their [the Pakistani government's] guys are in contact with the Talibs.
They may not be assisting them, but they aren't busting them, either." A
Western diplomat, speaking off the record because he is not authorized to
represent his government's views to the media, says, "I'm sure there are
intelligence officials, active and retired, who have dealt with the Taliban
in the past and still support their cause. That's the power of personal
relationships over time. You don't cut those off abruptly."

The Taliban war effort is also greatly aided by dozens of "retired" former
officials in Mullah Omar's defunct Taliban government who now reside in
Pakistan, some armed with Pakistani national identity cards. The Taliban
don't think they're putting anything past the ISI-"the black snake," as they
call the agency. Mullah Shabir Ahmad, a provincial commander, spends upwards
of six months of the year inside Pakistan. "The Pakistanis know what we eat
for lunch and dinner," he says. Mullah Momin Ahmed, visiting his family in
Quetta shortly before his death in September, agreed: "Pakistan knows
everything about us, but it seems to ignore us." Maj. Gen. Waheed Arshad,
the military's chief spokesman, says that Pakistani forces have arrested and
deported 1,500 Taliban to Afghanistan, "but many somehow return."

Until now, most Pakistanis seem to have remained impervious to the jihadist
threat, despite the evidence around them. Musharraf himself has seemed
preoccupied with other matters. "He has failed to understand the danger of
insurgency on both sides of the border, and how to bring the Pakistani
people along with him to counter that threat," says retired Pakistani Army
Lt. Gen. Talat Masood. "He has been too obsessed with perpetuating his
power." Instead, according to Masood and other observers, the president has
allowed Pakistanis to lull themselves into thinking that the battle against
the jihadists is Musharraf's and America's problem, not theirs. "The
greatest danger is that the whole Pakistani nation, including senior
politicians, seems to be saying that this is not our watch, this is not our
war," says Masood. "Even the Taliban presence in the cities seems to have an
acceptance."

Few Pakistanis have any desire to live under the militants' rule. The
trouble is, the country's moderate alternatives have become almost as
unpopular. Musharraf won a third term as president by a unanimous Electoral
Assembly vote on Oct. 6 (heavily boycotted by the opposition). In a recent
nationwide poll by the International Republican Institute, however, he
earned a dismal 21 percent approval rating. Bhutto fared little better,
scoring a pitiful 28 percent. Many Pakistanis were appalled by her
willingness to cut a deal with Musharraf so that he would allow her to
return from exile.

True, the survey was taken before last week's attack. In the wake of the
deadliest terrorist bombing in Pakistan's history, the public might rally
once again to her support. "She won't be deterred," her husband told
NEWSWEEK, describing Bhutto as "composed" in a phone call after the attack.
"She won't be taken hostage by a small minority of people." But that
minority of Islamists isn't so small any longer-and it's ready for a long
war.

URL: http://www.newsweek.com/id/57485
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