<http://intellibriefs.blogspot.com/2007/10/irregular-warfare-after-smart-wea
pons.html> Irregular warfare : After smart weapons, smart soldiers

Today, October 27, 2007, 6 hours ago | Naxal Watch
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Oct 25th 2007
>From The
<http://economist.com/world/international/displaystory.cfm?story_id=10015844
> Economist 
http://intellibriefs.blogspot.com/2007/10/irregular-warfare-after-smart-weap
ons.html
Irregular warfare may keep Western armies busy for decades. They will have
to adapt if they are to overcome the odds that history suggests they are up
against




REBELLION is as old as authority itself, and so therefore is the business of
putting it down. Nearly 2,000 years ago Jewish militants-known as Zealots,
hence the English word-took up arms against the world's greatest power and
terrorised those deemed collaborators. The Romans dealt with the revolt in
Palestine in familiar fashion, laying waste any town that resisted,
prompting many to commit suicide rather than suffer capture and, in 70AD,
destroying the great Temple in Jerusalem and taking its treasures. "While
the holy house was on fire," records Josephus, "everything was plundered
that came to hand, and ten thousand of those that were caught were
slain...children and old men, and profane persons and priests, were all
slain in the same manner."

Modern Western armies cannot, as the Romans did, make a wasteland and call
it peace. Modern wars are complex affairs conducted "among the people" and,
as Sir Richard Dannatt, head of the British army, put it recently, "in the
spotlight of the media and the shadow of international lawyers". In Iraq in
the 1920s, Britain's air force pioneered the use of "air policing" to put
down rebellious tribesmen on the cheap; today the use of air power often
carries big political costs. The greater the accuracy of modern weapons, the
louder the outcry when they nonetheless kill or wound civilians. And the
wider the reach of the internet, the bigger the impact of propaganda videos
showing insurgent attacks against Western forces, regardless of civilian
casualties. The British who fought the Mahdist religious rebels in Sudan in
the 19th century had no need to worry about provoking attacks in London;
today such a campaign would be seen as another front in the jihad against
the West.

Such bewildering conflict is regarded by some military thinkers as the
"fourth generation" of warfare, distinct from those of previous eras: the
first generation, of line and column, which culminated with the Napoleonic
wars; the second, of machinegun and artillery, which brought about the
slaughter of the first world war; and the third, of manoeuvre with tanks and
aircraft, which stretched from the second world war to the 2003 invasion of
Iraq. Fourth-generation warfare, according to Thomas Hammes, a retired
colonel in the American marines, involves loose networks, made more powerful
and resilient by information technology. It does not seek to defeat the
enemy's forces, but instead "directly attacks the minds of the enemy
decision-makers to destroy the enemy's political will".

Many others, though, regard today's conflicts as variations on age-old
irregular warfare, not least Mao Zedong's "protracted war" in China, the
Spanish guerrilla attacks against Napoleon's forces in Spain, or even
America's war of independence from Britain. Whatever the definition, "small
wars" can have big effects. In the past six decades the British have been
driven out of Palestine, the French from Algeria, the Americans (and French)
from Vietnam, the Russians from Afghanistan and the Israelis from Lebanon.

Can America and its Western allies avoid similar humiliation in Iraq and
Afghanistan? Martin van Creveld, an Israeli military historian, argues that
insurgencies have been almost impossible to defeat ever since Nazi Germany
failed to suppress Josip Broz Tito's partisans in Yugoslavia. Winning such
wars requires one of two tactics: extreme restraint and patience, as shown
by the British over nearly 38 years in Northern Ireland; or extreme
brutality, as shown by Syria in 1982 when the army destroyed much of Hama, a
stronghold of Islamist rebels, killing at least 10,000 people. Any other
method, says Mr van Creveld, risks being too harsh to win the support of the
population but not harsh enough to cow it into submission. 

This rule is too stark. Experts point to successes such as the end of the
insurgency in El Salvador, the collapse of the Shining Path rebels in Peru,
the end of the civil wars in Mozambique and Angola, the demise of the Red
Brigades in Italy and of the Red Army Faction in Germany. Much of this
debate revolves around the meaning of victory and defeat, as well as the
definition of counter-insurgency, civil war, counter-terrorism and so on.
One school of thought holds that America's forces had largely defeated the
Vietcong in Vietnam when its politicians lost the will to stop North
Vietnam's conventional army from overrunning the south. That is to miss the
point: in counter-insurgency one side can win every battle, yet lose the
war.
Lessons unlearnt

Such arguments are a hot topic at Western military colleges, especially in
America. More has been written on counter-insurgency in the past four years
than in the previous four decades. The study of small wars was largely
abandoned by the United States army in the 1970s as commanders promised "no
more Vietnams" and concentrated instead on how to defeat the massed Soviet
armies. America's humiliating retreats from Lebanon in 1983 and Somalia in
1994 convinced many Americans that, as Colin Powell, a former general (and
later secretary of state), once put it, America should not get involved in
"half-hearted warfare for half-baked reasons". The swift ejection of Iraq's
forces from Kuwait in 1991 reinforced such beliefs. Counter-insurgency
became a secondary task undertaken mainly by American special forces, which
sometimes offered training to friendly governments.


Given the difficulties in Iraq and Afghanistan, American officers are
relearning the history of their own interventions in Latin America and, more
important, the lessons of British imperial policing. Why, American experts
asked, did Britain succeed against communist revolutionaries in Malaya in
the 1950s, whereas America failed to defeat the communists in Vietnam in the
1960s and 1970s?

In his 2002 book "Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife" (a title drawn from
T.E. Lawrence's "Seven Pillars of Wisdom", describing the messiness of
waging "war upon rebellion"), John Nagl, an American lieutenant-colonel,
concluded that British soldiers were better than the Americans at learning
from their mistakes. General Sir Gerald Templer, the British high
commissioner in Malaya, argued that "the shooting side of the business" was
only a minor part of the campaign. Coining a phrase, he suggested that the
solution "lies not in pouring more troops into the jungle, but in the hearts
and minds of the people". In contrast, says Colonel Nagl, the Americans in
Vietnam remained wedded to "unrestrained and uncontrolled firepower",
despite some work with small units that were deployed in border villages and
civil-military reconstruction projects.

British officers are less impressed, saying their predecessors often
repeated their errors. During the troubles in Northern Ireland, the arrival
of British troops in 1969 was at first welcomed by Roman Catholics. But the
army's heavy-handed methods, such as large cordon-and-search operations and
the shooting of 13 civilians on Bloody Sunday in 1972, pushed many Catholics
into the arms of the Provisional Irish Republican Army.

In any event, the American army and marines have produced a new
counter-insurgency manual. One of its authors, General David Petraeus, is
now in charge of the "surge" in Iraq. It may be too late to turn Iraq round,
and Afghanistan could slide into greater violence. But the manual offers
some comfort: it says counter-insurgency operations "usually begin poorly",
and the way to success is for an army to become a good "learning
organisation". 

According to Mao's well-worn dictum, guerrillas must be like fish swimming
in the "water" of the general population. T.E. Lawrence, helping to stir up
the Arab revolt against Turkish rule during the first world war, described
regular armies as plants, "immobile, firm-rooted, nourished through long
stems to the head". Guerrillas, on the other hand, were like "a vapour". A
soldier, he said, was "helpless without a target, owning only what he sat
on, and subjugating only what, by order, he could poke his rifle at". 

Western armies have unsurpassed firepower, mobility and surveillance
technology. Guerrillas' main weapons are agility, surprise, the support of
at least some sections of the population and, above all, time. The warren of
Iraqi streets and the fortified compounds of Afghanistan compensate for the
insurgents' technological shortcomings. The manual, however, attempts to
change the army mindset: in fighting an enemy "among the people", it says,
the central objective is not to destroy the enemy but to secure the
allegiance of the citizenry. All strands of a campaign-military, economic
and political-have to be strongly entwined.

Much of this thinking is drawn from the British experience in Malaya, but
conditions today are vastly different. In Templer's day, securing "hearts
and minds" did not mean just acting with kindness to win the people over; it
also included coercion. Hundreds of thousands of ethnic Chinese, among whom
the insurgents mainly operated, were uprooted and moved into guarded camps
known as "new villages", where they were offered land. If the British could
not find the fish, they resorted to removing the water.

They also sought to starve insurgents by restricting supplies of food to the
population. In some areas rations of rice were handed out in cooked form so
they would spoil before they could reach fighters in the jungle. Such
measures are unthinkable today. Even the building of separation walls to
reduce sectarian killings in Baghdad arouses Iraqi opposition. Checkpoints
and curfews now have limited impact. 

Templer was both the civil and the military boss. He emphasised policing
rather than military operations, and the use of indigenous forces. The
majority Malay population largely supported the British. In a peninsula, the
borders were relatively well controlled and the rebels had few external
sources of support. Above all, the British had full sovereignty over Malaya.
They could undercut the insurgents' claim to be fighting colonialism by
guaranteeing equal rights, and by promising-and eventually
granting-independence.

By contrast, the borders of Iraq and Afghanistan are permeable. Some
neighbours are either hostile to the West (Iran) or unable to remove
insurgent havens (Pakistan). The powers of America's Coalition Provisional
Authority in Iraq lasted a year, long enough for America to make egregious
errors, such as disbanding the Iraqi army and removing former Baathists, but
not long enough to correct them. 
Discontinuity of command

 <http://economist.com/images/20071027/CFB190.gif> 

In Iraq the American effort is split between the military operations
overseen by the generals and the civil and political work conducted by the
embassy. In Afghanistan leadership is even more divided. There are two
separate Western military commands-the NATO-led International Security
Assistance Force, which provides the bulk of the troops, and the
American-led Operation Enduring Freedom, which concentrates on hunting
"high-value targets". Alongside these are a myriad of poorly co-ordinated
reconstruction agencies.

Coalitions add further complications. Britain, America's only ally of any
military significance in Iraq, is slowly leaving. And in Afghanistan, where
boots on the ground are in short supply, NATO is wobbly. Many allies refuse
to join a fight that has been waged mainly by American, British and Canadian
forces, and several are under domestic pressure to bring their troops home.
Overt colonialism has died, and with it have gone the large colonial armies.
Counter-insurgency requires large numbers of security forces. But the West's
all-volunteer forces have progressively cut expensive manpower in favour of
technology. They have become infinitely better at finding and destroying
things; but the best source of intelligence on the ground is often the
soldier on the street with his "Eyeball mark-1".

Nationalist and pan-Islamic sentiments are much stronger than in the past.
Information technology has helped jihadists spread the "single narrative"
that Muslims everywhere are under attack, a contention reinforced by
America's rhetoric about the "global war on terror". The internet provides a
new and unassailable sanctuary from which to propagandise, organise and
share tactics. 

Still, the generals plead for more time. They point to Iraq's Anbar
province, where Sunni tribes are turning against al-Qaeda. In Afghanistan,
says Britain's General Dannatt, "strategic patience" is essential. American
officers quote internal studies showing that it takes nine years on average
(and often much longer) to defeat insurgencies. Yet perseverance is no
guarantee of victory; many campaigns have taken as long, if not longer, to
lose.

A growing body of opinion, both in the Pentagon and outside, has concluded
that insurrections are best fought indirectly, through local allies. "It is
extremely difficult for Western powers to defeat insurgencies in foreign
countries in modern times," says Max Boot, author of "War Made New" (2006).
"At the same time, there are very few instances of insurgencies overthrowing
a local government. The problem is that Western armies lose the will to
maintain imperial domination." Western forces always have the option of
going home; for local governments, though, fighting insurgents is a matter
of survival.

A better model than Malaya, argues Mr Boot, is the end of the Marxist
insurrection in El Salvador in 1992. American forces did not lead the
fighting. Instead, a small contingent of under 100 advisers from America's
special forces helped the democratising government reorganise its army and
avoid the fate of nearby Nicaragua, which fell to the Sandinistas in 1979.
This approach has its own difficulties: America's reputation was tarnished
by right-wing Salvadorean death-squads. In the end it was external political
factors-the demise of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, partly caused by an
American-backed insurgency, and the collapse of the Soviet Union-that helped
bring about a settlement and the incorporation of the guerrillas into a
new-found democracy. 

David Kilcullen, an Australian colonel and General Petraeus's main adviser
on counter-insurgency, says fighting insurgencies in other people's
countries is hard. "Running Baghdad is not like trying to police New York
City; it's like the Iraqi police trying to run New York City." Tellingly, he
says, Indonesian forces successfully put down an insurrection by the
Islamist Darul Islam movement in the 1950s and early 1960s, but could not
quell the resistance to their annexation of East Timor. 

The dilemma for Western forces in Iraq and Afghanistan is that, though they
may lack the wherewithal to win, the national governments they seek to help
are unable to stand up on their own. At best, Western armies can create the
political space to build viable governments. But this has proved difficult
enough even where the fighting has stopped and the main political forces
have been co-operative (or at least acquiescent)-as in Bosnia and East
Timor. It may be impossible under sustained fire.

More brain, less brawn

Although most armies have now relearnt the limits of force and the
importance of the "comprehensive approach", commanders complain that other
branches of government have not. In a recent article, General Peter
Chiarelli, an adviser to Robert Gates, America's secretary of defence, says
more money has to be spent not on the Pentagon but on the "non-kinetic
aspects of our national power". He recommends building up the "minuscule"
State Department and USAID development agency (so small it is "little more
than a contracting agency"), and reviving the United States Information
Agency.

As the American army expands, some thinkers, such as Colonel Nagl, say it
needs not just more soldiers-nor even linguists, civil-affairs officers and
engineers-but a fully fledged 20,000-strong corps of advisers that will
train and "embed" themselves with allied forces around the world. The idea
makes army commanders blanch, but they do not question the underlying
assumption. Insurgencies may be the face of war for the West in the years
ahead. Even if America cannot imagine fighting another Iraq or Afghanistan,
extremists round the world have seen mighty America's vulnerability to the
rocket-propelled grenade, the AK-47 and the suicide-bomber.

  _____  


Armies of the future
Brains, not bullets

Oct 25th 2007
>From The Economist print edition
Western armies are good at destroying things. Can they be made better at
building them?

Eyevine


ANOTHER debate to do with Iraq and Afghanistan is building in America, one
that could have important consequences for the West. This debate is being
conducted in the Pentagon-and it has to do with the future shape of
America's armed forces. With its far-flung alliances and commitments, the
superpower rightly wants a "full spectrum" of military capabilities to deal
with everything from an all-out war to a small policing action. But
precisely what the mix should be is increasingly contentious-and could prove
expensive.

If the biggest threat comes from rising powers, such as a belligerent Russia
or a pushy China, America and its allies will need to invest in aircraft,
ships and advanced weapons to cope. If the greatest challenge is the fight
against militants and insurgents around the world-seen by some as a new and
different "fourth generation" of warfare (see article)-then they will need
more boots on the ground and, crucially, different sorts of soldiers wearing
them. Sadly for taxpayers everywhere, the emerging answer from America is
that a modern power needs to prepare for both challenges. But there has been
a clear swing towards manpower from technology.
The troops, they are a changin'

The change has been striking. The "transformation" advocated by Donald
Rumsfeld, George Bush's first defence secretary, envisaged that the armed
forces would be slimmed down and money invested in "smart" weapons,
reconnaissance systems and data links. Speed, stealth, accuracy and networks
would substitute for massed forces. The army's idea of its "future warrior"
was a kind of cyborg, helmet stuffed with electronic wizardry and a computer
display on his visor, all wirelessly linked to sensors, weapons and
comrades. New clothing would have in-built heating and cooling. Information
on the soldier's physical condition would be beamed to medics, and an
artificial "exoskeleton" (a sort of personal brace) would strengthen his
limbs. 



The initial success in toppling first the Taliban in Afghanistan and then
Saddam Hussein in Iraq seemed to vindicate such concepts. But the murderous
chaos in Iraq, and the growing violence in southern Afghanistan, have shown
that America is good at destroying targets, and bad at rebuilding states.
Firepower is of little use, and often counter-productive, when the enemy
deliberately mingles among civilians.

Robert Gates, Mr Rumsfeld's successor, is thus presiding over something of a
counter-revolution. Technological tricks are not being abandoned. But the
army is to get a bigger share of the defence budget and has been told to
recruit more soldiers with it. Precisely because America is so powerful
against conventional armies, Mr Gates expects its enemies to rely on
asymmetric warfare. In other words, America must expect to fight protracted,
enervating counter-insurgency wars that offer no clear-cut victories and
risk the prospect of humiliation.

A new manual on counter-insurgency co-authored by the man now in charge of
the war in Iraq, General David Petraeus, overturns the notion that America
doesn't "do nation-building". Counter-insurgency, it says, is "armed social
work". It requires more brain than brawn, more patience than aggression. The
model soldier should be less science-fiction Terminator and more
intellectual for "the graduate level of war", preferably a linguist, with a
sense of history and anthropology. 
The indirect approach

In general, the shift from technology to manpower is welcome. Some sceptics
will argue that America's first future priority should be to avoid smallish
wars of choice altogether. Even if that were sensible, history suggests it
is unlikely to happen: American troops have kept on getting involved in
foreign conflicts. The military planners' job is to cope with the likely,
not to restrict democratically elected politicians' options. 

>From that perspective, two doubts come to the fore. The first is whether the
Pentagon is right to focus so heavily on creating more combat brigades. With
American units serving 15 months in the field and a year at home at best,
the army understandably wants more front-line soldiers to ease the strain.
But large armies have often found it extremely hard to fight guerrillas in
far-away places-ask the French in Algeria, the Russians in Afghanistan and,
not least, the Americans themselves in Vietnam. With the possible exception
of the British in Malaya, it is hard to think of many insurgencies in modern
times that have been crushed by a Western occupying power.

Post-colonial politics, stronger concerns for human rights, the rapid
dispersal of news: all these (good) things make today's conflicts even
harder to win for occupiers. So it may well be better to step back and work
through local allies. Few insurgencies have unseated existing governments.
In the "war on terror" most of the important al-Qaeda suspects have been
rounded up for America by local allies. Strengthening local forces is the
best way of salvaging Iraq and Afghanistan, and may help avoid the need for
future interventions.

To be fair, the Pentagon talks about building "partner capacity", but it may
need more radical steps-in particular creating new specialist units to train
allies, embed Western soldiers in local forces to improve their performance
and be able to call in airstrikes, and help organise civil reconstruction.
Generals complain about splitting the army, but they already oversee a
myriad of specialist units. It is at least worth trying.

The other lingering concern with the shift in focus from destruction to
construction has to do with skimping on conventional weaponry. At the
margin, it is certainly worth putting more money into manpower at the
expense of some futuristic projects. The prospect of an all-out war with
Russia or China is distant for now; the risk of losing in Iraq and
Afghanistan is acute. But raiding other defence programmes can only go so
far. At 4% of GDP, America's defence spending is low by historical
standards: it was 9% during the Vietnam war and 14% during the Korean war.
The problem is worse in Europe: many of America's allies spend less than the
2% minimum target set by NATO. If the West wants to build a smarter army of
the future, it will have to pay for it.(F)AIR USE NOTICE: All original
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